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THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

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THE FOUNDATIONS
OF GERMANY

A DOCUMENTARY ACCOUNT

REVEALING THE CAUSES OF HER

STRENGTH, WEALTH, AND EFFICIENCY

By J. ELLIS BARKER

AUTHOR OF "MODERN GERMANY" ETC.

ENLARGED EDITION

LONDON

JOHN MURRAY, AL'BEMARLE STREET

1918

First Edition . . . *• ■ • J^^ne im
Second Edition May 1918

PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND EDITION

The second edition of ' The Foundations of Germany '
is, as the title-page states, a very greatly enlarged one. The
present volume would perhaps be described more correctly
as a new book. Three chapters contained in the first edition
which dealt with the causes of the World War, with the
relations between Germany and Turkey, and with the
German Colonial Empire, matters which have been treated
by many writers, have been omitted. On the other hand
nine new chapters, numbered VI to XIII and XIX, have
been added. There are more than two hundred pages of new
matter in the present edition.

Machiavelli, who at the same time was atf eminent
writer and an eminent statesman, pointed out in ' The
Prince ' that, according to historical experience, two able
rulers succeeding one another may create a new State and
firmly establish it. Modern Germany, which, after all, is
merely an enlarged Prussia, has been created by four men
possessed of rare statesmanUke genius, boundless ambition,
singular strength of will, and unlimited daring. It has been
created by Frederick William, the Great Elector, King
Frederick William I, King Frederick the Great, and Prince
Bismarck. Each of these four men directed the State
during an unusually long number of years. The Great

vi PEBPACE

Elector governed Brandenburg-Prussia during forty-eight
years, from 1640 to 1688. King Frederick William I and
King Frederick the Great ruled Prussia during seventy-three
consecutive years, from 1713 to 1786. Prince Bismarck
conducted Prusso-Germany's foreign and domestic policy
with almost regal authority from 1862 to "1890. During
no less than one hundred and forty-nine years the State of
the Eohenzollerns has been directed by men of the greatest
administrative and executive capacity, whose brilliant suc-
cbssea have astonished the world, by men who autocra-
tically wielded the entire power of the State, whose word
was law, whose only aim was success, greatness, and glory.
These four men have not only fashioned a new State, but
have at the same time firmly impressed their extraordinary
character upon the subjects. They have thus created both
a new State and a new nation, and they have supplied
State and nation, rulers and ruled, army and people with
great traditions, with great precedents to follow, with a new
rule of life.

The most eminent and the most in£uential among the
four makers of Prusso-Germany was not Prince Bismarck;
as is widely believed, but Frederick the Great. That
singularly successful monarch was in truth the creator of
modern Germany. His multitudinous activities inspired
the generations which succeeded him. Both Bismarck and
William 11 were his pupils. Determined upon increasing
the power of the State at any cost, he introduced that non-
mOral policy which Prusso-Germany has followed ever since.
Germalny's political and military philosophers, from Von
Bielfeld to Treitschke, and from Clausewitz to Bernhardi,
were not originators. The advocates of ' Machtpolitik '
merely built up a theoretical system upon Frederick's
practice, and furnished Prussia's traditional policy with a
pseudo-scientific cloak and justification.

Frederick was equally great as a general and as a
diplomat, as an organiser and as a law-giver, Germany's

PREFACE vii

administrative, educational, financial, industrial, agricul-
tural, and juridical policy is based upon 'Frederick's prac-
tice. A very full account of Frederick's policy and that
of his great predecessors will be found in the first two
chapters of this book. The fact that it is given as far as
possible in the words of Prussia's rulers, and especially in
those of Frederick the Great, should increase its value.

Incidentally this book reveals the failings of democracy,
the defects of democratic organisation and administration.
It is no doubt possible to combine the advantages of demo-
cratic with those of autocratic government, Uberty with
efficiency, order, and economy. Democracy need not, and
should not, be synonymous with disorganisation, instability,
amateurishness, drift, muddle, waste, improvidence, and
unpreparedness for war. The present war has revealed
the weakness of democracy. The views of the greatest
German rulers and statesmen collected in this volume may
indicate the cure. The experience of the present war may
cause Germany to become more democratic and may cause
the Ai^lo-Saxon democracies to become better prepared
and better organised. The views of Frederick the Great on
the defects of democracy and of cabinet government, which
are given at length on pages 28 to 34 and 38 to 42, should
be particularly interesting at the present moment.

The present volume on Germany bears the sub-title
'A Documentary Account revealing the Causes of her
Strength, Wealth, and Efficiency.' Frederick the Great
is one of the few statesmen who laid down his guiding
principles and views in a number of secret State papers,
political testaments, &c., for the use of his successors. Owing
to the indiscretion of his worthless nephew. King Frederick
William II, these were published shortly after his death.
They are practically unknown to the general public. The
most important of these invaluable documents will be
found in the original French in Chapters XIV to XVIII.
I would draw particular attention to them.

viii . PEEFACE

Prince Bismarck was Frederick's pupil. He endeavoured
to carry out the idea of the Fiirstenbund, Frederick's plan
of unif ying Germany under Prussia's leadership. The great
characteristic of his foreign policy was that in it daruag
was blended with wise caution. In Chapter VII the secret
story of the Ems telegram is fully told, and in Chapter VIII
it is shown by means of little-known documents how he
tricked Napoleon III in 1866, and how in that year he doubled
the number of the subjects of the Hohenzollerns by con-
cluding the most audacious, and the most profitable, peace
of all time. I have endeavoured to show that Germany fol-
lowed Bismarck's precedent of 1870 in goiag to war in 1914,
and that she is endeavouring now to conclude a peace doub-
ling her territory by following Bismarck's action in 1866.

Germany's war aims have been put forth in a petition
which was drawn up by the six greatest business associations
of the country. It was signed by the League of Agri-
culturists, the German Peasants League, the Westphalian
Peasants Society, the Central Association of German
Industrialists, the League of Industrialists, and the German
Middle-class Association. These powerful societies repre-
sent the bulk of the German business-men in town and
country. That most remarkable and important document;
which frankly advocates the confiscation of private property
in the conquered districts, the expulsion of the property-
owners, and the enslaving of the resident working popular
tion, is given in full in Chapter XIX.

Bismarck desired that the new Germany should follow
a cautious and conservative policy. He attached the
greatest value to maintaining Germany's friendship with
Eussia and England. He foresaw and foretold that the
rash and provocative policy of WiUiam II might bring
about a world coalition against Germany and the downfall
of the Empire. He tried in vain to oppose the EmpOTor's
' new course.' The contrast between Ms policy and that
of William II, rendered chiefly in Bismarck's own words,

PEEPACE ix

will be found in the lengthy Chapter III — ' The Policy of
Bismarck and of William II.'

The efficiency of the German people is due to their
education, while that of the German army is due to the
activity and excellence of the General Staff, which was
reorganised by Von Moltke. Germany's educational policy
is based upon that of Frederick the Great. It is described,
largely in Frederick's own words, in Chapter IV, while the
organisation of the General Staff and the cause of its
efficiency are explained in Chapter V.

Education in Germany, from the elementary schools to
the universities, is nominally free. In reality it is directed
by the Government, by the mihtary machine. The teachers
at , the schools and the universities, and the Protestant
and Eoman Catholic clergy as well, are well-drilled. State-
appointed, and State-paid State officials, whose true character
is disguised by their not being clothed in State uniforms.
Secular education and spiritual education have been made
subservient to the State, to militarism. How the Grerman
educational system has warped and distorted the national
mind is shown at length in Chapter VI — ' How Education
has Degraded the German People.'

Germa^ny's political propaganda in foreign countries
is described in Chapter IX in the words of one of her agents
at Washington. His revelations throw a good deal of hght
upon Germany's subterranean activities in the United States
previous to the Great War.

In his book ' Politics,' Treitschke significantly placed
Machiavelli, Luther, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck
side by side as the creators of the modern State, of modem
Germany. While Machiavelli was undoubtedly the father
of German statecraft, Luther had a far-reaching influence
in shaping the character of the German rulers and of their
subjects. Owing to his action, the German Eeformation,
which was originally a democratic movement, became an
instrument for increasing the absolute power of the German

X PBEFACE

princes and for enslaving the people. Besides, Luther's
coarseness and brutality affected German manners un-
favourably, The influence of MachiavelU on German state-
craft and of Luther on the German national character
has been documentarily depicted in Chapters X and XI.

Whether one-man government is a blessing or a curse
depends entirely upon the personal character of the monarch.
HohenzoUem absolutism, which created Pmsso-Germany's
greatness and prosperity, caused the downfall of the country
in 1806. At that time the Prussian people did not hold
responsible the weak and incapable King Frederick
William III. He was considered an innocent victim of
Napoleon I. But will the German people remain similarly
silent if the present war, which was caused by the reck-
lessness and ambition of William II, should end in defeat
and general ruin ? Chapter XII describes Prussia's down-
fall in 1806, its causes and its lessons, and Chapter XIII
deals with the consequences which Germany's defeat may
have upon the German monarchy and people. In the latter
chapter it is shown that the Germans were a democratic
nation in the past, that their democratic spirit is not dead,
that their democratic character has been suppressed, but
not entirely been destroyed, by the HohenzoUems, that
the Germans possess considerable aptitude for self-govern-
ment. A German defeat may discredit the HohenzoUem
autocracy and may make Germany once more a democracy,
and possibly a repubhc.

The bulk of this volume has appeared in The Nineteenfh
Century and After, The Fortrdghfly Beview, and The Con-
temporary Bevkw. The original articles have been con-
siderably expanded and have been interconnected. I
would cordially thank the editors of these three monthlies
for permitting me to reprint them.

J. ELLIS BARKEE.

Loimoir, Mvth 1918.

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGB

I, The FotJNDATioifs of Gbbmaky's Stbxnoth, Wealth,

AND EfFICIEKCT 1

II. The FouNDATioirs of Gebuahy's Diflomact . - . 69

III. The Polioz' of Bismabce and of William II . 108

IV. The Foukdations of Gesman Edttoaxion, and of <^

TEE National Ceabactbb' ..... 130

V. The Gebuan Asmy and tee General Staff . 168

VI. How Edvoation has Deqbaded the Gebman People 174

Vn. How Gebmant hakes Wab — The Seobet Hjstobt of

1870 201

VIII. How Gbkmany makes Peace — ^The Seobet Histobt

OF 1866 229

IX. How Gebmant makes Wab in Peace — Heb Pqlict ^

TOWABDS THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1888 . . 256

X. The Inplttenoe of Maohiavelli upon Gebman i'

Stateoeaft 279

XI. The Inflttencb of Litthbb upon Gebman National '

Chabacteb 301

XII. Pbussia's Downfall in 1806 — ^Its Causes, its Conse-
quences, its Lessons . . . • . . . 321

Xrn. Demoobatic Gebmant— a Glance into the Past ^

AND into the Futuee 350

zi

xH CONTENTS

OEAP. FAQB

THE MOST IMPORTANT PRUSSIAN PAPERS
XrV. IPbedebick the Geeat's Political Testament of

1776. (ExPOSfiDTjGoTTVEBNEMBNTPBUSSIEIf, &0.) . 373

XV. Intkoditotory Chapteb of Fbedbbioe the Gbbat's
PosTHTTMoirs Memoibs (Histoibe de mon Temfs),
wbitten fob the GinDANOE of his Suooessobs . 382

XVI. Fbedebick tee Gbbat's Meuoib on Govebnment and

ON THE DT7TIES OF SOTEBEIGNS [ESSAI SUB LES
FOBMES DE GOUYEBNEMENT, &0.) . . . 392

XVII. Ebedebice the Gbeat's Dibeotions FOB THE Edttca-

TIONOFPBn!rOBS(lNSTET7C!TION AT7 MaJOB BoBCEE) . 410

XVin. Fbbdebice the Gbbat's Instbttctions in case of his

Death in Battle, Defeat, ob Capiube . . 415

XIX\ The Wab Aims of the German Bttsinbss Men . 417
INDEX . . .427

THE

FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

CHAPTEE I

THE FOUNDATIONS OP GBBMANy'S STBENGTH, WEALTH

Bbfoee the outbreak of the present -war many very eminent;
but very ill-informed, people publicly expressed the beHef
that Germany would not dare to go to war because the
Powers ranged against her were too strong, because she was
too poor, because her finances were in disorder. Immediately
after its outbreak they proclaimed equally loudly that
Germany would rapidly be defeated, that the combination
of Franco-British wealth and of Eussian numbers, of the
greatest industrial and the greatest agricultural nation,
of the largest army and the strongest fleet, would inevitably
prove fatal to Germany, that before long the armies of the
Allies would sweep all over Germany and enter Berlin.
Since then many months have elapsed. The Allies have
not yet succeeded in seizing firmly upon German soil.
On the other hand, the Germans are still in possession of
nearly all Belgium, and of Serbia, and they hold besides
large and exceedingly valuable districts of North-eastern
France and of Western Eussia which contain some of the
most important manufacturing centres.

' From the Nineteenth Cemtwry and After, July 1915.

2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Belgium, Poland, and North-eastern Prance have
become German strongholds and German arsenals. Germany
controls territories filled with fortresses and with machinery
of every kind. Nor is this all. She has not only success-
fully defended her own country and invaded her neighbour
States ; she has in addition carefully organised the vast
territories occupied by her troops and has thoroughly
organised the defence of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Turkey as well. Lastly, she is providing Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey not only with an abundance of officers
and soldiers, but also with money, arms, ammunition, and
supplies of every kind. She is governing and administering
three great States. Without Germany's help Turkey and
Austria-Hungary would probably'have been lost. Germany's
great miUtary achievements, her vast industrial and financial
strength, the foresight and abihty of her military and
industrial leaders and of her administrators, and the unity
and the unflinching devotion of her people in field and
factory have amazed even the best informed.

At the moment the cry of national organisation is on
everybody's lips. We are told that the British nation,
that the whole British Empire, must be organised for -war,
that a perfectly organised nation such as Germany can be
overcome only if all the human and material resources
of the Empire are brought to bear upon the struggle.
Unfortunately, most Englishmen have only a vague idea
what national organisation means and involves. Since
statesmanship, the science of the vital interests of the
State, as Prince Metternich described it, is absolutely
ignored by the British and American universities, Germany's
national organisation and administration are practically
unknown to the English-speaking peoples. Industrious
investigators have described to us in detail the outside
of certain German institutions and organisations, but
they have failed to show us their mainsprings and spirit,
and to reveal to us the true sources of Germany's strength,

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 3

weajlth, and eiEciency. In the following pages I will en-
deavour to describe the causes of Germany's marvellous
miUtary and economic achievements, and will show that
the chief cause of Germany's strength is discipline. In
doing this I shall give a large number of most important
documents, nearly all of which have not previously been
published in the English language.

German efficiency and thoroughness have been plants
of slow growth. Germany's administrative policy was
not created by Bismarck, nor was her military policy
initiated by Moltke. If we wish to discover the sources
of Germany's power, we must acquaint ourselves with
the views and teachings of those great men who created
Germany's administrative, military, financial, and economic
policy, who created her traditions, who made modern
Germany. We must look into the past to understand
the present.

Three centuries ago Brandenburg-Prussia, which be-
came a kingdom only in 1701, occupied probably a far
lower position in Europe than that held by one of the Balkan
States at present. The country had neither a national
organisation nor an army. The people were poor, rude,
imcultured, ignorant, and were devoid of a sense of unity
and of patriotism. The Germans, as a race, are not par-
ticularly gifted. Man for man. Englishmen and French-
men are probably their superiors. However, a Govern-
ment can make or unmake the character of a nation. The
Germans have been made what they are by their masterful
rulers, especially by Frederick WilUam, the Great Elector,
by King Frederick William the First, and by Frederick
the Great. PUable materials are most easily moulded.
The success of the three greatest rulers of Prusso-Germany
is perhaps largely attributable to the fact that they set
to work on the most unpromising raw material, upon poor,
ignorant, and submissive boors.

Frederick William, the Great Elector, was born in 1620,

.4 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

and he came to the throne in 1640, at a time when the Thirty
Years' War of 1618-48 was still raging. As a youth he had
spent three years in Holland, which was then the wealthiest,
the most advanced, and the most warlike country in the
world. As Brandenburg-Prussia had been terribly de-
vastated by the warring troops, he wished before all to
create an army for its defence. However, he found it very
difficult to raise the necessary money. Self-government
prevailed in his scattered dominions. As the nobility
and the Estates jealously defended their privileges and
refused to vote the necessary funds, the Elector resolved
to break their power and to place taxation on a compulsory

He gradually destroyed popular representation, such as
it was, and made the Estates a mere tool. At last they
were called together exclusively for the purpose of voting
money. They were allowed to sit only for a fortnight,
and to discuss nothing except the proposals which the
Elector put before them. At the same time, they were
informed that any funds which they failed to vote would
be collected from them by force, by ' military execution.'
The written remonstrances and protests of his Parhament
were usually returned unanswered. At last the Estates of
Prussia declared in 1674 that they did not care to attend
the Diet any longer because their gathering led to nothing
except an increase in taxation. The Great Elector replied
that he also did not see the necessity of a Diet which did
nothing but complain and produce nothing but unnecessary
expense and delay. Frederick William, like Bismarck,
, preferred governing without a parliament.

Soon after his advent the Great Elector raised a force
of 3000 men. This was the first standing army of the
HohenzoUems, and it grew apace. In 1651, after eleven
years of government, the Great Elector had an army of
16,000, and in the war of 1665 he was at the head of 26,000
men supplied with seventy-two guns. His soldiers were

FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY'S STEENGTH 6

highly trained and disciplined. By enormous exertions he
had made Brandenburg-Prussia an important military Power.

The Great Elector ruthlessly and tyrannously suppressed
existing self-government in his possessions, and gave to
his scattered and parochially minded subjects a strong
sense of unity. Eelying upon his powerful army, he enforced
his will upon the nobihty, the Estates, and the citizens,
and made himself the absolute master of the country. He
ruled the State with savage energy and with great ability.
To enable the people to bear the cost of a large army, he
strove to increase their wealth by promoting agriculture,
commerce, and the manufacturing industries. He im-
ported from Holland skilled engineers who reclaimed
swamps, and able farmers a&d gardeners who improved
cultivation. Every peasant had to lay out a garden, and
none might marry unless he had planted at least six oak
trees, and had planted and grafted at least six fruit trees.
To improve industry and commerce, he constructed the
Frederick Wilham Canal, connecting the Oder with the
Spree and the Elbe, and numerous high roads, and intro-
duced a modern system of posts and mails.

As his country had been depopulated by the Thirty
Years' War, he wished to attract to it new inhabitants.
By an Edict of October 29, 1685, he promised to the Hugue-
nots who fled from France owing to the revocation of the
Edict of Nantes assistance for defraying their travelling
expenses, permission to settle where they liked, freedom
to bring in their goods and chattels free of all charges. The
needy were to receive empty houses which the Elector
would buy from their owners. They were to be given
building material of every kind for repairing these houses,
and to be freed from all imposts for six years. The well-
to-do who wished to build houses for themselves were
to be given land and building materials, and to be free from
all imposts for ten years. The rights of citizenship were
to be given gratis.

6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Manufacturers and artisans were to receive machines,
raw material, and monetary subsidies. Agriculturists were
to obtain ground suitable for cultivation. The refugees
were to be allowed to settle differences among themselves
by voluntary courts of their own, and in every town a
preacher was to be maintained for them at the Elector's
cost. French noblemen were to enjoy equality with Prussian
noblemen, &c.

As the French refugees might be deterred by the rigorous
chmate and the poverty of Brandenburg and migrate to
Switzerland, England, and Holland instead, the Elector
wisely tried to induce them to come to his country and
remain there by granting them far more valuable faci-
lities and privileges than they were offered elsewhere.
The result of his policy was that many French refugees
who had gone to Switzerland and Holland went later on
to Brandenburg. According to Ancillon's ' Histoire de
I'estabhssement des Francois Eefugies,' there were, in 1697,
12,297 French refugees in Brandenburg, not counting
the military.

Numerous French people settled in Berlin, brought to
that town their industries, and raised the intelligence of
the population by their culture, energy, and vivacity.
The French immigrants and their descendants became
most valuable citizens. They founded industries, entered
the professions, and many of the most eminent Germans
are direct descendants of the French refugees. Some
maintained their French names, Hke De la Motte Fouque,
Michelet, Lestocq, Ancillon, De la Courbiere. Others
Germanised them. Among the descendants of the French
refugees were the brothers Humboldt. At the end of the
Great Elector's reign no less than one-fourth of the inhabitants
of Prussia were foreign immigrants and descendants of
foreign immigrants.

By the policy outhned the Great Elector greatly in-
creased the population, the wealth, and the military power

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 7

of his country. By a skilful and daring diplomacy, and
by the energetic use of his excellent army, which he had
been able to create only by destroying the power of the
Estates and by greatly increasing" the wealth of the people,
he vastly enlarged his territories and gave to the State
a great prestige throughout Europe. Among his victories,
that over the dreaded Swedes at FehrbelUn was the most
glorious. During the forty-eight years of his wise, energetic,
but ruthless, reign, the territory of Brandenburg-Prussia
was increased by nearljf 50 per cent. Its population rose
from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000, notwithstanding wars, famine,
and pestilence. The success of the civil administration
of a cotmtry can be gauged largely by the revenue returns.
During the rule of the Great Elector the State revenue of
Brandenburg-Prussia increased, incredible as it may seem,
nearly five-fold, from 500,000 to 2,500,000 thalers. He had
found a poor, devastated country without order and without
an army. He left a greatly enlarged State, a comparatively
wealthy and much larger population, and a large and
excellent army to his successor.

In 1688 the Great Elector .died. His place was taken
by Frederick the Third, who in 1701 assumed the royal
crown and the title of King Frederick the First. Frederick
was a vain and worthless monarch. Under his rule the
coimtry declined and decayed. Maladministration became
general. However, he maintained and even increased
the Prussian army. That was his only merit.

Under the inept rule of this Frederick, who tried to ape
Louis the Fourteenth, and who wasted the national re-
sources in vain ostentation, luxury, and debauchery, the
Ufework of the Great Elector was largely destroyed. The
unification, concentration, and organisation of the Prussian
administration and of the whole national life which that
great ruler had effected and the efficiency which he had
created were temporarily lost. Favourites and mistresses
ruled and robbed the country, and the worthless King went

8 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

so far in the neglect of his duties that he handed to
his Minister-favourites signed blanks to be filled with
orders and instructions at their pleasure, thus saving
himself the trouble of reading documents requiring his
signature.

His son, Frederick William the First, was one of the
most remarkable and one of the greatest rulers the world
has seen. He is unknown to the English-speaking peoples,
for Carlyle and Macaulay have made a caricature of him.
His eminence as a ruler may be seen from the fact that
Frederick the Great, in writing an account of his life, closed
it with the words : ' As all the strength of the spreading
oak has sprung from a little acorn, so the greatness of
Prussia has sprung from the industrious hfe and the wise
measures of Frederick William the First.' Frederick
William was neither briUiant, nor had he wiiming ways.
He was the organiser, the disciplinarian, the schoolmaster,
the true maker of modern Germany. History which has
named his son ' the Great ' should call Frederick William
the First ' the Thorough.'

The Great Elector had, as we have seen, destroyed the
power of self-government and of obstruction in Prussia,
and had thus cleared the way for his successors. Frederick
WiUiam the First made use of the opportunity which his
grandfather had thus provided, and founded in Prussia
a perfectly organised modern State, a model adminis-
tration, and created a perfectly equipped and ever ready
army.

Frederick William was in every respect totally different
from his father. He was uneducated, boorish, coarse,
gluttonous, harsh, brutal, suspicious, domineering, grasping,
impetuous, and filled with energy and determination.
While he lacked nearly all the finer qualities. Nature had
given him cunning, unlimited common sense, a passionate
love of industry and orderliness, and a strong sense of
acquisitiveness, quahties which are often found in ilUterate

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S , STEENGTH 9

peasants who succeed in accumulating great wealtli in a
life of unceasing labour, strife, and penurious thrift.

Frederick William the First had watched hfe at the
Prussian Court in his father's time with horror and disgust.
He came to the government in 1713. Although he was only
twenty-five years old and quite unacquainted with affairs
of State, he immediately set to work in his rough and
impulsive way to clear the Augean stable of Prussiaj being
determined to save it from bankruptcy and to introduce
in it a regime of frugality, thrift, morality, and efficiency.
His first action consisted in dismissing the great majority
of the courtiers, reducing the royal expenditure to one-fifth,
and applying the amount saved to increasing the army.
He sold the bulk of the useless jewellery, plate, valuable
furniture, horses, carriages, and wine which his spendthrift
father had accumulated, and forced those who had robbed
the State in his father's hfetime to disgorge. He sold or
let all unnecessary royal edifices, and converted vast royal
parks and pleasure gardens into ploughed fields and drill
grounds. While, according to Beheim-Sohwarzbach, the
coronation of King Frederick the First had cost 6,000,000
thalers, his own cost only 2547 thalers and 9 pfennigs.

King Frederick WiUiam had seen the advantage of
conscientious one-man rule in the case of the Great Elector.
He resolved to administer Prussia autocratically, treating
the whole country Mke a huge private estate, and to improve
it in every direction to the utmost of his abihty. He wrote
on one of the first days of his government, according to
Droysen, that he would be his own field-marshal and his
own nainister of finance. He might have added that he would
be his own minister of war, agriculture, commerce, education,
justice, rehgion, and home affairs as well. He ordered
the affairs of the Chuych, and prescribed the nature of
the services and of the sermons. In every sermon the
duties of the subject, and especially the duty of paying
the taxes punctually, had to be mentioned. Other creeds

10 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

were not to be attacked by the clergy.. Sermons were to
be short. If a sermon lasted longer thap an hour the
clergyman was to be fined two thalers. Frederick William
despised those citizens who lived without productive work,
especially lawyers, artists, scientists, actors, dancing-masters,
and money-lenders, and he prosecuted usurers with the
greatest energy. Usurers advancing moijey to minors
could, by his edict of 1730, be punished with the confiscation
of their entire capital, with a whipping, and even with
death. He thought newspapers superfluous and wholly
mischievous. He prosecuted them, and in 1713 and 1714
he prohibited their appearance in Berlin altogether.

Frederick William the First desired to strengthen
Prussia and to increase its territories. Clearly recognising that
wealth is power, and that only a disciplined, well-governed,
and prosperous nation can provide a powerful army, he
concentrated his boundless energy upon improving the
national administration, increasing the wealth of the people,
and strengthening the army. When Frederick WiUiam
came to the throne the army was in a bad state and was
30,000 men strong. He rapidly increased it. In 1725
it came to 64,263 and in 1740, the year of his death, to
89,099 men. At that time Prussia had only 2,240,000
inhabitants. How enormous Prussia's army was may be
seen by the fact that at the same proportion of armed men
to the civil population, England would now have in peace
time a standing army of nearly 2,000,000 men, and Germany
one of nearly 3,000,000 men. By sleepless vigilance he
made his army the most perfectly drilled and equipped
and the most ready force in the world. Frederick the
Great himself acknowledged in his writings that he owed his
wonderful victories to the excellence of the army which his
father had created by twenty-seven years of unceasing labour.

Frederick William worked unremittingly for the country
from dawn till deep into the night. Field-Marshal Count
von Seckendorf, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, a

FOUNDATIONS, OF GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 11

most reliable observer, admiringly wrote on April 25, 1723,
according to Ameth's ' Life of Prince Eugene ' :

It is certain that nowhere in the world one can see troops
comparable with the Prussians for beauty, cleanliness, and
order. Although in drill, training, and marching much is
forced and affected, nearly everything is useful and efficient.
Besides, it must be admitted that the army and the troops
lack nothing that is needed. The soldiers number 70,000,
and every regiment has at least a hundred more men than
the normal figure. The Arsenal is superabundantly provided
with field artillery and siege artillery, and only the teams
are missing. Moreover, there is such an enormous store of
powder, shot, and shells as if a great war was threatening.
In Berhn and all about Brandenburg one sees as many
troops moving as one saw in Vienna during the last war
against the Turks. All this activity is directed by the
King in person, and only by him. Besides, he looks after
the whole public administration in all its branches with
such care and thoroughness that not a thaler is spent unless
he has given his signature. Those who do not see it cannot
believe that there is any man in the world, however intelUgent
and able he may be, who can settle so many things personally
in a single day as Frederick William the First, who works
from 3 o'clock in the morning till 10, and spends the rest of
the day in looking after and drilUng his army. . . .

Frederick WilHam the First created not only the German
army, but also the German administration and the Civil
Service. He made the German bureaucracy the ablest,
the most hard-working, the most thorough and the most
conscientious body of Government servants in the world.
He created its traditions, and gave it that ability, zeal,
and integrity which it has shown ever since.

Having punished severely those officials who had taken
advantage of his father's neglect of pubUc affairs, having
dismissed the incompetent, and having reduced the salaries
of the over-paid, he endeavoured to force thoroughness
and good order upon the bureaucracy by his personal

12 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

example and supervision, and by the severe punishment
of all who failed in their duty. However, the existing
organisation could not be made to work smoothly and
with despatch. When the King found that the departments
could not be made to work in harmony, and when all the
attempts of his ministers at reforming the service had
failed, he retired to one of his country houses and drafted
there in seclusion in his almost illegible hand and in very
ungrammatical German the most comprehensive regulations
for the reform of the Prussian administration. They may
be found in Foerster's ' Life of Frederick WilMam the
First,' in which they fill more than a hundred pages. All
the departments were to be harmonised by being united
, in a single body. The King gave the most minute orders
regulating the proceedings of the ' General Directorate,'
the supreme administrative authority of Prussia, and of
the individual departments. The nature, thoroughness, and
minuteness of his instructions will be seen from the following
characteristic and amusing extract from the instructions
to the General Direetorate :

In summer the Ministers shall meet at 7 o'clock in the
morning, and in winter at 8 o'clock.

The meeting shall not break up until all the matters
which are to be discussed and decided upon have been
disposed of. Not a single document must be left over for
another day.

If the business in hand can be finished in an hour, the
Ministers are free to go. If it cannot be settled in the fore-
noon, they must continue sitting without interruption until
6 o'clock in the evening or imtil all the business is completed.

We herewith order Our Minister von Printz that, if the
Ministers are working later than 2 o'clock in the afternoon,
he shall have fetched for them four good dishes of food from
the royal kitchens, together with an adequate quantity
of wine and beer. Half of the Ministers shall dine while
the other half shall contiaue working, and those who are
working shall dine as a second shift when those who were

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 13

dining have finished and are again at their work. In that
way the work will be diligently and faithfully done. , . ".

If one of the Ministers or one of their Councillors should
arrive an hour later than we have ordered, and if he has not
Our written permission for being late, one hundred ducats
shaU be deducted from his salary. If one of the Ministers or
Councillors should miss an entire sitting without being
prevented by illness or without having Our permission, he
shall be fined by the deduction of six months' pay. If
anyone should miss a second sitting without Our permission
or without being ill he shall be dismissed from his office with
disgrace, for as we pay our Ministers and Councillors they
must work.

With regard to the dinner of the Cabinet and the Coun-
cillors, Minister von Printz received further instructions :

The head cook must at every sitting inquire at eleven
o'clock through a servant whether he should provide dinner
or not. Now we order herewith that in case dinner should
be required by the Ministers and high officials there shall
always be four good dishes, namely a good soup, a good piece
of boiled beef with vegetables, a good dish of fish, and a good
piece of roast beef, mutton, or veal.

In addition there should be a quart bottle of good Ehine
wine for every person. However, the bill of fare should not
always be the same. There should always be a change of
dishes. The food should always be the same as that which
is put before their Majesties themselves. It shall be served
only by a single servant, for otherwise the room will be
crowded with servants. To reduce the number of servants,
every one of the Ministers shall receive together four plates
and a glass, and a large basket shall be provided into which
the soiled plates can be put.

Frederick William had the highest conception of duty.

He lived not for himself or for his family, but for his country.

He worked most conscientiously and like a strenuous

business man. Thoughts of his duties constantly disturbed

' his sleep. Not unnaturally he demanded that all his officials

14 THE FOUNDATIONS OF 6EEMANY

should be as hard-working and as thorough as he was himself.
He treated his ministers as unceremoniously as he did his
non-commissioned officers if they neglected their duty.
In speaking of the Prussian Administration he habitually
called it ' my machine.' It became indeed a machine
absolutely controlled by the King. It acted with precision
and speed, like clockwork. His officials had to work un-
ceasingly and rapidly, but they were not allowed to become
mere mechanical tools, for intelligence was as much demanded
of them as was industry. Isaacsohn in his excellent three-
volume work, ' Geschichte des preussischen Beamtenthums,'
described the reforms introduced by Frederick William the
First as follows :

The Prussian Civil Service was organised and developed
on military hnes. In the Prussian Civil Service, as in the
army, skill, obedience, punctuality, cleanliness, and deter-
mination became the first and most indispensable qualifica-
tions. Official positions were given only to those who pos-
sessed a thorough practical knowledge of their office, and
whose E|,ppointment was an obvious advantage to their
superiors and to the State. The military spirit which per-
meated Prussia since the time of Frederick ■\5^iUiam the Krst
filled the whole body of officialdom to the highest degree,
and caused Prussia to be called a military State. Already
as Crown Prince, Frederick WiUiam wore chiefly a military
uniform, and after 1725 he appeared exclusively in military
dress. . . .

The great characteristic of the new Prussian bureaucracy
was the absolute responsibility of every official. None
could hide behind another's back or behind a piece of paper,
or plead that he had misunderstood his orders, that others
were responsible. If a mistake, had been made the culprit
could invariably be found and punished. Isaacsohn tells
us :

Never before had the officials so urgently and so unceas-
ingly had impressed upon them the fact that they were

FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY'S STEENGTH 16

personally responsible, and never before had personal
responsibility so sternly been enforced. . . . The principle
of personal responsibility was the great characteristic
feature of the instructions given by the King to his Ministers.
Every document put by the higher officials before the General
Directorate had to be signed by one of the Councillors who,
by giving his signature, assumed responsibility for its con-
tents, and every document put before the King bore in addi-
tion the signatures of the five departmental Mnisters. . . .

No Councillor was to be employed in the province to
which he belonged, in order to abolish favouritism and
personal considerations of every Mnd. Officials were to act
with absolute impartiality. . . . That was particularly
necessary because the nobility and the prosperous citizens,
from whose ranks the higher officials were recruited, were
not in sympathy with the administrative and financial
reforms introduced by the King. . . .

The absolute subordination of the Civil Service from the
highest to the lowest, their unquesticMiing obedience to the
King, together with their absolute responsibility not only for
their own actions, but also for those of their colleagues and
their inferiors, created among them an extremely strong
sense of professional honour, solidarity, and of professional
pride. The influence of the nobihty and of Society dimin-
ished unceasingly. The service of the King required un-
divided attention. The King's uniform, which every Civil
Servant had to wear when on duty, kept the feeling alive
among them that they were the King's servants and had to
represent the King's interests. The power of the officials
and their independence, in case they were opposed by strong
social influences, was increased by the fact that the officials
were strangers in the districts in which they were employed,
for Frederick William continued the policy of appointing
only strangers to the district to official positions, a poliby
which the Great Elector had introdiiced in order to overcome
the opposition of the Estates in his policy of centralisation
and of unlimited personal Government. . . .

Every official document had to be signed, and every
signature involved the responsibility of the man who gave

16 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

it. The members of the Ministry were jointly responsible
for one another. Every mistake, every error, every delay
■was visited on the 'guilty. The greatest exertions were
demanded from all officials. Eemonstrances and protests
were useless. The King enforced discipline absolutely,
and his servants had either to obey or to go under. The
discipline enforced had the most marvellous results. He
taught the officials to work with exactitude, rapidity,
conscientiousness, and care, and thus Prussian officialdom
became a model throughout Germany.

Ministers of State, hke generals and colonels, obeyed
unquestioningly and carried out their orders with mihtary
precision and punctuality. Only if the King had clearly
acted in error they ventured upon a respectful protest.
Every Minister, even if he were personally easy-going and
soft-hearted, was compelled in his own interest to maintain
in his department the same rigid spirit of order, punctuality,
and rapidity which the King enforced upon his Ministers,
and from the Minister's room the spirit of order and efficiency
spread through the departments and through all rariks down
to the humblest officials!

Frederick William hated flattery, and demanded from
all his officials brevity and the naked truth. An official
who had deceived him was lost. In his instructions to
the General Directorate he stated emphatically in specially
large print :

We do not vdsh in any way to he treated vrith flattery. We
wish always to hear the clear truth. Nothing must he hidden
from Us, and no falsehood must he fut hefore Us, for We are
the Lord and King and can do what We like.

In order to ensure the integrity and efficiency of the
Prussian Administration and of the whole body of officials,
Frederick WiUiam created a special authority, the ' Piskalat,'
which, by means of agents, was to supervise ' and watch
all the officials and to bring every irregularity directly
before the King, In his instructions to the clidef of the

FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S STEENGTH 17

Fiskalat, von Kattsch, the King wrote with his own hand :
' Von Kattsch shall not spare anyone, whoever it may be,
even if it be my own brother. He must, of course, carefully
look out for thieves of every kind. He must watch all
and spare none, and he may be assured that I shall support
him with energy against all as long as I live.' The monthly
and quarterly reports of the Fiskalat enabled the King
to deal rapidly with every abuse, trace it to its very source,
and punish the guilty.

A government which governs can easily form the
character and the habits of the people. The German
people are often praised for their thoroughness, industry,
frugahty, and thrift. These qualities are not natural
to them. They received them from their rulers, and
especially from Frederick William the First. He was an
example to his people, and his son carried on the paternal
tradition. Both Kings acted not only with thoroughness,
industry, frugality, and economy, but they , enforced these
qualities upon their subjects. Both punished idlers of
every rank of society, even of the most exalted. The
regime of Thorough prevailed under these Kings, who
together ruled during seventy -three years. These seventy-
three years of hard training gave to the Prussian people
those sterling qualities which are particularly their own,
and by which they can easily be distinguished from the
easy-going South Germans and Austrians who have not
similarly been disciplined,

Frederick William the First was a stern disciplinarian,
not only to his people, but even to his family. When his
son and heir tried to flee the country in order to escape
the bodily violence which he had to suffer frpm his father,
Frederick William wished to have him shot by a court-
martial as a deserter, although he loved his children, for
duty, as he conceived it, was with him a stronger sentiment
than affection. The harshness of Prussian education and
the absolute discipline enforced in the Prussian families

18 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

and the Prussian schools are due to the example of the
man who not only created the Prussian State but moulded
the character of the German people upon his own.

Following the example of the Great Elector, King
Frederick William strove to increase the wealth of the
people, by improving communications and agriculture,
by encouraging commerce and industry, and by settling
numerous foreigners on the waste lands in his dominions.
He drained swamps, constructed canals and roads, and on
June 3, 1713, three months after he had come to the throne,
he demanded that all the supphes for the army should be
bought in Prussia, Only then it was discovered how low
the Prussian industries had sunk. To raise them, Frederick
William protected the manufacturing industries, especially
the woollen industry, and forbade in his instructions to
the General Directorate the investment of Prussian capital
abroad.

How lavishly the thrifty King spent money for the
improvement of the country may be seen by the fact that,
although the whole income of the State amounted only to
7,400,000 thalers per year, he spent in the course of six years
6,000,000 thalers for improving the Province of Lithauen
alone. He created there a number of towns, 332 villages,
twenty-four water-mills, eleven chmrches, hundreds of
schools, &c.

The Germans are perhaps the best educated people,
and they have Frederick William to thank for it, for he
was the first monarch who introduced compulsory education.
It aimed at making the people useful and patriotic citizens.
On September 28, 1717, Frederick William pubhshed an
edict, which stated :

We regret that we have noticed that parents, particularly
in the country, omit to send their children to the schools,
and allow them to ^ow up in ignorance not only of reading,
writing, and reckoning, but also in the knowledge of those
things which are necessary for their soul and their salvation.

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 19

In order to abolish this most pernicious evil we have
resolved to publish this edict and to order most earnestly
that in those places where there are schools parents shall be
compelled by severe punishment to send their children to
school daily in winter and at least once or twice a week in
summer, when they are not wanted at home, so that they
shall not forget entirely in the summer what they have
learned in winter. The children shall pay 2 dreiers per week
to the schools, and if the parents cannot afford it, the school
money shall be paid by the Local Authorities.

While Frederick William promoted elementary educa-
tion, recognising its practical utiUty, his peasant-hke
ignorance prevented him understanding the use of the
sciences and arts. He despised higher education, learning,
and the arts of civilisation, to the despair and dismay of hia
son and heir, who loved them. He made learned professors
court fools, and made his court fools university professors.
Hence, Prussia remained a land of boors and soldiers, and
Frederick the Great believed to his death that Germany
was an unsuitable soil for the sciences and arts, that German
was and always would remain a ba,rbarous tongue, that
the arts and sciences could not flourish in Prussia, and he
surrounded himself with Frenchmen.

King Frederick WilUam was a great organiser and
administrator. He created the framework of the Prussian
State and its traditions, and impressed his own character
upon the nation. However, he did not possess the gifts
of a great commander, and still less those of a diplomat.
His boorish roughness, his impetnousness, and his choleric
temperament prevented him securing any success in the
field of diplomacy. Therefore, he obtained only an in-
significant accession of territory. However, owing to
his excellent administration and his thrift, he built for
the future. He enormously increased the strength and the
efficiency of the country. He trebled the national revenues.
He greatly increased the wealth and the number of the

20 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

people. He vastly improved the land. He nearly trebled
the army, made it the most efficient force in the world,
and accumulated a vast store of war material and a large
War Fund, with the help of which his son acquired Silesia
and successfully resisted nearly all Europe dmring the
Seven Years* War.

The Great Elector prepared the ground. King Frederick
William the First firmly laid the foundations, and Frederick
the Great erected thereon the edifice of modem Germany.

The strength of Germany lies in her form of government,
as shaped by her rulers. She owes her power to her great
sovereigns. The Great Elector and Frederick William
the First were not men of many words. They were men
of action. They practised an enlightened absolutism, but
did not preach it. While sovereigns like Louis the Four-
teenth of France and Frederick the First of Prussia used
their absolute power chiefly for gratifying their vanity,
their greed, and their lust, men like the Great Elector and
Frederick William the First saw in their power a trust.
They worked with all their might for the greatness and
glory of their country and for posterity, and they crushed
all opposition, and made themselves absolute masters of
the State in order to increase the efficiency of their action.

Frederick the Great's character widely differed from
that of his father. He was a man both of action and of
words. He possessed eloquence, imagination, and a fluent
pen — he would have made an excellent jomnahst — and he
both practised and preached an enhghtened absolutism.
He gave eloquent expression to the faith within him, and
he tried to make the people understand the policy of their
rulers and to make them partners in their Sovereign's glory.

Frederick the Great was the meet gifted and the most
successful Prussian monarch. He was a great strategist,
a great tactician, a great diplomat, a great economist and
financier, a great organiser, and a great administrator.

As he had been most successful in all his undertakings,

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 21

it is only natural that his views and teachings have always
enjoyed the greatest prestige in the highest Prusso-German
circles, and that they have deeply influenced the action
of his successors and of their statesmen. Among the
numerous writings which he left, his confidential memoirs
written for the guidance of future generations and his
' Pohtical and Military Testaments ' are of course most
authoritative. Among the many pupils of Frederick the
Great was Bismarck. It is no exaggeration to say that the
writings which Frederick the Great addressed to posterity
are the arcana imperii of modern Germany. Those who
desire to learn the secret of Germany's strength, wealth,
and efficiency, should therefore most carefully study the
teachings of Frederick the Great.

Frederick's 'PoKtical Testament' of 1752, addressed
to his successors, begins with the significant words :

The first duty of a citizen consists in serving his country.
I have tried to fulfil that duty in all the different phases
of my life.

The idea that the King is merely the first citizen, and
that his duty consists in serving his country with aU his
strength and all his ability runs through the writings of
Frederick the Great. In his later memoirs he elaborated that
idea. For instance, in his ' Bssai sur les Formes de Gouvern-
ment,' written in 1777, twenty-five years after his first
' Political Testament,' he stated :

The citizens have accorded pre-eminence to one of their
number only because of the services which he can render
them. These services consist in maintaining the laws, in
meting out justice, in opposing with all his strength the
deterioration of morals, in defending the State against its
enemies.

The ruler should carefully watch the cultivation of the
soil. He should provide an abundance of food for the people,
encourage industry, and further commerce. He ought tp

22 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

be like a sentinel who watches unceasingly the neighbours of
the State and the activities of its enemies.

It is necessary that the sovereign should act with fore-
sight and prudence and conclude alliances in good time,
and he ought to choose his Allies among those who are most
likely to promote the interests of his country.

Each of the functions named requires a wealth of know-
ledge from the sovereign. He must study profoundly the
physical cdnditions of his country, and should thoroughly
know the spirit and character of the people, for an ignorant
sovereign is as guilty as an ill-disposed one. Ignorance in
the ruler is due to his laziness, while mahce springs from an
evil mind. However, the sufferings caused by his mistakes
are as great in the one case as in the other.

Princes, sovereigns, and kings' have not been given
supreme authority in order to live in luxurious self-indul-
gence and debauchery. They have not been elevated by
their fellow-men to enable them to strut about and to insult
with their pride the simple-mannered, the poor, and the
suffering. They have not been placed at the head of the
State to keep around themselves a crowd of idle loafers whose
uselessness drives them towards vice. The bad administra-
tion which may be found in monarchies springs from many
different causes, but their principal cause lies in the character
of the sovereign. A ruler addicted to women wiU become
a tool of his mistresses and favourites, and these wiU abuse
their power and commit wrongs of every kind, wiU protect
vice, sell offices, and perpetrate every infamy. . . .

The sovereign is the representative of his State. He and
his people form a single body. Euler and ruled can be happy
only if they are firmly united. The sovereign stands to his
people in the same relation in which the head stands to the
body. He must use his eyes and his brain for the whole
community, and act on its behalf to the common advantage.
If we wish to elevate monarchical above republican govern-
ment, the duty of sovereigns is clear. They must be active,
hard-working, upright and honest, and concentrate all their
strength upon filling their office worthily. That is my idea
of the duties of sovereigns.

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 23

A sovereign must possess an exact and detailed knowledge
of the strong and of the weak points of his country. He
must be thoroughly acquainted with its resources, the
character of the people, and the national commerce. ....

Eulers should always remind themselves that they are
men like the least of their subjects. The sovereign is the
foremost judge, general, financier, and minister of his
country, not merely for the sake of his prestige. Therefore,
he should perform with care the duties connected with these
offices. He is merely the principal servant of the State.
Hence, he must act with honesty, wisdom, and complete
disinterestedness in such a way that he can render an account
of his stewardship to the citizens at any moment. Conse-
quently, he is guilty if he wastes the money of the people,
the taxes which they have paid, in luxury, pomp, and de-
bauchery. He who should improve the morals of the
people, be the guardian of the law, and improve their educa-
tion should not pervert them by his bad example.

Frederick took his regal duties very seriously. Like
his father he worked indefatigably and unceasingly for
his country. He rose in summer at three o'clock, and in
winter at four o'clock, and a quarter of an hour later he
was at his desk. Like his father he worked much and
slept little, and set an example of industry and thoroughness
to his subjects.

His capacity for work was prodigious. Like Frederick
Wilham the First he supervised the army and the Civil
Service in all its branches. In addition, he conducted
personally the enormous business of his very active diplomacy,
and as chief of the staff he planned his campaigns.

He was ready to practise that absolute devotion to
the State which he preached in his writings. That may
be seen by his unceasing activity. It may also be seen
by the fact that he was prepared to lay down his life for
his country not only in the heat of battle but in cold deliber-
ation. He repeatedly gave instruction that, if made a
prisoner, he should be sacrificed for Prussia. On January 10,

24 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

1757, for instance, during the second year of the Seven
Years' War, when Prussia's position was critical, he sent
the following instructions to his Minister and confidential
friend and adviser, Count Fink von Finkenstein :

In the critical position of Prussia's affairs, I must -give
you my orders. These wiU empower you to take all the
necessary measures in case of a great misfortune.

(1) If, which Heaven forbid, one of my armies should be
completely defeated in Saxony, or if the French should drive
the Hanoverians out of the country, occupy Hanover, and
threaten to invade Brandenburg itself, or if the Eussians
should penetrate into Brandenburg, the royal family, the
Highest Courts of Justice, and the Departments of State
must be brought into a place of security. If we are defeated
in Saxony about Leipzig, the most suitable place for the
royal family and the treasure is Kiistrin. If the Eussians
should advance into Brandenburg, or if a disaster should
overwhelm us in Lusatia, everything must be brought to
Magdeburg. The last place of refuge is Stettin, but it must
be resorted to only in case of the utmost necessity. The
garrison, the royal family, and the treasure are inseparable.
They always go together. To the treasure must be added
the crown diamonds and the royal table silver. In case of
need the royal silver and the gold plate must be melted down
without delay.

(2) If I should be kiUed in action, the national business
must be carried on without the slightest change. Nobody
must notice that the government has changed hands. The
rendering of the oath and the act of homage to the new
ruler should take place as quickly as possible throughout
Prussia, and especially in Silesia.

(3) I might have the misfortune of being made prisoner
by the enemy. In that case, I absolutely prohibit that the
sUghtest consideration be paid to my person and that any
notice whatever be taken of the letters which I may write
from my place of confinement. In case of such a misfortune
I will sacrifice myself to the State. Everyone must obey
my brother, and he and all my ministers and generals are

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 25

responsible to me with their heads, that neither territory nor
money is offered to the enemy in exchange for my liberty,
that the war will be contmued, that all advantages for
defeating the enemy will be made use of, that matters will
be treated as if I had never existed.

I hope and believe that you. Count Pink, wUl not find it
necessary to make use of the orders contained in this letter.
However, in case of misfortune I empower you herewith
to carry out these instructions, and as a token that they
embody my firm and constant will, and that they have been
given after thorough and careful deliberation, I sign this
letter with my own hand and append to it my own seal.

Frederick concentrated his whole energy and ability
upon the government and the advancement of his country,
and he desired that his successors also should manage them-
selves the entire business of the State. In order to enable
them to fulfil this heavy task, he considered that a special
education was required.

In a State such as Prusso-Germany the education of
the future ruler is of course a matter of supreme importance,
for the fate of the country depends upon the character and
ability of the monarch. Therefore, the instructions which
Frederick the Great wrote for the education of his nephew
and successor, and sent to Major Borcke on September 24,
1751, when the heir-presumptive was seven years old, are
of the highest interest and importance to all who wish
to understand the poUcy and character of modern Germany
and the causes of its success, for it may be said that
Frederick's instructions have guided aU his successors in
the education of their heirs. The following are the most
interesting passages from that most important document :

I entrust to you the education of my nephew, the Heir-
Presumptive of Prussia. As there is a great difference
between the education of the child of a private citizen and
of a child that will be called upon to rule the State, I here-
with give you my instructions for your guidance. . . .

26 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

The boy should learn history, but not like a parrot.
The great utihty of history consists in enabliiig us to compare
the present with the past. The intelligent study of history
shows the causes which have brought about vast changes
in the world. It shows besides that, generally speaking,
vice is punished and virtue rewarded. Attention must be
drawn to the fact that the ancient writers are not always
reliable, and that one must critically examine their state-
ments before beheving them. . . .

The greatest and most important part of education con-
sists in shaping the character. Neither you nor all the
powers of the world can change the character of a child.
Education can only moderate its passions and instincts.

You should treat my nephew like an ordinary child that
wiU be called upon to succeed by its own exertions. Ee-
proach the boy for his faults, and teU him that he will be
despised by all if he will not learn. He must not be allowed
to become conceited. He should be brought up quite
simply. He must be courteous towards all, and must be
made to apologise immediately if he has been rude to any-
body. He must be taught that all men are equal, and that
exalted birth without exalted merit is worthless. Let him
talk freely to all. That will make him self-possessed. It
does not matter if he talks nonsense, for he is only a child.
His whole education should be directed with the aim of
making him self-reliant. He should not be guided by
others. Whether he speaks foolishly or wisely, his ideas
should only be his own.

It is very impqrtant that he should love the army.
Therefore he must be told at all occasions and by all whom
he meets that men of birth who are not soldiers are pitiful
wretches. He must be taken to see the troops drilling as
often as he likes. He ought to be shown the Cadets, and
be given five or six of them to drill. That should be an
amusement for him, not a duty. The great point is that he
should become fond of military affairs, and the worst that
could happen would be if he should become bored with them.
He should be allowed to talk to all, to cadets, soldiers,
citizens, and officers, to increase his self-reliance.

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 27

It is particularly important that he should learn to love
his country, and that all people whom he meets should utter
only patriotic sentiments. With all iiuestions discussed
some moral ideas might he connected. He should learn to
love humanity and Mndness, sentiments which grace all
honourahle men, and particularly princes.

My nephew will, when he becomes older, begin to ,'do
service as a lieutenant. He must pass gradually through
all the ranks. That will prevent him becoming conceited.
The ofi&cers who dine with him should contradict and tease
him freely to make him self-possessed and bright. He
should see as much of the world as possible. ... At every
opportunity you should inculcate in him love and respect
for his father and mother and for his relatives. You will
find out his passions, but you must try to moderate, but not
to destroy them. He should never do anything without
good reason, except during his hours of recreation. For
minor transgressions he should be scolded. For greater
ones he shorJd be punished by being deprived of his sword,
by being placed under arrest, and by other punishments
likely to appeal to his sense of honour.

Eeport to me about him every month, and more often if
necessary. Do not make him timid by showing too much
anxiety about his health and safety. Great care must of
course be taken of him, but he must not notice it. Other-
wise he will become soft, timid, and nervous. These instruc-
tions are valid only till the child is ten or twelve years old.

Prussia has been a military State since its beginning.
The country has grown great by successful wars and by
conquest. Frederick William the First not only created
a powerful army but miHtarised the administration and
the civil institutions as well. He made the entire civil
Hfe of the country subservient to his military requirements
and ambitions. Frederick the Great clearly recognised
that the future of Prussia would depend upon its army, and
upon the military strength of the country as a whole, that
it needed a form of government which was most Ukely to

28 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

increase the power of the State. The activity of the
Great Elector, of Frederick William the First, and his
own achievements had shown him how greatly an able
monarch, who is entirely mihampered by popular interfer-
ence and control, can advance a naturally poor and weak
country.

Frederick was deeply convinced of the superiority
of monarchical over democratic government in adminis-
trative matters in general, and especially in matters of
foreign pohcy and of war. A miUtary State, Hke an army;
should, in his opinion, be governed not by an Administration,
not by statesmen and generals, but by a commander-in-
chief, by the Sovereign himself. He showed an unlimited
contempt for feeble sovereigns, for the weakness and in-
efficiency of the then existing republics, such as Holland,
and for those States which under monarchical forms were
democratically governed, such as England. He repeatedly
described England as a repubHc in disguise and sneered
at its army. He frequently expressed his opinion that
monarchy was a far more efficient form of govenunent;
especially in war, than democracy. He wrote, for instance,
in his ' Lettre sur I'Amour de la Patrie ' :

A monarch is not a despot, whose only rule of conduct is
his caprice. He must be the centre of the State where aU
the lines from the circumference unite. A monarchical
government can maintain in its deliberations that secrecy
which is absent in republics, and the various branches of the
administration can act together like a Well-trained team of
horses. Besides in monarchies party spirit is far less ramp-
ant than in republics, which are often plagued by party strife
and by party intrigue.

In his ' Histoire de mon Temps,' Frederick wrote :

Sweden which, under Gustavus Adolphus, had been a
land of heroes became the home of cowardice and infamy
under a republican government. Thus kingdoms and

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 29

empires may decline and fall after having risen to the
greatest glory. The cause of Sweden's decline may probably
be found in the change in the form of its government. While
Sweden was a monarchy, the army was honoured. It was
efficient for the defence of the State, and could never become
a public danger.

In republics the government must, by its very nature,
be peaceful, and the mihtary must be kept down, for the
politicians in power are afraid of generals who are worshipped
by their troops and who may bring about a revolution.
In republics men of ambition can obtain power only by
intrigue. Thus corruption arises and destroys public
morality. The true sense of honour is lost. AH try to
succeed by intrigue. Besides, in republics secrecy is never
observed in matters of State. The enemy knows their
plans beforehand and can foil them. . . .

When Sweden was turned into a republic it became
weak. The love of glory was replaced by the spirit of
intrigue. Disinterestedness was replaced by cupidity. The
public welfare was sacrificed to individual advantage.
Corruption went so far that in the Swedish Parliament
sometimes the French and sometimes the Eussian party
was supreme, but never the Swedish.

The views expressed by Frederick regarding the repubUe
of Sweden should give food for thought to Englishmen and
Americans. Democracy, both in the monarchical and in
the republican form, provides undoubtedly a less efficient
government than a monarchy. In democracies party
spirit proves only too often more powerful than
patriotism. While party interests are promoted those of
the nation are disregarded and suffer neglect. Besides,
democracies are administered not by men of action but
by men of words, by amateurs whose position depends on
the popular will and upon the popular whim. Consequently,
nearly every Government measure brought forward in a
democratic State is determined not on its merits, not by its
national utility or necessity, but by the question : W^ll it be

80 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

popular or unpopular ? Will it gain or lose votea ? Will
it strengthen or weaken the pohticians in power or the
Opposition ? Besides, every measure, however Secret, must
be discussed in public although public discussion may
imperil the existence of the State. While a monarch in a
well-organised monarchy such as Germany can, in a
time of danger, command and thus employ the whole
national resources to the best advantage without delay,
the head of a democratic Government can hope to unite
the citizens and impel them to action only by begging
and imploring, by exhorting and beseeching them to do their
duty.

A modem democracy, like an old-fashioned charity,
is run on voluntary contributions. A democracy has not
one master, but many masters. Every democratic citizen
claims for himself the right to decide whether he will obey
or not, for he is one of the sovereigns. In the words of the
judicious Bagehot : ' The natural instinct of Enghshmen
is to resist authority.' Politicians pander to the electors,
and thus the people in democracies are taught that they
have rights, but not that they had duties. Many months
after the beginning of a war in which Great Britain's existence
is at stake, the politicians who had prevented and opposed
the tuition of patriotism in the schools began teaching
the citizens by posters, by the methods of patent medicine
vendors, the duty of defending their country.

Organisation in time of a crisis can be efiScient only if
the men in power can command, and if those over whom
they have authority are certain to obey. Democracy is
government by argument. It does not organise, but it
disorganises, and the men in authority are afraid to order
men to fight or to work because every democrat claims for
himself the right to do what he hkes, the right to resist
authority. The German Government has opposed parlia-
mentary institutions to the utmost, and has given to the
Parliament which it has granted to the people merely the

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S STEBNGTH 31

power of a suburban debating society, not so much because
the rulers and the aristocracy were jealous of their privileges, ,
but because they feared, and rightly feared, that the de-
mocratisation of Germany would destroy its power, and
would prove fatal to the country in case of war.

Circumstances have made Prussia a military State.
The country has grown great by its military strength.
Frederick clearly recognised that the existence and the
future of Prussia depended upon the army. Therefore
the army was his principal care. It was to be an army
not for show and for parade, but excluS|ively for use in
war. In his ' Political Testament ' of 1752 he wrote :
' The army must be managed in peace in such a manner
as to make it as efficient as possible in case of war.' Nothing
was to be left to chance. Preparation down to the smallest
details was unceasingly recommended by Frederick. Prussia
was to rely in war not on her AUies, but entirely on her
own unaided strength. The King wrote in his J Essai sur
les Formes de Gouvernement ' :

The size of the national army must depend on the strength
of possible enemies. A ruler cannot safely reckon upon his^
Allies, for these do not always fulfil their obligations, or they
fulfil them only in part. Those who count upon the strength
of their Allies as upon their own are sure to be deceived.

Frederick thought it of the highest importance that
the Sovereign himself should direct and command the
army. He wrote in his ' Political Testament ' of 1776 :

If the sovereign himself does not manage the army and
does not set an example to his people in military matters
all is lost. If the ruler shows by his actions that he prefers
the loafing courtiers to his officers, all men will prefer idling
at court to working hard in the army.

In his ' Political Testament ' of 1752 he wrote :

That ruler rules best who has carefully laid down his

32 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

policy and who rules himself. He will not be hampered
at the moment when a decision must promptly be made, for
he holds all the threads in his own hands. It is particu-
larly important for him that he should possess as much
knowledge as possible of all military details.

Men who are not soldiers are ill-fitted for devising a plan
of campaign, especially if they are unacquainted with all the
military technicalities, the knowledge of which is indispens-
able. He who does not know the need of an army, who is
not acquainted with its thousand and one requirements,
who does not know how an army is mobihsed, and who is
unacquainted with the art of war, who neither knows how to
keep discipline among troops in peace time, nor how to lead
them in time of war, wiU never succeed in conducting a war
even if he should be a most able man and statesman, econo-
mist, and financier.

I wish to convince my successors that it is necessary for
every King of Prussia to make war his particular study and
to encourage those who wish to take up the noble and
dangerous profession of arms.

As Prussia is surrounded by powerful States my succes-
sors must be prepared for frequent wars. The soldiers must
be given the highest positions in Prussia for the same reason
for which they received them in ancient Eome when that
State conquered the world. Honours and rewards stimulate
and encourage talent, and praise arouses men to a generous
emulation. It encourages men to enter the army. It is
paradoxical to treat officers contemptuously and call theirs
an honoured profession. The men who are the principal
supports of the State must be encouraged and be preferred
to the soft and insipid society men who can only grace an
ante-chamber.

Only the sovereign can create and maintain perfect
discipline, for only he can act with authority, and blame
and punish severely according to desert without respect to
birth and rank. Only he can liberally reward the deserving,
can constantly review the troops and keep them efficient.
Therefore the King of Prussia should be a soldier and should
be himself the Commander-in-Chief. ...

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 33

Monarchies are disgraced by soft and idle rulers who
leave the command of their troops to their generals, and thus
tacitly avow their pusillanimity and their incapacity.

Those who have asserted in the past that civilian
politicians are fit to manage the army and navy, and that
a Cabinet, a number of politicians, can make plans of war,
wiU do well to ponder on Frederick the Great's testamentary
views.

Frederick was of opinion that the quality of the army
depends in the first instance upon the ability and character
of the commander. He was exceedingly careful in selecting
men for high command, and he wrote in his ' Guerre de
Sept Ans ' :

The ability and determination of a general are more
decisive in war than the number of soldiers. . . ,

Generally speaking, towns are defended neither by their
fortifications nor by the strength of their garrison, for all
depends on the ability, courage, and determination of their
commander.

The perfect discipline of the German army has surprised
many observers. At the word of command German soldiers
wiU act like automata, perform the greatest deeds of valour,
or commit the most shocking crimes. That perfect dis-
cipline which makes men machines in time of war was created
by Frederick Wilham the First and was recommended as
indispensable by Frederick the Great. The latter wrote
in his ' Political Testament * of 1752 :

Military discipline makes the troops absolutely obedient.
It makes blindly obedient the soldier to his officer, the officer
to his colonel, the colonel to his general, and the generals to
the commander-in-chief. A soldier who murmurs against a
non-commissioned officer, or who draws his weapon against
him, and an officer who draws his weapon against his com-
mander, must be punished with death, for no clemency is
possible towards those who violate the rules of discipline.

84 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

Insubordination supplies a dangerous example. The slight-
est loosening of the bonds of discipline would create a spirit
of lawlessness and of mutiny, and would force the com-
manders to obey their men. Therefore the generals and
colonels are given a despotic power over their regiments.

The commanders must be responsible to the sovereign
with their lives for the obedience of their men. Hence a
ruler is certain that his orders will be carried out. Strict
discipline makes the troops so accustomed to absolute
obedience that ihey no longer know how to disobey. They
will neither grumble, nor argue, nor complain. They will
do wjiat they are told, act according to orders, expose them-
selves to the greatest dangers, and go to their death at the
word of command. They will follow their ofiBlcers and
perform deeds of marvellous valour.

Discipline fiUs and regulates the lives of the soldiers,
prevents them using violence, stealing, drinking, and gamb-
ling, and causes them to return to their, quarters at the
appointed time. Thus discipline will be better observed
among soldiers in the army than among monks in a monas-
tery. Absolute subordination through all grades makes the
whole army dependent upon the will of a single man, the
ruler, and if he is a skilful general he need only give his
orders, for he can be certain that they will be carried out
with exactitude.

In a democracy in which indiscipline is general, where
men in authority can request, but not command, where
the army is controlled by civilian politicians, the maintenance
of perfect military discipline is of course impossible. More-
over, the English soldier has two masters : his officer and
the law. If he shoots at the word of command he may be
hanged for murder. That conception alone suffices to
destroy a perfect sense of discipline in the army.

Frederick kept the greatest secrecy with regard to
Prussian affairs. His opponents were rarely able to antici-
pate the King's plans. On the other hand,' Frederick
was determined to become acquainted with the intentions

FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S STRENGTH 85

of his possible enemies.. With this object in view he
developed a most perfect system of espionage in all the
countries in which Prussia was chiefly interested. The
King wrote in his memoirs ;

If one wishes to oppose the plans of one's enemies one
must know their plans.

Natural allies are those State? the interests of which are
identical with our own. Nevertheless alliances may be
concluded among nations' the interests of which differ,
although they will be only short-lived.

In the present position of Europe aU States are strongly
armed, and as a Power of superior strength can destroy
the weaker ones, it is necessary to conclude alliances either
for mutual defence or for foihng the plans of one's enemies.
However, alliances by themselves do not suffice. It is
necessary to have in one's neighbour States, and especially
among one's enemies, agents who report faithfully all they
see and hear. Men are bad. It is most necessary to protect
oneself against being surprised.

Germany's financial strength and her financial pre-
paredness for war have surprised all observers, except
those Who are acquainted with Prusso-Germany's financial
policy, and with her financial preparedness for war in the
past. Here also Frederick William the First, and especially
Frederick the Great, have created a tradition by which
Germany continues to be guided.

Finance is a most powerful weapon in war, and none
understood its importance better than Frederick the Great.
He wrote in his ' Political Testament ' of 1752 ;

If a country wishes to be happy and respected it is
necessary that good order in the national finances should be
maintained. . . .

Prussia has not the riches of Peru, nor wealthy mer-
chants and banks, nor all the numerous resources possessed
by France, Spaiin, and England, However, by means of
industry and thrift, Prussia may succeed in occupying a

36 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

worthy place by their side. The most important thing is
that carefulness and good order should be observed in both
income and expenditure.

In his ' Political Testament ' of 1776 Frederick stated
his views on financial preparation for war more fuUy. He
wrote :

Since the Seven Years' War Prussia's State revenues
have prodigiously increased. . . . The national revenue
amounts at present to 21,700,000 thalers. With that sum
the whole of the national expenditure is provided and 187,000
soldiers are maintained. After all the necessary expenditure
has been provided for, there remains every year a surplus
balance of 5,700,000 thalers. Of that sum 2,000,000
thalers are deposited every year in the Treasury, while the
remaining 3,700,000 thalers are spent on fortifications, on
land improvements, on compensation for disasters, &c.
These 5,700,000 thalers are used in war time for paying the
war expenditure, which comes to 11,000,000 thalers, per
annum. Hence, 5,300,000 thalers are required as extra-
ordinary expenditure for every year of war.

That sum may be drawn from the Treasury, which
contains at present 19,300,000 thalers. Besides that sum
Prussia has another War Fund of 4,500,000 thalers, the so-
called Small War Fund, from which the cost of mobilisation
will be defrayed. In addition, there exists a War Fund of
4,200,000 thalers at Breslau for purchasing forage for an
army of 60,000 men, and there is a Fund of 900,000 thalers in
the Bank .at Magdeburg with which forage for six weeks can
be bought..

Besides, the War Chest should contain 11,000,000 thalers
for paying the rpgiments in advance in war time. Of that
sum 4,000,000 thalers are there, and the remaining 7,000,000
will be added within three years. It should be noted that
if the whole war expenditure is to come out of the war
treasure, the money in hand suffices only for a campaign of
four years. Hence Prussia must act with the greatest cir-
cumspection and economy so as to have money in hand at
the time when peace comes again in sight.

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 37

It will be noticed that in 1776, thirteen years after
the ruinous Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great had
accumulated financial resources sufficient to pay for a war
lasting four years. Yet he deplored that the money in
hand sufficed ' only for a four years' campaign.' Foresight
in financial affairs, the necessity of the most ample financial
preparation for war, was taught by Frederick the Great,
and subsequent rulers have acted in accordance with his
teachings.

Frederick the Great attached the highest value to
well-ordered finances, to the possession of large funds
which might be used in time of national emergency. Hence
he valued a good system of taxation which would incon-
venience the citizens as little as possible and which would
be strictly just. In his ' Essai sur les Formes de
Gouvernement ' we read :

Foreign policy cannot prosper, and the army cannot be
strong, unless the national finances are in perfect order,
and unless the ruler himself is economical and prudent.
Money is like a sorcerer's wand. Miracles may be per-
formed with it. Great political undertakings, the main-
tenance of an army, and a wise social policy require money.

No Government can exist without taxation. The great
art of raising taxes consists in doing it without oppressing
the citizens. To ensure that taxation should be fair,
careful Goverimient surveys and valuations of land are made.
These are carefully classified, and thus taxation is imposed
in accordance with the capacity of the individuals. It
would be unpardonable if through a clumsy taxation the
tillers of the soil should be made to abandon the land.
Having acquired their property, they ought to be able to live
on it with their families in comfort.

Frederick the Great provided in peace not only all the
money required for a protracted war, but the food as well.
He wrote in his ' Political Testament' of 1776 :

We have in Berlin a magazine of corn of 36,000 wispels,

88 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

suf&cient to feed an army of 60,000 men during a whole
year. There is an equaUy large magazine in Silesia for
another 60,000 men. Besides there is a fund of 2,000,000
thalers reserved for purchasing grain in Poland. That
sum can furnish 120,000 wispels. Thus Prussia is protected
against the possibility of famine in time of peace, and in time
of war she has sufficient corn in hand for a campaign of
three years.

Those who, at the beginning of the war, believed that
Germany could be starved into surrender were not ac-
quainted with the providence of the Gernian Government,
and with the food policy which Frederick WiUiam the First
and Frederick the Great had introduced, and which is
still pursued by the Prusso-German Government, That
Government not unnaturally follows the tradition created
by the greatest Prussian rulers.

Frederick William the First had, as we have seen, created
in the General Directorate a Supreme Administrative
Authority, in which all the Departments of State were co-
ordinated so that all should work in harmony and unison
instead of hampering and obstructing one another as they
had done hitherto. That co-ordination was still further
developed by Frederick the Great, who thought it indis-
pensable for the efficiency of the national administration
that all the great departments of Prussia should work
hke a single body. He wrote in his ' Political Testament '
of 1752 :

All the branches of government should be closely inter-
j connected. The management of the national finances, the
' national policy, and the army are inseparable. It does not
suffice that one of these branches is well managed. All
three must be efficiently conducted and must advance in the
same direction, like a well-trained team, pulling the car of
State.

.In his ' Political Testament ' of 1776 Frederick once
more exhorted his successors :

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 39

Foreign policy, the army, and the finances are the three
great branches of statesmanship, and, they are so closely
interwoven that they cannot be separated. All three must
be cultivated simultaneously. If all three are promoted
simultaneously in accordance with the rules of sound policy
the State will reap the greatest advantage. ... In France
there is no real union among these three branches. They
do not co-operate. Each Minister is occupied only with
the care of lus own department. If a similar state of affairs
should arise in Prussia the State would be lost.

In the following extract from his ' Essai sur lea Formes
de Gouvernement ' of 1777, Frederick the Great seems
almost to describe Cabinet government on a democratic
basis, such as exists in England, where men govern without
system and without a plan, and where government naturally
and inevitably results in waste, confusion, muddle, and
inefficiency, if not in disaster. The Kiag wrote :

If a ruler abandons the helm of the ship of State and
places it into the hands of paid men, of the Ministers ap-
pointed by him, one will steer to the right and another to the
left. A general plan is no longer followed.

Every Minister disapproves of the actions of his prede-
cessor, and makes changes even if they are quite unnecessary,
wishing to originate a new policy which often is harmful.
He is succeeded by Ministers who also hasten to over-
throw the existing institutions in order to show their ability.
In consequence of the numerous innovations made none can
take root. Confusion, disorder, and all the other vices of a
bad administration arise, and incapable or worthless officials
blame the multitude of changes for their shortcomings.

Men are attached to their own. As the State does not
belong to the Ministers in power they have no real interest ,
ia its welfare. Hence the government is carried on with
careless indifference, and the result is that the administra-
tion, the public finances, and the army deteriorate. Thus
the monarchy becomes an oligarchy. Ministers and generals
direct affairs in accordance with their fancy. Systematic

40 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

administration disappears. Everyone follows his own
notions. No link is left which coimects the directing factors.
As all the wheels and springs of the watch serve together
the single object of measuring time, all the springs and
wheels of a Government should be so arranged and co-
ordinated that all the departments of the national admin-
istration work together with the single aim of promoting
the greatest good of the State. That aim should not be
lost sight of for a single moment. Besides, the individual
interests of ministers and generals usually cause them to
oppose each other. Thus personal differences often prevent
the carrying through of the most necessary measure.

These wise words of Frederick the Great should be
placed in golden letters in all the public offices, and be
learned by heart by every school child.

In modern times Great Britain has experienced the
efficiency of one-man rule in the time of Cromwell and of
the elder Pitt. Under these two men the British Govern-
ment worked like a single body, animated by a single will,
with the most gratifying success. A Prime Minister can
preserve the unity in the Cabinet, and the unity of govern-
mental action, only if he possesses the supreme direction
of all departments, if Cabinet Ministers are not his equals,
but his subordinates, if the curious fiction of joint responsi-
bility of the Cabinet is abandoned, if the Prime Minister
alone is responsible. A Prime Minister cannot unify the
great departments and services by acting merely the part
of an amiable chairman at a suburban temperance meeting.

Unfortunately, Democracy, after having destroyed
the power of the King, has gradually undermined that of
the Ministers as well. Thus the nation is left without a
guide. It has become a gigantic business with a large
body pf squabbling amateur directors, but without a general
manager. No one is there to command. Amateurs, men
without knowledge, without practical experience, without
authority, without power, without initiative, nominally

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 41

govern the country, but in reality they merely occupy
office, pose as administrators, and allow things to drift.
And what is worst, they have suppressed the expert. Amateur
poHticians have muzzled the military and naval experts, and
the ' sovereign ' nation is not allowed to know the truth.

The Ministers in power practise on the nation the con-
fidence trick on a gigantic scale. They attribute alll the
achievements of the experts to themselves, but make the
experts scapegoats for their mistakes. Custom, tradition,
the system is to blame for this state of affairs rather than
the men who occupy ministerial positions. That practice
prevails not only in England, but in all democracies, Switzer-
land alone excepted. JFrance was almost as unprepared
for war as was Great Britain, owing to the inefficiency of
her pohtical system.

Germany owes her efficiency not to the greater ability
of the Germans themselves, but to the political system
which Frederick William the First and Frederick the Great
have created, to the fact that a single will animates the
whole administration of the State, that the whole nation
acts like a single man, and every other consideration is
subordinated to the national interest, while in democracies
parties and people are squabbling, and the Departments
of State are aimlessly pulling some in one direction and
some in another.

Administrative efficiency requires not only a good system
but also good men. Frederick the Great knew no favourites.
In his own words, ' Nature has not distributed talents accord-
ing to rank and lineage.' Frederick, like Napoleon, gave.
rank and position only to merit. For obtaining good public
servants and increasing their zeal, he attached the greatest
value to two factors — to rewards and to punishments. He
wrote in his ' Political Testament ' of 1752 ;

Men are ruled by two motives : by the fear of punish-
ment and the hope of reward. . . .

42 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

A ruler should search for unknovm merit and reward
men for worthy deeds performed in secret. He should
always pay attention to this and keep agents everywhere
so as to be informed of meritorious deeds. He should
watch for good actions as carefully as tyrants do for con-
spiracies.

In his ' Political Testament ' of 1776 we read :

It is particularly necessary for the preservation of morals
that distinctions should be bestowed only for merit and not
for wealth. That principle has been disregarded in Frances
and the consequence has been that public morals have
dechned. Formerly Frenchmen could obtain honours
only by worthy deeds, but now they believe that wealth
alone suffices to bring them honours.

In his ' Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement ' of
1777 he stated :

The promotion of morality in the widest sense is one of
the most important duties of the sovereign. He can do
much by distinguishing and rewarding the worthy and by
showing his contempt for the worthless. A ruler should
loudly disapprove of every dishonourable act and tefuse
distinction to those who will not mend their ways.

A sovereign may do irremediable injury to the State by
distinguishing people of wealth but without merit, for
honours bestowed on the worthless rich strengthen the
widely held idea that wealth alone suffices to give distinction.
If that behef should gain ground, greed and cupidity will
break all bounds. A scramble for wealth will ensue, and the
most reprehensible means for acquiring riches will be
employed. Corruption will spread apace, become general,
and take deep root. Men of talent and of character wiU be
disregarded^ and the people will honour only those who by
ostentatious expenditure advertise their wealth.

To prevent the corruption of the national character the
sovereign must distinguish only men of true merit and
treat with contempt men of wealth without virtue.

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 43

The way in which Frederick practised what he preached
may be seen by the methods by which he forced the nobility
to act worthily towards their country. In the Prussian
Code, compiled under the inspiration of Frederick the Great,
we read in the chapter on the nobility ;

Men of nobility are particularly entitled to honourable
employment in the service of the State according to their
abilities. . . .

Loss of nobility is the consequence if a person of noble
birth leads a dishonourable life, or a life by which he lowers
himself to the level of the common people.

For committing a common crime people of noble birth
may be deprived of their nobility by judicial decision.

Unfortunately, England has been corrupted by politicians
who have bestowed rewards on the worthless and neglected
and discouraged the deserving. Distinctions and honours
are rarely given for services rendered to the nation. Hence
the saying, ' Patriotism does not pay,' is generally heard.
Titles and honours are frequently bestowed by party men
upon other party men. They are sold for cash or are given
for party services, and often for unavowable ones, to people
who sometimes have done the greatest injury to the State
and nation by preying upon the people, drugging them
with patent medicines, plying them with bad drink, or
deceiving them in the interest of the governing party.
On the other hand, patriots who have laboured all their
life for their country die in poverty and obscurity. Thus
intrigue is rewarded and patriotism discouraged.

People who have travelled in Germany have been sur-
prised by the efficiency of the Government services, by the
punctuahty of the trains, by the cheapness and promptness
of justice, the excellence of the post and telephone, the
efficiency of national education, the conscientiousness and
the honesty of aU officials, and the absence of muddle,
delay, and waste. The excellence of the German officials

44 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

is due to their training. Frederick the Great considerably
increased the ef&ciency of the wonderful civil service which
his father had created by applying to it his principle of
rewards and punishments, and by appropriate laws such as
the following. They form part of the Prussian code, which
breathes in every chapter the Frederician spirit. We read :

Nobody may be given oflaoial employment unless he is
sufficiently qualified for his post and has given proof of his
ability to fill it.

He who by bribery or by other improper means has
obtained official employment must immediately be dismissed.

All agreements and promises by which private advan-
tages are promised for obtaining official employment are
nidi and void.

He who knowingly entrusts an official position to an
unfit person must make good the damage which may arise
to the State or to private individuals through the ignorance
or the incompetence of the person appointed.

Officials in authority who have neglected to prevent
mistakes and misdemeanours on the part of their subordin-
ates which they might have prevented by acting in accord-
ance with the official regulations are liable for the damage
which their neglect has caused to the State and to private
citizens.

These laws and their watchful observance have naturally
increased greatly the efficiency of the Prussian bureaucracy.

Before the advent of Frederick the Great, important
positions in the State were given rather according to favour
than according to merit. Frederick abolished this abuse.
He was determined to give official positions only to men of
ability, regardless of their birth and descent. He wrote
in his ' Histoire de mon Temps ' : * Nature has distributed
gifts amongst men without considering their ancestors.'
He anticipated Napoleon's principle, ! La carriere ouverte
aux talents.'

Frederick believed that the strength of a State consists

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 45

not in its wealth, but in its power — ^that men are more im-
portant than commodities. He attached particular value
to agriculture, recognising that the peasantry would supply
him with excellent soldiers, and that the development of
the national agriculture would enable the soil to nourish
a very large population. The King wrote in his t Anti-
Machievel ' :

The strength of the State consists not in the extent of its
territory, not in the possession of a large solitude, but in the
wealth and in the number of inhabitants. Therefore it is
to the interest of a prince to people his country and to make
the inhabitants prosperous.

In his ' Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement ' we
read :

The agriculturists are truly the bread-winners of the
State. They should be encouraged to cultivate the land
carefully, for the true wealth of the country consists in the
productivity of the soil. It is true that Holland flourishes,
although she produces scarcely one-hundredth of the food
consumed by the people. However, Holland is a small
State, where commerce has replaced agriculture. It is
clear that the greater the territory of the State is, the more
necessary is it to promote its rural industries. . . .

The King stated in his t Political Testament ' :

War is a bottomless pit, which swallows up men. There-
fore attention must be paid to people the country as much
as possible. Consequently it is necessary that the land
should be well cultivated and that the cultivators should
be prosperous.

In Frederick's i Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement
we read :

Steps must be taken to provide at all times an abundance
of food for the people. To do this the first requirement is
to have the soil carefully cultivated, to drain all the wet land
which can be drained, and to increase the number of cattle

46 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

and thereby increase also the production of milk, butter,
cheese, and manure. Besides, an exact account must be
made of the quantity of grain of every kind produced in
good, medium, and bad years. When allowance is made for
the quantity of grain consumed, we know how much surplus
there is for exportation in good years, or how much shortage
there is likely to be in bad ones.

Every provident sovereign should establish magazines
to protect the people against scarcity and famine. In the
bad years 1771-1772, Saxony and the provinces of the
Empire suffered terribly because they had neglected that,
precaution. The people were forced to eat the bark of trees.
Entire districts became depopulated. Thousands of people,
pale and emaciated, like spectres, left the country in order
to find sustenance abroad. How their rulers must have
reproached themselves when they saw the calamities which
they had caused !

Frederick the Great, like the Great Elector and Frederick
William the First, strove to enrich the people by wise
goverimiental action. He settled large numbers of immi-
grants in his thinly peopled provinces, and promoted the
national industries by protection and by importing skilled
workers from abroad who created new industries ia Prussia.
According to his Minister Hertzberg, Frederick founded
more than 1200 villages, and in 1786, the year of his death,
between one-fifth and one-sixth of the inhabitants of
Prussia, or more than a million, were immigrants, or de-
scendants of immigrants. During Frederick's rule about
350,000 foreigners were induced to settle in Prussia. In
1785 Prussia had 165,000 industrial workers who produced
manufactures to the value of 80,000,000 thalers per year,
an enormous sum at the time.

The productivity of Prussia's agriculture was stimulated
by wise laws. The code drafted in Frederick's lifetime
laid down :

Every agriculturist is obliged to cultivate his property

FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY'S STRENGTH 47

thoroughly and economically for his own good and for that
of the community in general. Ilierefore he may be forced
by the State to cultivate his land adequately, and if he never*
theless continues to neglect it he may be compelled to cede
it to others.

No peasant is permitted to sell crops before they are
gathered.

The number of peasant holdings must not be dimin-
ished, either by incorporating them in landed estates or by
combining several of them in one hand. On the contrary,
landed proprietors are obliged to see that the holdings in
their villages are duly occupied. Peasants' properties
where teams are kept must not be converted into holdings
where no teams are kept except by special permission of the
State.

Desiring to increase the strength of Prussia, Frederick
the Great was as much ' interested in matters economic
as in war. As soon as a war was ended, the King en-
deavoured to repair its ravages and to increase the wealth
of the people as much as possible. Immediately after
the end of the first and second Silesian wars, Frederick
concentrated all his energy upon raising the economic
strength of the nation. In the first chapter of his ' Guerre
de Sept Ans,' the King tells us :

Although the late King Frederick William I had taken
care to bring order into the finances of Prussia, he had not
been able to do everything that was needed. He had neither
the time nor the means to accomplish so great a work, and
the things which had to be done were numerous. Waste
lands had to be cleared and cultivated, factories to be estab-
lished, commerce to be extended, and industry to be en-
couraged.

As the first years of the King's reign were devoted to
war, he could turn his attention to internal affairs only after
the establishment of peace. Along the Eiver Oder there
were vast swamps, which had probably been uncultivated
since the beginning of time. Plans were made for draining

48 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

the country. This was done by a canal from Kiistrin to
Wrietzen, and 2000 famiUes were established on the re-
claimed land. Farther on, about Stettin, 1200 families
were planted. Thus a small province was conquered by
industry from ignorance and sloth. The manufacture of
woollens was hampered by the lack of weavers. These
were imported from abroad, and a number of weaving
villages, comprising two hundred families each, were
created.

In the district of Magdeburg it had been a custom since
time immemorial that foreigners should come in for the
harvest and return to their homes when it had been gathered.
King Frederick permanently established these immigrants
about Magdeburg, and thus settled a large number of strangers
on the land. Through the various measures taken, two
hundred and eighty new villages were created ; but the
towns were not neglected. The King built a new town on
the river Swine near the mouth of the Oder. It was called
Swinemiinde.

Everywhere new industries were called into being. In
Berlin the manufacture of rich stuffs and velvets was
established. Factories producing light velvets and mixed
stuffs were erected at Potsdam. A sugar refinery was
established in Berlin. A factory for making curtain stuffs
was made to enrich the town of Brandenburg. At Frank-
fort-on-the-Oder the making of Eussian leather was intro-
duced, and in Berlin, Magdeburg, and Potsdam was intro-
duced the manufacturing of silk stockings and silk hand-
kerchiefs. The planting of mulberry trees was established
all over Germany. The clergy were made to serve as leaders
to the cultivators, and they taught them how to raise silk-
worms. In out-of-the-way places where wood was super-
abundant but unsaleable through lack of rivers ironworks
were established which furnished the army with guns and
shells. About Minden and in the Mark, saltworks were
created and those at HaUe were improved. In a word,
industry was encouraged in the capital and in the provinces.
The Emden Trading Company estabhshed an important
branch in China. By reducing the export duties of the

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 49

harbours of Stettin, Konigsberg, and Kolberg, the customs
receipts were doubled.

Through all these enterprises the revenues of the Crown,
excluding those of Silesia and East Prisia, were increased in
1756 by 1,200,000 thalers although the King had not intro-
duced any additional imposts whatever. A census showed
that the number of the inhabitants amounted to 5,000,000^
As it is certain that the wealth of the State consists in the
number of their inhabitants, Prussia could consider hprself
to be twice as powerful as she had been during the last
years of the reign of 'Prederick William I, the father of King
Prederick.

The national finances and the administration of justice
did not monopolise the king's attention. The army, that
powerful instrument for the glory and preservation of States,
was not neglected. Eighty pieces of heavy artillery were
cast, and twenty mortars. The store of gunpowder which
had been accumulated amounted to 56,000 quintals. In the
magazines there were 36,000 wispels of oats. Thus every-
thing was prepared for a war which was to be foreseen. . . .
The ants gather in summer the food they consume during
the winter, and a ruler must save in time of peace the funds
which he has got to spend in time of war.

Prussia had been devastated by the Seven Years' War,
which ended in 1763. It had largely been fought on Prussian
territory. The condition of the country resembled its
condition after the Thirty Years' War. Prederick has
told us in his ' Memoires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg ':

Prussia's population had diminished by 500,000 during
the Seven Years' War. On a population of 4,i500,000 that
decrease was considerable. The nobility and the peasants
had been pillaged and ransomed by so many armies that
they had nothing left except the miserable rags which
covered their nudity. They had not credit enough to
satisfy their daily heeds. The towns possessed no longer a
police. The spirit of fairness and order had been replaced
by anarchism and self-jotefest, The judges and the revenue

50 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

authorities had given up their work owing to the frequency
of invasions. In the absence of laws, a spirit of recklessness
and of rapacity arose. The nobility and the merchants,
the farmers, the working-men, and the manufacturers had
raised the price of their labour and productions to the utmost.
All seemed intent upon ruining each other by their exactions.
That was the terrible spectacle which the formerly so flourish-
ing provinces of Prussia offered after the conclusion of the
war. The appearance of the provinces resembled that of
Brandenburg after the end of the Thirty Years' War.

However, Prussia rapidly recovered owing to the King's
wise and energetic policy. Eef erring to himself in the third
person, as he habitually did in his writings, he stated in
his ' Memoires depuis la Paix ' :

There is no way to increase the wealth of a country except
by increasing its manufacturing industries. That is clear
and evident. Hence the King, after the peace, concentrated
all his energy upon this object. Within ten years, by 1773,
264 new factories had been established in the Prussian
provinces. Among them was the porcelain factory in
Berlin which gave work to 50O people, and its produce soon
exceeded in quality the famous Saxon china. A tobacco
factory with branches in all the provinces was created, and
it developed an export trade in manufactured goods.

The war had disastrously influenced the Ptuspian Ex-
change, and had thus harmed Prussia's foreign commerce.
Immediately after the peace the inferior coinage was with-
drawn and the exchange was improved by a State Bank
founded with this object in view. It had a capital of 800^000
thalers, which was found by the King. It had at first some
bad experiences, but later on proved a great success.

Sovereigns, like private people, must make economies
so as to have money when it is wanted. Wise agriculturists
regulate watercourses and use them for increasing the fer-
tility of the soil. Acting on the same principle, the Prussian
Government increased its revenue and used the surplus for
promoting the public good. It not only restored what
the war had destroyed, but improved all that could be

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 51

improved. It drained swamps, improved the land, increased
the number of animals in the country, aiid utilised the, sandy
soil for afforestation.

The draining of the swamps along the rivers Netze and
Warthe cost 750,000 thalers, and 3500 families were settled
on the land thus regained to agriculture. The work was
finished in 1773, and 15,000 people were settled where
formerly had been a wilderness. Hie marshes about Fried-
berg were similarly treated and 400 foreign families were
settled there. In Pomerania similar works were under-
taken. In Brandenburg the marshes of the Havel, of the
Ehine, and many others were drained. About Magdeburg
2000 new families were planted. Since the dea'th of his
father, Frederick William the First, the King had settled
13,000 new families.

Silesia was not neglected. The ravages which the war
had inflicted were made good and improvements begun.
The rich abbeys were compelled to establish manufacturing
industries, and soon linen, copper, and iron industries,
tanneries, and oil mills arose, and 4000 new families were
planted in the agricultural district of Lower Silesia.

Large landowners had incorporated numerous peasant
properties in their land. Eecognising that the posses-
sion of property attaches the citizens to their country, and
that they can care little for a State where they have nothing
to, lose, the landowners were compelled to re-establish the
peasants. In compensation the King helped them and
improved their credit by means of loan banks. Also he
took pleasure in spending 300,000 thalers in repaying some
of their most pressing debts.

All these expenses were necessary. Money had to be
lavishly spent in the provinces to accelerate their recovery,
which otherwise would have required, a century. By acting
generously and lavishly prosperity quickly returned, and
100,000 people who had fled from the war-stricken country
returned.

In 1773 the population was by 200,000 larger than it was
in 1756, when the Seven Years' War began. In Upper
Silesia 213 new villages were created. They had 23,000 in-

52 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GBEMANY

habitants, and plans were made for increasing the Pomeranian
agriculturists by 50,000 and those of the Mark by 12,000.
That project was carried out toward 1780. Between the
years 1740, when King Frederick came to the throne, and
1779 the population of the provinces increased as follows :
That of Prussia from 370,000 to 780,000 ; that of the Mark
from 480,000 to 710,000 ; that of Magdeburg and Halber-
stadt from 220,000 to 280,000 ; that of Silesia from 1,100,000
to 1,520,000.

_ Although enormous sums were spent on improving the
country, vast amounts were devoted to mihtary purposes
as well. On the other hand. King Frederick did not indulge
in ostentatious expenditure, usually found at Courts, but
lived like a private man. With rigid economy the Treasuries
were filled.

In 1770 all Northern Europe was stricken by famine.
The infliction required vigorous action. The poor received
gifts of corn. The King had accumulated large magazines
in all parts of the country. He had 76,000 wispels of grain,
enough to feed the army during a whole year, and 9000
wispels for the capital alone. His providence protected
the people from starvation. The army was fed from the
magazines, and the people were given grain for food and
seed. Next year the harvest was bad again, and the neigh-
bour States suffered much more than Prussia because they
had neglected establishing magazines in time of abundance.

While barley cost two thalers per measure in Prussia,
it cost five thalers in Saxony and Bohemia. Saxony lost
more than 100,000 inhabitants through starvation and flight,
and Bohemia at least 180,000. On the other hand, more
than 20,000 Bohemian peasants and as many from Saxony fled
to Prussia, where they were welcomed, and they were made to
people the territories which had been reclaimed to agriculture.

In economic matters, as in matters concerning the
national defence, the pubhc administration, and the national
finances, Frederick the Great acted with foresight and
providence, and his successors continued his policy. He
wrote prophetically in his • Memoireg depuis la Paix ' :

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S STEENGTH 53

A wise economic policy constantly improved upon from
father to son can change the character of the State and
convert it from a poor into a wealthy country. A wise
economic policy can make a State so wealthy that it can
exercise in Europe as great an influence as any one of the
leading States.

By pursuing the wise fostering poHcy which Frederick
the Great had initiated, the HohenzoUerns have indeed
converted poor agricultural Prussia into a wealthy Great
Power, possessed of highly developed industries and a
vast international trade.

During the last four decades, while British agriculture
has utterly declined and decayed, Germany's agricultural
production has fully doubled in weight, and has more than
doubled in value. Hence, Germany is agriculturally
almost self-supporting. On a territory which is only
75 per cent, larger than that of the United Kingdom, Ger-
many grows bread-corn for 45,000,000 people, while the
United Kingdom grows bread-corn only for 5,000,000.
Besides, Germany produces, on her 75 per cent, larger area,
three times as much meat, aboTit nine times as much potatoes,
and twenty times as much timber as the United Kingdom,
and enormous quantities of sugar and tobacco, of which
none are produced in this country, although it is suitable
for their production. Hence food is far cheaper in blockaded
Germany than in Great Britain.

The wise policy of encouragement initiated by Frederick
William the First and Frederick the Great, and reintroduced
by Bismarck, has not only enormously increased Germany's
agricultural production and rural wealth, but has had a
still more marvellous effect upon her manufacturing
iadustries. During the last thirty-five years the engine
power of Prussia has increased more than seven-fold.
While the British manufacturing industries as a whole,
comparatively speaking, have remained stagnant, the
German manufacturing industries have marvellously in-

■A THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

sreased, and her formerly insignificant iron and steel industry
s now far greater than that of this country.

In the manufacturing industries, as in commerce,
jermany has successfully challenged the formerly un-
!hallengeable supremacy of this country. The poUcy
)f action, of wise govemmentalism, has triumphed in
igriculture, in industry and in commerce over that of
aissea-faire and non-interference. Unfortunately, those
vho during the last two decades have unceasingly pointed
)ut the danger of allowing Great Britain's agriculture to
leoay and her manufacturing industries to decline and to
)e outstripped by German competition, as the writer of
ihis book has frequently done ia the pages of The Nme-
eentJi Century, The Fortnightly Beview, and elsewhere,
^reached to ears deliberately deaf. The politicians in
power did not ask whether the national safety was en-
langered by allowing the manufacturing industries, and
)ven the iron and steel industry, which provides weapons
'or war, to stagnate or to decline, or whether the decay
)f agriculture would do irremediable harm to this country
md perhaps cripple it in the hour of peril ; they simply
isked whether Protection was politically a ' profitable '
jolicy, whether it would gain or lose votes, and, beHeving
ihat it was an unpopular policy, that it might lose votes,
;he politicians in power preached Free Trade.

Those who are acquainted with the causes of Germany's
)f&ciency and success must look towards the future with
joncem. Germany makes war cheaply but efficiently,
jteat Britain makes war wastefully. She has spent
jolossal amounts with lamentably inadequate results.
[n view of the comparatively smsdl war expenditure of
jrermany and the enormous expienditure of Great Britain,
md in view of the wonderful revival which the Prussian
ndustries have experienced after the greatest national
lisasters, even after 1763 and 1806, in consequence of
he energetic action of her Government, and of nation-

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S STRENGTH 55

wide co-operation, Germany may conceivably be able to
bear the costs of the present war better than Great Britain,
and Great Britain may emerge from the war more crippled
than Germany. Unpreparedness and muddle are very
expensive luxuries in war, in administration, and in matters
economic as well.

A hundred and fifty years ago Prussia was a land peopled
by boors. Now it is a land peopled by professors, scientists;
and artists. Frederick the Great was the first Prussian
monarch to realise that science and art increase the strength
and prestige of nations. Hence^ he began cultivating
the sciences and arts, and his successors followed his example.
As science and art were found to be sources of national
power, they were as thoroughly promoted as was the army
itself, while in this country education remained amateurish.
Men toyed with science, and the universities rather taught
manners than ef&ciency.

Frederick the Great vastly improved the, Prussian
law. He desired that people should be able to obtain,
not law, but justice speedily and cheaply. With this end
in view he caused legal procedure to be shortened by wise
regulations, and, in order to simplify the law, he had it
codified. Herein lies the reason that justice may be obtained
quickly and cheaply in Germany, and that the laws are
simple and plain ; whereas in this country the laws are a
maze, and justice is sometimes unobtainable because of the
intricacies of the law, its uncertainty, and its ruinous oost.

The details given in these pages show clearly that
Germany's strength, wealth, and efficiency are due to the
governmental system of the country. Germany's power
has been created by her most eminent rulers, the Great
Elector, King Frederick William the First, and Frederick
the Great. They abohshed self-government of every
form, and made the whole nation a gigantic machine for
carrying out the sovereign's will in war and in peace. In-
dividually, the Germans are very ordinary men. Collectively

56 O^HE POUNl)ATIONS OF GBEMANY

they have been amazingly successful because the ■whole
power of the nation is organised, and can be employed
against other nations in peace and war by an absolute
Sovereign. The secret of Germany's strength, wealth
efficiency, may be summed up in a single word : Discipline.
Apparently Germany is a constitutionally governed State
possessing a Parliament, manhood franchise, &c. In reaUty
Germany is more absolutely governed than ever before, for
with the introduction of universal military service resistance
on the part of the people has become impossible.

At first sight it may seem that it is hopeless for a de-
mocracy to compete with a highly organised monarchy
such as Germany, that Great Britain is now suffering for
the execution of Charles the Krst, that in the conflict
between absolutism and democracy, democracy is bound
to be defeated, that democracy is doomed. The conclusion
is scarcely justified. A democracy may be efficient, business-
like, provident, and ready for war. That can be seen
by the example of Switzerland. It would be more correct
to say that a Government which governs is likdy to defeat,
in peace and in war, a Government which drifts.

Nations are made by their leaders. Unfortunately the
characteristic of British democracy is self-indulgence, while
the characteristic of the German people, and of the Swiss
people, too, is duty, patriotism, and work. British pohticians
have pursued the pohcy of pander which German statesmen
and Swiss politicians have wisely disdained. The advocates
of democracy, and especially of British democracy, may
point to the successes of the Enghsh race in every cUme,
and to the fact that it owns one half of the habitable globe ;
the English race, however, has expanded so successfully,
not because of democratic government, but in spite of it.
It has flourished so greatly because of its capacity for
colonising, because it was first in the field, because it was
favoured by chance, because the great nations were fighting
among themselves while EngUshmen were conquering the

. FOUNDATIONS OP GEBMANY'S STEENGTH 57

, globe, because it never had to fight an organised absolutism
such as the German.

Will the British and American democracy hold its
own against Germany, or will it go under? That is the
question which the war will settle.

It is too late to discuss principles of government when
existence is at stake. The problem is to defend the hberty
of Great Britain, of the British Empire, of the Anglo-
Saxon race, and of its Allies in the Ufe and death struggle
in which they are engaged. The resources of the British
Empire and of its Allies are boundless. They dispose
of 700,000,000 men as compared with only 150,000,000
Germans, Austrians, Bulgarians, and Turks. The German
combination has no chance against the Entente Powers if
the gigantic resources of the British Empire are at last
organised for war.

Analysis of Germany's organisation shows that nation-
wide and Empire-wide organisation cannot be effected
by voluntary methods, by persuasion, and by entreaty.
By persuasion one can organise a team of athletes, not an
Empire. Effort is merely wasted if those who ought to
work in the factory fight, and those who ought to fight
continue working, or idling. Organisation must be met
by organisation, absolutism by absolutism. The nation
and Empire want real leading, a system which can compel
those who ought to fight to join the army, and those
\^ho ought to work to labour to the best of their ability.
It seems that only a system conferring absolute power
for the duration of the war can organise the forces of the
United Kingdom and of the Empire as a whole.

Democracy is on its trial. The Anglo-Saxon race is
fighting for its existence. There is danger in delay. War
is a one-man business. Every other consideration should
be subordinated to that of achieving victory. When the
United States fought for their life, they made President
Lincoln virtually a Dictator. The freest and most unruly^

58 (PHE FOUNDATIONS 01* GEEMANY

demqcracy allowed Habeas Corpus to be suspended and
conscription to be introduced, to save itself. Great emer-
gencies call for great measures. The war demands great
sacrifices in every direction. However, if it leads to Eng-
land's modernisation, to the elimination of the weaknesses
and vices of Anglo-Saxon democracy, if it leads to the
unification and organisation of the Empire; the purifica-
tion of its institutions, and the recreation of the race, the
gain may be greater than the loss, the colossal cost of the
war notwithstanding. The British Empire and the United
States, the Anglo-Saxon race in both hemispheres, have
apparently arrived at the turning-point in their history. '

CHAPTER II

tTHB FOUNDATIONS OP GBBMANY'S DIPLOMACY *

Many British historians, statesmen, and publicists have
endeavoured to explain to us the hidden causes of the
present war. They have dwelt on the warlike and bom-
bastic utterances which William the Second has made ever
since he came to the throne, and have traced the conflagration
to two powerful influences : to the boundless ambition and
conceit of the German Emperor and to the support which
he received by the teachings of German jingoes of the
military and of the professorial variety, from Treitschke
to Bemhardi, They have compared the Emperor to
Bismarck, Louis the Fourteenth, and Napoleon the First.
However, nothing is easier than to establish superficial
but entirely misleading historical parallels.

Unfortunately, the British Universities, while devoting
much time to abstract economic theory, miscalled pohtical
economy, and to the dust and dry bones of history, have
completely neglected statesmanship, that most important
of all sciences, in its practical and historical aspects. Before
the war mediaeval Germany was assiduously studied by
the professors, but modem Germany was disregarded
and was scarcely known. Militarily and intellectually
Great Britain was equally unprepared for Germany's
attack, and those who unceasingly tried to warn the nation,
as the writer of these pages has done in The Nineteenth

' Erom The Nineteenth Cemtwry ani After, June 1915^
fi9

60 ^HE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Century, The Fortnightly Beview, and elsewhere during
fifteen years, were treated as alarmists, cranks, and anti-
Germans.

After the outbreak of the war, Britjsh soldiers and
statesmen hastily began to organise a national army,
and British professors endeavoured to explain to the public
modern German history and German statesmanship, two
subjects with which they are deplorably ill acquainted.
When it was too late, scraps from the political writings
of Treitschke and his disciples were published in translation
for the information of the public, and now everyone who
has read some extracts from Treitschke and Bemhardi
believes that he fully understands Germany's character
and policy.

The rash policy of William the Second in no way re-
sembles that of Prince Bismarck, nor is it comparable
with that of Louis the Fourteenth and Napoleon the First.
In another part of this book I shall show that WiUiam
the Second, soon after his advent, threw Bismarck's policy
and teaching to the winds, and that the Iron Chancellor
spent the last eight years of his life in strenuous opposition
to the Emperor's reckless policy, and foretold that it would
lead to Germany's ruin. William the Second has certainly
not acted in accordance with Bismarck's views and methods.
His world-embracing ambitions may resemble those of
Napoleon the First, and his attitude and his absolutist
pronouncements no doubt remind us of Louis the Fourteenth's
celebrated L'itat c'est moi. He has not, however, taken
Frenchmen for his model, but one of bis predecessors,
Frederick the Great.

The Emperor bears in many respects a most remarkable
resemblance to his great ancestor. Modern German states-
manship is not Bismarckian but Frederickian. Treitschke
and Bernhardi are not innovators, but imitators. They
are merely expounders of the methods of Frederick the
Great. A study of Frederick's policy is not only interesting

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 61

at the moment, but it should prove of very considerable
practical value to the statesmen of the nations allied against
Germany. Such a study wiU reveal to us the hidden causes
of the war and of Germany's conduct before and during
the struggle, and it wiD give us an excellent insight into the
traditional methods of Prussian statesmanship. It will
show us how Prusso- Germany rose from insignificance and
poverty to greatness and affluence, and it will at the same
time teach us the way by which alone the Entente Powers
can bring the war to a successful conclusion.

The British Universities, while pubhshing at great
expense editions and translations of the writings of remote
antiquity, which are entirely useless for all practical purposes,
have paid no attention to the most important foreign
poKtical writings with which every well-edlicated English-
man ought to be acquainted. For Bismarck's statesmanship
those who do not read German have to rely mainly upon
his badly translated ' Memoirs,' which contain chiefly
personal matters, and upon Busch's chatter ; while for
that of Frederick the Great they have to turn to the roman-
cings of Carlyle and Macaulay. Frederick the Great's
most valuable political writings are as unknown in this
country as are Bismarck's. Frederick wielded a most
prolific pen. His general writings fill thirty moderate-sized
volumes, and his political correspondence, of which so far
only part has been published, forty very large ones. He
wrote only in French, and the large majority of the extracts
from his writings and letters given in the following pages
have not previously been published in English.

The Germans are stohd and one-sided people. William
the Second strikingly resembles his great ancestor by his
un-German vivacity, his restlessness, and his ^eat ver-
satility. The Emperor poses as an authority on all things
human and divine, and endeavours not only to direct in person
the Army, the Navy, the Church, and all the Departments of
State, but all the arts and sciences and the economic activities

62 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

of Germany aa well. Similarly, Frederick the Great waa
the Government. He was his own Commander-in-Chief,
I Minister of War, Chief of the Staff, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Minister of Finance, of Commerce, and of Justice,
&c. His assistants were mere clerks. In addition he was
an excellent economist, historian, and musician. He wrote
a good deal of indifferent French poetry and philosophy,
and he patronised and endeavoured to direct all the sciences
and arts and the entire business of Prussia.

William the Second, hke Frederick the Great, is a
consummate actor. Frederick the Great posed before
the world as a philosopher, a friend of man, and a free-
thinker. William the Second poses as a devout and deeply
religious man. I Both Frederick the Great and William
the Second have acted with the greatest hypocrisy, un-
scrupulousness, and heartless brutahty. Both have success-
fully deceived the world in the early part of their career
by their frequently made fervent protestations that they

i loved peace and public morahty, and condemned injustice,
tyraimy, and war, and both have attacked their unsus-
pecting and unprepared neighbours after having lulled
them to sleep by their pacific and generous utterances.

' Before studying the views and policy of Frederick the
Great we should cast a glance at his immediate predecessors,
for thus we shall be able to follow the progress of Prussia
since the time when it became a kingdom.

Frederick's grandfather, the first King of Prussia, who
was crowned a king in 1701, was despicable as a man and
a monarch. Frederick the Great has drawn a terrible
picture of him in his ' Memoires de Brandebourg,' published
in 1751. He wrote:

Frederick the First was attracted by the pomp surround-
ing royalty. He was actuated by vanity and self-love. He
liked to exalt himself above others. His acquisition of the
royal crown was caused by a common and childish vanity.
In the end it proved a pohtical master-stroke, for the royal

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 63

dignity delivered the House of Brandenburg from ,the yoke
of the House of Austria. The crown became a spur and a
challenge to his posterity, and he seemed to urge his heirs :
' I have acquired for you a great title. Make yourselves
worthy of it. I have laid the foundation of your great-
ness. It is your duty to accomplish the work which I have
begun. . , . . '

The armies marching through Prussia, in the time of
Frederick the First, had spread disease throughout the
country, and famine had increased the effect of the pestil-
ence. The King abandoned his people in their misfortune,
and, while his revenues did not suffice for the magnificence
of his expenditure on vain pomp, he saw in cold blood more
than 200,000 of his subjects perish whose lives he could
have saved by timely action. ...

To obtain the royal crown he sacrificed the lives of 30,000
of his subjects in wars made on behalf of the Emperor.
The royal dignity appealed only to his vanity and his love
of dissipation. He was open-handed and generous, but
bought his pleasures at a terrible cost. He sold his subjects
as soldiers to England and Holland like cattle to the butcher.

He wasted the wealth of the nation in prodigal and vain
dissipation. 'His Coiurt was one of the most magnificent
in Europe. His favourites received large pensions. Nothing
could equal the magnificence of his palaces. His fetes were
superb. His stables were filled with horses, his kitcheia
with cooks, and his cellars with wine. He gave an estate
worth 40,000 thalers to a servant for shooting a large stag.
He intended to pawn his domains at Halberstadt in order
to buy the Pitt diamond which ultimately was bought by
Louis the Fifteenth. . . . His favourites were overwhehned
with gifts ; and while bis eastern provinces perished through
famine and pestilence he did not lift a finger to help them.

Frederick the First died for the good of his country
in 1713, and was succeeded by his son, Frederick William
the First, the father of Frederick the Great. Frederick
Wilb'am the First reduced the expenditure of the Court
to a minimum, introduced the most rigid economy in the

64 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

country, and employed the national resources exclusively
for creating a large army and a great war chest. He con-
verted Prussia into an armed camp and miUtarised the
whole nation. His character is drawn as follows by Frederick
the Great in the ' Histoire de mon Temps ' :

The late King Frederick WilHam the First strove to
make his country happy, to create a well-disciplined army,
and to administer his finances with order and wise economy.
He avoided war in order not to be diverted from this worthy
aim, and thus he advanced his country unostentatiously
on the way to greatness without awakening the envy of
other States.

In Frederick's essay ' Des Mceurs, des Coutumes, de
rindustrie,' we read :

Under Frederick the First Berhn had been the Athens of
the North. Under Frederick Wilham the First it became
its Sparta. Its entire government was militarised. The
capital became the stronghold of Mars. All the industries
which serve the needs of armies prospered. In Berlin
were established powder miUs and cannon fgundries, rifle
factories, &c. . . .

Frederick WiUiam the First strove less to create new
industries than to abolish useless expenditure. Formerly,
mourning had been ruinously expensive. Funerals were
accompanied by extremely costly festivities. These abuses
were aboUshed. Houses and carriages were no longer
allowed to be draped in black, nor were black hveries to be
given to servants. Henceforward people died cheaply.
The military character of the Government affected both
customs and fashions. Society took a military tone. No
one used more than three ells of cloth for a coat. The age of
gallantry passed away. Ladies fled the society of men,
and these compensated themselves with carousals, tobacco,
and buffoonery.

Frederick WilHam the First died on May 17, 1740, and
was succeeded by his son, Frederick the Second, the Great,

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 65

As Frederick loved the French language and French elegance,
was devoted to poetry, music, and art, and hated the army,
he was despised by his coarse and brutal father. He seemed
to him a fop and a degenerate, another Frederick the First.
Men in Prussia and abroad who had suffered under the harsh
and parsimonious government of Frederick Wilham the First
hailed Frederick's advent with joy. They thought that the
rule of the martinet had come to an end, that hfe in Prussia
under the new sovereign would be pleasant and peaceful.

Frederick was twenty-eight years old when he came
to the throne, and he had done his best to deceive the world
as to his real character. He was believed to be witty;
genial, and peaceful, if not unmilitary. In 1737, three
years before he ascended the throne, he pubUshed a book
called ' Considerations sur I'^tat du corps poHtique de
I'Europe,* which concluded with the words ; 'It is a disv
grace for a ruler to ruin his State ; and to attempt to obtain
territories to which one has no justified claim must be
branded as criminal injustice and rapacity."

Two years later, in 1739, Frederick the Great wrote
his celebrated book ' The Anti-Machiavel.' It was pub-
Ushed in 1740, the year when he came to the throne. In
it he stated with the greatest emphasis that pohcy should
be based upon morahty, and laid down the remarkable
doctrine that ruler and subjects were equals, and that the
sovereign was the first servant of the State. In the first
chapter of the ' Anti-Machiavel ' we read : ' A sovereign,'
far from being the absolute master of the people, should
only be the highest official (le fremier tnagistrat).' In
another edition of the same book that expression was re-
placed by 'le premier domestique.' In the 'Memoires de
Brandebourg ' he stated that a ruler should be ' le premier
serviteur de I'Etat.' Frederick the Great, in his ' Anti-
Machiavel,' laid down the duties of kingship as follows :

Eulers ought to be exclusively occupied with the duties

66 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

of study and of government in order to be able to act with
intelligence and in the fulbess of knowledge. Their business ,
consists in thinking correctly and in acting in accordance
with their intelligence and convictions.

In the ' Anti-Machiavel ' Frederick utterly condemned
the policy advocated by the great Florentine statesman. He
castigated the boundless ambitions of rulers, and urged that
the action of sovereigns should be animated by philosophy,
by a lofty idealism, by love of mankind, by virtue, and by
love of peace. We read in the Preface and in Chapter VI :

While Spinoza undermined the foundations of faith;
Machiavelli undermined those of statesmanship. ... I
venture to take up the defence of humanity against that
monster which strives to destroy humanity, and would
oppose reason and justice to sophistry and crime. . , .
Floods which overwhelm the land, the fire of lightning which
reduces towns to ashes, and pestilences which depopulate
entire provinces are not as terrible to the world as the
dangerous morals and the unbridled passions of kings. The
celestial inflictions last only for a time. They rage, only
over a Umited space, and Nature makes good the destruction
they have caused; but for the crimes of kings entire nations
suffer for a very long time. . . .

I would tell the kings that their true political interest
consists in outshining their subjects in virtue. I would
tell them that it is not enough for them to establish for
themselves a great reputation by means of brilliant and
glorious actions, but that on their part actions are required
which will promote the happiness of the human race.

Of all the sentiments which exercise a tyrannic influ-
ence over our minds, none is more fatal, more contrary to
humanity, and more pernicious to the peace of the world
than unrestrained ambition, an unquenchable desire for
false glory.

No terms were strong enough for Frederick with which
to brand a conquering prince, who to him was merely a
crowned villain. He told the world in his ' Anti-Machiavel ' :

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 67

Heroes and highwEtymen possess the same courage and
the same skill. The onlj difference between them is, that a
conqueror is an illustrious thief and that a highwayman is
an obscure one. The former is rewarded for his deeds with
a laurel wreath, and the latter with the rope.

The ' Anti-Maohiavel ' is a psean of peace. Peace is
described as the greatest blessing and war as the greatest
crime. The book significantly ends with the following
powerful sentences :

I feel convinced that if monarchs would fully realise the
miseries which a declaration of war inflicts upon their peoples
I should not appeal in vain to their better feelings. But
their imagination is not sufficiently strong. They do not
appreciate the evils of war ; they do not know them, and
they are protected against war's horrors by their exalted
position. They do not feel the taxes and imposts which
crush the people, the loss of the youth of the nation enrolled
in the army,' the infectious diseases which decimate the troops;
the horrors of battles and sieges, the sufferings of the
wounded and of the mutilated, the sorrows of the orphans
who have lost in their father their only support, the loss of
so many useful men who have been out off before their time.

Sovereigns who see in their subjects merely their slaves
will sacrifice them without pity and see them perish without
regret, but princes who see in other men their equals and
consider themselves as the soul of the body politic, of the
people, will carefully preserve the precious blood of their
subjects.

As government should be based on virtue and on the
love of mankind, it should be carried on with scrupulous
honesty, the more so as honesty is not only a virtue but
an advantage to those who possess it. Treaties should be
observed most religiously and be broken only in case of
direst need. We read in the ' Anti-Machiavel ' :

Both honesty and worldly wisdom demand that sove-
reigns should religiously observe the treaties which they

68 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

have concluded, and that they should scrupulously fulfil
all their stipulations. . . ,

A ruler is sometimes compelled by disagreeable necessity
to break his treaties and alliances. Howeyer, he should
part with his obligations like an honest man. He should
advise his Allies in time of bis intention, and he should
before all never take such an extreme step unless the welfare
of the people and absolute necessity make it inevitable. . . .

Looking solely at the interest of rulers, I assert that it is
very bad policy on their pslrt to act like rascals and to deceive
the world. They deceive only once, and then lose credit
everywhere.

According to the ' Anti-Machiavel,' Frederick's ideal form
of government was a limited monarchy on the Enghsb
model :

It seems. to me that if we look for a model among the
Governments of the present time we find it in England. In
England, Parliament stands between the King and the people.
The English King has the greatest power for doing good, but
none for doing evil.

IHie ' Anti-Machiavel ' is not merely an expression of
the purest and most praiseworthy sentiments, for it con-
tains at the same time many exceedingly shrewd and practical
pohtical observations. Frederick the Great utterly con-
demned entrusting the forces of the country to ministers
or generals, to underlings. In his opinion, the ruler should
command the army in person, and ^ould be supported
by an able general if he did not possese the necessary miUtary
gifts ; ■

A ruler should command his troops in person. His army
is his home, his interest, his duty, his glory. Being the
defender of justice, he ought to be the defender of his
subjects, and as this is one of the most important objects
of his office, he ought not to entrust it to anyone else. Be-
sides, his presence with the army abolishes misunderstaiiding
among his generals and dijfferences between them which are

FOUNDAa?IONS OF GEEMANY*S DIPLOMACY 6d

harmful to his interests and to those of the army. His
presence creates order in the matter of magazines, ammuni-
tion and warlike provisions, without which even a Julius
Caesar would be helpless. As the ruler orders battles to be
fought, he should also command in battle, and should by his
presence increase the courage and confidence of his troops
and animate them by his exainple.

Although Frederick censured in the strongest terms
war in the abstriact> he very sensibly recognised the necessity
of war against oppression and against the overweening
ambitions of another nation. He justified only wars of
defence, and he laid down the theory of the balance of
power in the following sentencee :

Sometimes sovereigns are wise in undertaking wars of
precaution. Such wars are technically wars of attack.
Nevertheless, they are just. When the excessive strength
of a State threatens to overflow ite boundaries and to engulf
the world, wisdom commands us to oppose dykes and to
arrest thereby the torrent while it can still be controlled.
When we see clouds arise on the horizon and when lightning
announces to us the coming storm, the threatened sovereign
who cannot weather it alone will, if he is wise, combine with^
those who are threatened with the same danger, and who
have therefore the same interests.

If the kings of Egypt, Syria, and Macedonia had allied
themflelvefl in time against the power of Eome, Eome would
never have been able to overthrow them. A carefully
devised alliance and an energetically conducted war would
have prevented Eome from achieving its aims and enslaving
the world. It follows that a ruler will act more wisely if
he embarks upon a war of aggression while he is stiU master
of his destiny, while he can stiU choose between war and
peace, than if he should sit still and wait until times have
become desperate, for then a declaration of war on his part
would serve no purpose except to delay his enslavement and
ruin for a little wlule.

It is an excellent maxim that it is better to surprise than

70 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

to be surprised in war, and all great men have taken advan-
tage of it.

The ' Anti-Maohiavel ' was an act of self-revelation
on the part of Frederick. At the end of the sixth chapter
we read the remarkable words : ' Let Caesar Borgia be
the model of those who admire Machiavelli. My model
is Marcus Aurelius.'

We have listened to Frederick's profession of faith
publicly made in the year 1740, when he came to the throne.
His book created an immense sensation throughout Europe,
and impressed rulers and peoples with the idea that a mild,
generous, and peace-loving Sovereign had ascended the
Prussian throne. However, the world was deceived.
While Frederick seemed to be devoted to peace, art, beauty,
and all the virtues, he was devoured by an insatiable thirst
for glory. He was determined to win renown either by
fair means or by foul, and was prepared to use the worst
methods described by Machiavelli to fulfil his ambitions.
He was ready to bring about a war which would cost count-
less lives, and which might end in the utter destruction
of his country and of his dynasty.

The Emperor Charles the Sixth had no son. He desired
that his hereditary rights, after his death, should fall to his
daughter Maria Theresa, and had endeavoured to guarantee
her peaceful succession by treaties with nearly all the
Powers, the so-called Pragmatic Sanction, to which Prussia
also had adhered. Although Prussia had signed that
solemn act which guaranteed Austria's integrity, Frederick
resolved to claim under the flimsiest of pretexts from
Austria four duchies of Silesia which had been in Austria's
undisputed possession ever since the Peace of Westphalia in
1648. We shall learn Frederick's motives for attacking
Austria partly from his correspondence, partly from his
'Histoire de mon Temps.' The latter is an historical
document of the very greatest importance. It is true

FOUNDATIONS OF GBEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 71

its style is occasionally flippant. However, it was written
by Frederick for the guidance of the future rulers of Prussia;
and is therefore an invaluable supplement to his political
and imilitary testaments. Its author told us in the Preface :

I wish to transmit to posterity the principal events in
which I have taken a part, or of which I have been witness,
for the guidance of those who will rule Prussia after me.
Thus they may learn the reasons of my actions, the means
which 1 employed, the enterprises of Prussia's enemies,
the course of diplomatic negotiations, &c.

While in his * Anti-Machiavel ' Frederick described love
of peace and morality as the greatest virtues of a ruler, and
condemned ambition, love of glory, and love of conquest
in unmeasured terms, he revealed his true character in
the Preface of the ' Histoire de mon Temps.' There he
revealed the fact that love of glory and conquest was after
all a virtue and his principal motive. He stated :

The true merit of a good prince consists in being sincerely
attached to the public welfare — to love his country and to
love glory. I mention glory because that happy instinct
which arouses in men a strong desire to acquire a good
reputation is the mainspring which incites them to heroic
actions. The love of glory is the power which awakens the
mind from its lethargy and causes us to embark upon useful,
necessary, and praiseworthy enterprises.

The Emperor Charles the Sixth, a naturally strong
and healthy man, died suddenly and rather unexpectedly
on October 20, 1740, at the early age of fifty-five. Frederick
was at the time in the country, at Eheinsberg, and he
immediately wrote to Jordan and other friends of his that
he would make use of the opportunity and attack Austria
in order to acquire glory, that he wished to employ the
powerful army which Frederick William the First had
created and the war treasure which he had accumulated

72 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

by his thrift. On November 1, 1740, Frederick wrote to
his principal Minister, von Podewils :

... I give yoa a question to solve. When one has the
advantage, should one make use of it ox not ? I am ready
with my troops and with everything else. If I do not use
them now I keep in my hands a powerful but useless instru-
ment. If I use my army it will be said that I have had
the skill of taking advantage of the superiority which I
have over my neighbours.

Frederick made war upon Austria ia 1740, not because
Prussia had any serious and valid claims to Silesia, but
merely because the young King was eager to acquire glory
and had a strong and ready army, while Austria was dis-
organised, was totally unprepared for war, and was likely
to prove an easy prey. The Austrian Government had
fallen into the hands of a young and inexperienced woman,
who lacked good advisers and generals ; and other Powers
were likely to follow Frederick's example, dispute the
Austrian succession, and endeavour to seize part of the
Austrian heritage. The King has told us with great can-
dour — or should one call it cynicism ? — ^in his ' Histoire de
mon Temps ' :

After the conclusion of the Turoo-Austrian War [in
which Austria was badly defeated] the Austrian army was
oompletedly ruined. . . . The larger part of the Austrian
troops remained in Hungary, but they numbered only 43,000
combatants. No one thought of reorganising and complet-
ing the army. Besides these, the Austrians had only
16,000 men in Italy, at most 12,000 in Flanders, while five
or six regimente were distributed in the Hereditary Lands.
Instead of being 175,000 men strong, the Austrian effectives
did not reach 82,000. . . .

Notwithstanding her disorganisation and hidden weak-
ness, Austria was, in 1740, still reckoned among the most
formidable of European Powers. People thought of
Austria's vast resources, and believed that a man of genius

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 73

might put everything right. Meanwhile, Austria replaced
strength with pride, and she sought comfort for her recent
humiliation by thinkirlg of her glorious past. . . .

Prussia had a national income of only seven million
thalers. The provinces were poor and backward owing to
the devastation of the Thirty Years' War, and were unable
to furnish adequate resources to the sovereign. Hence the
ruler had to rely for financing a war on the economies made
in the past. The late King Frederick William the First
had accumulated a war treasure. Although it was not
very large it sufficed. One could make use of one's oppor-
tunities. However, matters had to be managed with
prudent care. One had to avoid a long-drawn-out war, and
to hasten a decision.

It was most awkward that Prussia had no regulat shape.
The provinces of the country were small in size, and were
spread all about Central Germany from Poland to Brabant.
Her geographical position gave Pruseia many neighbours,
more than she would have had if her territory had been
rounded off and formed a soHd block.

As matters stood, Prussia could go to war only if she was
supported either by Fnance or by England. One could
march hand in hand with France, for that country thirsted
for glory and desired to humble the House of Austria.
From the Enghsh one could have obtained nothing except
subsidies, which they would pay only for the promotion of a
policy favourable to British interests, while Kussia had as
yet not sufficient weight in the balance of European power.

After the death of the Emperor, Austria was in a most
difficult position. The national finances were in confusion.
The army had fallen to pieces and was disheartened by its
failure in the War with the Turks. The Ministers were dis-
united. At the head of the Government was a young woman
without experience [Maria Theresa, who was only twenty-
three years old] who had to defend a disputed succession.
Hence the Austrian Government did not appear redoubtable.

The King of Prussia was certain that he was able to
obtain allies. Frederick's determination to make war upon
Austria was confirmed by the death of the Empress Anna of

74 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Eussia. Through her demise the Eussian crown fell to the
youthful Grand Duke Ivan," a son of a Princess of Mecklen-
burg and of Prince Anton Uhrich of Brunswick, and the
latter was Frederick's brother-in-law. To all appearances,
Eussia would, therefore, during the minority of the young
Czar, be more interested in maintaining order in the interior
of the Empire than in defending the Pragmatic Sanction in
Austria. ... '

Marshal Miinnich, who had caused the elevation of the
Prince of Brunswick and of his Mecklenburg consort, was
the most eminent personage in Eussia. He wielded for, all
practical purposes the sovereign power during the Grand
Duke's minority. The Prince of Brunswick was weak and
unintelligent. His wife was capricious, and she possessed
all the faults of an ill-educated woman. Under the pretext
of congratulating the Prince of Brunswick and his wife/'
the King sent Baron Winterf eld on a mission to Eussia. His
real reason for sending Winterfeld was to gain over Marshal
Miinnich, who was Winterfeld's father-in-law. He wished
to induce the Field-Marshal to favour the designs which
Prussia was on the point of carrying out. The success of
Winterfeld's mission was as great as could be desired.

Although every precaution was taken to disguise the
intended expedition against Austria, it was impossible to
accumulate perishable provisions, to establish magazines,
to assemble artillery, and to move large bodies of troops
without attracting attention. The public began to suspect
that some enterprise was about to be undertaken. The
Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, Damrath, advised his Court
that a storm was brewing which might sweep over Silesia.
The Council in Vienna replied : ' We will not and cannot
believe your news.' Nevertheless, the Austrian Court
sent the Marquis Botta to Berlin nominally with the mission
of congratulating King Frederick on his succession, but
really in order to find out whether the Austrian Ambassador
was right or whether he had given a false alarm. . . .

Although King Frederick was firmly determined upon
his policy, he thought it useful to make an attempt at
arriving at an agreement with Vienna. With this object

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 75

in view, Count Goiter was dispatched to Vienna. He was
to declare to Maria Theresa that King Frederick would
assist her against all her enemies if she would cede Silesia
to him. As that offer was likely to be rejected, Count Gotter
was authorised to declare war on Prussia's behalf. However,
the Prussian army travelled more quickly than the Prussian
Ambassador. It entered Silesia two days before Count
Gotter arrived in Vienna.

iiTwenty battalions and thirty-six squadrons were directed
towards Silesia, and these were followed by six battalions
^ho were to besiege the fortress of Glogau. Although that
n\iaiber was quite small it seemed sufficient to seize an
UDitefended country. . . .

On December 23, 1740, the Prussian army entered
SilesiJk. On their march the troops distributed everywhere
proclatnations in which were shown the rights which the
House of Brandenburg had to Silesia. At the same time
manifestoes were distributed in which it was stated that
the Prussians took possession of Silesia in order to defend
that country against attacks from a third Power. Thus
it was hinted Vith sufficient clearness that Prussia would not
abandon Silesia without fighting. At the same time, in
consequence of these proclamations, the nobility and people
of Silesia did not look upon the Prussians who entered their
province as hostile invaders, but considered their arrival
as an endeavour on the part of a neighbour and ally to
assist in the defence of that province against third
parties.

Frederick the Great has told us in his ' Guerre de Sept
Ans ' :

If sovereigns wish to make war they are not restrained
by arguments suitable for a public proclamation. They
determine the course upon which they wish to embark,
make war and leave to some industrious jurist the trouble
of justifying their action.

Frederick's intention to attack Austria without cause
' surprised and scandalised even his best friends. Bas

76 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

intimate friend Jordan wrote to the King from Berlin on
December 14, 1740 :

Les critiques croient la d&narche pr6sent6 direotement
opposee aux maximes renfermees dans le dernier chapitre
de I'Antimachiavel.

To this the King replied :

Laisse parler les envieux et les ignorants ; ce ne seront
jamais eux qui serviront de boussole ^ mes desseins, mais
bien la gloire. 3'ea. suis penetr6 plus que jamais, mes
troupes en ont le coeur enfl6, et je reponds du succes.

On November 1, 1740, Prederiok- had expressed to his
Minister, von Podewils, as we have seen, hia determination
to attack Austria. Five days later, on Novembet 6, he
requested Professor von Ludewig, who during forty years
had collected material showing Prussia's claims to four
Silesian duchies, to send him a memoir for his justificationii

Although Frederick had in his ' Anti-Machiavel ' recom-
mended honesty and straightforwardness in diplomatic
negotiations, he acted with incredible unscrupulousness,
Writing on November 15 to hia Ambassador in Vienna;
he stated that the position in Europe had become so critical;
and that the balance of power in Europe> the preservation
of the German Empire and German hberty were so much
endangered, that he waa forced to employ violent remedies.
Hence he had resolved to invade Silesia, partly in order
to prevent that province being seized by another State;
partly in order to be able to support and save Austria
from the ruin with which she was threatened. He
dwelt on the purity of his motives, and stated that he
was ready to guarantee the Austrian possessions against
all comers and to conclude an alliance with Austria if that
country would cede Silesia to Prussia.

Very naturally, his ' offer ' was declined.

Frederick invaded Silesia before Count Gotter, the bearer
of his ultimatum, had arrived in Vienna. The province

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 77

stood open to the Prussian troops, and was entirely un-
defended. In order to disarm resistance on the part of the
inhabitants, Frederick informed them by a Proclamation;
dated December 1, that, as the Emperor had died without-
leaving an heir male, the Austrian succession had been
challenged, that there was a danger that other Powers
might seize Silesia, and that he occupied that province
with his troops, ' not at all in the intention of insulting
Her Majesty, Maria Theresa, but, on the contrary, in
order to manifest his friendship with the house of Austria,
to promote its true interests;^ and to contribute to its
preservation ; that no hostility was to be expected from
the Prussian troops, and that he hoped that the inhabitants
would act like good neighbpurs.'

That Proclamation singularly resembles the one
addressed to the inhabitants of Belgium at the beginning
of the present war.

Wishing to deceive the other European Powers as
to his intentions as long as possible, Frederick sent, on
December 6, 1740, a declaration to the principal embassies;
according to which the invasion of Silesia was not intended
to be a hostile attack, for it was worded as follows ;

JiO Eoi, en faisant entrer ses troupes en Silesia, ne s'est
porte k cette demarche par aucune mauvaise intention contre
la cour de Vienne et moins encore dans celle de vouloir
troubler le repos de I'Empire. Sa Majeste s'est cru indis-
pensablement oblige d'ayoir sans delai recours k oe moyen
pour revendiquer les droits incontestablee de sa maison
sur ce duoh6, fondes sur des anciens pactes de famille et
de confraternity entre les electeurs de ' Brandebourg et
les princes de Silesie, aussi bien que sur d'autres titres
respectables.

Les circonstances presentes et la juste crainte de se voir
prevenir par ceux qui ferment dee pretentions sur la succes-
sion de feu I'Empereur ont demande de la promptitude dans
cette entreprise, et de la vigueur dans son execution. Mais

78 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

ei ces raisons n'ont pas voulu permettre au Eoi de s'eclaircir
prealablement 1^-dessus avec la reine de Hongrie et de
BohSme, elles n'empScheront jamais S.M. de prendre tou-
jours les interets de la maison d'Aiitricbe fortement k coeur,
et d'en etre le plus ferme appui et soutien, dans toutes les
occasions qui se pr^senterout.

In a letter sent to the King of England on December 4,
he stated that he had invaded Silesia in order to guarantee
Germany's liberty and to protect Austria, and that he was
acting in Austria's true interests. He wrote :

Monsieur mon Er&re : La grande confiance que j'ai dans
I'amitie de Votre Majesty, et nos interets communs dans les
conjonctures critiques d'^ present, m'obligent h Lui com-
muniquer sans reserve mes sentiments sur les mesures k
prendre dans la situation epineuse des affaires ot. I'Europe se
trouve maintenant, et h Lui faire part en meme temps de la
d-marche k laquelle j'ai et6 oblig6 de recourir, pour remedier
promptement au danger dont I'Europe entiere, la liberty
de I'Allema^e, et le syst^me de I'Empire sont menaces
§galement.

La maison d'Autriche, en butte & tous ses ennemis,
depuis la perte de son chef et le delabrement total de ses
affaires, est sur le point de succomber sous les efforts, de ceux
qui font ouvertement des pretentions sur la succession, ou
qui m6ditent en secret d'en arracher une partie ; et comme
par la situation de mes fitats je me trouve le plus int6ress5
h en empScher les suites et k prevenir surtout ceux qui
pourraient avoir form6 le dessein de s'emparer de la Sil6sie,
qui fait la surety et la barri&re de mes provinces limitrophes,
je n'ai pu me dispenser de faire entrer mes troupes dans ce
duche, pour emp^cher que d'autres, dans les conjonctures
pr6sentes, ne s'en emparent k mon grand prejudice et k
celui des droits incontestables que ma maison a eus de tout
temps sur la plus grande partie de ce pays-1^, comme je ne
manquerai, pas de le manifester en temps et lieu.

Mon intention en cela n'a d'autre but que la conservation
et le veritable bien de la maison d'Autriche,

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 79

Je me suis mSme expliqu6 sur cela par mon ministre h la
cour de Vienne d'une maniere que, si elle entend ses v^ritables
interSts, eUe ne balancera pas uu moment h j donner les
mains. . . .

In striking at unprepared Austria Frederick bad well
calculated bis cbances. Austria and all tbe otber Powers
were unready for war. Tbe King tells us in bis ' Histoire
de mon Temps,' in tones of satisfaction :

Towards the end of 1740 all tbe Powers discussed,
negotiated, intrigued, and strove to come to some arrange-
ment, to form alliances. However, none of tbe European
Powers disposed of troops ready for immediate action. None
had bad the time to accumulate magazines and stores. So
King Frederick made use of this state of affairs in order to
carry out his great plan.

Frederick no longer considered his subjects as bis equals
whose lives should be cherished, as he had done in tbe
' Anti-Macbiavel.' He wrote callously in this ' Histoire
de mon Temps ' : ' When Kings play for provinces, men
are merely gambling counters.' Summing up the events
of the first Silesian war, tbe King stated :

Tbe acquisition of Silesia increased Prussia's revenues
by 8,600,000 tbalers. The greater part of that sum was used
to increase the army. In 1741 it consisted of 106 battalions
and 191 squadrons, and we shall presently see tbe use which
Frederick made of these troops. . . •

Silesia was united to Prussia. A campaign of two years
bad suf&ced for conquering that important province. Tbe
War Fund which the late King bad collected was nearly
exhausted. Still, it is very cheap to acquire States when
they cost only seven or eight millions. Chance helped in
carrying through tbe enterprise successfully. It was neces-
sary that France should allow herself to be dragged into
the war with Austria. . . .

The principal cause of tbe successful conquest of Silesia
was tbe army which had been formed in the course of twenty-

80 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

two years by an admirable discipline and which was superior
to the troops of all the other States of Europe. Besides, the
Prussian generals were true citizens. ,The ministers were
wise and incorruptible, and the whole enterprise wag accom^^
panied by that good fortune which often favours youth
but shuns old age. If that great undertaking had failed;
King Frederick would have been called a foolish prince. He
would have been reproached for having begun an enterprise
that was beyond his strength. Owing to lus success he was
declared to be lucky. Indeed, Fortune makes one's reputation.
Fortunate men are praised and unfortunate men are blamed.

Silesia was to be merely a stepping-stone towards
further conquests. Describing the events of the year 1744,
Frederick the Great significantly wrote in his ' Histoire
de mon Temps ' : ' The acquisition of Silesia had given
new strength to Prussia. Hence Prussia was now able
to carry out with energy the plans of the ruler.'

Frederick's calculations had proved correct. His
excellent and well-led army defeated the slowly gathering
Austrian troops. Other States desired to take advantage
of Austria's weakness and to share in the plunder. France
was made to play the same part by Frederick the Second
which Austria-Hungary has been made to play by William
the Second. In May 1741 Frederick concluded at Nymphen-
burg with France and Bavaria an alliance against Austria.
In June 1742 a separate peace was made between Prussia and
Austria at Breslau whic^ gave to Prussia all Silesia. Its
possession increased Prussia's population by no less than
one half.

France and Bavaria, Prussia's AlHes, continued the
war against Austria. Gradually Austria gathered strength
and defeated her two opponents. Fearing that Austria,
having defeated Prance and Bavaria, might retake Silesia, •
Frederick resolved to recommence the war and to attack
her before she had become too strong. He concluded some
aUiances, and in 1744 once more acted as the aggressor, j

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 81

Again he strove to deceive the world as to his mdtives,
and endeavoured to justify his conduct in an ' Expose des
motifs qui ont oblige le Eoi de donner des troupes auxiliaires
k TEmpereur,' ^ which concluded with the words : ' En
un mot, le Eoi ne demande rien, et il ne s'agit point de ses
interSts personnels ; mais Sa Majeste n'a recours aux armes
que pour rendre la liberte k I'Empire, la dignity k TEinpereiu:,
et le repos.^ I'Europe.'

Once more Frederick the Great was victorious, but
as his position had become precarious he made peace with
Austria at Dresden. That peace merely confirmed the peace
previously made. No territorial gain rewarded Frederick
for the second war. He was no doubt, disappointed,
for his ambitions were by no means satisfied by the con-
quest of Silesia. In 1762, four years before the outbreak
of the Seven Years' War, he wrote a political testament
in which he urged upon his successors that they should
conquer Polish Prussia, Swedish Pomerania, and especially
Saxony, which country he considered a particularly valu-
able and desirable possession. In his political testament
of 1776, the ' Expose du Gouvernement Prussien,' Frederick
wrote ;

De nScessite il faut s'emparer de la Saxe. , . . S'il
s'agit des vues poUtiques d'acquisition qui conviennent k
cette monarchie, les Etats de la Saxe sont sans contredit
ceux qui lui conviendraient le mieux, en I'arrondissant et lui
formant une barri^re par les montagnes qui separent la Saxe
de la Boheme. . . . Cette acquisition est d'une necessite
indispensable pour donner k cet Etat la consistance dont il
manque. Car, des qu'on est en guerre, I'ennemi pent
avancer de plain pied jusqu'^ Berlin sans trouver la moindre
opposition dans son chemin.

Meanwhile the world had no longer any illusions as to
the character of Frederick the Second. It had recognised

' This Emperor, who disputed Maria Theresa's suocession, was Charles
the Seventh, Elector of Bavaria. He was set up by Frederick the Great,

o

82 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

that the King was not merely a poet, a philosopher, and
a champion of all the virtuea, but that in him were combined
unscrupulousness with craft, and craft with power. The
nations around saw in Frederick a danger to the peace of
Europe, and their alarm was increased by the fact that
Frederick's diplomacy was feverishly active in every quarter,
and that his army was constantly increasing in strength.

Very naturally his neighbours wished to protect them-
selves in time. Austria tod Saxony concluded an alhance
in 1745, and Eussia joined it. Through the bribery of
some officials, Frederick had become acquainted with
these arrangements which were to restrain his aggression,
He was annoyed, and in 1756 he resolved to embark upon
a third war of attack, and he began it by invading coveted
Saxony in August of that year. As usual he made a surprise
attack. When, in Jujy, the Saxon Covact became seriously
concerned at Prussia's miKtary preparations, the King
wrote on the 10th of that month to his Ambassador at
Dresden :

I find it somewhat extraordinary that Saxony has become
alarmed at my so-called military preparations, and that I
should be believed to be organising three armies for war.
You must positively assure those who speak to you on the
subject that no army is being formed, that only some regi-
ments are being moved according to the ordinary routine
as they are in other countries, such as Austria.

The following month Frederick invaded Saxony with a
large army, ostensibly on the ground that necessity com-
pelled him to attack Austria by way of Saxony, because
Austria intended to strike at Prussia. Saxony was thus made
another Belgium. On August 26 the King wrote to his
representative at Dresden in tones of unctuous
rectitude :

The unjust proceedings and dangerous plans of Austria
are forcing me to violent measures, which I should like to

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 83

have avoided out of love of peace and of public tranquillityi
Circumstances compel me to march my army into Saxony
in order to reach Bohemia. ... In making this declaration
in a most pohte and tactful manner to the King, you should
impress upon him the fact that necessity compels me, and
that the Vienna Court is solely responsible for these hard
and disagreeable consequences.

The British Ambassador Mitchell reported on August 27
to his Government a conversation with Frederick the
Great in which the King had stated that he was compelled
to forestall the Austrians, and that ' nothing but the absolute
necessity of his affiairs made him take that step.' We
are reminded of the German declaration made at the beginning
of the present war that France's intention to attack Ger-
many by way of Belgium compelled her to invade that
country in self-defence.

Having occupied Dresden, Frederick had the archives
searched. The defensive treaties between Saxony, Austria,
and Eussia and much correspondence were discovered,
and these were pubhshed and described to the world as a
vile conspiracy against Prussia. WiUiam the Second
merely repeated at Brussels the performance of his ancestor
at Dresden.

Having invaded Saxony, Frederick explained his conduct
to the world in the usual way. The war had been forced
upon him. Once more he was the innocent victim. In his
celebrated 'Memoire Eaisonn§,' justifying the invasion,
which was distributed in thousands of copies in all countries,
and which may be found in Hertzberg's ' Eecueil,' we read :

Les raisons, qui ont mis le Eoi dans la n6cessit6 de
prendre les armes contre la Cour de Vienne et de s'assurer
pendant cette guerre des fitats h6reditaires ^ du Eoi de
Pologne, sont fondles sur les regies les plus exactes de r§quit6
et de la justice. Ce ne sont pas motifs d'ambition ni des

* That is to say. Saxony. Eiederiok Augustus the Second, Elector of
Sasony by inheritance, was, lik^ his father, the elected King of Poland.

84 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

vues d'aggrandissement. O'est une suite de projets, de
complots et de traHisons de la part de oes deux Cours qui
ont oblige Sa Majeste de souger k sa defense et ^ sa surete.
Les decouvertes qu'Blle a faites sur cette importante matiere
mettent cette verity dans tout son jour et forment une
^spece de demonstration de la justice de sa cause et des
mauvaia procedes de ceux qui I'ont forcee d'en venir h
ces tristes extremites. . . .

In German and even in English histories may be read
the fable that a European Coalition had been formed with
the object of despoiling Prussia, that Prussia was forced
into the Seven Years' War. Yet Count Hertzberg, who
wrote the ' Memoire Eaisoime ' at Frederick's orders, and who
conducted the Prussian Foreign Office in Frederick's time dur-
ing more than two decades, admitted himself in a paper read
before the Berlin Academy in 1787, the year after Frederick's
death, that in 1756 there had been no conspiracy against
Prussia and no plan to attack her ; that combined action
had been planned by Austria, Saxony, and Eussia only
if Prussia should be the aggressor. A full account of his
lecture may be found in Schoell's ' Histoire Abregee des
Traites de Paix.' The Prussian historian von Eaumer more
recently stated that ' Frederick had not proved, and could
not prove, that a formal o£fensive alliance against him
had been concluded between Austria, Eussia, and Saxony.'

Frederick the Great, hke Napoleon the First, kept his
own counsel. We do not know for certain why he invaded
Saxony in 1756. As he was not threatened by a hostile
coalition as he alleged, as the second Silesian War had not
' brought him the hoped-for territorial increment, and as in
1752 ^ he had, in his political testament, urged his successors
to acquire Saxony, one may safely conclude that he went
to war in the hope of acquiring that country,

Germany's assertions that a conspiracy was formed

, ^ Ab we have seen, he also urged the acquiution of Saxony in hia
later ' Political Testament ' of 1776.

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 85

against her by King Edward and Sir Edward Grey finds its
exact counterpart in Frederick's assertions made in 1756.

The peculiar attitude of modem Germany towards
treaties, which are treated as scraps of paper if they are
inconvenient to her and as sacred undertakings if she can
benefit by them, is based on the precedents set by Frederick
the Great and upon his teachings. In his ' Anti-Machiavel '
the King urged that honesty was the best policy, that faith
should be kept by rulers, that treaties should be religiously
observed, as will be seen by reference to the extracts given
at the beginning of this chapter. These views soon changed
when a change was deemed advantageous. In the Preface
of the ' Histoire de mon Temps ' we read :

Posterity will perhaps see with surprise in these Memoirs
accounts of treaties which have been concluded and broken.
Although examples of broken treaties are common, the
author of these Memoirs would require better reasons than
precedent for explaining his conduct in breaking treaties.
A sovereign must be guided by the interest of the State.
In the following cases aUiances may be broken :

(1) When one's ally does not fulfil his engagements ;

(2) When one's ally wishes to deceive one, and when one
cannot by any other means prevent him ;

(3) When necessity (force majeure) compels one ;

(4) When one lacks means to continue the war.

By the will of Pate wealth influences everything. Eulers
are slaves of their means. To promote the interest of their
State is a law to them, a law which is inviolable. If a ruler
must be ready to sacrifice his Hfe for the welfare of his
subjects, he must be still more ready to sacrifice, for the
benefit of his subjects, solemn engagements which he has
undertaken if their observance would be harmful to his
people. Cases of broken treaties may be encountered
everywhere. It is not our intention to justify all breaches
of treaty. Nevertheless, I venture to assert that there are
cases when necessity or wisdom, prudence or consideration
of the welfare of the people, oblige sovereigns to transgress

86 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

because the violation of a treaty is often the only means
•whereby complete ruin can be avoided;.

To me it seems clear and obvious that a private person
must scrupulously observe the given word, even if he should
have bound himself without sufficient thought. If a private
person breaks his contract the damaged person can have
recourse to the protection of the law, and however the
decision may go, only an individual suffers. But to what
tribunal can a sovereign appeal if another sovereign breaks
his treaty ? The word of a private person involves in
misfortune only a single human being, while that of sove-
reigns can create calamities for entire nations. The question
may therefore be summed up thus : Is it better that a nation
should perish, or that a sovereign should break his treaty ?
Who can be stupid enough to hesitate in answering this
question ?

In other words, advantage was to decide whether a
treaty was to be kept or broken, Frederick broke his
treaties shamelessly. He abandoned his ally. Prance,
because it suited him, as he frankly admitted in his ' Histoire
de mon Temps.' The King wrote :

We must now touch the reasons which led to an armistice
between Prussia and Austria. This is a deUcate question.
The pohcy of the King was wrongful and shady (scdbreuse).

The object of the war, as far as King Frederick was
concerned, was to conquer Silesia. He concluded alliances
with Bavaria and Prance only with that object in view.
However, France and her Allies looked upon the object of
the alliance in a different way. The Cabinet at Versailles
was convinced that Austria had arrived at the hour of her
destiny, and that her power would be destroyed for all time.
The downfall of Austria was incompatible with the hberty
of Germany, and did in no way suit the King of Prussia, who
worked for the elevation of his dynasty, and who did not
intend to sacrifice his troops in order to create new rivals to
himself. . . .

Had King Frederick too strenuously supported the

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 87

operations of the French troops, their success would have
been dangerous to himself. From an Ally he would have
become a subject of France. . . .

Queen Maria Theresa stood at the edge of a precipice.
An armistice gave her breathing time, and the King could
break the armistice at any moment convenient to himself.

France learned the meaning of the saying, ' travailler
pour le Eoi de Prusse.'

In deserting France, Frederick explained his conduct
in a letter written June 10, 1742, to Cardinal de Fleury,
the principal Minister of France, in which he stated :

L'avenir ne m'offre que des perspectives funestes, et dans
une situation aussi critique (quoique dans I'amertume de
mon cceur) je me suis vu dans la necessite de me sauver du
naufrage et de gagner un asile. Si des conjonctures f acheusea
m'ont oblige de prendre un parti que la necessite justifie,
vous me trouverez toujours fidele a remplir les engagements
dont I'exeoution ne depend que de moi.

These mendacious professions of impotence to continue
the war glaringly contrast with the real reasons for abandon-
ing France given by the King in his posthumously published
history.

Although Frederick readily broke treaties which were
not advantageous to himself, he condemned in the strongest
terms those nations which failed to fulfil their engage-
ments towards Prussia. To the end of his days he expressed
hatred and contempt for England because she had broken
her treaty with Prussia towards the end of the Seven- Years'
War. Modem Germany tells us that she was justified in
breaking her treaty regarding Belgium, but that Italy
acted criminally in refusing to participate in the Belgian
crime.

Bismarck induced Italy to join the Austro-German
Alliance, as he repeatedly stated, not so much in the hope
of obtaining her support in time of need, but in order to

88 OfflE I'OtJNDATlONS OP GEEMANY

keep her neutral in case of a great war. Herein he followed
Frederick's teachings, for the King wrote in his ' Anti-
Machiavel ' :

It is frequently asserted that treaties are useless because
their stipulations are hardly ever fulfilled, and that men are
no more scrupulous now than they were in former ages. To
those who argue thus I would reply that although both in
ancient and in modern times rulers have failed to fulfil their
treaty obhgations, it is always advantageous to conclude
treaties. An ally is an enemy the less, and if your ally does
not come to your aid, you induce him by means of an alliance
to remain neutral — at least for some time.

Sham alliances were highly valued by Frederick. He
wrote to his Minister von Podewils on June Ij 1742 :

For the future security of Prussia's new possessions I
rely upon a good and numerous army, a large war treasure,
strong fortresses, and sham alliances — ^that is, upon alliances
which at least will make some impression upon outsiders. . . .

The easiest way to neutrahse a powerful country and ,
a possible future enemy seemed to the King an alliance
with that very State. Therefore we read in his ' Expose
du Gouvemement Prussien,' his ' Political Testament ' of
1776 :

One of the first political principles is to endeavour to
become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may
become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason
we have an alliance with Eussia, and thus we have our
back free as long as the aUiance lasts.

During the last two centuries all the Eussian Czars
except pne married German princesses. German princesses —
the supply is very large — ^have sat upon many foreign,
thrones and often influenced the policy of nations in Ger-
many's favour. Prusso-Germany's matrimonial poKcy was
estabUshed on a broad basis and most highly developed

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'g DIPLOMACY 89

by Frederick the Great. In order to influence Eussia's
policy in Prussia's favour he strove in 1744 to direct Eussia's
policy through German influence in the ruling family as he
had done in 1740. The King has told us in his ' Histoire
de mon Temps ' :

Nothing would have been more opposed to Prussia's
interests than to allow the formation of a matrimonial
alliance between Eussia and a Saxony hostile to Prussia.
At the same time, nothing would have seemed more un-
natural than to sacrifice a Prussian princess of the blood
royal in order to dislodge the Saxon princess whom the Saxon
Court wished to give to the Grand Duke to wife. Another
expedient was necessary. Of all the German princesses of
marriageable age none seemed more suitable for Eussia and
none seemed more Hkely to serve the interests of Prussia at
the Eussian Court than the Princess of Zerbst.

With the object of supplanting the Saxon princess by
the Princess of Zerbst, compUcated intrigues were entered
upon, and they proved completely successful. The Eussian
Czarina was prevailed upon to consent, and the Princess
of Zerbst, known to history as Catherine the Second, the
Great, went to Eussia and influenced Eussian pohcy in
Prussia's favour. By making similar use of family in-
fluences, Frederick the Great strove to direct, in Prussia's
favour, the pohcy of Sweden, which then was still a very
important State. Frederick has told us in his ' Histoire
de mon Temps ' :

When the Eussian Czarina had agreed to it that the
Princess of Zerbst should marry the Grand Duke, her son,
matters were made easy for marrying Princess Ulrike of
Prussia to the new Crown Prince of Sweden. Prussia
founded her security upon these two family alliances with
Eussia and Sweden. A Prussian Princess close to the
Swedish throne could not possibly be hostile to her brother
King Frederick, and a German Princess married to a Eussian
Grand Duke, a Princess who had been brought up and

90 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

educated on Prussian territory and who owed her elevation
to the action of the Prussian King, could not desert him
without ingratitude.

Describing the events of the year 1773, King Frederick
stated in his ' Memoires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg ' :

By careful management and intrigue the King succeeded
in inducing the Eussian Czarina to choose the Princess of
Darmstadt, the sister of the Princess of Prussia, as a wife for
her son the Grand Duke Paul. In order to have influence in
Eussia it was necessary for Prussia to place there persons
who were hkely to favour Prussia. It was to be hoped that
the Prince of Prussia, when succeeding King Frederick,
would be able to draw great advantage from the fact that his
wife's sister had married the Eussian heir to the throne.

Bribery, corruption, and spying have been among the
most conspicuous characteristics of the pohcy of modem
Germany. German money is lavishly spent abroad for
influencing opinion and the action of foreign GovemmentSj
and according to apparently reliable reports the German
Emperor himself has taken a strong and personal interest
in the more seamy side of the German Secret Service. If
these reports are true, he has acted as a. faithful disciple
of Frederick the Great. In his time spying, corruption;
and bribery were brought to the highest perfection.

We have seen in the beginning of this chapter that
Frederick, when intending to attack Austria for the first
time in 1740, sent to Eussia Baron Winterfeld. He was
to influence his father-in-law, Field-Marshal Miinnich, who
at the time was all-powerful in Eussia, and he was to resort
freely to bribery. On December 6, 1740, Frederick wrote
to his Ambassador at Petrograd :

You must use all your skill to gain Field-Marshal Miimiich
to my interests, and must spare neither compliments nor
promises of gratitude. You can assure him that if, by
employing his authority and credit, he induces the Eegent

I'OUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 91

to support me, I will give him and his posterity in perpetuity
the estate of Biegen, which has a yearly income of more than
5000 thalers, and I shall give him as well the County, of
Wartehberg in Silesia. ...

As both the properties mentioned were in Silesia; which
Frederick was about to overrun and conquer, Miinnich
was directly interested in the success of Frederick's piratical
expedition.

Two days later he wrote in the instructions for Count
Gotter, who was sent to Vienna with that celebrated ulti-
matum to Maria Theresa which arrived two days after
the Prussian army had invaded Silesia :

If the Cabinet in Vienna can be gained to Prussia's
interests by bribery, my Ambassador, von Borcke, had
instructions given him on the 7th of this month to offer up
to 200,000 thalers to the Grand Chancellor, Count Zinzen-
dorff, and 100,000 thalers to the Secretary of State, Toussaint.
If others have to be bribed, Count Gotter should let me know,
and I will give my orders.

On January 11, 1741, Frederick wrote to his Ambassador
in Petrpgrad, von Mardefeld, that if the estates which were
to be offered to Field-Marshal Miiimich by his son-in-law.
Count Winterfeld, Prussia's special envoy, should not
suffice to gain him over to Prussia's interests, Winterfeld
could dispose of 100,000 thalers as well. In 1745 Herr
von Mardefeld was ordered to offer 40,000 thalers to Count
Bestucheff if Eussia would remain neutral during the second
Silesian War.

When, in the beginning of the Seven Years' War, Frederick
the Great became hard pressed by his enemies, it occurred
to him that he might possibly detach France by bribing
Madame de Pompadour, the all-powerful mistress of King
Louis the Fifteenth. The poUtical correspondence of the
Kjng, published on behalf of the German Government in
a large number of volumes, contains a number of references

92 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

to that interesting transaction. For instance, on July 7*
1757, Frederick wrote to his sister :

My deab Sisteb, — It is too kind of you to take so much
trouble with my affairs. • I &ih ashamed to abuse your
kindness. Still, as you are willing to promote the con-
clusion of peace, 1 would ask you to send M. de Mirabeau to
France. I will gladly bear the expenses of his journey, and
he may offer to the King's favourite a sum up to 500,000
thalers for the conclusion of a peace. He may even increase
his offer far above the sum named, if Madame de Pompadour
should bind herself to procure to Prussia not only peace, but
also some advantages. You understand, of course, that this
business must be treated with the greatest delicacy, and that
my name must not be connected with it. If the people in
England should get wind of this transaction, all would be
lost. ...

Soon Frederick increased the bribe which he was wiUing
to offer to Madame de Pompadour. On September 26,
1767, he wrote to Colonel von Balbi :

; . . I sincerely hope that the secret negotiations which
I have opened will substantiate, unless cessions of territory
should be required. As I have been informed that the
transaction might be soon concluded if I could make up
my mind to cede t'o Madame de Pompadour the principality
of Neuchatel and Valangin for life, I have much pleasure
in telling you that I shall raise no difficulties, and I authorise
you expressly by the present letter to mention this offer to
your friends so that they can boldly insinuate and promise
to Madame de Pompadour on my behalf that I shall cede to
her the principahty named for hfe as soon as peace is con-
cluded between France and Prussia. The revenues of the ,
principality will be hers, and I trust that she will use her
whole influence so that the conditions of peace will be
advanta,geous, or at least httle onerous, to Prussia. . . .

Frederick the Great achieved his master stroke in
(iorruption during the period of peace which preceded the

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 93

Seven Years' War, when men in the Austrian and Saxon
Diplomatic Services whom he had bribed delivered to him
the most important secrets of State. The King tells us
in his ' Guerre de Sept Ana ' : '

A man named Weingarten, who was secretary to La
Puebla, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, allowed himself
to be used by King Frederick, and furnished the King with
the most secret correspondence which passed between the
Austrian Ambassador and the Court of Vienna and the Court
of Petersburg,

This man, whose services were exceedingly important
at last became suspected by his master. He was lucky
enough to notice it in time. He escaped from the Embassy
and claimed the King's protection. He was withdrawn
with difficulty from the prosecution which the Austrian
Ambassador set on foot, was hidden and sent to Kolberg,
where he changed his name.

Although that source of information was thus cut off,
there was another channel by which the King received
reliable information regarding the plans of his enemies. He
was well served by an employee of the Secret Chancellery
of Saxony at Dresden. That man handed every week to
the Prussian Minister to Saxony the despatches which the
Dresden Court received from Petersburg and Vienna, and
he also supplied him with copies of all the treaties deposited
in the Dresden archives.

The employee of the Foreign Office at Dresden mentioned
by the Kiag was the notorious Friedrich Wilhelm Menzel.
He was engaged, not by one of the King's underhngs without
his knowledge, but by the direct orders of Frederick himself,
and the King settled all the details regarding this man
in a letter sent on April 8, 1752, to von Maltzahn, his Am-
bassador in Dresden. We read in it :

■Quant k celui que le sieur Eehnitz vous a amene [Menzel]
je vols, par les echantillons que vous m'avez marques de
son savoir-faire, que ce sera un sujet bien utile et dont nous

94 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Baurions tirer des connaissances trSs utiles. C'est aussi
pourquoi vous devez vous arranger et prendre les concerts
qu'il faut avec lui.

J'ai r6solu de lui faire payer una pension jusqu'^ 2000
6cus par au, selon que vous conviendrez avec lui, et men
conseiller prive Eichel a mes ordres de vous faire parvenir
cet argent en tels termes que vous le desirerez, soit par des
expres ou par des remises en argent, tout comme vous le
jugerez convenable.

Pour vous mettre aussi en 6tat de faire d'abord des
largesses k cet homme, j'ai fait ordonner par le conseiller
prive Eichel au banquier Splitberger de vous remettre la
somme de 500 6cus sous le pr6texte d'un argent qui lui
avait ete remis par vos parents, afin de vous le faire payer
k Dresde.

Au surplus, vous vous garderez bien de ne rien communi-
quer au departement des affaires etrang§res des avis que vous
tirerez de ce canal, sans mes ordres expr§s, parceque je
veux, pour etre d'autant mieux assure du secret, que tout
ceci ne passe que par mes mains seules. C'est aussi pourquoi
vous ne me ferez autrement vos rapports k ce sujet que par le
ciiiffre immediat dont vous etes en possession.

Quant au sieur Eehnitz, comme je crains tout comme
vous qu'il ne g^te par sa conduite imprudente et inconsideree
toute cette affaire vous t3,cherez k le disposer de partir le
plus t6t possible de Dresde en I'assurant que ses affaires
particulieres qu'il a 1^, n'en souffriraient pas, et que je lui
saurais gr6, s'il voulait faire un tour dans le pays de Saxe
pour engager et m'amener ici quelques Parchentmach&r
[skilled artizans] que je voudrais bien etablir dans ce pays-ci.

Je remets tout k votre dexterity et prudence et attendrai
votre rapport sur la manike que vous aurez tout arrange.

Pebdeeic.

Between 1752 and 1756 Menzel betrayed the diplomatic
secrets of Saxony and of her Allies to Frederick. How
greatly the King was interested in Menzel's activity will
be seen by the fact that he is mentioned or alluded to in
jio less than thirty-six of the King's published letters.

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 95

Frederick cherished him like the apple of his eye, and
frequently had enjoined care upon him, sent him on hoh-
days, &c.

Frederick was the most thrifty of monarchs in all matters
except bribery and corruption. Professor von Ludewig,
mentioned in an earher part of this chapter, when set to
work to prove Prussia's historic claims to Silesia, was paid
three thalers (95.) a day for his labour, and he was remuner-
ated for his forty years' activity in collecting the necessary
material to support the King's claim ' with a little wind
that costs nothing,' in the shape of a title, as von Podewils
put it.

Frederick attached the highest importance to the
possession of a large fund of ready money to be used for
political purposes at the right moment. He wrote in his
' Anti-Machiavel ' :

Cardinal de Eetz stated rightly that in important affairs
money should be regarded as of no consequence. A sove-
reign should therefore always be in the position of controlling
large funds usable in case of necessity.

In his ' Pohtical Testament ' of 1776 Frederick stated :

Statesmanship ought to look as far as possible into the
future and calculate the chances and the constellations of
Europe, and make use of them either for concluding alliances
or for foiling the plans of Prussia's enemies.

It must be remembered that it is not possible to shape
the course of history. However, opportunities must be
seized when they occur. Hence the finances of the country
must always be in order. Herein lies the reason that there
should always be kept a large reserve of ready money, for
then only can the Government strike immediately when the
right moment for action has arrived. War itself should be
conducted in accordance with the true principles of states-
manship. One must strike the most sanguinary blows at
one's enemies.

96 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Frederick ' the Great, like William the Second, en-
deavoured to produce dissension within the Governments
of countries the activities of which he desired to cripple.
Immediately after his first attack upon Silesia, on January 6,
1741, he wrote to his Ambassador at Petrograd :

You will skilfully throw an apple of discord among the
Eussian ministers so that we can carry out the principal aim
which we have in view. I leave you full liberty to employ
not only flatteries and promises, but as much money as you
think necessary, alid Major von Winterfeld can draw on
the offices of the Company.

Frederick the Great was absolutely unscrupulous.
He deliberately brought about three wars, and he employed i
unhesitatingly the worst methods of Machiavelli. Never-
theless, Hke Shakespeare's Eichard the T^iird, he posed
habitually as an injured innocent. In his ' Guerre de Sept
Ans ' he described his great and good opponent as follows :

King Frederick had, in the person of the Empress Maria
Theresa, an ambitious and vindictive enemy, and she was aU
the more dangerous as she was a woman who stuck obstin-
ately to her opinions and was implacable. Devoured by
ambition, Maria Theresa wished to pursue glory in every
way.

When, soon after the beginning of the Seven Years'
War, Prance and Sweden joined Austria, Eussia, and Saxony
against Prussia, and when Frederick began to experience
serious defeats, he cried to Heaven about the wickedness
of his opponents. On July 13, 1756, he wrote despairingly
to his sister Wilhelmine :

I am in the position of a traveller who is surrounded by a
number of rascals and on. the point of being murdered
because these robbers wish to divide his goods among them-
selves. Since the League of Cambrai there has never been
an example of a conspiracy similar to that which that criminal

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 97

triumvirate has engineered against me. It is infamous, a
disgrace for mankind, and a crime against morality. Has
the world ever seen three powerful princes forming a plot
to destroy a fourth who had done nothing to them ?

I have never had any differences with France or with
Eussia, and still less with Sweden. Three men acting thus
against a neighbour would be condemned by the law. Never-
theless, we see three monarchs giving such a horrible example
to their subjects. I am a king, and believe that I should
think like a king.

It has always been my principle that to a Sovereign his
good name should be more precious than his life. A con-
spiracy has been hatched against me. The Court at Vienna
has insulted me, and I should have considered myself dis-
honoured had I borne the insult. Thus the war was begun,
and a band of rogues attacked me from all sides. That is
my story.

In the introduction to his ' Memoires depuis la Paix de
Hubertusbourg,' the arch-deceiver among kings protested :
' During my whole life I have never deceived anyone. Still
less shall I deceive posterity.'

Modem Germany, like Frederician Prussia; loudly
protests her innocence. Her alliances were legitimate,
and were purely defensive. Those of her opponents were
meant for aggression, were a conspiracy against Germany.
According to her protestations, Germany has never deceived
or attacked any Power. She is a peaceful State, and the
other nations have fallen on her without any cause, desiring
to destroy Germany and German civilisation.

Modem Germany is guided by the principles of Macht-
folitik. It is frequently assumed that the policy of using
power ruthlessly has been invented by Bismarck, Treitschke,
Bernhardi, &c. In reality, the policy of using power ruth-
lessly was evolved and brought to the highest perfection
by Frederick the Great. He wrote in his ' Histoire de
mon Temps ' : ' Eoyal crowns are won only by means of
big guns.' Believing that all policy was founded in the

98 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

last resort upon po\(rer, upon force, life in peace was for
Frederick the Great a constant preparation for war. He
wrote in his ' M6moires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg ' :
' Peace was to the Prussian armies a school, and war was
the practice.*

Although Frederick was of opinion that States were
founded not upon right but upon force, and although he
believed that States could be estabhshed, enlarged, and main?
tained only by force, he absolutely disapproved of the
wanton abuse of force. Like Cardinal Eichelieu and Prince
Bismarck, he was absolutely opposed to wars of aggression,
to wars of precaution, to wars of prestige, to rash inter-
ference in international affairs. We read in his preface
to the ' Histoire de mon Temps ':

All who have bowels of compassion and look at things as
they are must be deeply moved by the evils which statesmen
inflict upon the people, either through thoughtlessness or
through their passions.

Eeason prescribes for us a rule of conduct which, in my
opinion, every statesman should observe. It is, to make
use of one's opportunities, and to embark upon a dangerous
enterprise only when circumstances are favourable, but not
to force the pace and to leave all to chance. There are
moments which one should seize, when one should act with
the utmost energy, and there are others when prudence
compels us to remain inactive. This question requires our
most profound thought, and we must examine not only the
present position of affairs, but also study all the conse-
quences to which our enterprise may give rise, and weigh the
means possessed by ourselves against those of our enemies,
in order to be able to gauge wMch side is hkely to prevail.
If the decision should not be left to cold calculation, but
should be influenced or dictated by passion, a happy issue
of a great enterprise is impossible.

Statesmanship requires patience, and the masterpiece of
the skilled statesman consists in doing the right thing at the
right moment and in the right way.

FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S DIPLOMACY 99

History is the school of princes. They should strive to
learn from the mistakes made in past centuries, so as to
avoid them. Thus they may learn how to map out a wise
policy, and how to carry it out step by step. Only he who
has best calculated his chances and who has most carefully
laid down his line of action, can hope to overcome men who
act less logically.

It will be noticed that Frederick the Great recommended
coupling energy with moderation.

When, in 1740-41, he had succeeded in wresting Silesia
from Austria, he desired that Prussia should remain at peace,
and should, by a poUcy of moderation, reconcile Europe to
the great increase of Prussia's power. On June 21, 1742,
he wrote to his Minister Podewils :

At the present moment our task consists in making the
capitals of Europe accustomed to see Prussia occupy the
great position which she has obtained by her war with
Austria, and I believe that great moderation and a concilia-
tory attitude towards our neighbours will help us in this.

The policy recommended in the foregoing letter singularly
resembles that urged by Bismarck in the thirtieth chapter
of his posthumous memoirs, in which we read :

We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling
which has been called forth through our growth to the
position of a real Great Power by honourable and peaceful
use of our influence, and so convince the world that a
German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partizan;
and also less harmful for the freedom of others, than would
be that of France, Eussia, or England.

Frederick the Great and Bismarck would undoubtedly
have loudly disapproved of the war which William the
Second so rashly began in 1914.

Frederick the Great, hke Bismarck, spent the later years
of his Hfe in laying down the principles of statesmanship

100 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

for the benefit of future generations, and Frederick, like
Bismarck, looked with anxiety and pessimism towards
the future. In the concluding passages of his history of
the Seven Years' War he stated :

Time, which heals everything, will no doubt give back
to Prussia her old prosperity and splendour. The other
Powers also will recover. However, in future other ambi-
tious men will bring about new wars and new disasters to
mankind, for it is a pecuHarity of men that they will not
learn by experience. The foUies committed by the fathers
are not heeded by the sons. Every generation must make
its own experiences. . . .

May Heaven — supposing Providence looks down upon our
human miseries — protect Prussia and the Kings who will
govern the State in future against the calamities from which
the country has suffered in the troublous times which I have
described, and may they never be compelled to have recourse
to those terrible and violent measures which had to be
employed to protect the State against the ambitious hatred
of all Europe, which wished to destroy the House of Branden-
burg and to exterminate for all time the very name of
Prussia.

In many passages of Frederick's writing we find a
free expression of his pessimistic forebodings, which were
only natural in view of the worthlessness of his nephew
and successor, Frederick WiUiam the Second. In his
' Histoire de mon Temps ' we read : ' La fortune est souvent
plus funeste aux princes que I'adversite. La premiere
les enivre de presomption ; le seconde les rend circonspects
et modestes.' Good fortune was indeed fatal to Frederick
Wilham the Second and Frederick Wilham the Third.
It made them presumptuous. They neglected the State,
and allowed the army to decline. The rule of these two
princes led to Prussia's downfall in 1806.

Frederick recommended that Prussia should follow
a cautious, conservative, and moderate policy. He desired

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 101

that the country should not lightly engage in war, that
Prussia's sovereigns should only rarely engage in hostilities.
The great King, thought it particularly important that
Prussia should go to war only if the campaign was likely
to be highly profitable to the State. He wrote in his
' Political Testament ' of 1776 :

As Prussia is not rich, care must be taken not to enter
into a war where nothing can be gained. In such a war one
exhausts one's strength, one can only lose, and if later on
some good opportunity should arise, one cannot take
advantage of it.

All territories lying at a distance from the State are a
burden. A village on the frontier is more valuable than a
priacipaUty sixty miles away.

It is necessary to hide with care, and as much as possible,
one's ambitious plans, and it is advisable to awaken envy
among the European Powers, for their division enables
Prussia to strike. . . . Secrecy is a most important virtue
both in statecraft and in war.

During the Seven Years' War, Prussia, supported by
England, successfully resisted the united forces of Austria,
Eussia, France, Saxony, and Sweden. More than once she
suffered serious defeats. Yet she was not overwhelmed.
The causes of her successful resistance to nearly aU Europe
should be of particular interest at the present moment
when Germany is engaged in a similar and apparently
hopeless struggle. la the Seven Years' War Prussia fought
against three Great Powers. Now, Germany fights against
three races, the Latin, the Slavonic, and the Anglo-Saxon
race. The highest authority on the causes of Prussia's
successful resistance is undoubtedly Frederick the Great
himself. In 1759 Prussia suffered a number of most dis-
astrous defeats, and the King's position seemed to be
desperate. In commenting on the campaign of that year
the King wrote :

That campaign was perhaps the most disastrous of aU,

102 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

and Prussia would have been lost if her enemies, who knew
how to defeat her, had known equally well how to take
advantage of their victories.

How Prussia weathered her greatest defeat may be seen
from the Battle of Kunersdorf . At that battle the Prussians
lost a large number of guns to the Eussians, and an enormous
number of killed, wounded, and prisoners. A,* tbe end of
the day scarcely 10,000 men of Frederick's army remained,
and these were a flying mob. Commenting on that dis--
astrous battle the King wrote :

Had the Eussians known how to take advantage of their
victory, had they pursued the discouraged Prussian troops,
Prussia would have been lost. Owing to their inaction, they
gave King Frederick time to make good his losses. Nearly
aU the Prussian generals were wounded. Prussia's enemies
had it in their power to end the war. They need only have
given their defeated enemy the coup de grdce. But they
stood still and, instead of acting with vigour and energy, as
the occasion demanded, congratulated each other on their
success and praised their good fortune.

Prince Soltikoff explained the reason of his inactivity.
When Marshal Daim, the Austrian general, urged him to
continue his operation with vigour he replied : ' I have
done enough during this year. I have won two battles which
have cost Eussia 27,000 men, and before going into action
once more I wish to wait for a couple of Austrian victories.
It is not right that the Eussian troops should bear the
brunt and do aU the fighting.' Only with difficulty could
the Austrians induce the victorious Eussians to cross the
river Oder.

Commenting on the campaign of 1761-62; Frederick
the Great told us :

At the end of the last campaign in the opinion of all
statesmen Prussia was lost. She was saved by the death of
a woman, and was supported and saved by the help of that

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 103

Power which had been most eager to destroy her. In a
similar manner Madame Masham saved France in the War of
Succession by her intrigues against Lady Marlborough.
How vain are all our calculations ! The smallest accident
influences and changes the fate of empires. Chance makes
a plaything of us, laughs at the vain wisdom of us mortals'
elevates some and overthrows others.

Frederick the Great was saved from annihilation, as
he himself admitted, through the mistakes of his opponents,
and especially through their lack of unity. When all
seemed lost Fate saved the King by the death of the
Empress EHzabeth of Eussia. Her son, Peter the Third,
a blind admirer of Frederick, not only made peace with
Prussia, but concluded an alKance with her.
' When matters were desperate with Prussia; Frederick
tried to divide the Allies against themselves. Writing of the
year 1760, he told us in his ' Guerre de Sept Ans ' :

From day to day the war became more difficult, and the
risks and dangers constantly increased. Although the
Prussians were fortunate. Fortune betrayed them several
times. Nothing could be hoped for from Italy, and Turkey
had so far not seemed inclined to let it come to a breach with
Austria. Therefore the only resource left consisted ia
dividing or separating the Powers which had formed
the anti-Prussian Alliance. With this object in view
negotiations were entered upon both in France and in
Eussia.

As we have seen, the negotiations with Eussia proved
successful in the end through the death of the Czarina.

In the ' Histoire de la Guerre de Sept Ans,' Frederick
summed up the causes of Prussia's successful resistance
as follows :

In 1757, during the second year of the Seven Years'
War, it seemed impossible that Prussia would be able to
resist the attack of the Powers arrayed against her. . If we

104' THE I^OUNDATIONS 01* GEEMANY

carefully examine the causes which led to so unexpected an
issue, we find that the following reasons prevented Prussia's
downfall :

(1) The lack of agreement and harmony among the
Powers which^ formed the Anti-Prussian Affiance ; their
different interests, which prevented them agreeing with
regard to the military operations which were undertaken ;
the lack of unity among the Eussian and Austrian generals,
which made them over-cautious when opportunity demanded
that they should act with energy and destroy Prussia, as
they might easily have done.

(2) The over-artful policy of the Court at Vieima. That
Court made it a principle to ask Austria's affies to undertake
the most difficult and the most dangerous operations, so
that at the end of the war Austria should possess a better
and stronger army than that of any of the other Powers.
The pursuit of this policy caused the Austrian generals to
act with over-great caution. Hence they abstained from
giving the cowp de grdce to Prussia when Prussia's position
was absolutely desperate.

(3) The death of the Eussian Czarina, with whose demise
the Eusso- Austrian Affiance died as well ; Eussia's desertion
of the anti-Prussian Affiance, and her affiance with King
Frederick, which was concluded by the Czarina's successor,
Peter the Third.

Frederick the Great summed up the losses caused by
the Seven Years' War as follows :

Prussia had lost by the war 180,000 men, and in addition
83,000 people had died owing to the ravages of the Eussians.
According to estimates, the Eussian troops lost 120,000 men.
The Austrians estimated their loss at 140,000 men, the
French theirs at 200,000 combatants, the English and their
Affies lost 160,000 men, the Swedes and the troops of the
German Circles 23,000 men. The French Government had
lost all credit, and the French commerce with both Indias
had been destroyed by the English. Sweden was on the
point of becoming bankrupt. Prussia had suffered most,
for the Austrians, French, Eussians, Swedes, and the troops

FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 1Q5

of the Circles under the Duke of Wurtemberg had ravaged
the country.

Before his advent to power, Frederick the Great had
posed as a philanthropist, a lover of peace, and a friend
of virtue. Animated by insatiable ambition and recognising
that he could easily conquer Silesia, he attacked Austria
in 1740, httle heeding the consequences. That reckless
and criminal attack led to two further wars, and Prussia
would have been lost had not chance saved her at the most
critical moment.

The Seven Years' War alone cost more than a million
lives ; and according to Frederick's own statement, ' the
state . of Brandenburg, after the Seven Years' War, re-
sembled that caused by the Thirty Years' War.' Frederick
the Great had declared in his ' Anti-Machiavel ' that his
model was Marcus Aurelius, while that of the admirers
of Machiavelli was Caesar Borgia. Frederick himself,
Uke his imitator William the Second, was in many respects
another Borgia ; but Wilham the Second has improved
upon his ancestor by using weapons which Frederick disdained
and condemned.

The Seven Years' War inflicted terrible sufferings upon
Prussia and all Europe, but it laid the foundation of Prussia's
greatness, of modem Germany. By his conquests Frederick
nearly doubled the national territory, increased Prussia's
population from 2,250,000 to 5,500,000 inhabitants, and
made her one of the Great Powers. Besides, Prussia's
successful resistance to nearly all Europe enormously in-
creased her prestige. It enabled Prussia to weather her
defeats of 1806, and the remembrance of the Seven Years'
War is now encouraging Germany and inspiring her with a
firm hope of a final victory.

The history of the Seven Years' War suffices to show
that it will not be an easy matter for a great European
Coalition to triumph over the Germanic combination of

106 tEHE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Powers. The experience of the Seven Years' War and
of many other wars proves that coalitions suffer from serious
disadvantages, that disunion is hable to appear in their
ranks, and that a dictatorship, such as that which exists
permanently in Germany, has enormous advantages over
Governments less well organised for war. In the time
of Frederick the Great lack of energy and of initiative
in warfare lamed the power of the Coalition.

After all, it is only natural that amateurs who co-operate
with difficulty are at a disadvantage in contending against
perfectly drilled and organised professionals, that a mihtary
State which absolutely obeys a single will enjoys enormous
advantage over several non-military States. Modem war
is conducted by armed nations. Exactly as the command
of an army cannot safely be entrusted to a committee,
but only to a single commander-in-chief, the guidance
of a nation at war is best entrusted to a single man, to a
dictator. That was clearly recognised by the ancient
Bomans, the most fervent republicans the world has seen,
and the modem democracies that are fighting for their
Uberty may do well to learn from Eome's example.

Austria suffered grievously at Prussia's hands in the
time of Frederick the Great and of Prince Bismarck. Is
she willing to be ruined completely by WiUiam the Second,
who has dragged her into the present war, or will she re-
member her sufferings and turn at the most critical moment
against her ancient enemy, as Bismarck foreshadowed?
He wrote in his ' Memoirs ' i

If in Austria anti-German tendencies, whether national
or religious, were to gain strength, and Austria leagued
herself with Germany's enemies for the purpose of making a
clean sweep of the results of 1866, no words are needed to
show how greatly aggravated would then be the peril of
Germany. This idea is pessimistic, but no means chimerical.

If, then, changes were to occur in the political situation
of Europe of such a kind as to make an anti-German policy

FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY'S DIPLOMACY 107

appear salus puhlica for Austria-Hungary, public faith could
not be expected to induce her to make an act of self-sacrifice.

In taking account of Austria it is even to-day an error
to exclude the possibility of a hostile policy such as was
pursued by Thugut, Schwarzenberg, Buol, Bach, and Beust.
May not the policy which made ingratitude a duty, the policy
on which Schwarzenberg plumed himself in regard to Eussia,
be again pursued towards another Power ? . . .

We cannot abandon Austria, but neither can we lose
sight of the possibihty that the policy of Vieima may willy-
nilly abandon us.

In disclosing the existence of the Ee-Insurance Treaty
with Eussia, and foretelling the present war, and the breakr
down of the Triple Alliance, in the Hamburger NachricMen
on January 24, 1892 (the full text will be found in another
chapter of this book), Bismarck wrote :

No one can tell whether Austria's historic resentment
will not reawaken and endeavour to find satisfaction at
Germany's cost if the pressure of European events should
weigh upon us. Notwithstanding her fidehty to treaty,
Austria may be disinclined to bear the supremacy of the new
German Empire.

Germany's defeat would mean Austria's aimihilation.
Germany's victory would make her a German vassal State.
It seems not impossible that at the critical moment the
allied Powers might approach Austria and offer her com-
pensation for the losses which she is bound to suffer in the
east and south, by giving Silesia back to her and joining
the chiefly Eoman Catholic South German States once more
to the Dual Monarchy. Austria might recover the great
position which she held in Germany and revenge herself
upon Frederick the Great at the cost of William the Second.
The present pmperor may have rashly destroyed not
only the hfework of Bismarck but that of his great ancestor
as well.

OHAPTEE III

THE POLICY OP BISMABOK AND OF WILLIAM 11^

Prince Otto Eduabd Leopold von Bismaeck, Germany's
greatest son, was born on April 1, 1815, at Schonhausen.
He died on July 30, 1898, at Friedrichsruh. Fate has its
ironies. Apparently William the Second took the terrible
decision which brought about the present war at a Council
held at the Neues Palais in Potsdam on July 30, 1914, the
anniversary of Bismarck's death ; and the celebration of
the centenary of Bismarck's birth has taken place in the
turmoil of a war which seems likely to end in the destruction
of Bismarck's Ufe-work and of the Empire which he had
laboriously created.

To the broad masses of the English-speaking people,
and even to most well-informed men in this country. Prince
Bismarck is an unknown and a sinister figure, a mysterious
and terrible character, a man of blood and iron, Germany's
evil genius, a. statesman devoid of human feeling ; who
by diabolical cunning, unscrupulousness and violence,
by the medieval methods of Machiavelli, united Germany ;
who imprinted his character deeply, and fatally, upon the
new Empire, and forced it into a path which inevitably
led to the present catastrophe. Those, however, who see
in Bismarck a bloodthirsty and unscrupulous schemer of
boundless ambition, who believe that the Iron Chancellor
is responsible for the present war, and that William the

* Prom The Nineteenth Century and After, April 1916.
108

POLICY OP BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM II 109

Second and his supporters have merely acted in accordance
with Bismarck's teachings, are in error. The principal
characteristic of Bismarck's foreign pohcy was not its
daring and miscrupulousness, but its perfect sanity, one
might almost say its wise moderation and its cautious
restraint.

The present war is solely the work of WiUiam the Second
and of his entourage. Had not the Emperor and his
counsellors deUberately thrown to the winds Bismarck's
pleadings for a sane policy and his unceasing admonitions,
Germany would still be prosperous and at peace. Un-
fortunately, statesmanship is Uttle studied in Great Britain.
Bismarck, the statesman, is almost unknown even to those
who are keenly interested in pohtics and who have adopted
politics or diplomacy as a profession. This is the more
to be regretted as Bismarck was probably not , only the
greatest diplomat but the greatest statesman, in the fuUest
sense of the word, of whom we know. In his social pohcy,
economic pohcy, parUamentary pohcy, and in matters of
organisation and administration he was a pioneer, and
in all these he was probably as great as he was in the
sphere of foreign pohcy. Unfortunately statesmanship, the
greatest of all human sciences, is completely neglected at
the Anglo-Saxon Universities in both hemispheres. If it
were taught, as it ought to be, there would be chairs of
Bismarckian statesmanship at every university.

The greatness of a statesman may be seen not by his
eloquence and his parhamentary and electoral successes,
but by his national achievements. Bismarck created
an empire and made a nation. Measured by the positive
success of his activity Bismarck was undoubtedly one of
the greatest statesmen known to history. In 1862, when
Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia, Germany
was merely a geographical expression, and Prussia was a
weak, poor, small, torn, and disunited State. It consisted
of two disjointed halves., which were separated from one

110 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

another by the independent States of Hanover and Hesse.
It had only 18,491)220 inhabitants. It had practically no
merchant marine, no manufacturing industries, and very
Httle wealth. The nation and its Government were in
conflict. Austria doininated and domineered over Prussia.
The country had been shaken to its foundations by the
revolution of 1848. Another revolution seemed not im-
possible.

Civil strife was so acute, and the internal difficulties
of Prussia were so great when Wilham the First ascended
the Prussian throne, that he had actually written out in
his own hand his act of resignation. With difficulty
Bismarck induced the despairing monarch to tear up that
fatal document.

King and Parliament were in deadly conflict. Kingship
had fallen so low in pubUc esteem that, as Bismarck has
told us, scarcely anyone raised his hat to the King in Berlin
except a couple of Court hairdressers. Such was the posi-
tion when Bismarck took office. He resolved to break the
power of the pugnacious Prussian Parliament, to strengthen
to the utmost the authority and power of the Crown, to deprive
Austria of her leadership, to conquer for weak and despised
Prussia the supremacy in Germany and in Europe.

Bismarck is unique among statesmen. Gifted with
marvellous' foresight, he formed the full programme of
his entire life-work as a comparatively young and quite
inexperienced man, and was able to carry it out in every
particular in the course of a long and laborious Ufe. In
manuscript notes written down in March 1854, and in a
long memorandum sent to Otto von Manteuffel, the then
Prime Minister of Prussia, on July 25, 1854, both of which
are reprinted in vol. ii. of the ' Anhang zu den Gedanken
und Erinnerungen von Otto Fiirst von Bismarck,' we find
laid down the complete poUcy which Bismarck pursued un-
swervingly to the day of his death. He then advocated,
for instance, that Prussia should follow not a German

POLICY OF BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM H 111

but a purely Prussian policy ; that she should make herseli
supreme in Germany, following, if necessary, an anti-
Austrian policy ; that she should cut herself off from
Austria, and should not support that country if the pursuit
of her Balkan ambitions should involve the realm of the
Hapsburgs in trouble with Bussia. I

As a young student, Bismarck, like many men of his '
time, dreamed of a United Germany. However, while the ,
vast majority of Germans wished to unite all the German
States and the States of Austria-Hungary in some loose
form of federation, Bismarck aimed at creating a compact
and purely German Germany, a great national and homo-
geneous State, under Prussia's leadership, expelling Austria
out of Germany and leaving to the House of Hapsburg
the rule of the alien nations, of the Slavs, Magyars, Rou-
manians, and Itahans.

In the beginning of his official career Bismarck advocated
the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein with Kiel, desiring
to make Prussia a seafaring and naval Power. He recom-
mended the construction of the Baltic and North Sea Canal;
and looked hopefully forward to a war with Napoleon the
Third, who then dominated Europe, trusting that his
overthrow would unite Germany and give to Prussia the
hegemony in Germany and Europe.

Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia in 1862.
Supported by the King, he immediately set to work to
strengthen the Prussian Army immensely, for he wished
to make Prussia independent and powerful with its help.
As the Prussian Parliament absolutely refused to vote
the large funds required, he governed for years without a
Parliament and without a budget, collecting the taxes by
force. Two years after, in 1864, supported by Austria, he
made war upon Denmark, and took from that country
Schleswig-Holstein and Kiel. At that time, Austro-Prussian
co-operation was indispensable for achieving Bismarck's
aims. As the two Germanic Powers seemed firmly united.

112 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

and as Eussia and France were not ready for war, the States
of Europe only protested against the seizure of the Danish
territories, but did not intervene.

Austria had served Prussia well by enabling her to
acquire the coveted Danish territories, but the defeat of
the Dual Monarchy was required to make Prussia supreme
in Germany and to give her the leadership of the other
German States, the adherence of which would immensely
strengthen her military power. The Austro-Prussian
condominium in Schleswig-HolStein lent itself admirably
to the production of the necessary casus belli. War was duly
brought about in 1866. The Prussian people and their
parliamentary representatives, who had dreamt of a Greater
Germany, embracing Prussia, Austria, and all the smaller
States, and who detested Bismarck as an enemy of liberalism
and of representative government, protested passionately,
but in vain, against the Bruderkrieg, the fratricidal war.
Owing to the great increase of the Army, made agaiast the
will of the representatives of the people, Prussia had become
exceedingly strong. She defeated Austria, and that country
lost her supremacy both in Germany and in Italy. By arms
Prussia had established her paramountcy in Germany.

Austria's defeat had freed Prussia from Austria's leader-
ship, had made her independent, had greatly increased her
power and prestige, and had loosely attached to Prussia
the Central and South German States, who naturally in-
clined towards the victor. To weld Prussia and the South
German States into a firmly united body, to give Prussia
for all time the leadership in Germany, and to reconquer
the formerly German Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck required
a successful war with France, the hereditary enemy. He
clearly recognised that only a victory over France could
arouse among all the German States and peoples an
enthusiasm sufficiently strong to overcome the petty
jealousies which had divided Germany since the dawn of
her history.

POLICY OP BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM II 113

In six years, from 1864 to 1870, Prussia had, under
Bismarck's leadership, fought three most successful wars.
She had acquired free access to the sea. She had created
an organic connection between the detached eastern and
western halves of the Monarchy by incorporating Hanover
and Hesse as a result of the war of 1866. She had acquired
vast German territories, and had firmly joined to herself
the purely German South German States. She had re-
conquered Alsace-Lorraine, and had won for the King of
Prussia the Imperial Crown. Thus, Bismarck had at the
same time made Prussia great, had united Germany, and
had firmly established the authority of the King. He had
achieved all this against the will of the people and against
that of the most influential circles. Even the King himself
had always to be persuaded and convinced, cajoled and
threatened, to follow Bismarck's lead.

Goverimient against the will of the people, as carried
on by Bismarck, had proved marvellously successful. The
King-Emperor was given the full credit of Bismarck's
achievements. Hence, Bismarck's successes had steadily
increased the authority of the monarch. The people had
been taught to trust their rulers blindly and unquestioningly;
and to treat their shortsighted parhamentary represent-
atives almost with contempt. The beUef in authority
among the people was greatly strengthened by a patriotic
education in the elementary schools, and by making the
formerly free universities of Germany and the Press instru-
ments of the Government and of the Imperial will. Thus;
the Uberal and democratic Germany of former times was
destroyed.

^. Having created Pru&so-Germany's greatness, Bismarck
wished to establish the country's security for all time. By
an economic policy which at the same time was wise and
daring, he created a wonderful system of State railways,
and a powerful and efficient merchant marine. He con-
verted Germany from a poor and almost purely agricultural

114 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

State into a wealthy industrial country. He introduced a
system of State Insurance which has been copied by many
countries, and secured Germany's position among the
Powers by the most wonderful system of alhances which
the world has seen.

By sparing Austria after her defeat of 1866, Bismarck
made possible her reconciliation with Germany. By
placing the Dual Monarchy into opposition with Eussia at
the time of the Eusso-Turkish War, he raised the spectre
of a Eusso- Austrian War. It alarmed Vieima very greatly,
and made an Austro-German Alliance not only possible
but necessary.

Fearing the abiding resentment and hostility of defeated
and humihated France, Bismarck wished to isolate that
country. The German- Austrian Alliance did not seem to
afford a sufficient guarantee against the formation of an
anti-German coalition, in which France would, of course,
be the moving spirit.

To alienate Prance and Italy, Bismarck gave to France
at the Congress of Berlin Tunis, to which Italy had by far
the stronger claim, and thus he involved these two countries
in bitter hostility, and a ten years' Customs war. He
prompted France to acquire colonies in opposition to
England, and at the same time encouraged England to
occupy Egypt, to the possession of which France considered
herself entitled. Thxia, he estranged Prance and England.
Furthermore, England and Eussia were made to quarrel
over Constantinople and Asia.

Prance's hostihty, combined with Austro-German pres-
sure, forced Italy to join the German-Austrian Alliance.
The Triple AUiance was created. Germany could rely on
the support of two Great Powers, while Prance, Eussia,
and England were isolated. Germany's security seemed
throughly established. Nevertheless, Bismarck still feared
the formation of a coaHtion hostile to Germany. It is true
the Triple Alliance was a purely defensive instrument.

POLICY OP BISMAECK AND OP WILLIAM II 115

Still, Eussia might conceivably feel threatened by that
combination and endeavour to protect herself by a counter-
aUiance with Prance, Germany's natural enemy.

To prevent Eussia and Prance combining, Bismarck
not only demonstrated to Eussia Germany's sincere friend-
ship whenever an opportunity offered, but. he concluded
with that country a secret but purely defensive alUance
which assured Eussia that Germany would not aid Austria-
Hungary if that coimtry should attack Eussia, but, on
the contrary, observe towards Eussia an attitude of bene-
volent neutrality. The two treaties completely shackled
Austria's freedom of action, and tied that country to the
German car of State. They made Austria-Himgary a
junior partner in the Alliance. With the two alternative
Alliances Bismarck could always play off Austria-Hungary
against Eussia, or Eussia against Austria-Hungary. The
initiative in the Triple Alliance was reserved to Germany.

As England was hard pressed by Prance in Africa, and
by Eussia in Asia, she naturally inclined towards Germany,
and would probably have assisted that country in a war
with Prance and Eussia. She was considered to be an
unofficial, a semi-detached, member of the Triple Alhance.
In addition, Eoumania, ruled by a HohenzoUem Prince,
was attached to the Triple Alliance by a secret treaty, and
Turkey could be reUed upon to support Germany against
Eussia in time of need. As Eussia and England were
friendly to Germany, Prance was isolated and unable to
find an ally. By this wonderful system of alliances, con-
cluded with all the important European nations, which
were encouraged to quarrel among themselves, Bismarck
dominated and directed all Europe. An anti-German
coalition was unthinkable. Germany ruled Europe.

Bismarck pursued not an ambitious poUcy of domination,
but a purely nationahst and a conservative poHcy. He did
not aim at ruling the world. The wars which he had brought
about were in truth wars of nationality. They were under-

116 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

taken solely for the purpose of uniting the divided German
nation. They were means to an end, and they were neces-
sary for Germany's unification. Ever since his youth,
Bismarck had wished to see all Germans, except the Eoman
Catholic Austro-Germans, united in a single State, ruled
by the HohenzoUerns. In 1871 he had achieved his ideal.
When, by three successful wars, he had accomphshed his
aim, he considered his work completed. He had created
a great German Empire, and he desired the new Empire
to keep the peace and to remain a purely German State.
Ever since 1871 Bismarck strove to avoid war. It has
often been asserted, but it has not been sufficiently proved,
that Bismarck intended to attack France in 1875. He
denied that intention to the day of his death, unceasingly
condemning wars of ambition or precaution, such as that
brought about by William the Second.

The future historians of Germany may tell their readers
that Bismarck created the German Empire and that William
the Second destroyed it. It seems exceedingly strange
that Bismarck's successors proved unable to continue
Bismarck's work, for their task was simple and easy. At
the time when the Iron Chancellor was dismissed the position
of the German Empire was impregnable. The Triple
Alliance was a rock of strength, and as Austria was kept
in check by the German-Eussian secret treaty of alliance
Berhn retained the initiative. England, Russia, Turkey,
and Roumania were firm friends of Germany, and were
likely to support that country in case of need. Isolated
Prance was Germany's only enemy.

It is true Bismarck had no great successor. He has
often been reproached for not having trained a statesman
to take his place. However, great statesmen, like great
poets, are born, not made. Besides, Germany no longer
required a great statesman to Continue Bismarck's work,
for that far-seeing statesman had left to his successors the
fullest and the most detailed instructions for their guidance.

POLICY OP BISMAUCK AND 0^ WILLIAM II 117

His policy, like that of every truly great statesman, was
distinguished by its simpHcity and by its absence of secrecy.
No statesman has ever taken his contemporaries more
freely and more fully into his confidence than has Prince
Bismarck. He laid his policy open to all Germany, and
the Germans showed their gratitude and admiration for
the founder of the Empire by pubhshing in full Bismarck's
innumerable speeches and addresses, despatches. State
papers, newspaper articles, confidential and private corre-
spondence, and his conversations and table-talk in many
hundreds of volumes. Modern Germany gave itself over
to a veritable Bismarck cult. The Bismarck literature of
Germany is about as copious as is the Napoleonic hterature
of France. Bismarck's views on every subject and on
every question were studied, not merely by the elect, but
by the masses. His ' Memoirs,' his pohtical testament,
were and are probably as widely read and as frequently
quoted in Germany as the Bible and Gqethe's ' Faust.'

Under Bismarck's guidance Germany had grown great
by three victorious wars. Having created Germany's
unity and firmly established the State, Bismarck desired to
estabhsh its permanence and security by pursuing a peace-
ful, prudent, moderate and concihatory foreign policy,
rightly fearing that a policy of dash and adventure, of
interference, provocation and bluster, would raise dangerous
enemies to the new State. In one of the concluding chapters
of his ' Memoirs,' his political testament, that great states-
man laid down on large lines the policy which Germany
ought to pursue in the futm-e, in the following phrases : —

In the future not only sufScient miUtary equipment;
but also a correct pohtical eye, will be required to guide the
German ship of State through the currents of coahtion to
which, in consequence of our geographical position and our
previous history, we are exposed. . . .

We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling
among the nations, which has been called forth through our

11^ tTHE I'OtJlJDATiONS OJ' GERMANY

growth to the position of a real Great Power, by honourable
and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world
that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less
partizan, and also less harmful to the freedom of other
nations, than would be the hegemony of Prance, Russia or
England. . . .

In order to produce this confidence, it is above everything
necessary that we should act honourably and openly, and be
easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward events.

William the Second came to the throne on June 16,
1888. He disagreed with Bismarck on important questions
of domestic and foreign policy. He dismissed the founder
of Modern Germany on March 22, 1890. After his dismissal,
Bismarck watched with concern and anxiety the unceasing,
reckless, and neurotic activity of the young Emperor. He
feared that the youthful monarch, encouraged by Court
flatterers, place-hunters, and adventurers, might endanger,
or even destroy, the newly created Empire, and deep
pessimism took hold of him. Hoping to save his country,
Bismarck devoted the remaining eight years of his Ufa
entirely to political teaching. He laid down the principles
of his foreign and domestic policy in a large number of news-
paper articles and speeches, he criticised freely and fearlessly
the mistakes of his successors, and he gave to his country
the essence of his statesmanship, the arcana imperii, in
his ' Gedauken und Erinnerungen,' his ' Memoirs,' which
may be found in every German house.

Bismarck's pessimism as to Germany's future; which
impressed numerous Germans who paid him homage in
his retirement, was chiefly caused by the unstable, rash,
overweening and domineering character of WilUam the
Second, by his vanity and by his susceptibility to flattery.
I have already quoted in this book the following two para-
graphs from Bismarck's ' Memoirs,' obviously comparing
WiUiam the Second with his grandfather, but they will
bear repetition :

POLICY OP BISMAECK AND OP WILLIAM II 119

The Emperor William I was completely free fropi vanity
of this kind ; on the other hand, he had in a high degree a
peculiar fear of the legitimate criticism of his contemporaries-
and of posterity. ... No one would have dared to flatter
him openly to his face. In his feeling of royal dignity,
he would have thought 1 If anyone has the right of praising
me to my face, he has also the right of blaming me to my
face.* He would not admit either. . . .

What I fear is that by following the road in which we are
walking our future wiU be sacrificed to the impulses of the
moment. Former rulers looked more to the capacity than
the obedience of their advisers ; if obedience alone is the
quahfication, then demands will be made on the general
abihty of the monarch which even a Frederick the Great
could not satisfy, although in his time politics, both in war
and peace, were less difficult than they are to-day.

Eeferring to the misrule of former Prussian kings,
Bismarck significantly wrote in his ' Memoirs ' :

In an absolute monarchy no one except the sovereign
can be proved to have any definite share of responsibility
^or its policy. If the King comes to any unfortunate deci-
sions, no one can judge whether they are due to his own will
or to the influence which various personalities of male and
female ' gender — ^aides-de-camp, courtiers and political in-
triguers, flatterers, chatterboxes, and tell-tales — may have
upon the monarch. In the last resort the royal signature
covers everything ; how it has been obtained no one ever
knows.

WilUam the Second dismissed Bismarck because he
thought his own pohcy wiser than that of his experienced
Chancellor. Believing himself a genius, he wished to be
his own Chancellor. He had no use for statesmen, for men
of genius and of character such as Bismarck, but only for
time-serving nonentities, for men without backbone, who
were ready to execute without question the Imperial will

120 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

and every Imperial whim, regardless of the consequences
to the country. On July 1, 1897, Bismarck commented on
the impending retirement of Herr Marschall von Bieberstein
from the German Foreign OfiSce. He discreetly pointed
out that not Herr von MarschaU, but the Emperor himself
was to blame for the mistakes of Germany's foreign pohcy
made since Bismarck's dismissal. He wrote in the Ham-
burger Nachrichien :

A number of papers, especially the Kolnische Zeitung, give
a good character to Herr von Marschall at the occasion of his
impending resignation. . . .

We have not noticed that Herr von Marschall has been
guided by any political views and principles of his own in
carrying out the Imperial orders. We are convinced that ,
he possessed certain principles when he entered the Foreign
Ofi&ce, but we do not believe that he had any opportunity
to apply them during his seven years of office. We believe
that he has merely done his official duties by carrying out the
instructions which he received from the Imperial Chan-
cellor on behalf of the Emperor. ...

We do not intend to criticise Germany's policy during
the last seven years, but we should be acting unjustly in
holding him responsible for that policy. We consider that
he had no part in shaping it, that he merely did what he
was told.

William the Second has made numerous absolute pro-
nouncements, such as ' You Germans have only one will,
and that is My will ; there is only one law, and that is
My law.' ' Sic volo, sic juheo.' ' Only one master in this
country. That is I, and who opposes Me I shall crush
to pieces.' Like another Louis the Fourteenth, William
the Second taught the people 'L'Mat c'est moi.' Bismarck
dreaded the Emperor's inclination towards absolutism.
He considered his recklessness to be doubly dangerous in
view of the great power possessed by the monarch, and the
abject flattery and servility prevailing in German Court

POLICY OP BISMAECK AND OP WILLIAM 11 121

circles, on the one hand, and in view of the extreme docility
of the well-drilled German nation on the other. Hence,
Bismarck strove with all his might to create a counter-
poise to the Emperor in an enUghtened pubhc opinion, in
an independent ParUament, and in frank pubUc criticism
of the Emperor's pohcy. He wrote in his ' Memoirs ' :

Absolutism would be the ideal form of Government for a
European State were not the King and his officials as other
men to whom it is not given to reign with superhuman
wisdom, insight, and justice. The most experienced and
well-meaning absolute rulers are subject to human imper-
fections, such as an over-estimation of their own wisdom,
the influence and eloquence of favourites, not to mention
petticoat influences, both legitimate and illegitimate.
Monarchy and the most ideal monarch, if in his idealism
he is not to be a common danger, stand in need of criticism ;
the thorns of criticism set him right when he runs the risk
of losing his way.

Criticism can only be exercised through the medium of a
free Press and of Parliaments in the modern sense of the term.

After his dismissal, Bismarck settled in Priedrichsruh,
his country seat, close to Hamburg, and the Hamburger
Nachrichten became the principal organ in which he
stated his views, in numerous anonymous articles which
betray his authorship by their style. They will be found
collected in the seven-volume work of Penzler, and in the
two-volume work of Hermann Hofmann, two journalists
who edited them, and in the pubHcations of Poschinger,
Horst Kohl, Liman, Blum, and other writers on Bismarck.
It should be added that the vast majority of the extracts
given in this chapter have not been published in the English
language. Their authenticity may be seen by the fact
that Bismarck did not repudiate their authorship when,
during his lifetime, they were collected and published by
Penzler and described as articles emanating from the great
Chancellor.

122 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Iri the Hamburger NachricMen of November 24, 1891,
Bismarck commented severely on the Emperor's pronounce-
ment ' Suprema lex regis voluntas.' He contrasted it
vsdth his first speech from the throne, on June 27, 1888,
in which the Emperor had promised that he would maintain
the existing constitution, and had stated that he was satisfied
with his position as established by it.

On December 11; 1891, Bismarck received the editor
of the Eisenldhn Zeitung. Eeferring to the Emperor's
pronouncement ' Sic volo, sic jubeo,' he told the journalist
that he saw Germany's salvation in the possession of a
strong monarchy and of a Parhament which defended
the rights of the people. On the following day, Decem-
ber 12, 1891, receiving a deputation of the town of Siegen,
Bismarck said :

The most disquieting feature for me is that the Eeichstag
has abdicated its position. We suffer everywhere from the
bureaucracy. . . . The Eeichstag is the indispensable
cement of Germany's national unity. If its authority
declines, the bonds which hold Germany together are
weakened.

On July 24, 1892, Bismarck, addressing a South German
deputation at Ki^singen, said :

I would have gladly continued my work, but our young
Emperor will do everything himself. . . . The German
Eeichstag is the focus of our national life. To strengthen
the Eeichstag, the responsibility of Ministers should be in-
creased. Anyone can become Imperial Chancellor, whether
he is fitted for the office or not, and the Chancellor's post may
be abused to such an extent that he becomes a mere secre-
tary, and that his responsibility is limited to executing
the orders he receives. ... If ministerial responsibility
were established by law, a man who does not possess the
nece^ssary qualifications would not take office. . . .

When I became Minister, the Crown was threatened by
the people. The King was discouraged because he could no

POLICY OF BISMABCK AND OP WILLIAM II 123

longer rely on his Ministers, and he wished to abdicate.
Hence I strove to strengthen the Crown against Parliament.
Perhaps I have gone too far in that direction. We now
require a balance of power within Germany, and I believe
that free criticism is indispensable to the monarchy. Other-
wise we fall a prey to official absolutism. We require the
bracing air of public criticism. Our entire constitution is
based on it. If Parliament becomes powerless, becomes
a mere tool in the hands of the Government, we return to
the regime of absolutism.

Bismarck was particularly dismayed at the Emperor's
unceasing and exasperating interference in foreign pohtics
which threatened to create everywhere enemies to Germany.
On July 30, 1892, he stated in his speech at Jena that in
foreign policy the most important thing was not activity
but patience, and he attributed much of his success to the
fact that he had learned patience when stalking deer or
fishing. Continuing, he said :

The basis of a constitutional monarchy is the co-opera-
tion of the monarchical will with the convictions of the
governed people. . . .

It is a dangerous experiment nowadays to strive after
absolutism in the centre of Europe. Henceforward we must
aim at strengthening independent pohtical thought and
political conviction in our Parliament and among the German
people. . . .

The wars which united Germany were necessary, but
there is no need for further wars. Our wishes are fulfilled.
We should be frivolous or clumsy if we allowed ourselves
to be involved in further wars without need. If we follow
a conservative policy we shall be able to hold our own against
all comers, although we are in the centre of Europe. Ger-
many cannot conduct aggressive cabinet wars. Besides, a
nation which can be forced into such wars does not possess
the right constitution. . . .^

Since 1870 we have avoided further wars and have striven
to strengthen Germany. In building up the empire some

1^4 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

kind of dictatorship was necessary, but that cannot be
considered as a permanent feature. Our task can be com-
pleted only when Germany possesses a powerful Parliament
which embodies our sense of unity.

As Bismarck's appeals to the German ParHament and
to the German people to assert themselves proved fruitless,
he endeavoured to find a counterpoise to the Emperor in
the minor States of Germany, which are represented in the
Federal Council. He wrote, on June 11, 1897, in the Levp-
siger Neueste Nachrichten :

According to Article 8 of the German Constitution, there
exists within the Federal Council a committee on foreign
affairs, formed by representatives of the Kingdoms of
Bavaria, Saxony, and Wiirtemberg, and by two representa-
tives elected by the other Federal States. That Committee
is entitled to demand information from the Government
regarding diplomatic affairs. Formerly, a meeting of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council was of
the greatest rarity. Prince Bismarck guided Germany's
foreign policy, and no one felt the necessity of controllmg
him. Now matters are different.

Although we do not wish to criticise the achievements of
Prince Hohenlohe or Herr Marschall von Bieberstein, we
feel tljat it is necessary to remind the country of the existence
of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council.
We are of opinion that the German people are entitled to
know the character of the ' changes ' which have taken
place in the relations between Vienna and Berlin, about
which inspired Austrian papers have been writing, and we
hope that these ' changes ' have not taken place at Ger*
many's cost, that they will neither lead to Germany's isola-
tion.nor to Germany's dependence upon Austria and Eussia.

The watchword of modem Germany is ' Machtpolitik.'
Unrestrained violence is advocated as a pohcy. During
recent years, and especially since Bismarck's death, many
leading Germans have advocated a ruthless policy devoid

POLICY OP BISMARCK AND OP WILLIAM II 125

of morality and based exclusively on brute force. Modern
Germany has paid lip-worship to Bismarck, but has dis-
regarded his teachings, for that great statesman endeavoured;
in the main, to follow an honest, moderate, and straight-
forward policy, and he attached the greatest value to
political morality. On July 21, 1893, addressing a thousand
people from Brunswick, Bismarck said :

The possession of moral authority is a very important
factor in pohtical Ufe. To avoid wars, something more is
needed than the possession of a powerful army. I attach
value to the respect and the prestige which Germany enjoys
among the non-German nations. Eespect and prestige
are desirable not merely to satisfy national vanity and
ambition. They are valuable and extremely useful assets
which carry with them great advantages, and we suffer when
Germany's prestige and respect are diminished.

Contemplating with concern the Chauvinistic tendencies
which had become noticeable in Germany under the govern-
ment of William the Second, Bismarck, after his retirement,
unceasingly urged that Germany should follow a policy of
peace, of moderation, of good faith, and of good fellowship
towards other nations. He wrote in his ' Memoirs ' :

We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling
which has been called forth through our growth to the
position of a real Great Power by the honourable and peace-
ful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a
German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan,
and also less harmful for the freedom of others, than would
be the hegemony of France, Russia, or England.

It has always been my ideal aim, after we had established
our unity within the possible limits, to win the confidence not
only of the smaller European States, but also of the Great
Powers, and to convince them that German poHcy will be
just and peaceful now that it has repaired the vnjuria
temporum, the disintegration of the nation. In order to
produce this confidence it is above everything necessary

126 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

that we should be honourable, open, and easily reconciled
in case of friction or untoward events.

In most cases an open and honourable policy succeeds
better than the subtlety of earlier ages.

Advocating a peaceful, honourable; and straightforward
policy, Bismarck was absolutely opposed to unnecessary
wars, and especially to preventive wars. Hence, he would
not allow the military men, who easily incline towards
war, to exercise any influence upon statesmanship. He
wrote in his ' Memoirs ' :

Even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are
forced upon one. Besides, one cannot read the cards of
Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical develop-
ment and make one's own calculations accordingly. It is
natural that in the staff of the army not only young, active
ofi&cers, but experienced strategists also should feel the need
of turning to account the efficiency of their troops and then;
own capacity to lead, and should wish to make themselves
renowned in history. It would be a matter of regret if that
feeling did not exist in the army. However, the task of
keeping that feeling within such limits as the nation's need
of peace can justly claim is the duty of the political, not the
military, heads of the State.

That feeling becomes dangerous only under a monarch
whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist
one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences.

How peaceful Bismarck's views were may be seen from
the following New Year article which appeared in the
Munchener Allgemeine Zeitung on January 4, 1892. We
read :

The indisputable predominance of Germany in European
policy from the end of the Franco-German War to the end
of the 'eighties was due, before all, to the superiority of the
German army and to the great personal prestige and influence
enjoyed by the Emperor William I and Prince Bismarck.
Since th^n other nations have increased their readiness for

POLICY OF' BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM II 127

war, and since the disappearance of the old Emperor and of
his Chancellor, Germany's authoritative position has natur-
ally diminished, for only fresh successes can give Germany
that prestige and influence which she acquired in the times
of these men. However, successes similar to those achieved
in the time of WiUiam I do not often recur.

The German Empire, as left by its founders, does not
require new foreign wars, for nothing can be gained by them.
On the contrary, Germany's principal aim must be to increase
its internal strength, so that the Empire may be able to
weather future storms. In the time of William I it was
necessary to bring about appeals to arms, because the
foundations of Germany's national life had to be laid. Now
it is Germany's task to avoid these decisions as far as possible;
for by war nothing can be gained, and only that which has
been won can be lost. That has been Prince Bismarck's
leading political idea ever since the Peace of Frankfort in
1871. ...

In entering upon the New Year we express the wish
that German statesmanship may not abandon the funda-
mental directions which have been laid down for its guid-
ance, that Germany may, at least in the domain of foreign
policy, continue to pursue the old course.

After dismissing Bismarck, Wilham the Second an-
nounced to the world that he would henceforth steer the
ship of State over a new course, and that he would lead
Germany towards a great and glorious future. Filled
with anxiety lest the reckless ambition of the Emperor
would involve the young Empire in unnecessary and perilous
wars, Bismarck wrote, in a series of articles published in
the Munchener AUgememe Zeitung between May 12
and 18, 1892 : l

Prince Bismarck had created Germany on a broad
national basis. When that task had been fulfilled he and
his successors had only to preserve Germany's position, the
creation of which had demanded such heavy sacrifices.
This being his fundamental maxim, it was necessary fop

128 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Germany to be as strong as possible. At the same time, it
was necessary to avoid, as long as possible, all appeals to
arms in which Germany could win nothing, but could only
lose. His leading view was that every extension of territory
beyond the limits of 1871 would be a misfortune. . . .

Bismarck's entire foreign policy culminated in the idea
of isolating Prance and of placing the new frontiers which
he had given to Europe under the protection of all the other
Powers. . . .

Germany's position and activity will always largely
depend upon her AUies. On the day when the leading
German statesmen have to decide on peace or war they
should inquire conscientiously whether the prize is worthy
the sacrifice, and whether the desired result cannot be equally
well obtained without a war, the issue of which no one can
guarantee. War is made only for the sake of peace. It is
made only in order to obtain those conditions in which we
wish to live with our opponent when the war is over. . . .

Is it really necessary to pursue a new course ? The new
pilot is, perhaps, not able to steer the German ship of State
with the knowledge and determination of his predecessor,
but is it therefore necessary to abandon altogether the course
that had been steered in the past ?

Wishing to avoid unnecessary and ruinous wars, Bismarck
desired before all to avoid a war with Eussia, Germany's
traditional ally, who had saved Prussia from extinction
in the time of Napoleon, and who had supported her ia
the wars of 1866 and 1870, and had thus enabled Germany
to achieve her national unity. Besides, Germany and
Eussia had no conflicting interests, and neither Power had
reason to covet any territory possessed by the other.

Desiring that Germany should develop in peace, and
fearing the possibility of a hostile attack, Bismarck had
concluded a purely defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary
and Italy. It seemed, therefore, not Ukely that Eussia
would attack either Germany or Austria. Hence a war
with Eussia seemed to be possible only if an Austro-

POLICY OP BISMAECK AND OP WILLIAM II 129

Eussian quarrel should break out about the Balkan Penin-
sula and if Austria was the aggressor.

Bismarck was determined that Germany should not be
drawn unnecessarily into a purely Austrian quarrel. Hence
he had concluded with Eussia a secret defensive Treaty
which, as has previously been stated, assured that country
of Germany's benevolent neutrality in the event of an
Austrian attack.

As long as Eussia felt sure of Germany's benevolent
neutrality if attacked by Austria, she had no cause to ally
herself with France. Thus Prance remained isolated,
and Austria could not venture to attack Eussia unless
with BerUn's approval. Hence she was compelled to be
guided in her Balkan policy by Germany. If, on the other
hand, Eusso-German relations should become bad, it was
clear that Eussia would turn to France for support, and
that Austria would be able to drag Germany into her Balkan
adventures. Bismarck wrote in his ' Memoirs ' :

After the conclusion of our defensive alliance with Austria
I considered it as necessary to cultivate neighbourly relations
with Eussia as before. ...

If, however, Germany -should quaarrel with Eussia, if an
irremediable estrangement should take place between the
two countries, Austria would certainly begin to enlarge her
claims to the services of her German ally, first by insisting
on an extension of the casus foederis, which so far, accord-
ing to the published text, provides only for the measures
necessary to repel a Eussian attack upon Austria ; then by
requiring the casus foederis to be replaced by some provision
safeguarding the Austrian interests in the Balkans and the
East, an idea to which the Press has already succeeded in
giving practical shape.

The wants and the plans of the inhabitants of the basin
of the Danube naturally reach far beyond the present hmits
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The German Imperial
Constitution points out the way by which Austria may ad-
vance and reconcile her political, and material interests, so

130 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

far as they lie between the eastern frontier of the Eoumanian
population and the Gulf of Cattaro. It is, however, no part
of the policy of the German Empire to lend its subjects,
and to expend their blood and treasure, for the purpose of
realising the designs of a neighbouring Power.

In the interest of the European political equilibrium
the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a
strong independent Great Power is for Germany an object
for which she might, in case of need, stake her own peace
with a good conscience. But Vienna should abstain from
going outside this security, and should not deduce from the
alliance claims which it was not concluded to support. . . .

After Bismarck's dismissal the defensive Eusso-German
Treaty, the so-called Ee-Insurance Treaty, was not renewed.
Prince Hohenlohe wrote in his diary on March 31, 1890 :

It seems more and more clear that differences regarding
Eussia between the Emperor and Bismarck have brought
about the breach. Bismarck intended to leave Austria in
the lurch, while the Emperor wished to support Austria,
even if his policy should involve him in war with Eussia
and France. That is made plain by Bismarck's words that
the Emperor carried on his policy like Frederick William
the Fourth. Herein lies the danger of the future.

In another part of his ' Memoirs,' Prince Hohenlohe
wrote that the Emperor's refusal to renew the Eusso-German
Treaty was the principal cause of Bismarck's dismissal.

The old Emperor was so strongly convinced of the
necessity of Germany keeping peace with Eussia that on
his death-bed, addressing WiOiam the Second, he said,
according to Bismarck : ' Thou must always keep in touch
with the Eussian Emperor ; there no conflict is necessary.'
These were some of his last words.

Bismarck had been dismissed largely because the
Emperor wished to reverse Bismarck's policy towards
Eussia and Austria-Hungary. Foreseeing that a discon-
tinuance of the Eusso-German Treaty would ultimately,

POLICY OF BISMAECK AND OP WILLIAM II 131

and almost inevitably, involve Germany in an Austro-
Eussian war about the Balkans, where Germany had no
direct interests, Bismarck wrote in the Hamburger
Nachrichten on April 26, 1890, only five weeks after his
dismissal :

Austria cannot hope to obtain Germany's support for
promoting her ambitious plans in the Balkan Peninsula.
These Austrian plans have never been encouraged by Ger-
many as long as Germany's foreign policy was directed by
Prince Bismarck. On the contrary, the Prince has, at every
opportunity, particularly at the time of the Bulgarian
incident, shown with the utmost clearness that he is very
far from wishing to promote Austria's special interests in the
Balkans in antagonism to Eussia. Such a policy would not
be in harmony with the stipulations of the Triple Alliance.
That Alliance views only the damnum emergens, not the
lucrum cessans, of the signatory Powers.

Least of aU is it Germany's business to support Austria's
ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula. If such ambitions
exist, and are to be promoted with the assistance of other
nations, Austria-Hungary will have to address herself not
to Germany, but to the nations interested in Balkan politics.
These are all the Great Powers except Germany. They are
(apart from Eussia) England, France, and Italy. Austria
can always arrive at an understanding with these Powers
if she wishes to further her interests in the Balkans, and
Germany need not concern herself about them. Germany's
point of view is this : that she has no interests in Balkan
affairs.

Five months later; on September 29, 1890, Bismarck
renewed his warning in the Hamburger Nachrichten :

In the past, when the relations between Germany and
Austria and between Germany and Eussia were discussed,
there were two points of danger : Firstly, that Germani\
poHcy — or, what would be worse, the German Army — <\
should be placed at the disposal of purely Austrian interests 1
in the Balkans against Eussia ; secondly, that Germany's |

182 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

relations with Eussia should be endangered and brought
to the breaking-point by unnecessary Press attacks.

We have always warned against this twofold danger,
but we have never advised a breach of treaty faith towards
Austria. The Austro-German alliance does not demand
tjiat Germany should support Austria's Balkan interests
against Eussia . It only demands that Germany should assist
Austria^ if her territories should be attacked by Eussia. . . .

We attach the greatest value to the preservation of good
and cordial relations between Germany and Eussia. If
Austria and Eussia should differ, Germany can mediate most
successfully if she is trusted in St. Petersburg. Besides, a
breach with Eussia would, according to our inmost conviction,
ma,ke Germany dependent upon Austria. . . .

No one can object if Austria succeeds in her Balkan policy
without a war with Eussia which would demand enormous
sacrifices in blood and treasure. The Balkans do not
concern Germany. We are interested in the maiutenance of
peace, and we do not care how Austria and Eussia arrange
their spheres of interest in the Balkans. . . .

Being anxious that good relations should exist between
Germany and Austria, and that Austria's power and position
should be preserved, we have opposed mistaken views as
to the scope of the Austro-German Treaty, and have en-
deavoured to show that that Treaty does not oblige Germany
to support Austria in the Balkans.

Hinting at the so-called Ee- Insurance Treaty with
Eussia which William the Second had refused to renew,
under the provisions of which Germany was to support
Eussia in case of an unprovoked attack upon her by
Austria, Bismarck wrote in the Hamhurger Nachrichten oi
January 24, 1892 :

The Austro-German Treaty of Alliance of 1879 contem-
plated, as far as Eussia was concerned, only mutual defence
against a possible attack. Hence Germany always pointed
out in Vienna that the Austro-German Alliance protected
only the Dual Monarchy itself, but not its Balkan poUcy,

POLICY OF BISMAECK AND OP WILLIAM II 183

against Eussia. With regard to the Balkans, Germany had
unceasingly advised Austria to find protection by means of
a separate Treaty with the States interested in the Balkans,
such as England and Italy. Eelying on the unaggressive
character of the Austro-German iTreaty, Germany was
always able to go hand in hand with Eussia, and to influence
Austria if the Eastern policy of that country seemed likely
to take an undesirable turn.

This advantageous position, the maintenance of which
made considerable claims upon the skiU of Germany's
diplomacy, was later on believed to be too comphcated.
Besides, personal misunderstandings [between the Emperor
and the Czar] impaired the good relations between BerUn
and St. Petersburg, and led to the Eusso-Prench rapproche-
ment. Thus the position has changed to Germany's dis-
advantage. Formerly it was in Germany's power to arrive
at any moment at an understanding with Eussia, in con-
sequence of treaty arrangements which existed side by side
with the Austro-German Treaty, but which exist no longer.
In consequence of the estrangement between Germany and
Eussia, Austria has been enabled to exercise considerable
pressure upon Germany.

Foretelling the present war and the breakdown of the
Triple Alliance, Bismarck continued :

Apparently German statesmanship no longer observes a
disinterested attitude in Eastern affairs. By following the
path upon which she has entered, Germany is in danger of
gradually becoming dependent upon Austria, and in the
end she may have to pay with her blood and treasure for
the Balkan pohcy of Vienna. In view of that possibiMty,
it will be readily understood that Prince Bismarck again and
ever again gave warning that Germany should not break
with Eussia. . . .

The change in the European situation to Germany's
disadvantage cannot be excused by extolHng the power of
the Triple Alliance. Formerly the Triple Alliance existed
as it does now, and its importance was increased by the fact
that Germany had a free hand, directed it, and dominated

134 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Europe. We fear that since then the strength of the
Alliance has not increased. . . .

A crisis in Italy, a change of sovereign in Austria or the
like may shake its foundations so greatly that in spite of all
written engagements it will be impossible to maintain it.
In that case Germany's position would become extremely
serious, for in order not to become entirely isolated she would
be compelled to follow Austria's policy in the Balkans
without reserve. Germany might get into the leading-
strings of another Power which, it is true, has accepted the
new position of Germany. However, no one can tell whether
Austria's historic resentment will not reawaken and
endeavour to find satisfaction at Germany's cost if the
fortune of war should no longer favour Germany or if the
pressure of European events should weigh upon us. Not-
withstanding her fidehty to treaty, Austria may be dis-
inclined to bear the supremacy of the new German Empire.

Considering good relations between Eussia and Germany
absolutely essential for Germany's security, and desiring
to bring about a renewal of the Eusso-German Ee-Insurance
Treaty, Bismarck at last embarked upon a great Press
campaign. He revealed to Germany and the world the fact
that there had formerly existed a secret treaty with Eussia
in the plainest language in his celebrated article which
appeared on October 24, 1896, in the Hamburger Nach-
richten. We read in it :

Eusso-German relations remained good until 1890.
Up to that date both States were fuUy agreed that if one of
them were attacked the other would observe a benevolent
neutrality. For instance, if Germany were attacked by
Prance she would be sure of Eussia's benevolent neutrahty;
and Eussia would be sure of Germany's benevolent neutrality
if she was attacked without cause. That agreement has not
been renewed since the time when Prince Bismarck left office,
and if we are rightly informed about the occurrences which
have taken place in Berhn it appears that the failure to renew
the treaty was not due to Eussia being dissatisfied at the

POLICY OF BISMARCK AND OP WILLIAM II 135

change of Chancellors. It was Count Caprivi who refused
to renew the mutual insurance of Eussia and Germany,
although Russia was ready to renew it. As at the same
time Germany pursued a philo-Pohsh policy, it was only
natural that the Russian Government should ask itself:
What can be the object of Prussia's Polish policy, which
stands in flagrant opposition to the friendly relations
established at the time of the Emperor William the First ?
We need not mention other anti-Russian indications
at the German Foreign Office. Caprivi's attitude in the
general European poUcy and in Germany's Polish policy
was such that Russia, notwithstanding her great power, had
seriously to consider the future. During the Crimean War
all Europe, Prussia excepted, had been hostile to Russia.
We do not intend to assert that a similar position will return.
Still, it is only natural if a powerful State like the Russian
Empire says to itself : ' We must have at least one reliable
Ally in Europe. Formerly we could reckon with the three
Emperors Alliance. Afterwards we could depend upon the
House of Hohenzollem. If, however, in times of difficulty,
we should meet with an anti-Russian policy, we must en-
deavour to arrange for support elsewhere.' The Kronstadt
meeting and the first rapprochement between Absolute
Russia and Republican France was solely brought about by
Caprivi's political mistakes. Hence, Russia was forced to
find in Prance that security which of course her statesmen
desired to obtain.

This article created an immense sensation not only in
the entire German Press but in the Press of the world.

The Government-inspired Press accused Bismarck of
high treason in divulging secrets of State, and threatened
him with the public prosecutor and with imprisonment.
The disclosure led to a prolonged Press campaign in the
course of which Bismarck defended the Re-Insurance Treaty
with great vigour in numerous articles. With wonderful
energy Bismarck, who was then eighty-two years old, en-
deavoured once more to direct the poMcy of Europe with

136 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

i
his 'indefatigable pen. He not merely criticised Germany's
ioreign policy and pointed out the dangerous mistake which
had been made in destroyiug the intimate relations which
existed formerly between Eussia and Germany ; he en-
deavoured at the same time to bring about a re-grouping
of the Powers and to create differences between Eussia
and France likely to destroy their recent intimacy. This
may be seen from many articles of Bismarck's, published
at the time in various journals.

In his ' Memoirs ' Bismarck summarised his views as
to the attitude of Eussia and Prance in this blunt phrase :
' With France we shall never have peace ; with Eussia
never the necessity for war, unless Liberal stupidities or
dynastic blunders falsify the situation.'

' Dynastic blunders ' have done what Liberal stupidities
failed to achieve.

In his articles and in his ' Memoirs ' Bismarck repeatedly
pointed out that Austria-Hungary might not only abandon
Germany in the hour of need, but, remembering the loss
of Silesia to Prussia and the Battle of Koniggratz, turn
against Germany.

Unceasingly Bismarck pointed out in the clearest
language that Germany was under no obligation whatever
to support Austria in the Balkans, and that, in case of
serious Austro-Eussian differences, such as those which
arose in July 1914 about Serbia, Germany should not act
as Austria's unconditional supporter but as a mediator
between the two States. Bismarck wrote in the Hamburger
Nachrichten on January 15, 1893 :

The Austro-German Treaty of Alliance provides only
against an attack on Austrian and German territory on the
part of Eussia. Being thus limited, the possibihty is excluded
that the Treaty may serve Austria's special interests in the
Balkans. The purpose of the Alliance is exclusively to
prevent a Eussian war of aggression. Its purpose is in no
way to strengthen Austria in the pursuit of a purely Austrian

POLICY OF BISMAECK AND OP WILLIAM II, 137

policy in the East. Germany has no interests in the East.
Besides, if she supported Austria's Balkan policy she would
defeat the purpose of the Treaty, which is to preserve the ■
peace.

If Austria was entitled to the support of Germany's
bayonets if engaged in the East, a colhsion with Eussia
would become probable. Hence the casus foederis is hmited
to the possibility of a Eussian attack upon one of the two
Allies. The task of Germany, as Austria's Ally, consists
in acting as a mediator between the two Powers in case
of differences in the Balkans. If Austria wishes to further
her individual interests in the Balkans she must seek
support not in Germany, but among those countries
which are interested in the East — ^England, Prance, and
Italy.

Bismarck spoke and wrote in vain. His shallow
successors treated his advice with contempt. The great
German statesman not only pointed out the mistake which
the Emperor had made in breaking with Eussia but he
tried to recreate the intimate relations which formerly
existed between Germany and Eussia. His exertions
proved unavailing, and he wrote despairingly in the West-
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in June 1892 :

The worst that has happened under the Chancellorship
of Caprivi is that all the threads connecting Germany with
Eussia were suddenly broken. The German Emperor tried
to win over the Eussians with amiable advances. However,
busy intermediaries reported to him expressions from the
Czar's entourage which proved that his intended visit to
Eussia would be politically unsuccessful. Then WiUiam
the Second immediately went to England and concluded
with England the Treaty relating to Zanzibar and Heligo-
land, and that anti-Eussian demonstration was followed by
his philo-Pohsh policy, which was hurtful to Eussia. Ger-
many's foreign policy could not have taken a more fatal
step than to threaten Eussia with the re-estabhshment of
the Kingdom of Poland in case of a Eussian defeat. That

138 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

was bound to lead to the Franco-Russian rapprochement
and to Kronstadt.

Bismarck clearly recognised that the alliance between
Italy and Austria was an unnatural one, and that Italy's
fidelity to her two partners would depend partly on the
character of Germany's policy, partly on England's relations
with Germany. In view of Italy's long and exposed sea-
border and of her vulnerability in case of an attack from
the sea, Italy could obviously not be expected to support
Germany and Austria if such support would involve her
in hostihties with the strongest naval Power. For this
reason, among others, Bismarck was anxious that Germany
and England should be firm friends. He wrote in the
Hamburger Nachrichten on June 13, 1890 :

The co-operation of Germany, Austria; and Italy
threatens no one. The Triple AIKance does not involve
dangers which would become fatal to the co-operation of
these three States. On the contrary, the Alliance is designed
to strengthen the peace of Europe. The casus foederis
towards Russia arises only if Russia attacks the territory of
one of the two AlUes. This limitation deprives the Alliance of
all aggressive tendencies, and excludes the possibility that
it may serve the special interests of Austria in the Balkan
Peninsula and thus threaten the preservation of peace. . . .

The Austro-Italian Alliance is not equally favourable.
Between Austria and Italy there are unadjusted differences,
which are to be found particularly on the side of Italy, such
as the anti- Austrian aspirations of the Irredentists. Besides,
the Italian Radicals are opposed to the Triple Alliance, and
sympathise with France. . . .

In view of France's aspirations, Italy must be able to
rely on the assistance of the English fleet, for the Triple
Alliance cannot protect the Italian coasts. Hence, Italy
has to think of England, and consideration of England may
conceivably limit Italy's freedom of action. The mainten-
ance of the present relations between Austria and Italy
must be the principal care of the diplomats, especially as,

POLICY OP BISMAECK AND OP WILLIAM II 139

if Italy for some reason or other should abandon the Triple
Alliance, the Austrian Army would be compelled to protect
the Dual Monarchy against Italy. Hence it would no longer
be able to fulfil Article 1 of its Alliance with Germany,
accordiDg to which it should assist Germany ' with its entire
armed power.' By the detachment of Italy, the Austro-
German AUiance would militarily lose so much that its
value would become very problematical. . . .

If we sum up the considerations developed we find that
the present position is quite satisfactory. As long as
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy are united in the
Triple Alliance, and as long as these three States may
reckon on the assistance of the EngHsh sea-power, the peace
of Europe will not be broken. We must take care that
friendly relations between Austria and Italy and between
Italy and England shall be maintained. Besides, we
must see that the Triple AUiance is restricted to its original
scope, and that it is not allowed to serve those special
interests which have nothing to do with it. We therefore
firmly trust that, as far as Germany is concerned, the ' old
course ' will be preserved with particular care.

Bismarck died on July 30, 1898. We know from his
speeches that he attached the greatest value to good rela-
tions between England and Germany, that he saw in England
' Germany's natural and traditional aUy.'

The greater part of the German colonies was acquired
by Bismarck. His principal care was to ensure Germany's
security on the Contiaent of Europe, and he attached the
greatest value to Great Britain's good will and support in
view of the possibihty of Continental comphcations. Con-
sidering Germany's Continental interests infinitely more
important than her transoceanic ones, he absolutely refused
to pursue a transmaritime and colonial pohcy in opposition
to England, fearing that an anti-British pohcy would drive
England iato the arms of France and Eussia. Even when
diplomatic diilerenoes had arisen between the two countries,
Bismarck wished to remain on cordial terms with Great

140 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GBEMANY

\

Britain. On March 2, 1884, for instance, he stated in the
Eeichstaig with reference to an Anglo-German dispute:

I shall do everything in my power in order, sime ird et
studio, and in the most conciliatory manner, to settle this
matter in accordance with that quiet and friendly inter-
course which has at all times existed between England and
Germany, a quiet and friendly intercourse, which is most
natural because neither Power possesses vital interests
which conflict with the vital interests of the other Power.
I can see only an error in the opinion that England envies
us our modest attempts at colonising.

He laid down at greater length his guiding principles
in his intercourse with Great Britain on January 10, 1885,
when he stated in the Eeichstag :

The last speaker has told us that we must either abandon
our colonial poUcy or increase our naval strength to such
an extent that we need not fear any naval Power, or to speak
more clearly, that our navy should rival that of England
herself. However, even if we should succeed in building up
a navy as strong as that of England, we should stiU have
to fear an alliance of England and France. These Powers
are stronger than any single Power in Europe is or ever can
be. It follows that the policy indicated by the last speaker
is one which should never be striven after.

I would also ask the last speaker not to make any at-
tempts to disturb the peace between England and Germany
or to diminish the confidence that peace between these two
Powers will be maintained by hinting that some day we may
find ourselves in an armed conflict with England. I ab-
solutely tieny that possibihty. It does not exist, and all the
questions which are at present being discussed between
England and Germany are not of sufficient importance to
justify a, breach of the peace on either side of the North
Sea. Besides, I really dd not know what disputes could
arise ' between England and Germany. There never have
been disputes between the two coimtries. From my diplo-
matic experience, I cannot see any reasons which can make

POLICY OP BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM II 141

hostilities possible between them, unless a cabinet of incon-
ceivable character should be in power in England, a cabinet
which neither exists nor which is ever likely to exist, and
which criminally attacks us.

Four years later, on January 26, 1889, only a short time
before his dismissal, he stated with reference to the Anglo-
German Zanzibar dispute in the Eeichstag :

I absolutely refuse to act towards the Sultan of Zanzibar
in opposition to England. As soon as we have arrived
at an understanding with England, we shall take the neces-
sary measures in Zanzibar in agreement with that country.
I do not iutend either actively to oppose England or even to
take note of those steps which subordinate British individuals
have taken against us. In Zanzibar and in Samoa we act
in perfect harmony with the British Government! We are
marching hand in hand, and I am firmly resolved that our
relations shall preserve their present character.

English colonial interests compete with ours in numerous
places, and subordiuate colonial officials are occasionally
hostile to German interests. Nevertheless, we are acting
in perfect unison with the British Government. We are
absolutely united, and I am firmly resolved to preserve
Anglo-German harmony and to continue working in co-
operation with that country.

The preservation of Anglo-German good-will is, after all,
the most important thing. I see ia England an old and
traditional ally. No differences exist between England and
Germany. I am not using a diplomatic term, if I speak of
England as our ally. We have no alliance with England.
However, I wish to remain in close contact with England
also in colonial questions. The two nations have marched
side by side during at least a hundred and fifty years, and if
I should discover that we might lose touch with England
I should act cautiously and endeavour to avoid losing
England's good-will.

Modern Germany has erected to Bismarck countless
statues. Bismarck's speeches, Bismarck's letters, and

142 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Bismarck's memoirs have been printed in hundreds of
thousands of copies, and they are found on the book-shelves
of the German people by the side of Schiller and Goethe.
But Modern Germany has forgotten, or she dehberately has
disregarded, Bismarck's policy, and Bismarck's warnings.

Bismarck saw in England ' an old and traditional ally.'
Hence he never thought an Anglo-German war possible.
To him such a war was, as he said, unthinkable.

As long as the great Chancellor lived Wilham the Second
did not venture upon pursuing a violently anti-British
policy which was bound to drive this country into the arms
of Prance and Eussia. Although WilKam the Second was
hostile to England, he was probably restrained by the fear
of Bismarck's criticism during the Chancellor's lifetime.
Soon after Bismarck's death William the Second began his
naval campaign.

When Bismarck had closed his eyes a violent anti-
British agitation, financed by Krupp and carried on by
hundreds of generals and professors, was started throughout
Germany, and in 1900 was published the great German Navy
Bill, in the introduction of which we read the ominous
and oft-quoted words : ' Germany requires a fleet of such
strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would
jeopardise the supremacy of that Power.'

Bismarck had observed the Emperor's Anglophobia
in its more modified form with alarm, fearing its effect
upon Italy. He had written in a series of articles on the
European situation, pubhshed in the Miinchener Allgemeine
Zeitung from May 12 to 18, 1892 :

In discussing Anglophobia in Germany we must remem-
ber that the principal Anglophobe is supposed to be the
Emperor WilUam the Second, who was hostile to England
not only as Crown Prince, but even during the first years of
his rule.

England's attitude towards the Triple Alliance depends
not upon the Heligoland Treaty, but on Italy. If England

POLICY OP BISMAECK AND OP WILLIAM II 143

is opposed to Germany we can never reckon upon Italy's
help. . . .

The Austro-Hungarian Army is at Germany's disposal
only if the Dual Monarchy does not require its use against
Italy. Otherwise, one-half of the Austrian army would be
lost to Germany. . . . Italy is therefore a very important
factor in the Triple Alliance, even if she limits her action
to abstaining from attaclqng Austria. . . .

The idea that Eussia may make a surprise attack upon
Germany is Utopian. Only moderate diplomatic skiU on
Germany's part is required to avoid a war with Eussia for
generations. The tension among the nations would be
greatly diminished if we should succeed in recreating in
leading Eussian circles the faith in Germany's neighbourly
honesty which has disappeared since Bismarck's resignation.

A Eussian war is a calamity which must not be brought
upon the population of the Eastern Provinces of Germany
without pressing necessity. The seriousness of a Eusso-
German war is particularly great, because it would im-
mediately lead to a Pranco-German war, while, on the other
hand, a Pranco-German war need not lead to Eussian inter-
vention. Besides, the impossibility of obtaining adequate
compensation for such a war must be borne in mind. What
can Gennany obtain from Eussia ? ... At best she would
obtain a second neighbour-State thirsting for revenge.
Germany would be in an uncomfortable position created
by her own rashness.

Bismarck did not consider England's support as a matter
admitting of doubt. He reckoned upon it as a matter of
course. Commenting upon an important colonial debate
in the Eeichstag, he wrote in the Munchener Allgemeine
Zeitung on Pebruary 8, 1891 :

The value of England's friendship consists in this : that
in case of a war she protects the ItaUan coasts or, which is
perhaps more uncertain, helps in protecting the German
shores. By doing this, England would largely act in her
own interest. . . .

144 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Three days later he wrote in the Hamburger Nach-

richten :

In decisive moments our co-operation with Italy would
be influenced by England's attitude. The greater or lesser
measure of good relations between England and Germany is
not without influence upon Italy's policy, and it is certainly
questionable how Germany's relations with Italy would
shape themselves if Italy should no longer be in the position
of being attached by an equal friendship to England and to
Germany.

On May 19, 1892, he wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten :

We have repeatedly had occasion to point out that Italy's
faithfulness to the Triple Alliance depends largely upon
the relations existing between England and that country.
Italy cannot run the risk of being isolated in the Mediter-
ranean, and of being defeated by Prance. Hence she must
be certain of the protection of the Enghsh fleet in case of
need.

The agitation for strengthening the German navy began
in a mild way soon after Wilham the Second came to the
throne. Bismarck, observing that dangerous development
with concern, warned Germany against frittering away ber
strength and competing on the sea with the French or
English fleets. Addressing 3000 people from Scbleswig-
Holstein, Bismarck said on May 26, 1895 ;

I wished to acquire Schleswig-Holstein, because unless
we had that province we could not hope to have a German
fleet. It was a question of national dignity that in case of
need Germany should be able to hold her own against a
second-rate navy. Formerly we had no fleet. I should
consider it an exaggeration for Germany to compete with
the French or the English navy. However, we must be
strong enough on the sea to be able to deal with those second-
rate Powers which we cannot get at by land.

POLICY OF BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM II 145

Two years later Bismarck warned Germany more
emphatically against creating a fleet strong enough to
challenge England. On September 4, 1897, Mr. Maximilian
Harden published in the Zukunft the following pronounce-
ment of Prince Bismarck ;

The papers are discussing unceasingly whether the
German fleet should be increased. Of course, all that is
required in the opinion of sober-minded experts should be
voted. I have never been in favour of a colonial policy of
conquest similar to that pursued by France. As far as one
can see, the most important thing for Germany is a strong
and reliable army provided with the best weapons. I am
of Moltke's opinion — ^that we shall have to fight on the
Continent of Europe for the possession of colonies. We
must beware of undue economy in naval matters, but we
must also guard ourselves against fantastical plans which
might cause us to quarrel with people who are important
for our position in Europe. Qui trap embrasse. . , .

In December 1897 Bismarck stated his views on
Germany's transmaritime policy as follows in the Levpziger
Neiieste Nachrichten :

The German Government should not embark on under-
takings unless they are absolutely required, or at least justi-
fied, by the material interests of the State. . . . Nothing
would be more strongly opposed to Germany's interests
than to enter upon more or less daring and adventurous
enterprises guided merely by the desire to have a finger in
every pie, to flatter the vanity of the nation or to please the
ambitions of those who rule it. To carry on a policy of
prestige would be more in accordance with the French than
the German character. In order to acquire prestige, France
has gone to Algiers, Tunis* Mexico, and Madagascar. If
Germany should ever follow a similar policy, she would
not promote any German interests, but would endanger the
welfare of the Empire and its position in Europe.

Bismarck clearly foresaw that by embarking recklessly

146 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

upon a policy of adventure in the colonial sphere, Germany
might endanger her relations with Great Britain. Besides,
he foresaw that by wresting Port Arthur from victorioua
Japan in company with Bussia and France, and occupying
Kiaochow, she might later on be exposed to Japan's hostility.
He did not understand why Germany should have gone
out of her way to drive Japan out of Port Arthur with the
help of France and Eussia. Therefore he wrote on May 7,
1895, in the Hamburger Nachrichten ;

It appears that Japan, following the friendly advice of
Germany, Eussia, and France, has abandoned the Liao-
tung Peninsula. Germany has no interest whether the
district in question remains in China's possession or not. If
she has nevertheless exerted pressure upon Japan she might
have had reasons with which we are not acquainted. Pos-
sibly the pohcy made in Berlin may have been due to the
persuasiveness of people who were in favour of a pohcy of
prestige similar to that pursued in the time of Napolfeon the
Third.

If Germany's action at Tokio was intended to do a service
to Eussia, it might perhaps be approved of. However,
Eussia might have been supported by an attitude of bene-
volent neutrality without active interference. . . .

For the present we beheve that Germany's initiative in
East Asia was not timely, and we doubt whether that policy
and the extraordinary change of attitude towards England
can be justified. We cannot help fearing that Germany's
initiative in East Asia is merely a symptom of a defect from
which our foreign pohcy suffers : that it springs from the
inabihty to sit still and wait. We do not see why it was
necessary to run any risks. . . .

Germany's action has diminished the sympathies for
Germany which hitherto existed in Japan. That loss was
perhaps unnecessary. The loss incurred on the one side
may perhaps be balanced by gains, but only the future can
show whether there are any gains.

Eeverting to Germany's Bast Asiatic pohcy, Bismarck

POLICY OF BISMAECK AND OF WILLIAM II 147

wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten on May 23,
1895 :

Germany's action against Japan can only be explained
by a desire to regain good relations with Eussia, which have
lately been lost. If that is the case, the Government should
be careful not to fall between two stools. Eussia desires to
obtain ice-free harbours in the East, and Germany has no
reason either to support or to oppose her. During decades
we have endeavoured to encourage France to develop and
expand in every direction — except in that of Alsace-Lorraine4
We have encouraged her to expand in Tunis, in India, and in
Africa, and we have a similar interest as regards Eussia in
the East. Germany has little interest in the Black Sea, but
still less in the Sea of Japan. . . .

As we said before, we do not know the intentions of the
Goverimient, but we can only recommend that Germany,
after having once more grasped Eussia 's hand, should hold it
firmly and stand by Eussia as long as Germany's own inter-
ests are not hurt thereby. If the contrary policy is followed,
the result would be that we should offend Eussia as much as
we have already offended Japan by our interference.

Bismarck gave two most impressive warnings regarding
mistakes in foreign poUoy in general and regarding a German
attack on France, such as that which took place in 1914,
in particular. In chapter xxAdii of his ' Memoirs ' the great
statesman wrote :

Errors in the policy of the cabinets of the Great Powers
bring no immediate punishment, either in St. Petersburg or in
Berlin, but they are never harmless. The logic of history is
even more exact in its revisions than the chief Audit Office of
Prussia.

In chapter xxix; entitled 'The Triple Alliance,'
Bismarck wrote regarding a German attack upon France :

It is explicable that for Eussian policy there is a limit
beyond which the importance of France must not be dimin-
ished. That Kmit was reached, I believe, at the Peace of

148 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Frankfort, a fact which, in 1870 and 1871, was not so com-
5pletely realised at St. Petersburg as five years later. I
hardly think that duririg the Franco-German War the
Eussian Cabinet clearly foresaw that, when it was over,
Eussia would have for neighbour so strong and so united a
Germany.

Bismarck was a most loyal citizen. He never
endeavoured to revenge himself on the Emperor for the
disgraceful way in which he was dismissed, and for the
persecution which, after his dismissal, he suffered at the
hands of the bureaucracy, no doubt by the ^ Emperor's
orders. Although he distrusted the Emperor'p reckless
and adventurous personal policy, he never attacked him
or reproached him personally. He merely criticised his
advisers and their action, and laid down the broad principles
of Germany's policy in his posthumous ' Memoirs ' and in
numerous speeches and articles.

Bismarck's worst fears have been realised. The German
nation, as I stated before, has paid hp-service to Bismarck,'
but has utterly disregarded his warnings and advice.
William the Second and his courtier-statesmen have ap-|
parently destroyed Bismarck's creation. They cannot plead
that they were not warned, for Bismarck foretold unceasingly
that the Emperor's rash interference would lead to the
break-up of the Triple Alliance, make Germany subservient
to Austria-Hungary, involve her in war with Eussia about
the Balkan Peninsula where Germany possesses no interests,'
detach Italy, bring about Japan's hostility, and end in
Germany's isolation in Europe. j

The official and non-official spokesmen of Germany
have asserted unceasingly that a world conspiracy had
been formed against their country, that Eussia, or England,
is to blame for the present war. Those who are acquainted
with Bismarck's writings know that the present war
has not been caused by England's jealousy or Eussia's
ambitions, or Prance's thirst for revenge, but only by

POLICY OP BISMARCK AND OF WILLIAM II 149

Germany's own foUy, and especially by the action of her
Emperor, who dismissed Bismarck, disregarded his warnings,
and plunged the nation into a war which may end in
Germany's destruction.

Bismarck died at the ripe age of eighty-two. During
no less than thirty-nine years he was in the service of the
Government, first as Ambassador and then as Prime Minister
and Chancellor. As Prime Minister of Prussia and Chan-
cellor of Germany he was uninterruptedly in office during
twenty-eight years, and during the whole of that long
period he laboured and fought unceasingly with the single
object of establishing the German Empire and of con-
solidating it. Bismarck scarcely knew the meaning of
pleasure or of relaxation. He laboured day and night.
Frequently in the course of the night he called one of his
secretaries to his bedside and dictated to him. The great
Chancellor gave aU his time, in fact his whole hfe, to his
country. After his dismissal in 1890 he spent the last eight
years, not in resting from his labours, but in fighting for his
country. He fought not against the Emperor, as his
enemies and enviers have often asserted, but against the
pernicious policy, the incompetent statesmen, and the
dangerous influences which, he feared, would cause Ger-
many's downfall. Bismarck laboured and fought in vain.
A century after his birth the wonderful edifice which he
erected almost single-handed seems to be crumbling. One
man created the German Empire, and another one is
apparently destroying it.

CHAPTEE IV

tCHE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN EDUCATION AND OF
THE NATIONAL CHAEAOTEE ^

Theeb is a vast literature on German Education. Innu-
merable books, pamphlets, and articles give us the fullest
details of the German school system in aU its branches.
Enthusiastic British and American educationalists have
explored the great education machine of Germany in every
aspect, and have bidden the Anglo-Saxon countries to copy
it. However, most writers on German Education have
considered only its outward aspects and its present state.
They have failed to explain to us the secret of Germany's
education. An educational system, Uke a national consti-
tution, cannot be copied. It is a thing that has been
evolved in the course of centuries. We can understand
German education and the German character only if we
go back to the foundations, if we consider the way by
which the German educational system has been created.

The Germans, and particularly the North Germans;
the Prussians, were until comparatively recent times a
nation of ignorant boors. To-day they are the best educated,
or at least the most educated, people in the world. They
have been made what they are by their great rulers, es-
pecially by Frederick William, the Great Elector, King
Frederick William the First, and King Frederick the Great.

It would, perhaps, lead too far to study the government

• From The Coniemporary Review, January 1916,
160

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEAOTEE 151

and the influence of the Great Elector. He ruled from
1640 to 1688. It requires some mental effort to appreciate
his educational activities at the present day. It will
perhaps suffice to say that he introduced in Prussia the
rigime of enlightened absolutism as has been shown in the
beginning of this book. He destroyed the independence
of the nobihty, of the towns, and of the estates, and made
the whole people a willing instrument in the hands of their
ruler.

The Great Elector died, and was succeeded by his son;
Frederick, who became the first King of Prussia. The
son was a worthless monarch. He sacrificed the welfare
of his country to his vanity and his lust. Under his rule
Prussia declined and decayed. He was succeeded by his
son, King Frederick William the First, a coarse-mannered,
ignorant brute. Frederick William was as uncultured as
was President Kruger. At the same time he possessed,
Uke Kruger, great natural abilities. He allowed himself
to beguided by his instincts. He ruled Prussia absolutely
in accordance with his will, in accordance with the precedent
which the Great Elector had created. Frederick WiUiam
loved the army. He was fond of order and cleanliness,
and he was extremely thrifty and parsimonious. He
founded in Prussia a model administration and a model
army, and he moulded the character of the people upon
his own.

Frederick the First had tried to imitate Louis the Four-
teenth of France. He spent the money of the citizens
lavishly and almost ruined the country. His son was out-
raged by the outlandish elegance and luxury, the waste
and immorahty, which his father had introduced in Prussia.
His instinct rebelled against his surroundings in his early
childhood. When, as a small boy, he was given a dress- of
the most precious brocade, he refused to wear it. At great
trouble he was prevailed upon to put it on. However,
before joining the company he crept into a chimney, covered

152 THE FOUNDATIONS 0^ GEEMANY

himself with soot, and entered the royal presence looking
like a sweep. He hated the full-bottomed powdered wigs
with enormous flowing curls which Louis the Fourteenth had
made popular. One day the little prince was sitting among
a number of pompous old courtiers ornamented with the
largest and costliest French wigs. He himself wore only a
little one. Suddenly, the Crown Prince exclaimed that
it was too hot for wearing wigs. The courtiers of course
agreed. In a moment Frederick WilHam threw his own
wig into the blazing fire, exclaiming, ' He is a rascal who
does not follow the Crown Prince's example ! * AD the
courtiers regretfully, but obediently, followed suit.

When Frederick William the First came to the throne
his first action consisted in inspecting the royal accounts
and in reducing the royal expenditure to one-fifth. Without
a moment's delay, all the superfluous courtiers and servants
were dismissed or pensioned. All unduly high salaries
were reduced. The superfluous royal buildings and grounds
were sold or let to the best advantage. Eoyal parks and
ornamental gardens were converted into ploughed fields
and into drill grounds for the army. The unnecessary
jewellery which his father had accumulated, vast quantities
of costly wines, and many horses and carriages were sold.
Innumerable objects of silver and gold were sent to the
Mint and turned into coin. While in his father's time the
charabteristic of the Prussian Court had been elegance
and luxury, its characteristic feature under Frederick
William the First became simplicity and thrift. The King
lived Uke a simple private citizen. Upholstered furniture,
carpets, and rich han^ngs were banished from the royal
rooms. The new King preferred plain wooden floors and
plain wooden tables and chairs. Simplicity and cleanliness
became the predonainant note of the royal residence.

The impetuous King hated luxury. He would tolerate
luxury neither in his own family nor among others. By
legislative enactments, profusion in dress and wastefulness

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEACTER 153

of expenditure were checked. The King hated the French
fashions, and tried to make them ridiculous. With this
' object in view he caused the most despised men in his army,
the provosts, who acted as miUtary police and as execu-
tioners, to be dressed at parade in the richest French fashions
and in flowing wigs. The ladies at Court were not allowed
to use paint or powder. Elaborate French cooking was
banished from the royal kitchens. The royal table was
supphed. with the plainest viands. When the King on
his walks noticed an attractive smell of cooking emanating
from the house of a peasant or of a citizen of small means,
he would not hesitate to enter and to invite himself to dinner.
He T?ouId ask after the price of the food, and then insist
that the royal cook should provide him with a meal of
the same kind at the identical price.

In his personal expenditure the King was the thriftiest
of men. For the sake of economy he always wore oversleeves
and an apron when working at his desk. He checked the
accounts of the royal household down to the smallest sums,
and woe betide a dishonest servant or one who through
ignorance or carelessness had spent too much in supplying
the royal family. The same economy which the King
practised in his person and his family he required from all
the officials and from the private citizens as well. Every
penny had to be carefully accounted for. Ministers of
State were told that common paper, which was cheaper
than white paper, was good enough for their use. In large
matters the King was economical as in small ones. Every
year considerable sums of money were saved. Officials
who wished to acquire the King's favour had to produce
large surpluses. Vast sums thus saved were employed for
strengthening the army and for improving the (jountry by
building canals and high roads, by draining marshes and
irrigating dry land, by settling large numbers of foreigners
on reclaimed waste lands in Prussia, and by accumulating
a fund in ready money in the cellars of the royal castle.

154 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

Frederick William the First educated the Prussians not
only to habits of frugahty, economy, and order, but to
industry and thoroughness as well. In his father's time
the Government business had been left to underhngs, who
had abused their position. Frederick William resolved
to take the whole national business in his own hands and
to become the principal official of the State. He fulfilled
his duties most conscientiously. Thoughts of the national
business disturbed his sleep. He rose at the break of dawn
and worked jndefatigably till far into the night. He was
no doubt the most industrious man. in his kingdom. On
every walk and every ride he acted as general inspector to
the nation, supervising, admonishing, helping or punishing
the people on the spot. When he saw working-men idling
at their work he accelerated their movements with his stick.
Once on one of his early morning walks the King approached
one of the Potsdam gates and noticed that a traveller who
had arrived by the night mail from Hamburg was knocking
in vain at the gate. The enraged King had the gate opened,
rushed into the gatekeeper's house, and with his stick drove
him out of bed and out of office. Then, returning to the
astonished traveller he apologised to him, and expressed
his deep regret that a Prussian official should have been so
neglectful of his duties. Frederick William listened to all
complaints, and investigated them in person if possible.
While he insisted that all the citizens should be industrious
and thrifty, he was always pleased when he saw hard-workiag
men enjoying innocent amusements. Once he came, on
one of his walks, to an inn where people were playiag at
ninepins. He watched their game and praised them for
spendiag their leisure hours in such a healthy way. The
players told their friends, and when the Kiag happened to
pass the ninepin-alley a few days later there was a crowd
of loafers who waited for the King's applause. Immediately
the King grew red in the face, rushed among them, and
drove them to their business with his stick.

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEACTEE 155

Frederick William the First died in 1740, and was
succeeded by his son, Frederick the Great. Frederick the
Great is known to the world chiefly as a soldier and as a
diplomat. Like Napoleon the First, he was his own Com-
mander-in-Chief, Minister of War, Chief of the Staff, and
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is not so much known
that Frederick the Great, like his father, administered in
person all.the principal offices of State, that he was a great
administrator and, before all, a great educator in the widest
sense of the word. He was an indefatigable worker. He
rose in summer at three o'clock in the morning, and in winter
at four o'clock, and his servants had instructions to get him
out of bed by force if he did not rise immediately when
called. A quarter of an hour after having been awakened,
Frederick was at his desk, reading his correspondence
and dictating replies. He, like his father, became to the
Pruseian people a model of industry, thoroughness, and
e;eonomy.

Frederick the Great left numerous hitherto unpubHshed
writings for the guidance of his successors, as well as printed
essays and books scarcely known to the BngUsh-speaking
■ peoples, in which he explained the principles which guided '
his numerous activities. His enhghtened views as to
education in the narrower sense are extremely interesting
and valuable, especially as they have had the greatest
influence upon Prusso-German educational poKcy. He wrote
in his ' Memoires depuis la Paix' :

Custom, which rules the world, holds imperious sway
over the narrow-minded. Still, a Government must not
restrict its activities to a single aim. It must be prompted
to action not only by the consideration whether action is
profitable. The pubHc welfare has numerous aspects, and
the Government should interest itself in all. Among the
objects which the Government should further with particular
care, the education of youth is one of the most important. . . .
Unfortunately teachers strive merely to fill the memory of

156 TfiE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

their pupils with facta and dates, and omit to strengthen their
intelHgence and their judgment.

Frederick the Great believed that by a wisely directed
education a nation might be raised rivalling the ancient
Greeks and Eomans in bravery and general ability. He stated
in his pamphlet, ' Lettre snr I'Education,' written in 1769 :

The vast number of great men which Eome and Greece
have produced have influenced me in favour of the education
of the ancients. I am convinced that by following their
methods one can create a nation superior in character and
ability to the generality of modem nations.

The educatfon given to the children of the nobility
throughout Europe is extremely bad. In Prussia they are
given their first education in the parental house, and an
intermediate and higher education at the schools and the
universities. In the house of the parents, blind parental
love prevents them giving their children the necessary
correction. Mothers particularly, even if they rule their
husbands with despotic severity, have a boundless indul-
gence for their children. These are handed over to servants,
who flatter and spoil them, who inspire them with pernicious
ideas, and who thus fatally influence minds so tender. The
educators who are generally chosen for the children when
they are a httle older are, as a rule, either clergymen or
young lawyers who often themselves need educating

Children are trained to habits of idleness by being allowed
to be idle. Men who wish to get on in the world require a
hard and laborious education. Boys should be given work
of composition, which should be corrected and recorrected.
By forcing them to rewrite and to improve their work, they
will be taught to think correctly and to express their ideas
with facility. Instead of following this method, teachers
cram the brains of the young with facts and allow the working
intelligence of their pupils to remain inactive and un-
developed and to become atrophied. Children are forced
to accumulate knowledge, but are prevented from acquiring
that discriminating inteUigence with which alone they can
make good use of the knowledge which they have acquired.

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEACTEE 157

The softness of their first education makes boys effemi-
nate, comfort-loving, lazy, and cowardly. Thus, instead of
rearing a hardy race resembling the ancients, a race of
pleasure-loving sybarites is created. Hence young men
lead Hves of idleness and of self-indulgence. They believe
that they have been bom to enjoy comfort and pleasure, and
that men of their position are under no obligation to be useful
members of society. Consequently, they wiU commit
foUies of every kind, run into debt, drink and gamble, and
ruin their famiHes.

Young men cannot be too well educated. They cannot
possess too much knowledge, whatever their oalhng may be.
The profession of arms, for instance, requires very vast
knowledge. Nevertheless, one often hears people say:
' My boy will not learn. I shall therefore make him
a soldier.' He may become a private, .but not an officer
qualified to fill the highest posts.

In the administration of justice and of the national
finances, in the diplomatic service and in the army, illustri-
ous birth is an advantage. However, all would be lost if
birth should become more potent than merit. A Govern-
ment which would exalt birth above merit would no doubt
experience fatal consequences. ... It is an error to believe
that the arts and sciences soften the national character.
All that serves to enlighten the mind and to extend the range
of knowledge, elevates the national spirit.

In Frederick's opinion, education should improve the
character and increase the abilities of the people. It
should be practical and useful rather than ornamental and
showy. These principles should apply to the education of
girls as well. He wrote in his ' Lettre sur I'Education ' :

I must confess that I am surprised to see that people of
the highest position bring up their daughters like chorus
girls. They chiefly wish that their daughters should be
admired, that they should please by their appearance.
Apparently it is considered unnecessary that they should
be esteemed, and it is forgotten that their business in life
consists in raising families. Their education should be

158 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

directed towards their principal object in life. They
should be taught to detest everything that is dishonourable.
They ought to learn wisdom and be made to acquire useful
and lasting qualities. Instead of this, parents -endeavour
to cultivate their beauty and grace, attractions which are
evanescent. Example is more precious than precept.
How then can parents teach their daughters wisdom and virtue
if they themselves lead idle and frivolous lives and devote
themselves to luxury and to other scandalous practices ?;

Frederick the Great clearly recognised that the sciences
and arts are apt to increase the prestige and the power of a
nation. He regretted that the Prussians were a nation
of boors, and he wished to create culture among them by a
suitable e^ducation. He therefore encouraged all the
sciences and arts, established learned institutions, and
promoted study and investigation in every way. He wrote
in his ' Discours de I'UtiUte des Sciences ' :

The inborn gifts of men are small. Men possess tenden-
cies which education may develop. Men's knowledge must
be increased so as to widen then: horizon. Their memories
must be filled with facts, so that their imagination wiU have
sufficient material with which it can work. The critical
faculties of men must be sharpened so as to enable them to
discrimiaate between the valuable and the worthless. The
greatest genius among men, if devoid of knowledge, is like
an uncut diamond. How many geniuses have been lost to
society, and how many truly great men have lived and died
in obscurity, because their great natural gifts remained un-
developed either through lack of education or through lack
of opportunity ! The welfare and the glory of the State
require that the people should be as weU educated and as
enhghtened as possible, for then only can the nation produce
men of the highest ability in every walk of life for the good
of the country, . . .

All enlightened rulers have patronised and encouraged
those learned men whose labours are useful to society, and
now matters have come to such a pitch that a State will

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEACTEE 159

soon be a century behind its neighbours if it neglects to
encourage the sciences. In this respect Poland furnishes us
with a warning example.

Very interesting are Frederick's own instructions for
the Academie des Nobles in Berlin, where sons of the nobiUty
were to be educated. Frederick the Great wrote !

The professor of law should draw upon Hugo Grotius.
The pupils should not be turned into juridical experts. WeU-
brought-up men should possess some soimd general ideas
about the law, but need not have profound legal knowledge.
The law professor shall therefore limit himself to giving to
his pupils some knowledge of the rights of the, citizens, of
the rights of the people, and of the rights of the monarch.
They should have some idea of international law. At the
same time they should be told that international law lacks
that authority and compelling power which are possessed
by the ordinary law, and that it is therefore a phantom to
which sovereigns appeal even when they are violating it.
The lessons will be wound up by the study of the Frederician
code, which, being the body of the national laws, should be
known by all the citizens.

If the pupils should do wrong, they must be punished. If
they do not know their lessons, they should be made to wear
a donkey's head. If they are lazy, they should be given only
bread and water. If they are ignorant through ill-will,'
they should be locked up, deprived of food, scolded, served
last at table, not be allowed to carry their sword in pubhc,'
and be compelled to ask pardon in pubhc. Obstinate pupils
should be aUo-ffifed to carry only an empty scabbard until
they repent of their obstinacy. But under pain of imprison-
ment the governors of the academy are prohibited from
beating their pupils. As they are young men of position,
they should possess greatness of soul and a keen sense of
honour. The punishments inflicted on them should awaken
•their ambitions but should not humihate them.

Law is an important part of the national education.
Frederick the Great was eminent not only as an educa-

160 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

tionalist, but also as a law-giver. He considered that the
citizens were entitled to obtain justice quickly and cheaply,
that the confusion and the multiplicity of laws prevented the
poor obtaining justice, and enabled the rich and ounrung to
oppress the poor and the weak. He laid down his priaciples
regarding the laws in various writings. In his ' Dissertation
sur les Eaisons d'Etabhr ou d'Abroger lee Lois ' he wrote :

Few and wise laws make the people happy, while the
multiplicity of laws embarrasses jurisprudence. A good
doctor does not overdose his patients with medicines, nor
does a skilful legislator overdose the public with super-
fluous laws. Too many medicines are harmful. They
neutrahse one another. Too many laws create a maze, in
which the lawyers and justice itself become lost.

England has a law against bigamy. Once a man was
accused of having married five wives. As the law had to be
interpreted literally, he could not be punished for bigamy.
To make the law clear it ought to have stated : ' Whoever
marries more than one woman wiU be punished.' The vaguely
worded laws of England, which are literally interpreted,
have given rise to the most ridiculous abuses.

Carefully worded laws leave no room for chicanery.
When they are vaguely and obscurely expressed, it becomes
necessary to discuss and to determine the intention of the
law-givers, and judges, instead of adjudicating on the facts,
have to waste their time in expounding and interpreting
the law.

One can limit the addresses of lawyers to the recital
of facts which can be supported by proofs, and their addresses
may be concluded with a short recapitulation. Nothing
is more powerful and more moving than an appeal to the
passions, to sentiment, made by a man gifted with eloquence.
An eloquent advocate can move his hearers in any way he
Ukes, and can thus obscure the truth. Lycurgus and Solon
prohibited the use of eloquence in the law courts. . . ,
Prussia has followed that wise custom of Greece. Eloquence
is banished from our pleadings.

When the laws of a State have not beeri, collected in a

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEAGTER 161

code it is only natural that the existing laws frequently
contradict each other. As they have been made by different
legislators at different times, they lack that unity which is
essential in all important matters.

In his ' Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement ' Frederick
wrote :

Good laws must be clearly expressed. Otherwise
trickery can evade them, and cunning take advantage of
them, and then the weak will become a prey to the powerful
and the cunning. Legal procedure should be as short as
possible. Otherwise the people will be ruined by protracted
law suits. They should not have to spend vast sums in
litigation, for they are entitled to justice. The Law Depart-
ment of the Government cannot be too watchful in pro-
tecting the people against the grasping greed of the lawyers.
The whole legal apparatus should be kept in order by
periodical inspections, when those who believe that they
have been wronged by the law can place their complaints
before the visiting Commission.

Punishments should never be excessive. Violence should
never displace the laws. It is better that a sovereign should
be too mild than too severe. Laws must be devised in
accordance with the national character. A docile people
does not require severe laws.

More than 150 years ago Frederick the Great endeavoured
to make the laws plain and clear to all by compiling a code.
Great Britain is still devoid of a code. Contradictory
laws and all the evils described by Frederick the Great
abound. The law in England, and in America too, is a
scandal, and the lawyers oppose the compilation of the laws
in a code in their own interest.

The old Prussian Code, which was inspired by the ideas
of Frederick the Great, is a model of clearness and brevity.
It is interesting not only because it shows how plain and
simple the law can be made by a government which has
the will to simplify it, but also because it shows how powerful

162 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

an educational instrument legislation can become in the
hands of a wise government. The old Prussian Code
established clearly the rights and duties of ruler and ruled,
of the State and of the citizen. While England and the
United States are swayed by individualism, while in the
Anglo-Saxon countries the interests of the individual are
placed above those of the community as a whole, Frederick
the Great impressed upon his people throughout his Code
the fact that the whole is more important than the part,
that the State is more important than the individual. In
the Introduction to the Code we read, in the beautifully
clear and brief language which makes it a model of style :

Every citizen is obliged to promote the welfare and
security of the community in accordance with his position
and means. If the rights and duties of the individual should
come into collision with the promotion of the general welfare,
the rights and advantages of the individual citizen must
range after the interests of the community. On the other
hand, the State is obliged to make good the damage which
individuals may sufFer by sacrificing their rights and interests
to the general welfare.

It will be noticed that the State; the community, was
given enormous powers over the individual, powers which
might be abused. To prevent their abuse, the citizens
were enabled to proceed at law against the State with the
same ease with which they could proceed against one another.
The Code stated :

Differences between the head of the State and his sub-
jects will be settled before the ordinary law courts, in
accordance with the law, and will be decided by them.

That was not an empty assertion. While in England and
in the United States the popular representation is all-
powerful, and can, with impunity, act unjustly towards
the citizens, the Prussian people were enabled by law to
place their differences with Government and ruler before

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEACTER 163

the law courts. When Frederick the Great had built
the chdteau of Sansouci he found that a windmill close
by disturbed him at his work. He offered to buy the mill,
but the miller refused to part with it at any price. Annoyed
by his refusal, the King threatened to seize the mill, paying
the miller compensation, whereupon the proprietor fear-
lessly replied that the King could not act against the law;
that he would take the matter to the law courts if Frederick
used violence, and the result was that the miller remained
in undisturbed possession of his property.

By the action of the Great Elector, of Frederick William
the First, and of Frederick the Great, the ruler and the
Government of Prussia had been given the greatest powers.
Frederick the Great was no doubt a despot, but he was
an enlightened despot. He claimed for the State the most
far-reaching rights, but he insisted that ruler and Govern-
ment, being endowed with the greatest power, were obliged
to fulfil their duty towards the citizens, that they should
act towards them the part of Providence. The old Prussian
Code lays down :

All rights and duties of the State towards the citizens
are united in the sovereign.

The principal duty of the ruler of the State consists
in maintaining peace and security towards other nations
and in the interior of the country, and in protecting every
citizen in the enjoyment of his life and property against
violence and against disturbance.

The duties before mentioned were generally recognised
by conscientious sovereigns. However, Frederick the Great
went farther. He was of opinion that the Government
should not pnly protect the citizens, but should also promote
their prosperity by wise interference, and come to their
aid when in distress. The Code states :

It is the duty of the ruler to provide measures and
create institutions whereby the citizens will obtain means

164 THE POUNDAOJIONS OF GEEMANY

and opportunities for developirig their abiEties and powers,
for using them and for increasing their prosperity.

Hence, the head of the State is possessed of all the
privileges and powers which are required in order to obtain
this object.

The State is obhged to maintain the security of the
subjects and to defend their person, their honour, their
rights, and their property.

Hence, the State is obliged to take the measures and
to create the institutions necessary for providing justice,
for taking care of those who cannot help themselves, and
for preventing and punishing transgressions and crimes.

Germany was the first State to introduce a system of
National Insurance. As Bismarck inaugurated the first
national insurance laws, it is often believed that he originated
Germany's social policy. In reality he merely carried out
the duties which Frederick the Great had recommended;
and which were laid down in the old Code. The old Prussian
Code distinctly states that those citizens who are in need
are entitled to employment, and that they are entitled to
support if employment cannot be found for them, or if
they are unable to work. On the other hand, citizens were
not allowed to live in idleness by begging, and institutions
which encouraged idleness and dissipation, even if they
were charitable institutions, were not to be tolerated. The
Code states :

It is the duty of the State to provide for the maintenance
of those citizens who cannot provide for themselves, and
who cannot obtain maintenance from those private persons
who, according to the law, are obliged to provide for them.

Those who lack means and opportunities to earn a living
for themselves and their dependents, are to be supplied
with work suitable to their powers and capacities.

Those who will not work, owing to laziness, love of
idleness, or other disorderly inclinations, shall be made to
do useful work by compulsion and punishment.

Foreign beggars must neither be allowed to enter thff

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CHAEAGTEE 165

country nor to remain in it if they have entered it, and if
they should have succeeded in entering it by stealth, they
must be sent back across the frontier.

The native poor must not beg. They must be sent
back to the place to which they belong, and must there be
provided for in accordance with the law. The State is
entitled and obliged to create institutions and to take
measures which prevent destitution among the citizens, and
which prevent exaggerated expenditure and waste.

Arrangements and institutions which promote idleness,
especially among the masses of the people, and which are
harmful to dihgence and industry, must not be tolerated
within the State.

Charitable and other institutions which favour and
promote inclination towards idleness, may be dissolved
by the State, and their income may be used for the benefit
of the poor, .jl

Those who deliberately live by begging, such as tramps
and idlers of every kind, must be made to work ; and when
they are useless they must either be cheaply provided for
or be expelled from the country as strangers.

Thieves and other criminals who, owing to their evil
inclinations, may become dangerous to the community,
shall not be allowed to leave prison after they have served
their sentence unless they have shown that they are able
to make an honest living.

Authorities and officials who neglect the preventive
measures outlined will be held responsible for themselves
and for their subordinates, according to the circumstances
of the case.

Germany does not swarm with tramps, touts; and idlers
of every kind who live by defrauding charitable organisations
and kindly disposed private people, because t^e nation has
been trained to habits of industry and thrift during the
last two hundred years. The Prussian sovereigns themselves
have given an example of industry and thrift to their people,
and they have, in addition, endeavoured to make the people
industrious and thrifty by wise legislation, for the prmciplea

166 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

contained in the old Code still guide the German Government
and the local authorities of the country.

On his journeys, Frederick the Great, like his father
■ Frederick William the First, lent a willing ear to the com-
plaints of all his citizens. Beferring to his activity when
travelling, he wrote to Voltaire :

I endeavour to prevent that in Prussia the strong oppress
the weak, and I try to mitigate sentences which appear to
me to be too severe. That is part of my occupation when
travelling through my provinces. Every citizen can ap-
proach me without let or hindrance, and his complaints'
are investigated either by myself or by others. Hence X
am able to help numerous people who were unknown to
me until they handed to me their petitions or complaints.
As I am apt to revise sentences the judges are careful and
cautious, and are not likely to proceed with over-great
harshness.

Frederick the Great endeavoured by law not only to
promote industry and to discourage idleness among the lower
classes, but among the middle and upper classes as well.
Feasants and farmers who cultivated their land badly could
be compelled to cede it to others unless they improved its
cultivation. By careful Government regulation efiSciency
was enforced in every direction. Officials could only be
appointed if they had given satisfactory proof of their
abiUty, and people of the middle classes were allowed to
engage in industrial and professional pursuits only if they
had shown their capacity. Quacks, humbugs, and frauds
of every kind, who flourish so greatly among Anglo-Saxon
nations, were not allowed to make a living in Prussia. In
all professions, in all callings, from the highest to the lowest,
efficiency and competence, thoroughness and industry, were
required and were enforced by appropriate regulations and
laws. The nobihty were given great privileges, but corre-
sponding duties were required of them. Appointments were
to be made only according to abihty and merit, and noble-

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL OHARACTEE 167

men who had disgraced themselves or had not done their
duty towards the State, could be deprived of their title and
position either by the sovereign or by the law courts. Pull
religious liberty was granted, but no religious body was
allowed to encourage hostility to the State or to promote
immorahty, for the Code stated :

Every citizen must be allowed complete freedom of
religion and of conscience.

On the other hand, every religious body is obliged to
teach its members fear of God, obedience to the laws,
loyalty towards the State, and moral behaviour towards
the citizens.

Two centuries ago the Germans were a nation of boors.
They were poor, ignorant, backward, and undisciplined.
They have become a cultivated and a powerful nation by
the training which they received from their ruler-statesmen,
who have been the most successful educators, in the widest
sense of the word, which the world has seen. Great Britain
and the United States may learn from their example.

CHAPTER V

THB QEBMAN ABMT ANP THB GENEBAIi STAFF

The success of an army, like that of any individual, depends,
in the first place, not upon its brute strength, but upon its
brain. The General Staff is the brain of an army, A
General Staff in some form or other has existed in armies
since time immemorial. Cromwell had an excellent
General Staff, although it bore a different name. However,
the General Staff in its modem and most perfect form is a
German invention. Count von Moltke's greatest merit
consists in having created the German General Staff upon
foundations which promised to ensure its permanent use-
fulness and value.

Unfortunately no English books on military affairs
give a true inside view of the wonderful organisation of the
German General Staff. The existing mihtary literature
deals exclusively with its outward activities. The most
valuable account existing is contained in the conMential
reports which Colonel Stoffel, who was the military attach^
of France in Berlin from 1866 to 1870, sent to his Govern-
ment. As that book has not been translated into English,
I would herewith give some extracts from it which describe
the organisation and activities of the German General
Staff :

The Great General Staff in Berlin is perfectly organised
for the training of officers and for serving as a brain' to the
army. At its headquarters may be found all the documents

168

GERMAN ARMY AND THE GENERAL STAFF 169

necessary for studying the different European amoies and
the countries which may become theatres of war. All
books, military journals, pamphlets, and other publications,
maps, charts, &c., which appeat anywhere in Europe are
collected and classified. It possesses particularly the most
complete investigations regarding the countries bordering
upon Prussia. A special feature is a collection of the most
detailed studies regarding the resources of the various
countries, their geographical features, their roads, towns,
and villages, their population, their revenues, their water-
courses, the volume, depth, and width of streams, their
points of passage, &c. Nothing similarly complete exists
in France.

It must be proclaimed very loudly, and as an incontro-
vertible truth, that the Prussian General Staff is the first
and foremost in Europe. The French Staff cannot be com-
pared with it. I have unceasingly pointed this out, being
convinced that if there should be an early war; the North
German Federation would derive the, very greatest advan-
tages from its General Staff, while the French would terribly
regret the inferiority of theirs. This question seems to me to
be the gravest of all. I do not wish to disguise it, and my
conviction is so strong that I raise a cry of alarm. Caveant
consules ! I should not do my duty did I act differently. . . .

General von Moltke is the chief of the staff, and he
possesses almost absolute powers. He chooses the of&cers
who are to be admitted and to be employed by the General
Staff. He makes the promotions, which the War Minister
merely ratifies, and he distributes staff officers throughout
the army. His power is practically unlimited, and hia
position, which would appear incomprehensilfle in France,
appears in Prussia only natural, because the integrity and
merit of von Moltke are generally recognised in that country.

Any lieutenant in the army, after three years' service
with his regiment, may enter the War Academy (Kriegs-
Aka4emie) at Berlin. This is an important military high
school. It is the foremost military school in Europe by
the character of the teachers and by that of the tuition.
It is not merely a staff school, for it has a larger aim. Its

170 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

object is to familiarise chosen and ambitious officers with
the higher aspects of the art of war by giving them a training
which will develop their intellectual faculties, and which wiU
enable them to become good staff officers and prepare them
for obtaining a high command. . . .

Of the 120 lieutenants who on an average wish to join
the academy every year, only the 40 who show most
ability are admitted. They are selected by severe examina-
tions from the 120 who have come forward. The course of
the study extends over three years; and it continues during
nine months of every year. During the remaining three
months the officers rejoin their regiments and take part
in the autumn manoeuvres. In the third year the pupils
receive their training in actual staff duties and travel during
a month through varied country under the guidance of
their professors. During that month they occupy themselves
with reconnaissances, practical studies of the ground, military
map-making, placing camps for troops, and other practical
military problems. . . .

When these thre& years of training have passed, all the
lieutenants are sent back to their regiments, and the professors
and the director of the academy point out to General von
Moltke the most promising and the most zealous pupils.
Now of the forty officers the twelve ablest are chosen, and
these are transferred for six or nine months to a regiment
belonging to another arm than that with which they have
hitherto been acquainted. Those men who during that
new stage have shown the necessary zeal and ability in
their new surroundings are then called by General von
Moltke to Berlin to serve their apprenticeship on the General
Staff. However, they work there not in staff officer's
uniform, but in their regimental uniform. The distinction
of being allowed to wear a staff officer's uniform is not
easily obtained. . . .

The one or two years which the officers chosen spend
at the General Staff headquarters in Berlin, learning the
practical staff business, are of the greatest importance to
their future career, for they attend the highest military
training school of the country, which is directed by General

GBEMAN AEMY AND THE GENERAL STAFF 171

von Moltke in person. By personally supervising the
training of the young officers, von Moltke becomes acquainted
with their character, and is able to judge of their abilities.
He carefully introduces these young men to the work of
each of the departments of the General Staff, and in addition
he delivers lectures to them. He orders them to write
essays on subjects which he chooses himself, and he reads
and criticises these essays before the assembled officers.
However, in doing so he never mentions the name of the
author, in order neither to hurt the feelings of the unsuccessful
nor to arouse a spirit of vanity among the successful . . .

When this temporary service at the headquarters of
the General Staff, which is a kind of apprenticeship, has
been completed. General von) Moltke chooses secretly those
officers with whom he has been working who are to be
appointed to the General Staff. He could, of course,
immediately appoint those whom he considers to be the
most competent. However, in order not to hurt the feelings
of the unsuccessful men, all the officers who have served
their apprenticeship are indiscriminately sent back to
their regiments, where they resume their former duties.
Ihe less gifted are left there, but the most promising ones
are, after several months' practical service, promoted
captains over the heads of their fellows, and are given the
distinguishing and much-coveted uniform of the General
Staff ■ .

General von Moltke employs the captains who have
thus been chosen according to his discretion. He gives
them work for which they have shown particular aptitude,
and he sends the majority of the men to the staffs of the
different army corps in the provinces, where they become
acquainted with the corps duties. The Prussian staff
officers, unlike the French, are not permanently tied to
their desks. They are not occupied all the time with
clerical work, for all this is left to non-commissioned officers
and privates.

In being chosen for the General Staff the officers gain
not only prestige, but obtain at the same time substantial
material advantage, for by being promoted captains, they

172 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

obtain that grade from six to eight years earlier than they
^ould have obtained it jn the ordinary way. . . ,

Out of the 120 promising officers who on an average
come forward every year, desiring to join the War Academy,
only the forty ablest are admitted after severe examinations,
as has been pointed out, and of these forty only the twelve
most capable men are finally chosen, as has been shown.
However, among the officers who have not come forward
to study at the War Academy, and among those who have
attended the War Academy and who have been rejected,
there may of course be men of very great ability- In order
that these should be discovered and employed on the General
Staff, the regimental commanders are invited to propose
every year, t^irough the generals commanding, to von Moltke
those officers who have shown the greatest professional
knowledge, zeal, and aptitude. The commanders of regiments
and corps are of course anxious' to discover as many able
officers as possible in their commands, and to recommend
them to von Moltke. To the officers who have thus been
recommended to him, General von Moltke sends problems
to solve and questions to answer. If they show signs of
talent and of ability in carrying out the tasks which von
Moltke gives them, he calls them to the General Staff and
employs them tentatively. If they give satisfaction, they
receive permanent appointments. If they disappoint him,
they are sent back to their regiments. ...

All the mechanical staff work is left to underlings.
The staff officers themselves are occupied solely with the
study of important military questions, with brain work of
the highest importance. Every year the chief of the staff
of each army corps makes with all the staff officers a so-called
staff journey in order to extend their knowledge. On that
journey practical problems of war are treated. The officers
of the Great General Staff of Berlin make every year a simi-
lar staff journey, which is conducted by General von Moltke
himself and which lasts from two to three weeks. . . .

As shown by the details given in the foregoing, the
superiority of the Prussian General Staff over the staffs of
other nations is due firstly to the careful selection of the

GERMAN ARMY AND THE GENERAL STAFF 173

staff officers from all the officers of the army, for all officers
may compete for staff appointments, as has been shown. Its
superiority is due, in the second place, to the fact that only
ambitious, capable, and industrious officers will come forward,
for they know that they can hope to succeed in obtaining
a staff appointment only if they work earnestly and with
the greatest concentration, for they are aware that only the
ablest will be selected — that appointments are made exclu-
sively by merit. By this most careful selection, and by the
highest professional training of the staff officers, Prussia
has secured for herself the foremost body of staff officers
in the world. The more frequently I compare the German
staff officers with the French staff officers, the more I am
struck with the superiority of the former.

It has been said that genius is an infinite capacity of
taking pains. Count von Moltke was a most painstaking
and conscientious worker. By infinite application and by
unremitting labour, he succeeded by the means described
to select from the large body of the German officers
practically all the best men and training them in their
duties. The great successes which the German army has
obtained in 1866, in 1870-71, in the present war, are chiefly
attributable to the General Staff, which has been the brain
of the army in the fullest sense of the term, which has trained
the commanders. Other nations may learn from Germany's
example. The methods practised by von Moltke are of
course applicable not only to the army, but to every Govern-
ment department and to eyery large commercial
organisation.

CHAPTER VI

HOW EDUCATION HAS DEGBADED THE GERMAN PEOPLE^

In all, the world's history no race has been bo drilled, schooled,
sermonised into a sort of inverted religion of hate, envy, jealousy, greed,
cruelty, and arrogance. Man and woman, girl and boy, have been taught
from childhood this inhuman vainglory and lust of power. It has grown
to be their sole Gospel, Creed, Hymnal, and Prayer-book. Britons and
Americans cannot comprehend how a great and intellectual people can
have come to a cult so Satanic.

Fbbdebio Habbison in The Times, August 4, 1917.

Nations consist of individuals. Hence the character
of a nation depends on that of the individuals composing
it. Now although the influence of race, of heredity, is
exceedingly powerful in man, aS it is in animals, that
of education in the widest sense of the term is at least
equally potent. Surroundings and upbringing determine the
character of individuals. An English baby, if adopted
and brought up by Prussians, will probably become a
typical Prussian, if brought up by Turks it will probably
become an average Turk, if abandoned in China it will
most likely become a Chinese. It wUl not only learn the
German, Turkish, or Chinese language, but adopt the German
Turkish, or Chinese habits, tastes, views, and standards
of life and behaviour, although it may do so somewhat
reluctantly. It cannot very well adopt English ways
of thought and action, because it knows only those of
the country of its upbringing. Only in very rare and

I From the Nineteenth Century and After, September 1917.
174

DEGEADATION OF GEEMAN EDUCATION 175

exceptional cases would such a child possess enough strength
of character and independence of mind to condemn the
views held by all the people around, even by the best and
the most exalted, and formulate views and principles of
its own totally opposed to its surroundings. I shall show
in the following pages that the character of the German
nation, which originally was democratic, kindly^ and human,
has been warped, but probably not completely destroyed;
by the educational policy which the Hohenzollerns have
pursued for generations.

For many years English people contemplated German
education with uncritical admiration. They saw in the
German educational system merely a powerful instrument
for developing the national abilities, but completely failed
to observe the disastrous effect which German education
had upon the national character. In an article signifi-
cantly entitled ' Education and Miseducation in Germany,'
which I contributed to the Contem'porary Beview in October
1906, and which forms chapter xx. of the fifth edition
of my book ' Modern Germany,' I wrote :

England and America have been flooded with a constantly
flowing stream of books in praise of German education,
but I have failed to discover a single book on the failure
of Germjan education, although such a book seems to be
very urgently required. It is to be hoped that a book
pointing out the grave defects of German education from
the English point of view wiU soon be written. . . .

The educational organisation of Germany was, and is
stiU, an absolutist machine, though at first sight it bears
a strongly democratic appearance. ... The leading
feature of the German elementary schools is militant
patriotism and militarism, while moral and religious educa-
tion is treated as a matter of secondary importance. The
Chinese child learns spelling from the Confucian classics,
the German child from tales illustrating German military
valour. While the English schools strive to elevate the

176 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

child's character by instilling the civic virtues, the German
schools strive almost exclusively to teach discipline and to
arouse and 'to develop the military inclinations, or rather
the spirit of Jingoism, giving little consideration to the
training of character and practically none to the develop-
ment of the civic virtues. The birthday of the Emperor
and the anniversary of the battle of Sedan are the two
great school festivals, not only in the elementary schbols,
but in the higher schools as weU, and they are celebrated
with patriotic songs, recitations, speeches, &c. The
' Hereditary Enemy ' plays a very large part in the elemen-
tary history books of Germany. No wonder, then, that
the principal and almost the only game of German school
children consists in playing at soldiers or at Frenchmen
and Germans, which lately has been superseded by playing
at Boers and Enghshmen. . . .

The chief practical value of the German schools con-
sists, in my opinion, not in the knowledge disseminated, but
in the discipline instilled. . . . German education teaches
the young to work, to obey, and, before all, to obey the
authorities. ... It cannot too often and too loudly be
asserted that Germany has become great and powerful
not through her education, as synonymous with know-
ledge, but through her disciphne.

In Prusso-Germany the State is all-powerful. It is
highly centralised, although centralisation is disguised by
the appearance of self-government. Most self-goveming^
bodies are as dependent upon the Grovernment at Berlin as
are the nominally independent and self-governing minor
German States with their kings, grand dukes, and dukes.
Frederick William, the Great Elector, who ruled from 1640
to 1688, took advantage of the terrible position created by
the Thirty Years' War. He destroyed the self-goverjiment
of the impoverished and weakened towns and introduced
governmental absolutism and a standing army in Branden-
burg-Prussia. His successors have continued and developed
that paliey. Since the rule of the Great Elector, and

DEGEADATION OF GBEMAN EDUCATION 177

especially since that of King Frederick William the First,
the father of Frederick the Great, who reigned from 1713
to 1740, Prussia has been a camp and a drill-ground. The
army was the State, and social life, industry, commerce,
education and science were made subservient to the military
exigencies and ambitions of the Sovereign. Ever siace
1640, and particularly since 1713, the people of Prussia
have lived under a rigorous discipline, and have been taught
that their principal duty consists in worshipping their
ruler, in obeying implicitly his commands and those of his
underlings, and in paying their taXea. Even now the Ger-
man ruler is sacrosanct and stands high above the Deity.
God takes merely the second place in the German scheme
of State. That may be seen from the fact that, while
there are many prosecutions for lise-majest& in Germany,
there are very few for blasphemy. Besides, while, accord-
ing to the German Penal Code, blasphemy, a verbal insult
offered to God, is punishable with imprisonment from one
day to three years, simple llse-majesti, a verbal insult
offered to the ruler, is punishable with imprisonment from
two months to five years. The difference is characteristic
and highly significant.

In Germany educational policy is considered to be
an extremely important part of statecraft. Educational
policy is therefore not shaped by the educational specialists,
but by the German rulers and their statesmen. Prusso-
Germany is a military State. Its character and purpose
are chiefly miUtary. The nation is an appendage of the
army. Hence it is only natural that Prusso-German edu-
cation has been militarised since an early date, that the
educational department is a branch of the military establish-
ment, and that it is directed for military purposes under the
influence of the high military dignitaries,

Education in the widest sense of the term is obviously
not restricted to the schools. The formation of opinions,
habits, tastes, etc., is a process which goes on continually

178 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

from the cradle to the grave. The principal educational
factors' which contribute in shaping the German character
are the various schools, the churches, the army, and the
Press. In addition there are numerous minor factors,
such as the Court, society, etc. The principal four factors
will be considered in the following pages, and it will be
shown that not only the nominally free schools and univer-
sities, but also the nommally free churches and Prep, have
become instruments of government and have fallen under
the control of the ruling military and aristocratic class.

, The German schools strive not to enlarge and develop
the mind of the German people, but to confine and control
it, while developing the usefulness of the citizens to the
State. They strive to confine and control the mind of the
people in the interest of the Sovereign, and of the ruling
arid the privileged classes through which he governs. A
German burgomaster, who disguised his identity under
the pseudonym ' Lothar Engelbert Schucking,' wrote in
' Die Eeaktion in der inneren Verwaltung Preussens ' {Berlin,
111908) :

As soon as the young citizens begin to go to school the
State commences its endeavours in giving them a patriotic
and religious education. The patriotic education is mon-
archical-national. However, it is very superficial, because
the budding citizen is purposely given no clear idea of
the political conditions of the State. No Prussian elementary
school tells its pupHs anything regarding the Prussian Constitu-
tion, its evolution, its history and constitutional practice.

Prussian administrative law and custom are a secret
science of the Prussian bureaucracy. Prussian history is
intended to create and increase affection for the dynasty.
This tendency, scientifically considered, is harmful. But
it is still more harmful that the pupils are constantly told
of the deeds of the Prussian Sovereigns as if they were
stiU living in an autocracy. A description of the circum-
stances which led to the proclamation of the Prussian
Constitution is never given in the schools, although that

DEGEADATION OP GEEMAN EDUCATION 179

part of our history is most interesting and most important
for the future citizens. The French Eevolution is depicted
in the schools as if it had been a senseless slaughter perpet-
rated by absolutely bestialised men. Other revolutions
dnd constitutional struggles are never mentioned. The
fact that Prussia's pohtical organisation, and even the
Prussian Constitution, have been founded on the achieve-
ments of the French Eevolution is carefully disguised.
Otherwise young Prussians might learn that poUtical
progress was possible, that many things in Prussia are un-
constitutional, that the Constitution and the electoral ar-
arrangements require completion and improvement. Hand
in hand with the suppression of all education with regard to
pohtical and administrative matters goes a truly disgrace-
ful neglect of tuition with regard to our official organisation.
Not a single pupil is acquainted with the functions and
powers of a Landrat or a Eegierungsprasident . . .

Matters are worse in the Prussian intermediate schools
(Gymnasia). Formerly historical instruction went as far
as the War of Liberation of 1813-1815. When it is no
longerjpossible to avoid the events of the nineteenth qentury,
it is inevitable to speak of the Prussian Eevolution of 1848
and the Constitution created in consequence of it. And
how this is done ! Most of our young men begin to study
the Prussian Constitution only when they have to do so on
account of a legal examination. Pupils at secondary schools
are told nothing of our bureaucratic organisation and
the rights of the citizens. In learning about the French
Eevolution they are told a great deal about the guillotine,
but nothing about the Eights of Man, and the Imperial
Constitution remains to them a book with seven seals.

The description given by the burgomaster is perfectly
true in every particular. German education deliberately
endeavours to create obedient citizens, who are absolutely
ignorant of political matters and of their rights, who know
only their duties, and who live in dread of the bureaucracy;
of the Government, whose powers appear to them vaguej
mysterious, and unlimited.

180 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

In consequence of the Eevolution of 1848 Prussia was
given a Constitution, which was proclaimed on January 31,
1850. Many of the promises made iu that interesting docu-
ment were simply not fulfilled. Others were artfully whittled
away. With regard to education the Prussian Constitution
states in paragraphs 20-24 :

Science and its tuition are free.

The education of youth shall be provided for by a
sufficiency of public schools. . . .

Everybody is at liberty to teach or to found or to direct
educational estabhshments if he has proved to the proper
authorities that he possesses the necessary moral, scientific,
and technical qualifications. . . .

Public teachers have the rights and duties of State
officials.

The local authorities are entitled to direct the outer
affairs of elementary schools. The State appoints from
those who are quaMed the teachers, with the assistance
of the local authorities, acting according to law.

At first sight it would appear that; according to the
Constitution, Prussia had a most liberal system of educa-
tion, that the founding and the direction of schools was left
to enterprising qualified individuals and to the people them-
selves, represented by the local authorities, that the State
aimed at educational decentralisation and individualisation,
that private schools should be as flourishing in Prussia as
they are in England. However, if we analyse the figures
furnished by the German educational census of 1911 we
find that German education is organised as shown in table,
p. 181.

It will be noticed that the number of pupils in private
schools is quite insignificant. If we take all the schools;
excepting Girls' Gymnasia, there is only one pupil in private
schools to 88 pupils in the pubhc schools. If we con-
sider the figures in greater detail we find the disproportion
between private and public schools even larger. For every

DEGEADATION OP GEEMAN EDUCATION 181

single pupil in a private elementary school there are 394
pupils in the public elementary schools of Germany, and
the disproportion between private and public schools is
almost as large in the case of the Gynmasia, the Eeal-
Gymnasia, and the Upper Eeal-Schools whence are drawn
the professional men, the officers, judges, officials, etc.

PHPILS.

XEAOHERS.

Public.

Private.

FubUo.

PrivatB.

I

Elementaiy Schools
Upper Schools
Gymnasia
Beal-Gymnasia
tipper Beal-Schools
Pro-Gymnasia
Fro-Beal-Gymnasia
Beal-Schools .
Various
Preparatory Schools

Girls' Gymnasia .

1

Elementary Schools
Gymnasia

» 1911 in Oert

10,309,949

273,394

167,186

70,053

75,682

8,434

7,220

78,414

11,054

49,234

nany.

26,151

80,660

2,451

304

160

1,075

32

11,554

3,435

466

187,485

7,531

9,612

3,677

3,440

534

381

3,611

523

1,206

?
4,534

157

31

33

36

3

654

249
33

11,050,620

126,278

218,000

5,730

134,044

n 1911 in Pru

6,572,140
103,849

78,280

aeia.

8,849
147

6,824

?
?

4,535

?

?

In the remaining schools, which are chiefly intended for
shopkeepers, the proportion of private schools is somewhat
greater.

Since 1871 the Prussian policy of making education a
State monopoly has been copied by the non-Prussian
States of Germany. Still these have not yet gone so far
as has Prussia. The table shows that in 1911 for every
single pupil in a private elementary school in Prussia there
were 743 pupils in public elementary schools, and for every
single pupil in a private Gymnasium in Prussia there were

182 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

707 pupils in the public Gymnasia. Only in the case of
Girls' Gymnasia private enterprise is comparatively im-
portant. There are almost as many teachers in the private
Girls' Gymnasia as in all the remaining private German
schools combined. The reason for this exception is obvious.
The women are of no importance in Germany. Hitherto
the State has not thought it worth while to control directly
the intermediate schools for girls. After all, women have
no votes and do not serve in the army.

The superficial have greatly admired the fact that
Germany has no 'religious difficulty,' that education in
the German schools is not purely secular, that Germany
has known how to combine general Instruction with the
teaching of religion. That has been comparatively easy
in Gtermany because, as will be shown farther on, the Ger-
man churches, Protestant as well as Boman Catholic, have
been made part of the governmental apparatus, and the
Protestant and Boman Catholic clergy have become part
of the German buteaucracy. Hence church and school,
teacher and priest, work hand in hand and control and
direct the schools jointly in perfect harmony. They act
in the interest of their employer, the State, and in accord-
ance, with directions ' from above.' In the fifteenth edition
of the standard ' Handbook on Prussian Constitutional Law
and Administrative Practice,' by Count Hue de Graia, we
read :

The Church participates in the management" of the
school because religion forms an important part of the
tuijtion given in the elementary schools. In consequence
of the comprehensiveness of tuition, reUgious instruction
could not easily be separated. The direction of religious
instruction by the various religious bodies, which has been
promised in the Prussian Constitution, and in particular
the co-operation of the local clergy, is not an absolute
right, but is given by order and with the permission of
the State.

DEGEADATION OF GEEMAN EDUCATION 183

It will be noticed that the local clergy co-operates in
the work of education ' by order and with the permission
of the State,' a condition which, of course, is incompatible
with true rehgious freedom. But then the churches in Ger-
many are not free, but have become servants of the State.

The teachers at the elementary schools are in the first
place State officials, part of the great bureaucratic apparatus
of Prussia. Only in the second place are they teachers.
The Prussian Constitution states, according to the extracts
previously given : ' Public teachershave the rights and duties
of State officials.' Count Hue de Grais informs us in his
valuable handbook :

The teachers at the elementary schools receive their
training at seminaries. Formerly they prepared for the
examination, which must be passed on entering, by private
studies. Now preparatory institutions have been created.
Instruction at the seminaries lasts three years. A special
examination is required for the position of a teacher. The
appointment, or the confirmation of an appointment, is in
the hands of the Government. The Constitution promised
that the local authorities should assist in the appointment
of teachers. At present such co-operation on the part of
the local authorities occurs only in a few cases. Particularly
in the eastern provinces local authorities have the right
to propose teachers. Elementary school teachers have the
duties and rights of State officials.

In other words, the elementary teachers of Prussia are
Government servants who are trained in Government
institutions, who are appointed by the Goveriunent, and
may be dismissed by the Government. They belong to
the large body of un-uniformed officials.

The position of the teachers in the secondary sohoola
is similar to that of the elementary school teachers. Count
Hue de Grais states :

The teachers in the higher schools are appointed after
passing an examination before a scientific commission.

184 fHE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

The appointment in the case of schools which are under
royal patronage, and, the confirmation in case of those
schools which are not under royal patronage, are made
either by the provincial school boards or by the Minister
of Education. The directors of the Gymnasia and of the
Eeal-Schools are appointed by the King.

The teachers at the higher schools have the duties and
rights of State officials.

Although according to the Prussian Constitution ' Science
' and its tuition are free,* the university professors also are care-
fully controlled by the State. Count Hue de Grais writes : ,

It is the duty of the universities to promote science
and the scientific education of the servants of the State
and of the Church. They were originally self-governing
corporations, and they have known how to preserve some
independence after they had become State institutions. . . .
Control by the State is exercised through the curator, who
acts as the representative of the Minister of Education.

The professors at the universities have the duties and
rights of State officials.

^ihe independence of the German universities resembles
that of the minor German principalities. No scientist,
however eminent, can hope to obtaiii a professorship in
Prussia if he is persona ingrata with the Government, and
a professor who opposes the Government, unless he acts
with the greatest moderation and circumspection, is hkely
to lose his position and income^ The German Government
exercises practically unlimited influence over the univer-
sities rather by indirect than by direct means. The pro-
fessors in their collegiate capacity will nearly always act in
accordance with the wishes expressed by the all-powerful
Minister of Education, for he disposes of vast powers and a
greatpatronage. Moreover, professors who make themselves
disliked by showing too much independence can be kept
in order by social pressure and by professorial and by Press
attacks, while those who please and support the Government

DEGEADATION OP GEEMAN EDUCATION 185

will be rewarded with promotions, appointments, valuable
grants, decorations, titles, &c. The university professors also
have become part of theun-uniformed Prussian bureaucracy.
Cln consequence of the influence which is unceasingly
exercised over the professors by the State, German science
is no longer free. The State interferes, of course, little with
the teaching of medicine, chemistry, etc., but the Govern-
ment has known how to destroy the independence of those
sciences which may be made subservient to the State.
Prominent among these are History and International Law,
which have become official science§7 German historians
boast frequently of their impartiaUty, of their objectivity,
their Sachlichheit. That virtue may be apparent in the
treatment of ancient history and of the history of those
States in which Germany has no special political interest ;
but that boasted impartiality is totally absent in the treat-
ment of German history and of the history of those States
which are Germany's competitors. The great histories of
Germany written by Eanke, Droysen, Sybel, Treitschke,
Oncken, &c., are totally unreUable. Their writers and
many other historians have merely endeavoured to write
a panegyric of the HohenaoUerns, not German history, and
as the great mass of minor historians have issued from the
school of these men, German history, as taught in Ger-
many, is a tissue of fables. Unfortunately many foreign
historians, in writing the history of Germany or of Prussia,
have drawn their information from these industrious but
totally umeliable official historians. German historians have
been eqtially mercenary in writing the history of France,
Eussia, England, etc. Lately a few German historians have
begun to revolt against the dehberate prostitution of history.
Herr Hans Prutz wrote in the introduction to his excellent
'History of Prussia ' (Stuttgart, 1900) :

Even a patriotic Prussian must doubt occasionally
whether German history is not written too much from the

186 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Prussian point of view, whether Prussia really was just
in all she has undertaken. After the disaster of 1870-1
the French historians ceased to flatter the national vanity,
as Thiers and others had done with fatal consequences
to the nation. That change was an advantage to France
morally. Are we Germans not drifting at the present
moment towards similar dangers in view of the fact that
future of&cers are taught history in the way in which it
is taught at the universities ? Warnings have been heard
against the manner in which history has been taught, and
historical science has loudly protested against methods
which are in conflict .with the highest law of history, with
truth. . . .

There must always be certain limitations to the state-
ment of historical truth in the course of tuition, in the
first place because we must respect our country, and in
the second because we must respect the feelings of German
youth. But with the methods which are now pursued
it is to be feared that the German past will be peopled
with ideal figures. That should particularly be the case
with regard to Prussia's rulers. By depicting them as
possessing more or less all human perfections, and by attri-
buting to them wisdom and far-reaching intentions which
they did not possess, it is impossible to understand their
action. The panegyric way of writing German history-
must raise doubts among the German youth, whose simplicity
is not as great as perhaps is imagined. They will form
their own ideas if they are taught ihat from the first ruler
of Brandenburg to the last all HohenzoHerns were equally
great as Prussian and as German patriots, that they were
equally eminent as diplomats, as administrators, and as
soldiers.

In Germany history has indeed been prostituted and
has been subordinated to the military aims of the State.
The German citizens never learn that many of their rulers
were vicious and incapable, e.g. that Frederick William
the Second was a degenerate. Owing to the way in which
history is written under official auspices, all Germans believe

DEGEADATION OF GBEMAN EDUCATION 187

that Frederick the Great was perfectly justified in seizing
Silesia by a surprise attack made in profound peace, that
the partition of Poland was necessary and requires no
defence, that war was forced upon inoffensive Prussia in
1864 by Denmark, in 1866 by Austria, and in 1870 by
France.

History is written in Germany from the conqueror's
point of view under the direction of the military, and inter-
national law has been abased and prostituted in the same
manner. As Germany's entire policy is based on the right
of the stronger, on might, the justification of the right of
the stronger had to be proved by those Germans who ex-
pound law, and .especially iaternational law. The law of
necessity {Notstand) was expounded by numerous eminent
professors and writers such as Janka, Stammler, Titze,
Auer, and Kohler. According to the conception of Notstand,
a German on a raft is entitled to push the others off in order
to save himself, a hungry man who cannot obtain food is
entitled to break into a baker's shop and help himself, a
sick man is entitled to bteak into a chemist's shop, etc. The
doctrine that necessity knows no law is of course most
highly developed by the German teachers of international
law. One of the most distinguished German teachers of
international law, Professor Zom, whose name is weU known
in this country, expressly states on the opening pages of
his handbook of international law that international law
is merely a fiction, that in war necessity, the right of the
stronger, is the only law.

The details given in the preceding pages show that\^e
German educational system, from the elementary schools
to the universities, is a gigantic apparatus controlled by
the Government, that it is an organisation which is as much
part of the German Civil Service as is the staff of the
Custom House. Meanwhile the fiction is maintained that
the German schools are free and independent by not pro-
viding the teachers with a uniform.JJ

188 THE FOUNDAT'IONS OP GEEMANY

Now let us consider the principles by which that huge
instrument which has been devised for shaping the mind
of the nation is directed.

Prince Bismarck stated on August 11, 1893, to a depu-
tation of Bavarian schoolmasters :

The school is an important part of Germany's national
institutions. The German school, like the German Corps
of Officers, is a specifically German institution which no
other nation can easily copy. In the course of the last
few decades the seed sown by the schools among the youth
has borne fruit and has given us a national poHtical conscious-
ness which fomerly we lacked.

The most potent influence which the body of the teachers
brings to bear upon German national education consists in
this, that when the German teacher receives the child its
mind is like a white sheet of paper. What the teacher
writes on it in the course of the elementary education
is written with indelible ink. It remains for life. The
youthful soul is soft and receptive, and we all know that
we never forget what we have been taught between the
ages of seven and fifteen. The lessons then impressed upon
us guide us for ever. In this receptivity of youth, in the
fact that the minds of people may at an early age be moulded
for all time, lies the power which the German teachers have
over Germany's future. As I have said on a former occasion,
he who controls the schools controls the future.

Germany's recent educational policy was created by
Bismarck. His general views as to the purpose of education
may be seen from the extracts given. He left, of course,
the details of educational organisation to the Minister of
Education.

Particulars with regard to patriotic tuition may be
found in numerous circulars sent to the teaching bodies
by the Ministry of Education. In these the greatest stress
is laid upon a form of tuition which will drill and militarise
the growing generation by means of the schools. From

DEGEADATION OP GEEMAN EDUCATION 181

year to year attempts have increased to make the schooli
subservient to the military and political aims of the State
The tendency to use the schools as a political and military
instrument has become accentuated since 1888, when thi
present Emperor came to the throne. After his accessioi
the deification of the HohenzoUerns and the abuse of th(
schools for political aims became more and more notable
In an educational address delivered on December 4, 1890
the Emperor stated :

If the school had done what must be demanded of it—
I am initiated in these things, because I have attendee
the Gymnasium and know how things are managed there-
it should at once and on its own motion have undertake!
the fight against Social Democracy. The teaching boardi
ought to have combined and ought with energy to hav(
instructed the growing generation in. such a manner as t(
furnish Me with material with which I can work within th(
State. Then it would have been easy to overmaster quicklj
the SociaUst movement.

In another address on educational matters delivered or
December 17, 1890, the Emperor said :

Men who support Eadical Utopias can as Uttle be em-
ployed in education as they can be employed in the Govern-
ment offices. According to his rights and duties, the teachei
is, in the fijst place, a State official — an official of the existing
State. In this position of his a teacher should do whai
is demanded from him. He should teach the young and
prepare them for resisting aU revolutionary aims. .. .
All who clearly understand the character of the State anc
its progress must recognise the danger of the Socialisi
theories and wiU consider it their duty to defend the Stat(
against all attacks from without and from within.

The German Government controls an army of about
250,000 teachers, who to the uninitiated citizens and to
their pupils appear to be free and independent men whc

190 THE FOUliJDATIONS OF GEEMANY

teach according to their conscience. In reality they are
Government servants whose identity is disguised by not
clothing them in a uniform, and their principal duty con-
sists in shaping the mind of the nation by order of the
Government. Apart from the difference in organisation,
the German teaching staff differs materially from the body
of Anglo-Saxon school teachers in a point to which too
much attention cannot be given by those who desire to
understand German education. While in England and
in the United States the great majority of the elementary
school teachers are women, the vast majority of German
elementary school teachers are men. Out of 1 87,485 German
elementary teachers employed in 1911, 148,217 were men
and only 39,268 were women. While in many cases little
boys are taught by women in England and America, the
majority of the German little girls are taught by men. This
is a very significant difference. Women represeM gentleness.
Now the German Government does not want to raise gentle
citizens, but ruthless soldiers. Therefore the children of the
tenderest ages are handed over to men, not to women.

Brutal men are more likely to be ruthless soldiers than
gentle ones. On the same principle on which profession^
criminals brutalise their dogs, the German Government
deliberately brutalises its citizens. Crimes of brutality
are therefore exceedingly frequent in Germany, and they
are treated with great leniency. Brutality is deliberately
confused with manliness. Duels are rather encouraged
than discouraged among the educated, and so are fights
with sticks and knives among the masses. For the same
reason sexual outrages and drunkenness are treated with
great leniency. Mr. Price Collier stated correctly in his
book • Germany and tBe "Gfeftnans ' :

It has always been the avowed policy of autocracies
to atone for the lack of political freedom by lax regulations
in regard to moral matters. The citizen is imprisoned

DEGEADATION OP GEEMAN EDUCATION 191

for insulting the State, but he may insult his own person
by dissipation up to any limit, this side of disorderliness,
in pubhc. Drinking, gambling, and other forms of vice
are provided for the citizens of Berlin comfortably and,
comparatively speaking, cheaply.

We have seen in the foregoing that the schools have
become part of the German bureaucracy. In addition the
State has succeeded in converting not only the Protestant
State Church but the Eoman Catholic Church as well into
instruments of government. Both the Protestant and the
Eoman Catholic clergy have become part of the German
bureaucracy. Prusso-Germany's ecclesiastical policy is based
upon that of Frederick the Great. Frederick wrote in his
'Political Testament of 1751 ' :

The Eoman Catholics, the Lutherans, the Eeformed,
the Jews, and many other Christian sects live in Prussia,
and live in peace. I strive to imite all these by making
them conscious that they all are citizens of the same State,
and that one may love just as much a man who wears a
red coat as a man who wears a grey coat.

To Frederick religion was purely a matter of outward
difference. He wished to give to the citizens full religious
liberty, but at the same time he meant tosubject the churches
to the State. Therefore he wrote tp Cardinal Sinzendorff :

In Church matters, except, of course, questions of
faith, I am summus episcopus in Prussia. I recognise
no other authority, not even the Pope. Let the Cardinal
remember this, and let him remember that he is the subject
of a Sovereign who possesses the means of maintaining
his authority.

Many similar pronouncements of Frederick the Great
might be given, and since his time the Prussian Government
has treated the churches as subordinate to the State — as
part of the bureaucracy. This may be seen from the cele-
brated Prussian Code, the Landrecht, which was begun

192 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

under Frederick the Great and was published in 1794,
eight years after his death. That most important com-
pilation of the fundamental laws of Prussia lays the greatest
stress on the principle that the churches and other
religious associations are subject to the State, that they
exist and teach by permission of the Government, and
that their clergy are State officials. We read in Part II,
chapter 11, of the Prussian Code:

Every religious association is obliged to teach its members
reverence towards God, obedience towards the law, fidelity
towards the State, and good moral sentiments towards the
citizens.

Eehgious principles opposed to these conditions must
not be taught within the State either by word of mouth or
in print.

Only the State is entitled to condemn religious principles
after an examination and to prohibit their teaching . - .

iThe persons appointed by religious associations for
celebrating divine service and for giving religious instruction
enjoy equal rights with the other officials of the State . . .

Every religious association which desires to enjoy the
right of toleration must give due notice to the State and
must prove that the opinions taught by it are not opposed
to the principles previously stated . . .

The private and the public exercise of religion of any
and every religious association is subject to the control
of the State.

The State is entitled to information with regard to all
matters which are taught and discussed during meetings
of religious associations . . .

The clergy of all religious associations which have
been authorised by the State are State officials, and as a
rule they are free from the burdens and duties [miUtary
service, &c.] of the ordinary citizens.

It will be noticed that the Prussian Code asserts twice
that the clergy of all religious denominations tolerated in
Prussia possess the character of State officials, that the

DEGEADATION OF GEEMAN EDUCATION 193

various religions may be exercised, both publicly and pri-
vately, only under the supervision and control of the Govern-
ment. It becomes therefore evident that the church, or
rather the churches, of Prussia occupy a position similar
to that held by the nominally independent schools. Indeed
the churches are part of the great educational apparatus
of the Government. The fact that the churches are con-
sidered to be part of the ofiBcial organisation for forming
the mind of the nation can most clearly be seen from the
existing administrative arrangements. Both the churches
and the schools stand under the supervision and direction
of a single Minister, the Kultusminister, who looks after
the promotion of culture — ^the Kulturfflege, as it is officially
termed. The fact that education and religion are part of
the same department which is devoted to the promotion
of Kultur throws a great deal of light on that fearful
and wonderful word. The State Department which deals
simultaneously with education and religion is called ' the
Ministry of Ecclesiastical and Educational Affairs.'

There are only two important churches in Germany,
the Protestant State Church, in which the Lutheran and
Reformed Churches have been united, and the Eoman
Catholic Church. The Protestant State Church stands
under the absolute and direct control of the Emperor.
The management of the State Church is in the hands
of the Supreme Church Council, which was established by ,
a Eoyal Proclamation issued on June 29, 1850, and
it is composed of a number of members and a president
who are nominated by the King of Prussia in person, who,
in appointing them, acts as the summus efiscopics of the
Church. The Supreme Council, being appointed solely
by the King, is responsible only to the King. Below the
Supreme Council there are Provincial Consistories which
examine and ordain candidates of theology, exercise super-
vision over the clergy, &o. The character of the organisa-
tion of the Prussian State Church shows that the King of

194 THE FOUNDATIONS OF QEEMA.NY

Prussia is as much the absolute commander o^ the Church
as he is of the army.

The official view as to the relations between Church and
State in Prussia is stated as follows in Count Hue de Grais'
handbook :

While the influence of the Church upon secular affairs
has been abolished almost completely, the State cannot
abandon certain rights towards the Church owing to its
very character. Supremacy over the Church is conse-
quently a necessary part of the supremacy of the State.
It comprises the right of tolerating religious associations,
the right of protecting them, and the right of supervising
them, and therefore of opposing all action on the part of
'religious associations which may violate and endanger its
safety.

The same writer, who bases all his statements on the
fundamental documents, to which he carefully refers in
numerous footnotes, lays down that, according to the regU'
lations in force, the necessary qualifications of clergy and
priests are as follows :

The exercising of a spiritual office in the Christian Church
presupposes that the person in question is a German, has
passed a German Gymnasium, and succeeded in the final
examination, and presupposes a three years' study at a
German university. A candidate may be dispensed from
these conditions by the Minister of Ecclesiastical and
Educational Affairs. It i^ forbidden to create schools and
seminaries which prepare for religious office. It is not'
permissible to appoint to religious office a person who
either lacks the qualifications demanded by law or who is
not suited for such office by reasons connected with his
general qualifications and character as a citizen. Spiritual
office may be given only to a candidate whose name has
been placed before the Oberprasident (a high Govern-
ment official) and if no objection has been raised by the
latter within thirty days because of the candidate lacking

DEGRADATION OF GEEMAN EDUCATION 195

the necessary qualifications. . . . Clergy and priests are
threatened vdth punishment if by sermons or other publica-
tions they endanger the State. . . , The introduction of
supervision by the State and of the management of its
funds, as well as the partial prohibition of religious orders,
views particularly the Eoman Catholic Church.

It will be noticed that with Prederiokian impartiality
the Prussian State exercises equal supervision and control
over the Protestant and the Eoman Catholic establishments.
A strict, and almost a military, discipline is maintained
within the Church. Appointments depend upon the all-
powerful representatives of the Government, and it will
be noticed that they are given a considerable discre-
tionary latitude. Appointments may be refused not only
because the candidate in question has not the necessary
qualifications as established by law, but also because he
may lack ' the general qualifications and character as a
citizen.' A candidate's history and record are carefully
scanned. If he has all the necessary qualifications, but
holds political opinions disliked by the Government, he may
never obtain an appointment. Even the fact that his father
or some other near relative is a Socialist may prevent him
obtainiug employment. With similar rigour candidates
for educational employment are sifted. Promotion and
preferment, both in the schools and in the Church, depend
not only on professional qualifications, but also the political
character of the individual. The Government wishes to
make sure that the teaching officials and the ecclesiastical
officials not only possess the desired orthodox views, but
also that they continue acting in a manner pleasing to the
Government during the whole course of their career.

With regard to clerical appointments Count Hue de
Grais states :

As independence has been attributed to the Church,
the clergy can no longer be considered as State officials.

196 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Nevertheless, their position bears the character of a public
oflSce.

The independence of the churches and of the clergy-
is of course purely nominal, is a mere make-believe, for,
continuing. Count Hue de Grais states :

The official income of the clergy can be confiscated in
exactly the same manner as that of the State officials.
The official income of the clergy must be granted by the
Protestant and Eoman Catholic parishes in accordance
with the standards laid down by law. The minimum salary
of Catholic priests is fixed at 1500 marks, and it rises
every five years by an addition of 400 marks up to
8200 marks. For the Protestant clergy the minimum salary
is 1800 marks per year, and it is increased every five
years by an additional 600 marks until it reaches 4800
marks.

It will be noticed that the State has fixed the salary of
the Protestant and Eoman Catholic clergy exactly as it has
fixed the salary of any other class of Government officials,
and that the salary of the clergy may be confiscated by the
State for the same reason for which the salary of ordinary
State officials may be seized. Moreover, a large portion of
the official salary of the clergy is paid by the State. In
1912 Prussia paid 25,480,000 marks to the Protestant
Church and clergy and 9,430,000 marks to the Eoman
Catholic and priesthood. Both Churches are, proportion-
ately, treated equally generously. Both are equally depen-
dent upon State support. Hence approximately both are
equally obedient to the Government.

The Eoman Catholic Church in Germany is nominally
controlled by Eome. Yet if we look a little more closely
we find that, notwithstanding the semblance of indepen-
dence, the Eoman Church in Germany is a German State
institution. Count Hue de Grais states in his authoritative
book :

DEGEADATION OP GERMAN EDUCATION 197

The Eoman Catholic bishops must render to the King
the oath of fidelity and of obedience. . . . They are elected
by the Chapters, but candidates for election who are not
pleasing to the Government are excluded. . . . The State
possesses the right of supervision over the administration
of the funds of the Boman Catholic dioceses.

He -who approves appoints. The Government, by reserv-
ing to itself the approval of elected bishops, makes the
election a sham. The Chapters can elect only a bishop
approved of by the Government. In other words, the
German Government appoints its own Eoman Catholic
bishops, and through the bishops the Government controls
the teaching establishment and the Eoman Catholic Church
as a whole. Eoman Catholic ecclesiastics who act in a
manner displeasing to the Government may have part of
their income withdrawn. On the other hand, Eoman
Catholic priests who please the Government may obtain
advancement. Lastly, the Eoman Catholic priests have
been trained in Government-directed or controlled insti-
tutions up to the time of their ordiiiation. It follows that
the Eoman Catholic Church in Germany is rather German
than Eoman Catholic, the Pope being merely the figure-head.

In directing the Protestant Church the King of Prussia
and German E^mperor acts through the supreme Church
Council, through men who are appointed by himself and
who are solely responsible to himself. In acting upon the
Eoman Catholic Church he makes use of the bishops whose
election he has permitted and upon whose German loyalty
he can as a rule absolutely rely. In matters of general
administration, an order issued by the King of Prussia
requires the ministerial counter-signature whereby the
power of the monarch is limited ; but when he acts as the
summus episcopus no such counter-signature is required.
The monarch is absolute in Church matters, and in his
eyes the high ecclesiastical dignitaries are merely the
commanders of his spiritual bodyguard. The Emperor's

198 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

attitude towards the Church may be seen from numerous
declarations of hiSi For instance, he stated on December
17, 1890:

I hear that you were surprised that I did not mention
reUgion in opening the great School Conference. I was of
opinion that My ideas about religion, about the relations
between men and God, are so high and holy to Me that
they would be known to every citizen. Both as King of
Prussia and as summus episcopus of My Church I consider
it My highest duty to take caie that religious sentiment
and the Christian spirit are cultivated within the school.

The authority of the German monarch over the Eoman
Catholic Church has been greatly increased in consequence
of the struggle with Bome, the EuUurhampf, in the course
of which recalcitrant Eoman Catholic bishops and priests
were persecuted and imprisoned, Eoman Catholic training
establishments were closed, and the official salaries estreated.
In addition a pulpit law was passed at the time, whereby
priests could be punished for sermons displeasing to the
Government. In course of time the German Government
gave way to Eome in the non-essentials, but it carefully
preserved supervision over the Eoman Catholic seminaries.

The nominal head of the Eoman Catholic Church in
Germany is the Pope, but he also has been brought to
some extent under German Grovernment control, partly
because the Eoman Catholic Church in Germany has be-
come rather German than Eoman Catholic, partly because
Germany has known how to exert influence in Eome in
co-operation with Austria. Their joint opposition no Pope
can disregard. In fact, his election depends largely upon
the good-will of the German and Austrian Governments.
In view of the great influence which Germany and Austria
exercise over the Pope, it is perhaps only natural that he
apparently pursues a philo-German policy, that his recent
peace proposals were highly favourable to Germany and

DEGEADATION OF GERMAN EDUCATION 199

Austria, and that he refused to discriminate between the
guilt of the Central Powers and that of their ^aplesa
victims. ,

As the Roman Catholic Church in Germany is rather
German than Roman Catholic, it is only natural that
German Catholics place the State high above the Church,
that they are official patriots first and Churchmen after,
that agnosticism and atheism are almost as prevalent among
the German Catholics as among German Protestants.

The Prussian Ministry of Ecclesiastical and Educa-
tional Affairs controls not only the German churches and
schools, but the arts and sciences as well. Artists and
scientists depend therefore very largely upon official patron-
age, which not only takes the form of Government com-
mands for statuary, architectural monuments, paintings,
etc., but also finds expression in exceedingly lucrative
appointments, titles, decorations, etc. Thus artists and
scientists have become part of the great bureaucratic
machine.

Not merely the churches and the schools, but the army
and the Press, are great educational factors. The object
of the army is not only to train soldiers in warfare, but also
to train their mind, to develop patriotism and blind obedi-
ence. The Press has been gained over by the Govern-
ment because the Government controls the sources of in-
formation, possesses vast secret funds, and can materially
assist impecunious journals by inserting advertisements,
subscribing to large numbers, etc. On the other hand, the
Government can penalise opposition journals by withdraw-
ing advertisements and information, and especially by with-
drawing the privilege of cheap distribution through the
post and at the Government railway stations. Represen-
tatives of a journal whose views are not approved of will
call in vain for information at the Ministries, and their
lives will be made a burden. By these methods indicated
the (Jovernment exercises control over the bulk of tha

200 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

non-Socialist Press and part of the Socialist Press, especially
in war.

The details given in these pages show that in Germany
the elementary schools, the intermediate schools, the uni-
versities, the Protestant and the Roman Catholic Churches,
art, science, and the Press have been made subservient
to the Government, have become Government tools, have
become part of the grfeat military machine. We cannot
therefore wonder if there are not only miHtant schools and
universities but a militant science, a mihtant art, and a- mili-
tant Church as well. The army has devoured the nation.
Opinion in Germany, from the cradle to the grave, has
been controlled and directed by the military. MacM-
politih and the policy of rnthlessness in warfare are there-
fore unanimously advocated by soldiers and citizens,
scientists and clergymen, merchants and Roman Catholic
priests. Most people in England have no conception how
opinion in Germany has been warped and falsified by a mili-
tary and all-powerful Government, how all the sources
of information and enlightenment have been diverted.
Montesquieu wrote nearly two centuries ago in his ' Esprit
des Lois,' in a chapter superscribed ' De I'education dans le
gouvernement despotique ' :

L'extreme obeissance suppose de I'ignorance dans celui
qui obeit ; elle en suppose mSme dans celui qui commands ;
il n'a point d, deliberer, & douter, ni h raisonner, il ii'a qu'i
vouloir.

Education, far from enlightening the German nation, has
blinded, debased, and dehumanised it.

CHAPTEE VII

HOW GEEMANT MAKES WAB — 'THE SBCEBT HISTORY OF 1870

The veil which has obscured the origin of the war is slowly
beginning to lift. Lately various interesting revelations
have been made. We have learned that the German Govern-
ment, desiring to make it appear that Eussia was the ag-
gressor, caused that country to mobilise by having a false
announcement of Germany's mobilisation printed in a
special edition of the Government-inspired Berlin Lohal-
anzeiger. The Eussian Embassy, of course, telegraphed the
news to Fetrograd as soon as it appeared. A few minutes
later the German Government announced that a mistake
had been made, that mobilisation had not been ordered.
However, meanwhile the wires to Eussia had been closed.
Thus that country had begun mobilising before the official
dementi was received. By a deliberate trick Eussia was
made to furnish the desired pretext for a ' war of defence '
on Germany's part. The German White Book published
on the outbreak of war bore the sub-title, ' How Eussia
and her Euler betrayed Germany's Confidence and thereby
made the European War.' Very likely that sub-title was
determined upon long before the crisis.

Since the beginning of the war Germany has protested
that the ultimatum to Serbia was sent spontaneously by
Austria-Hungary, that the German Government had had
no previous knowledge of its contents, that it was there-
fore not responsible for the outbreak of the war. However,

201

202 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

lately we have been told by exceedingly well-informed
people that various German diplomats had asserted long
before the dispatch of the fatal ultimatum that Austria
would send an unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia. In The
Times of July 28, 1917, it was stated that an Austro-German
Council, attended by von Bethmann-HoUweg, Admiral von
Tirpitz, General von Palkenhayn, Herr von Stumm, the
Archduke Frederick, Count Berchtold, Count Tisza, and
General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, was held at Potsdam on
July 5, 1914, that it was presided over by the Emperor,
and that at that meeting the policy was settled which
was embodied in the ultimatum sent to Serbia eighteen
days later. Si fecisti nega. Not uimaturally the German
Government has denied that it had agreed to the Austrian
ultimatum either on July 5 or at any other date. That
denial is strictly in accordance with German practice. See
October 1917.

Mr. Henry Morgenthau, formei? United States Ambas'
Sador to Turkey, published in the New Yorh World some of
his conversations with German and Austrian diplomats*
He confirmed Germany's guilt. He stated, according to
The Times of October 15, 1917 :

Whenever the question of peace is raised the Kaiser
solemnly asserts that he did not will this war, but that
with the help of the good German God he will see it through
to the end. He did will this war, and he brought it about
when it suited his purposes and his preparations. The
Serbian incident was more than an excuse ; it was an
opportunity. On August 18, 1914, as American Ambas-
sador in Constantinople, I called on the Marquis Pallavicini,
the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to congratulate him on
the Emperor's eighty-fourth birthday. After exchanging
the usual diplomatic compliments suitable to such an occa-
sion, he spoke of the condition of the Emperor's health
and his great physical and mental activity in spite of the
strain to which he was subjected. The conversation then

HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 208

turned to the war, which was in its third week, and his
Excellency told me that when he visited the Emperor in
May his Imperial Majesty had said that war was inevitable.

Mr. Morgenthau is able to confirm the statement that the
date of the war was fixed at a conference held in the early
■^part of July 1914. The secret of this conference was con-
fided to him by Baron Wangenheim, the German Ambas-
sador in Constantinople, in an ' outburst of enthusiasm
after the arrival of the Goeben and the Breslau in the
Dardanelles, he having directed their movements by wireless
while they were endeavouring to escape from the British
Fleet.' Baron Wangenheim himself was present at the
conference to report on conditions in Turkey. From him
Mr. Morgenthau learned :

The Conference was presided over by the Kaiser. Count
Moltke, the Chief of Staff, was there ; so was Grand Admiral
von Tirpitz, and with them were the leaders of German fin-
ance, directors of railways, and captains of industry, whose
aid was essential to the Kaiser in putting his vast military
machine into operation. Each was asked if he was ready
for war. All replied in the affirmative, except the financiers,
who insisted that they must have two weeks in which to
sell foreign securities and arrange their loans.

At the time this Conference was held nobody outside
the inner circles of the Berlin and Vienna Governments
dreamed of war :

They took good care that no suspicions should be aroused.
The Kaiser went straightway on his yacht to Norway.
The Chancellor left Berlin for a rest. The Diplomatic
Corps had no intimation of the impending calamity, and the
British Ambassador went away, leaving the Embassy to
the Charge d'Affaires. The same drug was used in Vienna,
and even when the blow fell the Russian Ambassador
was absent from his post on leave. From the date of this
conference German financiers were busy with their part,
while the Army marked time.

204 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Mr. Morgenthau's conversation with the German Am-
bassador took place on August 26, six weeks after the
Potsdam Council.

Eulers and statesmen not unnaturally follow the ex-
ample of their most successful predecessors. It has been
the traditional policy of Prusso-Germany to attack its
opponents unexpectedly and to defeat them by surprise.
Frederick the Great taught in his ' History of Seven Years'
War ' that sovereigns make war when they consider the
moment propitious, leaving to industrious jurists the trouble
of justifying their action after the event. Prince Bismarck
was a pupil of Frederick's, but he vastly improved upon
his master's policy. He wished to have public opinion on
his side by putting his opponents in the wrong. Every
one of the three wars which he brought about was willed
by Prussia, and was won by a surprise attack in overwhelm-
ing force. Yet in all three Prussia acted — at least nominally
— on the defensive. The Franco-German War is a classical
example of Bismarckian statecraft in bringing about war
in such a mainner as to put all responsibility upon tEe
attacked Power. The Iron Chancellor acted with so much
art and foresight that it was believed for decades, both in
Germany and abroad, that France had recklessly attacked
peaceful Ptussia. Only lately the world has been made
acquainted with Bismarck's manipulation of the Ems
Dispatch. However, that was merely the finishing touch
of Bismarck's campaign of provocation. There is too
great a resemblance between Germany's action in 1914 and
Prussia's proceeding in 1870 to be merely accidental. It
stands to reason that, in embarking upon the great gamble
and the great crime, Germany's rulers resolved to follow
Bismarck's example as far as possible. Only the initiated
few are acquainted with the events which brought about
the Franco-German War of 1870. A short account, based
on documents most of which are practically unknown in
this country, is most interesting, and it is valuable because

HOW GEEMANY MAKES WAE 205

it throws a great deal of light upon the genesis of the
present war.

Since his student days Bismarck had seen his ideal in
the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. At
an early date he had come to the conviction that to suc-
ceed in this, it was necessary to expel Austria out of
Germany, that Austria's defeat by Prussia was necessary,
and that the minor German States could be induced to
abandon Austria and to place themselves under Prussia's
leadership only in consequence of a successful war with
Prance. Before he came to office Bismarck's programme
consisted in defeating Austria first and France after-
wards.

In the war waged against Denmark by Prussia and
Austria jointly in 1864, and especially in Prussia's war
with Austria in 1866, Bismarck required Prance's goodwill
and benevolent neutrality!.' Prance's ill-will and opposition
would have inevitably led to Prussia's failure and defeat.
To secure France's support Bismarck approached Napo-
leon III, flattered that vain and weak ruler to the utmost,
expressed his greatest sympathy with Napoleon's policy
of nationalities, and declared that the most natural alliance
was one between Prance and Prussia. He told Napoleon
and other eminent Frenchmen that the Belgians were French
by race and language, that, in accordance with the principle
of nationalities, Prussia should be allowed to unite to her-
self the North German States, and that France should
compensate herself for Prussia's increase of power by ac-
quiring Belgium and perhaps Luxemburg, and the German
territories west of the Ehine as well. Napoleon III was
a dreamer. He allowed himself to be persuaded by Bis-
marck. He encouraged Prussia to attack Austria in 1866,
and urged Italy to support Prussia by attackiug Austria in
the rear. Under Napoleon's auspices the Prusso-Italian Alli-
ance was concluded, and the war of 1866 begun. Bismarck
had, before th6 war, been profuse, in promising vast terri-

206 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

torial compensations to the Emperor, and Napoleon III
had been short-sighted enough to trust Bismarck's words.
Perhaps he had hoped that the war would be long-drawn-
out and indecisive, that thus JPrance would have an oppor-
tunity to put forth her claims in time. However, the over-
whelmingly strong Prussian army utterly defeated Austria
at Koniggratz. In a few days Austria was overwhelmed.
When Benedetti, Napoleon's Ambassador, pressed Bismarck
at headquarters for the territorial compensations which
he had promised before the war, he received a refusal.
When he renewed his demand Bismarck threatened to
make peace with Austria, attack France with the united
Prussian and Austrian armies, and to raise a revolution in
that country. As the French army was utterly unready,
the French Government had to desist. In consequence
of the war Prussia acquired vast territories inhabited by
more than four million people, and Italy received
Venetia. France's eastern neighbours had been greatly
strengthened to France's danger. Napoleon and all France
felt (that they had been deceived and defrauded by Prussia,
Prussia owed her success in 1864, and especially in 1866,
to Napoleon's support. In February 1867 Bismarck said
frankly to General Turr, Napoleon's special envoy :

Je veux vivre en bonne harmonie aveo la France et ne
d§sire nullement avoir une guerre avec elle. C'est k I'emr
pereur Napoleon que nous devons nos succfes en 1866. . . ,
Je suis pret h. seconder en tout la France. Mais ici, h Berlin,
il faut travailler lentement, car on ne peut pas attaquer
notre roi de front. Si I'empereur voulait me formuler ses
desirs par ecrit, je me fais fort de les obtenir tous en quelques
mbis. S'il voulait, par exemple, annexer le Luxembourg
k la France, il n'y a qu'i chercher k creer dans ce pays un
parti fran5ais qui demande I'armexion. Je n'essaierai pas
niSme de verifier si ce parti repr^sente la majorite de la
population et je me bornerai k accepter tacitement le fait
accompli. Quant k, la Belgique, je I'ai dej^ . dit maintes

HOW GEEMANY MAKES WAR 207

fois et je le repete hautement : I'empereur n'a qu'^ la
prendre, et, s'il se trouve un gouvemement qui veuille s'y
opposer, noua croiserons la baiouuetto contre lui.

Many similar pronouncements of Bismarck's might
easUy be given.

Eelying on the great superiority of the Prussian army,
Bismarck pursued towards Prance a policy of deliberate
deception, humiliation, and provocation, playing with that
country in the most cynical manner. Having promised
Napoleon vast territorial compensations, he induced the
unsuspecting Benedetti to put before him in writing Prance's
territorial desires in the form of draft treaties, which the
Chancellor carefully put by for future use. When Napoleon
jecognised that he could not obtain in 1866 the vast com-
pensations which he had been promised, he hoped to receive
at least small compensations either by the acquisition
of Luxemburg or by. a correction of the Prusso-Prench
frontier. In accordance with his settled policy, Bismarck
encouraged the French Government to make one demand
after the other, which invariably met a refusal. Prussia
had, owing to Prance's support, not only succeeded in ac-
quiring vast territories with four million inhabitants, but
had furthermore attached to herself by treaty the powerful
and populous South German States. The balance between
Prussia and Prance had been most seriously disturbed to
Prance's disadvantage. All Prance had become exasperated
against Prussia, and, relying upon the superior strength of
the Prussian army, Bismarck strove to increase Prance's
exasperation not only by diplomatic action, but also by
making use of those Prench politicians and of that part of
the Prench Press which could be influenced with money or
otherwise.

Bismarck was determined to make war upon Prance,
believing that the South German States, which in 1866 had
been attached to Prussia by: treaty, would be willing to

208 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

merge themselves into' Germany, and to subject themselves
entirely to the King of Prussia only if their enthusiasm" was
raised to the highest pitch in a victorious war with France.
A pretext for war could always be found. The problem
was to begin it at the moment most favourable to Prussia,
and to create at the same time a situation unfavourable
to France. Immediately after the war of 1866 the South
German States, which had been forced to conclude defensive
and offensive alhances with Prussia, had been compelled
to reorganise and to greatly strengthen their armies. Dur-
ing each of the first three years Prussia's striking force
Would be increased by 100,000 soldiers owing to the measures
taken. For military reasons 1870 was the most favour-
able year for a war upon France. For political reasons
also it seemed undesirable to adjourn the war beyond 1870.
Dissatisfaction against Prussia was increasing in the South
German States. They had been forced to submit them-
selves to Prussia after their defeat. They wished to re-
conquer their freedom. South German particularism was
constantly increasing in strength. Possibly the South
German States might secretly ally themselves with Prussia's
opponents in order to be able to shake off the Prussian yoke.
Besides, Prance was known to be negotiating with Austria
and Italy for an alliance. The year 1870 was therefore
most propitious for a Prussian attack upon France for
political reasons as well.

France did not desire a war with Prussia. Napoleon's
power and prestige were declining. Liberal opposition to
Napoleon's absolutism became stronger and stronger. The
Emperor resolved upon introducing constitutional govern-
ment. On January 2, 1870, a Liberal Cabinet, presided
over by Emile OUivier, came into power. It was pledged
to peace, international arbitration, and the reduction of
armaments by international agreement. The new French
Foreign Minister, Count Daru, declared in a note sent on
February 13 to Lord Lyons :

HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 209

Notre intention est, en effet, de diminuer notre contingent ;
nous I'aurions dinunu6 beaucoup, si nous avions obtenu
une reponse favorable du chancelier . . . ; nous le dimin-
uerons moins, puisque la r6ponse est negative, mais nous
le diminuerons. La reduction sera, j'esp&re, de 10,000
hommes. . . .

Nous afiSrmerons de la sorte par les actes qui valent
mieux que les paroles, nos intentions, notre politique.
Neuf contingents, reduits de 10,000 hommes chacun, font
une diminution totale de 90,000 hommes. C'est dejik
quelque chose, c'est le dixi&me de I'armee existante, je
regrette de ne pouvoir faire plus.

To the Liberal Left the army reduction proposed seemed
insufficient. It demanded that twice as large a reduction
should be made, Li 1870 France had embarked upon the
novel experiment of parliamentary government. Parlia-
mentary orators unacquainted with practical statesmanship
were conducting the government. The amateurishness of
the Erench statesmen would be a vast advantage to
Bismarck.

The year 1870 was obviously the most favourable one
for a Prussian attack upon France. It remained to find
a plausible pretext for war, a pretext which would put
Prance ostensibly in the wrong, and to bring about a position
which would damage her militarily as much as possible.

In attacking Austria in 1866 Prussia had been greatly
benefited by her alliance with Italy, which country had
attacked Austria in the rear. The Habsburg Monarchy
had thus been compelled to divide its forces. Prance
might be similarly weakened if Prussia should succeed in
inducing Spain or England, or both countries, to attack
the French. An English attack upon France was likely
if France should lay hands upon Belgium. With the ob-
ject of bringing about hostility between the two countries,
Bismarck had unceasingly suggested to the French that
they should acquire Belgium in some form or other, and

210 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

had secured from Benedetti draft treaties arranging for
Prance's acquisition of Belgium. Accident gave Bismarck
the chance of securing Spain's support against France, and
the Chancellor resolved upon making the best use of his
opportunities.

Between 1863 and 1868 numerous revolutionary out-
breaks occurred in Spain. The Spanish people were dis-
gusted with the Government of Queen Isabella 11. On
September 30, 1868, she was deposed. Temporarily the
Government was in the hands of the military leaders, and
these, being opposed to the establishment of a republic,
sought a candidate for the vacant Spanish Throne. It
occurred to Bismarck that France's feelings might be
wounded to the utmost by placing, without her knowledge
and by suprise, a HohenzoUern prince upon the Spanish
Throne. A prince of the Boman Catholic Sigmaringen branch
of the House of HohenzoUern might prove a suitable can-
didate. France had watched with alarm the rapid growth
of Prussia's military power on her eastern frontier. Naturally
she would not allow a Prussian prince to obtain the Spanish
Throne. It had been an ancient maxim of French state-
craft not to allow an enemy of France to control the policy
of Spain. As Prance may be attacked on her eastern frontier
by Germany and Italy, she would have security on her
western frontier. Prance was as sensitive with regard to
Spain's political position as is England with regard to the in-
dependence of Belgium. Furthermore, if Bismarck should be
able to bring about a war with Prance regarding Spain's
selection of a King, France's refusal to recognise the German
candidate might be described as an insult to Spain. Thus
the proud Spaniards might be induced to play the same
part which Italy played in 1866, and attack Prussia's enemy
in the rear.

Some of the most valuable information relating to the
Spanish candidature of Prmce Leopold of HohenzoUern
may be found in the ' Memoirs ' of bis brother, King Charles

HOW GEEMANY MAKES WAR 21 1

of Eoumania, which were published in German between
1894 and 1900. Unfortunately there is no English trans-
lation of this important book. On September 17, 1869,
that Prince wrote in his diary : ' As early as October 13,
1868, various newspapers have mentioned the hereditary
Prince of Hohenzollern as a candidate for the Spanish
Throne, and on November 19, 1868, the 'Neue Freie Presse
has stated that his candidature had produced terror at
the Tuileries because it seemed likely to prove successful.'
On December 9, 1868, Prince Anthony, the father of Prince
Leopold, wrote to his son. Prince Charles of Eoumania :
' So far the Spanish candidature has been discussed only
in the papers. We have not heard a word of it. Owing
to our relations with Prussia, Prance would never tolerate
a Hohenzollern King in Spain.' Prince Leopold of Hohen-
zollern was certainly not proposed by Spain. On July 2,
1870, when the Hohenzollern candidature had suddenly
been sprung upon an astonished world. General Prim,
the all-powerful Prime Minister of Spain, stated to the
French Ambassador Mercier, according to the latter's
dispatch :

Ma consolation, c'est que ce n'est pas moi qui ai invente
cette combinaison ; je ne I'ai pas mSme cherchee, on est
venu me la mettre dans la main. Seulement, dans I'etat
ou nous sommes, je ne peux pas la repousser.

There is every reason to believe that General Prim did
not seek the candidature of the Hohenzollern Prince. Prince
Leopold accepted it very reluctantly and against his will,
upon the persuasion and pressure of Prince Bismarck, as
we shall see farther on. As neither General Prim nor the
Hohenzollerns of the Sigmaringen line brought forward the
candidature of Prince Leopold, there is every reason to
believe that it was arranged by Prince Bismarck, to whom
Prim obviously referred without actually naming him.
There were, indeed, mysterious arrangements and negotia-

212 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

tions between Bismarck and the temporary Spanish Govern-
ment. We are not yet fully informed as to Bismarck's
activity in Spain in bringing about the HohenzoUern can-
didature, but we know that he promoted it with the utmost
energy at home. The late King, then Prince, Charles of
Eoumania wrote in his diary on March 2, referring to him-
self in the third person :

Prince Charles learns that his brother, Prince Leopold,
has gone to Berlin, and that he will be followed in a few
days by his father. The Spanish question is to be finally
decided there and then. . . .

Count Bismarck pleads with great warmth that Prince
Leopold should accept the Spanish Crown. He demon-
strates in a memoir of his to King William of Prussia the
great importance for Germany of having a Hohenzollem
prince on the Spanish Throne ; that it would be politically
invaluable to have in France's rear a country biendly to
Germany.

We do not possess the final text of Bismarck's memoran-
dum, but we possess the draft whitih the Chancellor dictated
to Bobert von Keudell, one of his collaborators, for Keudell
reprinted it in his ' Eeminiscences,' which were published
in Germany in 1901. In that draft memoir, which is very
carefully written, and which probably closely resembles the
final document, we read :

For our relations with France it would be useful to have
in the rear of that country a State upon the sympathy
of which we could count. In the event of a war between
Germany and France . . . that would make a difference
of up to two army corps. . . . The prestige of the Hohen-
zollem dynasty would be greatly increased if that family
would occupy a European position similar to that which
the House of Habsburg possessed in the past.

The Spaniards would be wounded most severely if the
Crown of that country, which has held so exalted a place
in history, should be refused, if we should refuse to save

HOW GEEMANY MAKES WAE 213

that country from anarchy. It would seem harsh to decline
the Crown for personal reasons when the welfare of 16,000,000
people is at stake. Such a refusal would increase the
chance of establishing a republic in Spain, and France
might follow Spain's example, to.Germany's danger. Public
opinion in Germany would hold those responsible who, by
a refusal, would have created Spain's discontent with
Germany and who would have increased the dangers which
we must fear from France.

I therefore consider the acceptance of the Spanish
Crown to be in the interest of peace and of German general
contentment. I consider such a solution as advantageous.
This is the least dangerous solution of the Spanish problem.

The election by a three-quarter majority is assured.
... If we remember how in a similar way the reigning
dynasty of England was chosen in the place of the expelled
Stuarts, and how the Eomanoff dynasty was elected in
Eussia, the legitimacy of the Spanish Crown cannot be
doubted. ...

Bismarck described in his memoir the acceptance ot the
Spanish Crown by Prince Leopold of HohenzoUern as
militarily, politically, and economically advantageous to
Germany. From his insistence upon the duty of Prince
Leopold to accept the Spanish Crown for ideal and for
German national reasons, we can gauge the reluctance of
the Prince, which is apparent from many other documents
which it would lead too far to quote in this place.

Since autunm, liS68, Bismarck had been busy baiting
the Spanish trap for France. The question whether a
HohenzoUern prince should or should not ascend the Throne
of Spain was obviously considered to be not merely a private
question which regarded solely the House of HohenzoUern,
but it was considered to be a German national question
which might, and probably would, h,ave the most far-reach-
ing consequences. This may be seen from a letter which
Prince Anthony, the father of Prince Leopold, sent to his
Bon, Prince Charles of Eoumania. It may be found in the

214 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

King of Eoumania's ' Memoirs,' and it was written in Berlin
on March 20, 1870, That most important document ran
as follows:

I have been m Berlin for a fortnight on most important
family matters. No less is in question than the acceptance
or refusal of the Spanish Crown for Leopold, which has offi-
cially been offered to him by the Spanish Government under
the seal of secrecy, it being a European secret of State.

This question occupies people here very much. Bismarck
desires acceptance for dynastic and pohtical reasons, but
the King only if Leopold accepts wilhngly. On March 15
there was here a very interesting and important Council
(Beratung), presided over by the King. There were present
the Crown Prince, Leopold and I, Bismarck, Boon, Moltke,
Schleinitz, Thile, and Delbriick. The unanimous resolution
was in favour of acceptance, because this was a Prussian
patriotic duty. Leopold has declined for many reasons
after a great struggle. However, as Spain desires before
all a Eoman Catholic HohenzoUem prince, I have proposed
your brother Fritz instead of Leopold. . . .

It will be noticed that the acceptance of the Spanish
Crown was resolved upon by a Council of the highest Prussian
dignitaries, presided over by King William himself. At
this Council it was resolved to embark upon a policy which
was bound to provoke France to the utmost, and which
was likely to lead to a great war. Herein lay the reason
that the Council was attended by Moltke, Boon, and the
other leading Ministers. The secret of this Council was
revealed to the world by the> ' Memoirs ' of King Charles
of Eoumania. It destroyed the fiction that the Spanish
people had spontaneously offered the Spanish Crown to
the HohenzoUem Prince and that Germany had been forced
into war with France against her wish and will. Hence
Prince Bismarck tried to deny the fact that the Council
had taken place in chapter xxii. of his ' Memoirs,' in which
he stated :

HOW GEEMANY MAKES WAE 21 5

The ' Memoirs ' of his Majesty, the King of Eumania,
are not accurately informed as regards details of the minis-
terial co-operation in the question. The Ministerial Council
in the Palace which he mentions did not take place. Prince
Anthony was hving as the King's guest in the Palace, and
had invited him and some of the Miaisters to dinner. I
scarcely think that the Spanish question was discussed at
the table.

In view of Prince Anthony's detailed statement in the
letter written to his son five days after the event, Bismarck's
denial of the War Council is very unconvincing, and his
distinction between an official ministerial Council and an
unofficial Council of Ministers who had been invited to
dinner by the King, is ridiculous. In due course we may
learn that the War Council which, according to The Times,
took place at Potsdam on July 5, 1914, was also not an
official Council presided over by the Emperor, but was
merely an ordinary meeting of Ministers and other principal
dignitaries of Germany and Austria who happened to be
invited at the same time. The distinction between an
official Council and an unofficial one is a distinction without
a difference.

On May 26 Prince Anthony of HohenzoUern wrote to
his son, Prince Charles of Eoumania, that Bismarck was
very dissatisfied with the failure of his Spanish policy, the
Prince having refused the Crown. However, the Chancellor
soon succeeded in persuading Prince Leopold to accept
the Crown, according to Prince Charles's statement, 'in
Germany's interest,' which will be found in his diary
under the date of June 2. Two days later, on June 4,
reverting to the Spanish question. Prince Charles wrote in
his diary :

The hereditary Prince of HohenzoUern has declared his
readiness to accept the Spanish Crown, as it has been repre-
sented to him in the most authoritative quarter that that
step was required in the interest of the State ! He is resolved

216 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

to waive all personal objections and to yield to a higher
necessity. He has written a letter to the King of Prussia
in which he, has stated that he accepts the offered Crown,
as he could hope thereby to render a great service to the
Fatherland.

The HohenzoUern Princes were, as we have previously
seen, convinced that ' France would never tolerate a Hohen-
zoUern King of Spain.' Prince Leopold nevertheless accepted
the Spanish Crown, having been informed by ' the most
authoritative quarter,' that is, by Bismarck, and probably
the King as well, that acceptance was required in Germany's
interest. He accepted it, hoping thereby ' to render a
great service to the Fatherland.' At the Council of March
15, at which Moltke and Eoon attended, the military conse-
quences of the acceptance of the Spanish Crown by a Hohen-
zoUern Prince were no doubt discussed. The Chief of the
Staff and the Minister of War had probably assured the,
King of Prussia and the two HohenzoUern Princes; father
and son, that Prussia's victory was certain in the event of
the acceptance of the Spanish Crown leading to a war
between Prussia and France.

The HohenzoUern Princes of the Eoman Catholic Sig-
maringen line were on most excellent terms with the Em-
peror Napoleon III. They frequently visited him. Prince
Charles of Eoumania owed his throne to the EmperOT.
The Emperor , would never have thought it possible that
one of the HohenzoUern Princes, one of his personal friends,
would accept the Spanish Crown behind his back and without
his previous knowledge and consent. Prussia had deceived,
provoked, and humiliated France ever since July 1866.
When, at the beginning of July 1870, the news was published
that a Prince of HohenzoUern was candidate for the Spanish
Throne, and that the Cortes would elect him on the 20th
of that month, the news was felt by all France like a blow
in the face. The Empress Eugenie wrote to Ollivier that
it was a bomb-shell, and the King of Prussia also wrote

HOW GEBMANY MAKES WAB 217

of the ' Spanish bomb-shell ' in a letter to his wife. The
exasperation and indignation at the French Court and
throughout France were indescribable. After years of
humiliation Prussia had succeeded in striking France in
the most sensitive spot.

A clever criminal, in laying his plans, makes beforehand
careful arrangements to cover his tracks and to prove an
alibi. In the beginning of July 1870, all the world was
at peace. There seemed to be no possibihty of diplomatic
complications anywhere. The holiday season had begun,
and everybody was away, exactly as at the end of July 1914.
King William took the cure at Ems. Prince Bismarck
was at his country seat of Varzin, nominally HI, and had
left Herr von Thile in charge of the Prussian Foreign Office.
The French Ambassador in Berlin, Benedetti, was taking
the waters at Wildbad. In Paris Count Gramont had
quite recently replaced Count Daru as head of the Foreign
Office, and on July 6 he read in the French Parliament
a declaration of protest which stated :

I am about to reply to the interpellation addressed
to me yesterday by the Honourable M. Cochery.

It is true that Marshal Prim has offered the Crown of
Spain to the Prince of Hohenzollem, and that he has accepted
it. But the Spanish people have not yet declared themselves,
and we are not yet acquainted with the true details of a
negotiation which was concealed from us. Accordingly,
a discussion could not at present lead to any practical result.
We beg you, gentlemen, to postpone it.

We have not ceased to show our sympathy for the
Spanish nation, and to avoid everything that could have
had the appearance of an interference of any kind in the
internal affairs of a noble and great nation in the full exercise
of its sovereignty ; we have not, with regard to the various
candidates for the Throne, departed from the strictest
neutrality, and we have never fehown any of them either
preference or aversion.

We shall persist in this conduct. But we do not think

218 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

that respect for the rights of a neighbouring people compels
us to suffer that a foreign Power, by placing one of its
Princes on the Throne of Charles V, should disturb to our
disadvantage the present balance of power in Europe and
should endanger the interests and honour of France.

This eventuality we firmly hope will not be realised.

To prevent it, we count at once on the wisdom of the
German people and the friendship of the Spanish people.

In July 1870 the Goverrmient at Berlin pursued the
identical policy which it followed in July 1914. It pleaded
complete ignorance of the Spanish question, and asserted
that Prussia was in no way interested in it. Bismarck had
instructed his underlings to answer in reply to questions
that the Spanish candidature was a purely Spanish affair.
In 1914 diplomats, anxious to bring about a peaceful settle-
ment of the dispute between Austria and Serbia, were
similarly told at Berlin that this was a purely Austrian
matter. If France should ask for explanations in Berlin,
the Foreign Secretary was to plead ignorance. If questions
should be addressed to Bismarck in Varzin, the questioners
would not be received because of Bismarck's illness, and
be referred to Berlin. If the King of Prussia should be
approached while taking the cure at Ems, he was apparently
to refer questioners to his Chancellor and Foreign Office.

By direction of the French Foreign Office, M. Le Sourd,
the French Charge d'Affaires, went in Benedetti's absence
to the Prussian Foreign Office, where von Thile was in
charge. When asking for explanations of the Spanish
candidature, von Thile, who, as we have seen, had attended
the Cabinet Council of March 15, at which Prussia's Spanish
policy had been decided, declared, though with visible
embarrassment, that the Prussian Government completely
ignored the Spanish question, which did not exist as far
as Prussia was concerned. Bismarck's object was obviously
to induce Prance to protest in Spain in the hope of creat-
ing bad blood between Spain and France. Lord Loftus,

HOW GERMANY MAKES WAE 219

the British Ambassador in Berlin, reported on July 6
the conversation between von Thile and Le Sourd as
follows :

Being prevented by illness from leaving the house, I
requested Mr. Petre to call on M. de Thile to inquire if hia
Excellency could give me any information on the subject of
the reported offer of the Crown of Spain to the hereditary
Prince of Hohenzollern.

M. de Thile informed Mr. Petre that the French Charge
d' Affaires, M. le Sourd, had called upon him a few days ago
and had stated that the intelligence which had reached the
French Government of a deputation having been sent from
Madrid to offer the Crown of Spain to the Prince of Hohen-
zollern, and of the offer having been accepted, had produced
an unfavourable impression at Paris, and that the Imperial
Government wished to know what course the Prussian
Government intended to pursue with reference to this ques-
tion (' quelle serait I'attitude du Gouvemement prussien ').

M. de Thile told the French Charge d'Affaires that the
selection of a Sovereign to fill the Throne of Spain was a
question with which the Prussian Government had no
concern whatever (' c'etait une question qui n'existait pas
pour le Gouvemement prussien '), and that consequently
he was not in a position to give any explanations upon the
subject to the French Government. The Prussian Govern-
ment considered that the statesmen and people of Spain
were entitled to offer the Crown to anyone whom they might
think fit, and that it concerned the person alone to whom
the offer was made to accept it or not. . . .

As the French Government could obtain no information
at the Prussian Foreign Of&ce, and as the Prussian Foreign
Office disclaimed all knowledge of, and interest in, the affair,
Gramont du:ected the Ambassador Benedetti to go to Ems
to see King William and to apply to him as the ruler of
Prussia and the head of the Hohenzollern family. The
King had been carefully prepared by Bismarck for this
eventuality, and he told M. Benedetti, according to the

!i20 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Ambassador's dispatches, that the Prussian Government
was quite unacquainted with the Hohenzollern candidature,
that he had known of it only as head of the family, and not
as King of Prussia, and that he had neither called together
nor consulted the Prussian Cabinet. Exactly as Bismarck
did in his ,' Memoirs,' the King drew an untenable distinction
between private and public action. Privately the King
and his Cabinet knew and approved of the Hohenzollern
candidature, but both King and Government pleaded to
be officially ignorant of the event ! Naturally this trickery
irritated the French still further. Bismarck had not desired
that the King should negotiate with Benedetti, but his
protests had proved unavailing. To the dismay of the
Chancellor, the old King, instead of referring Benedetti
to Bismarck and the Foreign Office, discussed the Hohen-
zollern candidature repeatedly with Benedetti. He was
willing to give way, because he desired to avoid the war
which Bismarck wished to force upon France. The Euro-
pean Powers recognised that France was in the right in
protesting against the arrangement devised by Bismarck.
In consequence of the protests which arrived from all sides,
the Prince of Hohenzollern withdrew his candidature. To
Bismarck's despair it seemed that France had won a dipb-
matic victory. The Chancellor intended to resign. Un-
fortunately the hot-blooded amateur statesmen in Paris
were not satisfied with their triumph over Prussia, but
wished to accentuate it. They directed Benedetti to de-
mand that King William should bind himself never again
to consent to the Hohenzollern candidature in the event
■ of it being renewed, and to induce the King to write a letter
in that sense to the Emperor Napoleon. Not unnaturally
King Wilham refused this, kindly but firmly. He con-
sidered the matter settled, and, having received M. Bene-
detti three times with regard to the Spanish candidaturej
and being bombarded by Bismarck with telegraphic pro-
tests against his negotiating unconstitutionally with the

HOW GEEMANY MAKES WAR 221

French Ambassador, the King wished to abstain from
further negotiation, and declined a fourth audience which
Benedetti had demanded.

While in Ems it was believed that the Spanish incident
had been peacefully and permanently settled by the with-
drawal of the candidate, Bismarck, who had come to Berlin,
was in despair. We learn from the 22nd chapter of his
' Memoirs ' that, while dining with the Generals Moltke and
Boon, he received a telegram from Councillor Abeken, who
was in the King's entourage, and who reported the King's
final conversation with Benedetti as follows :

His Majesty writes to me :

' Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in
order to demand from me finally, in a very importunate
manner, that I should authorise him to telegraph at once
that I bound myself for all future time never again to give
my consent if the Hohenzollems should renew their candida-
ture. I refused at last somewhat sternly, as it is neither right
nor possible to imdertake engagements of this kind a tout
jamais. Naturally I told him that I had as yet received no
news, and as he was earlier informed about Paris and Madrid
than myself, he could clearly see that my Government once
more had no hand in the matter.'

His Majesty has since received a letter from the Prince.

His Majesty, having told Count Benedetti that he was
awaiting news from the Prince, has decided, with reference
to the above demand, upon the representation of Count
Eulenburg and myself, not to receive Count Benedetti
again, but only to let him be informed through an aide-de-
camp : That his Majesty had now received from the Prince
confirmation of the news which Benedetti had already re-
ceived from Paris, and had nothing further to say to the
Ambassador.

His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency whether Bene-
detti's fresh demand and its rejection should not be at
once communicated both to our Ambasadors and to the
Press.

222 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Bismarck described the receipt of the telegram by him
and his guests as follows :

When the copy was handed to me it showed that Abeken
had drawn up and signed the telegram at his Majesty's
command, and I read it out to my guests, whose dejection
was so great that they turned away from food and drink.
On a repeated examination of the document I lingered upon
the authorisatioi^ of his Majesty, which included a command,
immediately to communicate Benedetti's fresh demand and
its rejection both to our Ambassadors and to the Press; I
put a few questions to Moltke as to the extent of his confi-
dence in the state of our preparations, especially as to the
time they^ would still require in order to meet this sudden
risk of war. He answered that if there was to be war he
expected no advantage to us by deferring its outbreak,
and even if we should not be strong enough at first to pro-
tect all the territories on the left bank of the Ehine against
French invasion, our preparations would nevertheless soon
overtake those of the French, while at a later period this
advantage would be diminished ; he regarded a rapid out-
break as, on the whole, more favourable to us than
delay.

How fijmly Moltke was convinced of a German victory
may be seen from the fact that two days later he stated to
King William, according to Oncken : ' We stall do magni-
ficently with the South German States, without the South
German States, and even against the South German States.'

Having once more been told that a German victory was
certain, Bismarck sat down at a small table and condensed
Abeken's telegram, which was perfectly innocuous in its
original form, as follows :

After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary Prince
of HohenzoUern had been officially communicated to the
Imperial French Government by the Eoyal Spanish Govern-
ment, the French Ambassador at Ems further demanded
of his Majesty the King to authorise him to telegraph to

HOW GEEMANY MAKES WAR 223

Paris that his Majesty the King engages for all future
time never again to give his consent if the HohenzoUerns
should again return to their candidature. His Majesty the
King thereon declined to receive the French Ambassador
again, and had him told by the Adjutant in attendance that
his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the
Ambassador.

The abbreviated version of the Ems telegram, as given
above, will he found in the third volume of the British
Blue Book on the Franco-Prussian War (C.-210), where it
is significantly headed : ' Telegram addressed by the Prussian
Government to Foreign Governments.'

An ambassador is the direct representative of the
monarch. According to the shortened version of Abeken's
telegram it would appear that the King of Prussia had in-
sultingly broken off communication with the French Am-
bassador, had unceremoniously shown him the door. The
wounding and provocative character of the shortened tele-
gram was immediately recognised by Bismarck's guests, for
the Chancellor stated in his ' Memoirs ' :

After I read out the concentrated edition to my two
guests, Moltke remarked : ' Now it has a different ring ;
it sounded before like a parley, now it is like a flourish in
answer to a challenge.' I went on to explain : ' If in execu-
tion of his Majesty's order I at once conmiunicate this text,
which contains no alteration in or addition to the telegram,
not only to the newspapers, but also by telegraph to all our
Embassies, it will be known in Paris before midnight, and
not only on account of its contents, but also on account of the
manner of its distribution, will have the effect of a red rag
upon the Gallic bull.'

Having failed in bringing about war by the elaborately
staged and long-prepared Spanish candidature, Bismarck
succeeded at the last moment in causing France to declare
war upon Prussia by the manipulation of the Ems telegram.
We learn from his ' Memoirs,' which were only published

224 THE, FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

after his death, that he deliberately manipulated Abeken's
telegram -with the object of bringing about a French attack
upon Prussia. Up to Bismarck's death German diplomats
and historians had strenuously maintained that France
was the aggressor, that the war had been ' forced upon '
Prussia by the warlike French. That legend was assidu-
ously propounded by Bismarck immediately after the
outbreak of war. On July 15 Gramont and OUivier made
before the French Chamber a declaration which was equi-
valent to a declaration of war. On July 18 Bismarck
sent to the Prussian Ambassador in London a telegram
which was to be communicated to the English Govern-
ment, in which he stated, with scant regard for the truth,
referring to the notorious Ems telegram and the Spanish
candidature :

There exists no note or dispatch by which the Prussian
Government notified to the Cabinets of Europe a refusal
to receive the French Ambassador. There exists noth-
ing but the newspaper telegram known to all the world,
which was communicated to the German Governments
and to some of our representatives with non-German
Governments, according to the wording of the news-
papers, in order to inform them of the nature of the
French dernands, and the impossibility of complying with
them, and which, moreover, contains nothing injurious to
Fradce. ...

The statement is also untrue that his Majesty the King
communicated the candidature of Prince Leopold to me, the
undersigned Chancellor of the Confederation. I was casually
informed in confidence of the Spanish offer by a private
person concerned in the negotiations.

It will be noticed that Bismarck and the Prussian
Government described the abbreviated version of the Ems
telegram which the Chancellor had written out with his
own hand in Berlin as ' a newspaper telegram.' In all
the official German documents this celebrated telegram

HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 225

is called a ' Zeitungstelegiamm,' as if it had been written
by any ordinary journalist, and in the German ' Staats-
archiv ' it is called ' a newspaper telegram from Ems,' as if
some poor innocent journalist at Ems had drafted the cele-
brated message with which Bismarck deliberately provoked
France into war.

In embarking upon his diplomatic campaign against
Prance Bismarck had not only attempted to put France
ostensibly in the wrong, but also to involve that country,
if possible, simultaneously in a war with Spain or with
England, or with both countries combined. In Bismarck's
' Memoirs * we read :

I waited for some days expecting that a Spanish declara-
tion of war against France would follow that of the French
against us. I was not prepared to see a self-assertive
nation like Spain stand quiet behind the Pyrenees, with
folded arms, while the Germans were engaged in a deadly
struggle against France on behalf of Spain's independence
and Spain's freedom to choose her King.

We learn from Poschinger's ' Tischgesprache ' and other
sources that the day following the declaration of war
Bismarck asked General Prim how large a force Spain
would send against France.

Bismarck had unceasingly tempted Napoleon to attach
Belgium to France in some form or other in the hope of
involving France in a war with England. With this object in
view he published, immediately on the outbreak of war, the
various proposals and draft treaties which he had induced
Benedetti to submit to him. He not only stated that Prance
had unremittingly tempted Prussia to embark upon various
adventures which would involve the absorption of Belgium
into France, but he even asserted that Prance did not
really intend to make war upon Prussia, that she merely
wished the two countries to mobilise with the object of
jointly seizing Belgium in a piratical expedition. In a

226 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

telegram of July 28 to the Prussian Ambassador in London,
which will he found in the third volume of the British Blue
Book, Bismarck stated :

. . . The final conviction that no territorial aggrandise-
ment for France could be obtained vnth our co-operation
has undoubtedly ripened the resolution to gain it by war
against us.

I have even reason to believe that if this publication
(of the Franco-Prussian draft treaty written out by Bene-
detti) had not taken place, France woilld have proposed
to us, after the completion of her own and of our prepara-
tions for war, to enforce Count Benedetti's programme at
the head of the two armies against unarmed Europe — that
is to say, to conclude peace at the expense of Belgium. The
draft of treaty which is in our hands, and which Lord
Augustus Loftus has seen, is from beginning to end, including
the corrections, in Count Benedetti's own handwriting, well
known to the Enghsh Ambassador. If the French Cabinet
now denies tendencies for which it has constantly tried to
obtain our consent since 1864 by varying promises and
demands, this seems very natural under the present political
circumstances. . . .

On the following day Prince Bismarck sent to London
another telegram, in which thei accusation was repeated.
He stated :

... I am under the impression that it was only the
definitive conviction that no enlargement of the frontiers of
France was to be obtained with us that has led the Emperor
to the determination to strive to obtain it against us. I
have even reason to believe that, if the pubhcation in ques-
tion had not taken place — after the completion of the French
and our own preparations for war — propositions would have
been made to us by France to carry out jointly, at the head
of 1,000,000 armed men against unarmed Europe, the pro-
posals formerly made to us ; that is to say, before or after
the first battle to conclude peace on the basis of the Bene-
detti proposals at the expense of Belgium.

HOW GEEMANY MAKES WAR 227

At the same time Bismarck tried to involve England
and France in war by working upon Lord Loftus in Berlin,
but the British representative was shrewd enough to recog-
nise Bismarck's aims. In reporting this conversation with
Bismarck, he stated on July 30 :

It is evident to me that Count Bismarck wiU use all his
endeavours to obtain the co-operation of England, and he
hopes, by representing the dangers by which Belgium is
menaced, to work on pubhc opinion in England, with a
view to the eventual aid of Great Britain in the war against
France.

Many historians have asserted that war between
Prussia and Prance would have been avoided in 1870
had France been satisfied with her diplomatic success, with
the abandonment of the candidature to the Spanish Throne
by the Prince of HohenzoUern. That view is no doubt
erroneous. Bismarck had clearly shown that he meant
to have war with Prance in any case in 1870. On
July 13, when it seemed that the Franco-Prussian differ-
ences had been permanently adjusted by the withdrawal
of the Prince of HohenzoUern, Bismarck stated to Lord
Loftus, according to the report of the Ambassador to the
Earl of Granville:

After what has now occurred we must require some
assurance, some guarantee, that we may not be subjected
to a sudden attack ; we must know that this Spanish diffi-
culty once removed, there are no other lurking designs
which may burst upon us like a thunderstorm. . . .

Count Bismarck further stated that unless some assur-
ance, some declaration, were given by Prance to the Euro-
pean Powers ... the Prussian Government would be obliged
to seek explanations from France. It was impossible,
added his Excellency, that Prussia could tamely and
quietly sit under the affront offered to the King and to
the nation by the menacing language of the French
Government.

228 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEBMANY

Bismarck's words make it perfectly obvious that the
Chancellor was not willing that the Spanish question should
find a peaceful settlement. Had the French been satisfied
with the withdrawal of the Prince of HohenzoUern, Bis-
marck would have demanded * guarantees ' from France.
He would no doubt have made unacceptable demands,
such as the reduction of the French army, or an apology on
the part of the French Emperor, which inevitably would
have led to war.

CHAPTER VIII

HOW OEBMANT MAKES FEAOB — THE SEOBEX
HISTORY OP 1866

Geemany's diplomatic action in bringing about war in 1914
closely resembled Prussia's action in 1870. In that year,
having succeeded in placing upon France the reproach of
aggression, she destroyed by a model campaign the unready
French armies and forced France into a disastrous peace.
The war was extremely profitable to Germany. She gained
by it the possession of Alsace-Lorraine with 1,500,000 in-
habitants and a war indemnity of £200,000,000, a sum
which was four times as large as Germany's actual war
expenditure had been. As the war of 1870-71 had been
Prusso-Germany's most brilliant campaign, it is widely
assumed that the Peace of Versailles and Frankfurt, by
which it was concluded, was her most advantageous peace.
HenCe many believe that Germany, in making peace,
would endeavour to follow the precedent of 1871 in the
event of her proving victorious in the present war. How-
ever, it is an error to believe that the peace of 1871 was
the most advantageous one ever concluded by the Hohen-
zollerns. By far the most profitable peace made by them
was that of 1866 after the war with Austria. As Germany's
present position curiously resembles Prussia's position in
1866, it may be assumed that Prusso-Germany will en-
deavour to follow the precedent which she created in that
memorable year. Indeed everything points that way.

229

230 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

Hence it seems worth while studying Prussia's action at
that time. Such study will help us to understand Ger-
many's diplomatic activities and her numerous peace
proposals.

In 1870 Prussia's risk in going to war with France was
comparatively small. Her military superiority over France
was absolutely overwhelming. The issue of the struggle
could scarcely be in doubt. Moreover, in case of a defeat,
Prussia could have lost to France only a comparatively
unimportant stretch of territory west of the Rhine. In
1866 Prussia and her opponent were more evenly matched
than in 1870. As in 1914, Prussia had to wage war on
several fronts and against several opponents. As her
enemies were German States, she risked losing to them
vast stretches of purely German territory. A disastrous
war would undoubtedly have led to Prussia's partition,
to her disappearance as an independent State, and to the
abdication of her King. Bismarck, according to his own
confession, would have committed suicide in case of defeat.
Before the outbreak of the war of 1866 Austria had ex-
pressed to Napoleon the Third her willingness to cede
Venetia to Italy in exchange for Silesia, which she hoped to
conquer from Prussia. Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, Wiirtem-
berg, and Hesse, which were Austria's aUies, would un-
doubtedly have annexed vast Prussian territories, and
Napoleon the Third would very likely have claimed the
Rhine frontier, in return for the cession of which he would
have protected Prussia against too far-reaching a spoliation.
Prussia, which in 1866 had a little more than 19,000,000 in-
habitants, might have been reduced to a State of 12,000,000
or 13,000,000 people. Austria would have become para-
mount in Germany and would have made Prussia her vassal
unless that country had become a French Protectorate.

In 1866, as in the present war, the risk run by Prussia
was very great, but then, as now, the stakes for which
that country went to war were gigantic. Prussia was

HOW GERMANY MAKES PEACE 231

determined to risk all for all. The short and successful
campaign against Austria proved by far the most profitable
one in the history of Europe, and probably in that of the
world. The war lasted only a few weeks, and it was almost
bloodless. According to the official account, Prussia lost
in 1866 only 4450 killed in action, while 6427 officers and
soldiers died of disease. At a cost of less than 11,000 lives
the State of the HohenzoUerns doubled its territory and
population and became from a second-rate Power the lead-
ing Great Power on the Continent

The fact that by the peace of 1866 Prussia doubled her
territory and population is practically unknown in England,
yet it is correct. In 1866 Prussia had 19,304,843 inhabi-
tants. At the peace she annexed the following territories,
which were directly incorporated in Prussia :

Inhabitants

Hanover 1,923,492

Schleswig-Holstein 960,996

Electorate of Hesse 737,283

Kassau 466,014

Prankfort-on-the-Main 89,837

Hesse-Darmstadt Cessions 75,102

Bavarian Cessions 32,976

Total 4,285,700

The direct acquisitions made by Prussia at the peace
of 1866 were by far the greatest she had ever experienced.
The population acquired was practically three times as
large as that gained by the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine in
1871. However, her direct annexations were Prussia's
smallest gain, for in addition to the territories enumerated
in the table, Prussia firmly and quite openly attached
to herself the North German States, such as the various
Saxon States, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Liibeck,
Bremen, Hamburg, and some minor States. These became
her vassals in the North German Federation which Prussia
constituted. In addition to the North German States
mentioned, Prussia attached to herself in 1866 secretly the

232 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

great South German States, Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and
Baden, the independence of which was nominally main-
tained. The North German States and the South German
States which thus lost their independence in 1866, which
were permanently attached to Prussia, partly openly and
partly by secret treaty, which were made Prussia's subor-
dinates, and which were forced to place their entire armies
unconditionally at Prussia's disposal, had together about
15,000,000 inhabitants. Thus by the single battle of
Eoniggratz the population subject to the Hohenzollerns was
increased by 4,800,000 atmexed Hanoverians, Hessians,
&c., and by 15,000,000 Bavarians, Saxons, &c., who re-
mained nominally subjects of the terrorised minor poten-
tates of Germany. Thus the subjects of the Hohenzollerns
were in 1866, by a single stroke, increased from 19,800,000
to 88,500,000.

Prussia's gigantic success was scarcely noticed at the
time. The non-Prussian German States remained nomi-
nally independent. It was widely believed that the North
German Federation would break up before long, and it
was not known that the South German States also had
been made subject to Prussia. Besides the Government-
inspired Press and the Goveriunent-inspired historians of
Prussia preserved a judicious silence with regard to their
country's astounding expansion, which destroyed the bal-
ance of power in Europe. As the other European Powers,
and especially France, Prussia's direct neighbour, would
npt have tolerated the doubling of Prussia's population
and armed strength, the arrangements which were made
by Bismarck with the great South German States, with a
view to placing them completely under Prussian control,
were kept most strictly secret for a time. Besides, Bismarck
had succeeded in gaining France's goodwill and support
before he embarked upon attacking Austria. Thus inter-
ference on the part of France with Prussia's expansion had
become somewhat difficult.

HOW GERMANY MAKES PEACE 233

Before attacking Austria, detachiag from that country
all the minor German States, and attaching them to Prussia
in some form or other, Bismarck had to win the support of
the European Great Powers, and especially that of France,
Prussia's most dangerous neighbour. With this end in
view Bismarck sought the friendship of Eussia, Prance, and
Italy, for England kept aloof from continental affairs at
the time, and therefore did not count in his calculations.
Napoleon the Third was a dreamer. The Prussian Chan-
cellor succeeded in persuading that unfortunate monarch
that Prussia's expansion at Austria's cost was not only
not dangerous, but was beneficial to France ; that it was
in France's interest that Austria, which was dangerously
strong, should be weakened ; that France and Prussia
were naturally friends and allies who ought to co-operate
for their mutual advantage ; that if Prussia should succeed
in aggrandising herself, France should be compensated for
Prussia's growth by the acquisition of Belgium, of Luxem-
burg, and of German territories on the Moselle and on the
Ehine with Prussia's assistance.

Desiring to put France off her guard, Bismarck wished
particularly to convince Napoleon the Third of Prussia's
moderation in case she should be victorious in a war with
Austria. The Chancellor meant to be sure as to Napoleon's
attitude in case of war, and as action through his diplo-
matic subordinates had failed to give him the necessary
security, Bismarck resolved to discuss matters with Napoleon
in person. He took a holiday late in October in 1865, osten-
sibly for the sake, of his health, and went with his wife
first to Paris, where he stayed for a few days, showing
her the sights, and then to Biarritz, where Napoleon was
staying at the time. At Biarritz he had lengthy conversa-
tions with the Emperor, and in the course of his negotiations
was given the certainty that Napoleon would observe a
benevolent neutrality towards Prussia in case of a war
with Austria as long as Prussia would limit her war aims

234 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

to the incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein and to a
reform of the German Federation -which would give her
the leadership in North Germany. However, Napoleon
the Third insisted that South Germany should remain
' independent, and he pointed out to Bismarck that Prussia
would have to reckon with France's hostility should she
endeavour to bring under her influence the great German
States south of the river Main.

Having made very satisfactory arrangements with
Napoleon, Bismarck felt justified in working for a war
with Austria, On February 28, 1866, a great Prussian
Cabinet Council regarding a war with Austria was held.
It was presided over by King William, and his son, the
Crown Prince, also attended it. At that meeting Moltke
declared that a Prussian victory could be counted upon
for certain only if Italy attacked Austria in the rear and
forced that country to divide its armies. He demanded
that military co-operation with Italy should be arranged
for. Bismarck had been negotiating with Italy for a long
time with a view to forming an alliance directed against
Austria. As a result of the Cabinet Council he accel-
erated matters. On April 8, 1866, a Prusso- Italian
alliance of defence and offence, which was to be effec-
tive during three months from the date of its con-
clusion, was signed, and on the following day, April 9,
Prussia brought forward in the Diet of the German Federa-
tion a motion designed to facilitate war with Austria.
She proposed an electoral reform which she knew was un-
acceptable to her great opponent. Provocation followed
provocation, and on June 10, Prussia proposed in the
German Diet that Austria should be excluded from the
then existing German Federation, which embraced Austria
and all German States. On the following day Austria,
which hitherto had been the leading Power in Germany,
demanded not unnaturally the mobilisation of all the
Federal armies against Prussia. On June 12 the

HOW GEEMANY MAKES PEACE 235

diplomatic relations between Austria and Prussia were
broken off. On June 14 the fatal war vote took place
in the Federal Diet, and on the following day Prussia
opened hostilities simultaneously against Austria, Hanover,
Saxony, and the other German States which had placed
themselves at Austria's side. Being perfectly ready for
war, Prussia invaded the countries of all her opponents,
and on July 3, three weeks after relations had been broken
off, the battle of Koniggratz took place. It decided the
war, for Austria was utterly defeated.

Ever since November 1865, when Napoleon the Third
had promised Bismarck his benevolent neutraUty, and
especially since April 8, 1866, when the Prusso-Italian
war alliance was concluded, Bismarck had pointed out
unceasingly the reasonableness and moderation of Prussia
through the Press and through Prussia's political and
diplomatic representatives. For instance, on March 5,
1866, the Prussian Ambassador in Paris, Von der Goltz,
declared to Napoleon, according to the historian H. von
Sybel, who was allowed to read the ambassadorial reports,
that Prussia intended only to acquire Schleswig-Holstein
and to obtain the leadership in North Germany — that she
was determined to preserve carefully the autonomy of
the minor States. On June 16, when the war began,
Bismarck sent a circular note to all the diplomatic repre-
sentatives of Prussia in which he stated that Austria had
forced Prussia into the war, that Prussia fought reluct-
antly and that she would act with the greatest moderation.
It contained the following assertions :

Nous avions prevu que las armements inopines et in-
justifiables de I'Autriche auraient pour consequence une crise
fatale ; cette crise vient d'eclater. . . .

En presence de I'hostiUte ouverte manifestee par la reso-
lution de la Diete de mettre sur pied contre la Prusse lea
forces de la Confederation, Sa Majeste S'est vue dans la
necessite de prendre, Elle aussi, lea mesures que le soin de

23G THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Sa propre defense et Ses devoirs envers Son peuple re-
claimaient imperieusement. ...

Le Gouvemement du Boi a la conscience qu'en formulant
ces demandes il s'est renferme dans des limites aussi etroites
que le soin de sa propre defense le lui permettait. Si des
conditions si mod^rees ne sont pas acceptees, il se vena
oblige d'a>voir recours aux propres forces et d'employer
centre les Gouvernements qui se seront fait connaitre
comme ses adversaires determines' tous les moyens dont il
dispose. La responsabilite de ce qui en pourra resultei
retombera tout entifere sur ceux qui, par leurs menees hostiles,
auront cr^e cette situation, et qui auront repousse au dernier
moment la main que la Frusse leur tendait.

Before the outbreak of the struggle Prussia had, as far
as possible, concealed the high state of her preparedness
for war in order to be able to strike down her enemies by
surprise. Moreover, Bismarck had sedulously striven to
convince Napoleon that Prussia was weak, that a war with
Austria was very dangerous for her unless she possessed
Italy's alliance and France's support. Firmly believing
that Austria would be victorious over Prussia, Napoleon
had urged Italy to help Prussia. Beckoning upon the
probabiUty of an Austrian victory, France had not mobi-
lised her troops. Napoleon's army was quite unready f6r
war, partly owing to the Mexican expedition, partly owing
to internal disorganisation. The leading French authori-
ties considered Austria to be far stronger than Prussia, and
Prussia had done nothing to disabuse them.

Napoleon had promised Bismarck Prance's benevolent
neutrality largely because he did not consider Prussia
dfingerous. On July 8, three weeks after diplomatic
relation^ with Austria had been broken off, Austria was
decisively defeated in the gigantic battle of Koniggratz.
The news fell upon unprepared Paris like a thunderbolt.
Napoleon's diplomatic plans, which were based upon a
Prussian defeat or, at best upon along-drawn-out war, col-

HOW GEEMANY MAKES PEACE 237

lapsed like a house of cards. France was unready for inter-
vention. At best she could have raised a force of 40,000
soldiers. Still Bismarck wished Prance to be neutral.
He desired to retain France's support up to the peace, in
which he hoped to double King William's subjects and more
than double Prussia's power and wealth. He was prepared
to do a great deal in order to prevent France's interference.
With this object in view he pressed negotiations with Aus-
tria to the utmost. At the same time he endeavoured
to secure Napoleon's goodwill by promising him vaguely
vast compensations, such as the possession of Belgium and
of Luxemburg. He made these promises through the un-
fortunate Benedetti, the French Ambassador.

For a time he endeavoured to put Napoleon off his
guard by talking moderation. On July 8, five days after
the battle of K5niggratz, Bismarck telegraphed to the
Russian Ambassador, Von der Goltz, who had previously
reported that Napoleon and his Foreign Minister, Drouyn
de Lhuys, were becoming impatient and anxious : ' Prussia's
peace aims, as far as I know the wishes of King William,
do not materially exceed the reform of the German Feder-
ation. However, Prussia's friends and Prussia's opppnelnta
will have to be treated somewhat differently.' At the
same time Bismarck sent to Paris Prince Beuss, who was
fersona graUssima at the French Court, with a personal
letter written by the King of Prussia to Napoleon which
once more dwelt upon Prussia's moderation. Prince Beuss
verbally assured Napoleon that King William would be very
reasonable in his demands, which concerned mainly a reform
of the German Federation, a step of which Napoleoo him-
self had previously approved.

Ever since the begiiming of the war the whole Prussian
Press had, under official direction, preached reasonable-
ness and moderation, while the Austrian Press had bwn
allowed to indulge in the most extravagant language and
demands. According to Bothan, the semi-official Press

238 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

of Prussia went so far as to protest against the annexation
of Hanover and the Electorate of Hesse against the will
of the Hanoverian and Hessian peoples. By making skil-
ful use of Prussia's diplomatic representatives and of the
Press, Bismarck succeeded in creating an atmosphere ex-
ceedingly favourable to Prussia throughout Europe. The
whole world thought that Prussia would be exceedingly
reasonable in her demands when concluding a peace.

While ostensibly Prussia's main war aim was a reform
of the German Federation, the purpose and extent of which
was obscure to most non-Germans, and while Prussian
diplomats and the Prussian Press were creating a favour-
able peace atmosphere by displaying Prussia's self-re-
straint and generosity, Bismarck communicated part of his
real war aims to Von der Goltz, his Ambassador in Paris,
In a most important letter, which was written on July 9,
and which is printed in part in Sybel's ' History,' Bismarck
stated :

The French Cabinet has expressed the desire to know
Prussia's peace requirements. Your Excellency wiU have
the same impression which I have, that Prussian public
opinion demands the incorporation of Saxony, Hanover,
and Hesse in Prussia. That solution would certainly be
the most useful for all concerned if it could be brought about
without the cession of Prussian territorieji. I myself do
not find the difference between a sufi&ciently favourable
reform of the German Federation and the direct acquisition
of the countries mentioned great enough to risk once more
the fate of the monarchy. Our political requirements are
limited to being able to dispose of the strength of North
Germany in some form or another. We ought to treat the
decision as to the details of form, as far as possible, as an
internal affair to be arranged in Parliament.

It seems to me not permissible that those who on the
14th of June voted in favour of a Federal war against Prussia
should be given the same conditions as those who voluntarily
joined us, forming a new Federation. The former States are

HOW GEEMANY MAKES PEACE 239

the more powerful, and therefore they are the more dangerous
to the newly created Federation in the future. This diffi-
culty may be solved in two ways, either by imposing upon
Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse more unfavourable conditions
with regard to their mihtary autonomy or by diminishing
the territorial extent of these countries. . . .

As headquarters are about to move, I must finish my letter,
and I send your Excellency for the present these pages and
leave it to you to find out what impression will be created
and what demands for compensation outside Germany will
be raised by France if we should demand the full annexation
of Saxony, Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse, Upper Hesse,
and Nassau. Before doing this, you should carefully sound
the people as to the eventuaHties previously considered.
Youi Excellency should at the same time allow^ it to be
understood, without using any threats, that we are firmly
resolved not to accept a peace which would be dishonourable
in view of Prussia's successes.

Should the hope of arriving at a direct understanding
with Austria not materialise, and should France assume a
threatening attitude towards Prussia, we should await
developments, and then, basing ourselves on the planned
Imperial Constitution of Germany of 1849, bring about a
great rising of all Germany. We should unite the whole
nation and employ every means in our power in order to
strengthen the resistance of the nationl However, so far
I feel convinced that the fears of the Berlin public are un-
founded, and that we shall be able to come to an agreement
with the Emperor Napoleon if I should succeed in limiting
the demands made on this side to such an extent that they
will appear reasonable' and sufficient.

It will be noticed that in this most important dispatch
Bismarck considered not only the incorporation of Hanover
and Hesse in Prussia, but that of Saxony as well. However,
he was wise enough to believe real power more important
than outward form. The Chancellor plainly stated that
he wished before all to obtaiu control of the forces of
North Germany, It was immaterial to him whether the

240 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEBMANY

non- Prussian States in North Germany should be incorpo-
rated in Prussia or whether they should be allowed to pre-
serve a purely nominal independence. Furthermore, it will
be noticed that Bismarck was quite willing to give to France
territorial compensations outside Germany, which means
in Belgium or Luxemburg, and that he threatened that
he would raise all Germany against Napoleon, should
Napoleon be hostile. The reference to the proposed Impe-
rial Constitution of 1849 may be obscure to many readers.
At that time the Frankfurt Parliament proposed the crea-
tion of a united Germany, comprising Austria and all the
purely German States. In other words, Bismarck hinted
that in case of need Prussia would reconcile herself with
Austria, and that the united Prussian and Austrian armies
would march against France and rapidly overwhelm that
country.

Up to 1866 France was the dominant Power in Europe,
and Napoleon the Third was the dominating figure in the
political world. He liked to consider himself the master
of the Continent. Foreign rulers and statesmen eagerly
sought his friendship, his counsel, his favour, and his sup-
port, and he listened patronisingly to their wishes and
proposals. He believed that he controlled the Continent,
and all France shared his views. In a spirit of patronage
he had received Bismarck at Biarritz in 1865, and had
agreed to support Prussia against Austria.

Firmly believing that the war would be difficult and
long drawn out, that Austria would probably be victorious,
and that France would have ample time to arm to intervene
in the struggle. Napoleon had neglected mobilising his army.
The battle of Koniggratz opened his eyes. 'i!he sudden
rise of Prussia filled him with dismay, if not with terror.
On the evening of July 4, as soon as he had received the
staggering news of the battle of KSniggratz, he telegraphed
to King William of Prussia that the prompt and strik-
ing successes of Prussia compelled him to abandon his

HOW GEEMANY MAKES PEACE 241

passive attitude. He recommended moderation to the
King and proposed an immediate armistice. Fearing
Austria's collapse, and recognising the danger threatening
from Prussia, Napoleon intended to interfere with energy,
to mobilise the army, to advance into Ehenish Prussia,
which was denuded of troops, and to prevent a great change
in the European balance of power to France's disadvantage.
The French Chambers were immediately to be convoked.
When, however, the unready state of the army waS' de-
scribed to him, he recognised the danger of his proceeding.
He faltered, and could not make up his mind whether he
should interfere energetically at the risk of war or whether
he should abstain from action. The decision to assemble
the Chambers was abandoned. He hesitated to choose
a policy, and Bismarck, being fully acquainted with the
deplorable state of the French army through the Prussian
military attache. Von Loe, who was at Headquarters, made
the best use of the Emperor's perplexity and hesitation.
Bismarck politely declined Napoleon's demand for an im-
mediate armistice, pointing out to him that, owing to the
terms of the Prusso-Italian Alliance, an armistice could
only be jointly concluded by Italy and Prussia, and referred
Napoleon to Italy. At the same time he urged Italy to
refuse Prance's demand for an armistice. Italy acted in
accordance with Bismarck's advice when Napoleon the
Third suggested the cessation of hostilities. The arbiter of
Europe discovered that overnight hia power and prestige
had slipped from his hands.

Desiring to stay Prussia's progress. Napoleon sent to
the Prussian army headquarters Count Benedetti, the
French Ambassador in Berlin. He was given only very
vague instructions. Benedetti realised the danger to
France of a vastly aggrandised Prussia, He endeavoured
to oppose her expansionist ambitions and to claim foi
France territorial compensations which would maintain the
established balance of power between Prance and Prussia..

242 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

He failed in both tasks. Bismarck employed towards
the French Ambassador the arguments and threats sug-
gested to Von der Goltz in the dispatch previously quoted.
Von Sybel, who saw Bismarck's memoranda of his negotia-
tions with Benedetti, has told us :

When Benedetti demanded for France Mayenoe, &o.;
with great energy, pointing out Prussia's injustice and
ingratitude, Bismarck negatived his demand and stated
that in case of need Prussia would go to war with France.
The Chancellor gave this important declaration quietly
and politely, and added his reasons. He said that such
cessions of German territory were impossible. The German
people would oppose giving France the frontier of 1814.
King William coidd not hand over his subjects against their
will. Prussia attached no value to Luxemburg, but felt
disquieted at Napoleon's attitude, which would diminish
Prussia's confidence in him. Prussia had believed that
Napoleon was more interested in the rise of a strong and
independent Prussia than in territorial acquisitions. If that
assumption was mistaken, there would be no longer any
reason for limiting Prussia's aims to the control of North
Germany, and Germany's imity might be completed by in-
cluding the South German States as well.

Benedetti remained firm, and appealed to King William,
who confirmed the views expressed by Bismarck. He was
told that public opinion was opposed to any cession of Ger-
man territory, however small. The two' statesmen met once
more and discussed matters during several hours. At last
Bismarck summarised the position as follows : ' Why should
we act as you wish ? You must know that it is impossible
for us to cede German territory. That would be a confession
of bankruptcy in view of our victories. Perhaps different
ways might be found for satisfying France. However, if you
should insist upon your demand for German soil, we should
use every weapon. We should not only appeal to the entire
German race, but should unconditionally make peace with
Austria, we should leave to her the whole of South Germany
and should bear with the old German Federation, but then

HOW GEEMANY MAKES PEACE 248

Prussia, Austria, and the other German States would cross
the Ehine with 800,000 men and take from you Alsace-
Lorraine. All the German armies are ready. The French
army is unready, and you can imagine what the conse-
quences would be.'

Benedetti was deeply impressed, and exclaimed : ' Do
you think Austria would make peace if France should
oppose you ? ' Bismarck replied : ' I do not express to you
a new idea. Immediately before the war we and Austria
had discussed this very subject, and I assure you that Austria
would make peace to-day. Therefore you should avoid a
war which very easily might be fatal to France.' Benedetti
answered : ' I should do this willingly, but my conscience
compels me to declare to the Emperor Napoleon that his
dynasty will be endangered unless he receives territorial
compensations.' Bismarck closed the conversation with
the words : ' Tell your Emperor that a war springing from
such causes might under certain circumstances be fought
d coup de revolutions ; that in case of revolutionary dangers
the German dynasties might prove to be erected upon a
more sohd basis than that of. the Emperor Napoleon.'

Napoleon was ill with stone in the bladder, and was
racked with pain which sometimes was almost unbearable.
He recognised that his policy had been a failure, that he
had been instrumental in creating a powerful Prussia to
France's danger, that, by the sudden rise of Prussia, France
had lost her paramount position in the world. The Em-
press Eugenie was in despair. The sick Emperor was over-
whelmed with reproaches. On July 11 the Prussian
Ambassador, Von der Goltz, reported :

I foimd the Emperor deeply moved, almost broken. . . .
He admitted that possibly he had spoken favourably about
Prussia's planned reform of the German Federation with-
out having sufficiently weighed the consequences. He ad-
mitted that he had made a great mistake, which was doubly
awkward through the publicity which his policy had received.
If Prussia and Italy continued to oppose him, France would

244 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

be deeply humiliated, Something would have to be done
to get him out of the impossible position. He inquiied what
conditions were demanded for an armistice.

The French Emperor's position and his despondency
appear clearly from Von der Goltz's report.

On July 13 the Prussian Ambassador, who had
meanwhile received Bismarck's important directions as
to Prussia's peace aims of July 9, of which an extract
has been given in these pages, hastened to see Napoleon,
He discussed with him Prussia's peace aims tentatively
and in somewhat vague generalities. Napoleon wished still
to appear the leading diplomatic figure in Europe. He
felt keenly his previous failures. Hence he desired to pro-
pose himself those peace conditions which Prussia intended
to demand, as long as these were acceptable to France.
With this object in view he asked Von der Goltz to submit
to him Prussia's peace programme in writings As we have
seen. Napoleon had agreed that Prussia should become
supreme in North Germa,ny . On the other hand, the French
Emperor had shown that he felt doubtful whether France
could consent to vast Prussian annexations. He thought
that such a demand should be met by a French demand
for an equivalent territorial increment. Von der Goltz
was an exceedingly skilful diplomat. He desired that
Napoleon should himself propose the settlement which
Bismarck had outlined to him. In order to achieve thia
aim. Von der Goltz riesolved to omit the question of an-
nexations. He immediately set to work on a formula, and
on the following day, July 14, he saw Napoleon and
placed before him peace proposals which were worded as
follows :

, Austria recognises the dissolution of the old, German
Federation, and does not oppose a new organisation of Ger-
many in which she will not participate.

Prussia forms a union in North Germany which comprises

HOW GEEMANY MAKES PEACE 245

all States north of the river Main. She will have the com-
mand over the troops of these States.

The German States south of the Main are free to con-
clude a South German union which will enjoy an independent
international position. The bonds between the North Ger-
man and the South German unions will be arranged by
free and mutual agreement.

Schleswig-Holstein will be united with Prussia, with the
exception of those districts of North Schleswig, the inhabi-
tants of which desire reunion with Denmark,

Austria and her allies pay Prussia's war expenditure.

It will be noted that in the proposals, drafted for Napo-
leon's use Von der Goltz mentioned only the annexation
of Schleswig-Holstein, which Prussia had conquered with
Austria's help in 1864. Nothing was said about the in-
tended annexation of Hanover, Hesse, &g. !

Napoleon was simple enough to agree to everything.
He merely suggested the amendment that Austria should
pay only a part of Prussia's war expenditure, and added
the phrase, Venetia excepted, Austria's integrity will be
preserved.' He then turned to Goltz and told him that
the Prussian Ambassador had succeeded in expressing his,
the Emperor's, own ideas !

Napoleon had not only shown to Von der Goltz his in-
capacity and his despondency in the conversation reported
by the latter on July II, but he had allowed himself to
become a tool in the hands of one of Bismarck's ablest
diplomats. As the question of annexations had not been
mentioned. Napoleon possibly imagined that Prussia would
be exceedingly moderate in that respect. Goltz did nothing
to open Napoleon's eyes. He continued talking moderation,
especially as the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was
opposed to Prussia's aggrandisement. M. Georges Eothan, a
very able French diplomat and writer, described in his book,
'La Politique Fran^aise en 1866,' the unscrupulous way in
which Von der Goltz obtained Napoleon's consent to vast

246 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEBMANY:

Prussian annexations, notwithstanding tbe opposition of
the Foreign Minister :

On the 19th of July Von der Goltz entered the room of
M. Drouyn de Lhuys. His face was distorted. He abused
Bismarck, complained of his demands and his methods, and
said that he would resign. He had been given a most dis-
agreeable task, and he thought it wrong. However, having
been given orders by the Emg, he had to carry them out.
The Prussian Court was intoxicated by unexpected military
successes. Bismarck wished for Prussia's territorial expan-
sion. He hoped that the French Government and Emperor
would, in view of the circumstances, satisfy the demands of
the army and of public opinion in Prussia, which would be
greatly inflamed against those who woidd try to rob Prussia
of the fruit of her victories. After all, it was only a question
c^ some small pieces of territory with 300,000 inhabitants. . . .

Drouyn de Lhuys replied that an annexation of territory
with 300,000 inhabitants was not very serious, but that the
handing over of the population was a grave step which
should be discussed and approved of by the European
Powers. Besides, any Prussian annexation on the right
bank of the Ehine would inevitably lead to a French annexa-
tion on the left bank. The Ambassador repUed that Eiag
William absolutely refused to cede any German territory.
The French Minister rose and answered : ' If that is the case
I have nothing further to say. The only thing I have to do is
to bring your communication to the notice of the Emperor.'

Von der Goltz did not wish to be forestalled by M.
Drouyn de Lhuys. He rushed to Saint-Cloud and demanded
to see the Emperqr. He knew that Napoleon formed deci-
sions without consulting the Foreign Office, and that he
shrank from war in view of the nnpreparedness of the French
army. The next morning he went to the French Foreign
Office beaming with smiles and told M. Drouyn de Lhuys
that the Emperor had not only agreed in principle with
Prussia's annexationist demands, but had promised that he
would agree to the annexation of Hanover, the Electorate of
Hesse, &c., with about 4,500,000 inhabitants.

HOW GEEMANY MAKES PEACE 247

Von Sybel, the official historian of Prussia, who read
Von der Goltz's reports, has denied Eothan's account and
has declared it to be an invention. However, official his-
torians are not always reliable guides. Von Sybel always
tries to improve Prussia's case, and he is not averse from
stretching the truth in order to serve his country. Besides,
he may not have been shown all the dispatches sent by
Von der Goltz. At all events, one may say of Eothan's
account, ' Se non 6 vero e ben trovato.' In Paris it was
generally believed at the time that Prussia demanded
annexations of land with 300,000 inhabitants. Hence the
people were amazed when they learned that Napoleon had
consented to Prussian annexations which increased the
population of the country by almost 4,500,000.

On July 26 a preliminary peace was concluded be-
tween Prussia and Austria at Nikolsburg. In forty days
the most brilliant military and political campaign had been
concluded. On August 16, 1866, the King of Prussia
sent a message to the Diet at Berlin in which he asked for
their sanction to the annexation of Hanover, Hesse, Nassau,
&c., to Prussia. He stated :

We, William, by the Grace of God, King of Prussia,
&c., hereby declare and make known :

The Governments of the Kingdom of Hanover, of the
Electorate of Hesse, and of the Duchy of Nassau, as well as
the Free Town of Frankfort, have, by their participation in
the hostile conduct of the former Diet, placed themselves
in a state of open war with Prussia. They declined the
Neutrahty as well as the AUiance repeatedly offered to them
by Prussia, even at the last moment, under the promise of
a Guarantee of the Integrity of their Territory ; they took
an active part in the war of Austria against Prussia, and
appealed to the decision of war for themselves and their
countries. This decision, according to God's decree, has
been against them. Political necessity obliges us not to
restore to them the power of government, of which they have
been deprived by the victorious advance of our army.

248 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

The aforesaid countries could, in case they maintained
tlieir independence, cause, from their geographical position,
difficulties and obstructions by a hostile or even doubtful
attitude of their Governments towards Prussian policy and
military action, far surpassing the extent of their actual
power and importance. Not from a desire of acquiring
Territory, but from a feeling of duty td protect our inherited
States fronq a recurrence of the dariger, to give a broader
and surer foundation to the national reorganisation of
Germany, the necessity arises for us to unite for ever with
our monarchy the Kingdom of Hanover, the Electorate of
Hesse, the Duchy of Nassau, and the Free Town of Frankfort.

We know very well that only a part of the people of those
States share with us the conviction of this necessity. We
respect and honour the feelings of loyalty and devotion which
bind the Inhabitants of those Countries to their Princely
House and to their Independent Pohtical Institutions, but
we trust that a lively share in the progressive development
of the National Commonweal, together with an indulgent
attention to s,pecial legal interests, will facilitate the inevit-
able transition into ei new and more extensive community.

We caD on the Houses of the Landtag to give their
constittitional sanction to the contemplated Union, and for
this purpose send them the accompanying draft law.

It will be noticed that Prussia annexed Hanover, Hesse,
&c., ' not from a desire of acquiring territory, but from a
feeling of duty,' that she did so because she feared the
obstruction and the hostility of these small countries. In
the Eeasons for the Draft Law for the Annexation of Han-
over, &c., which were appended to this document, it was
stated that the continued existence of the annexed States
was ' a permanent danger ' for Prussia, that * recent events
have shovm how great the danger of their ' independence
has been ' ! Similarly, Germany talks now of the danger
of an independent Belgium.

Two days later, on August 18, an alliance was
concluded between Prussia, 8axe-Weimar, Oldenburg,

HOW GERMANY MAKES PEACE 249

Brunswick, Liibeok, Bremen, Hamburg, &c., whereby all
the North German States were made subject to Prussia,
and whereby their troops were placed unconditionally at
Prussia's disposal. The effect of the treaty will be seen
from the following extracts :

Art. I. The Governments of Prussia, Saxe-Weimar,
Oldenburg, &c., &c., enter into an offensive and defensive
alliance for the maintenance of their independence and
integrity, and of the internal and external- security of their
States, and they enter at once for the common defence of
their possessions, which they guarantee to each other recipro-
cally by this aUiance.

Art. IV. The troops of the Allies are under the Command-
in-Chief of his Majesty the King of Prussia.

The contingents to be furnished during a war will be
regulated by special agreements.

By these stipulations all the States of North Germany
and their armies were placed at the disposal of the King
of Prussia.

The South German States promptly shared the fate
of the North German States. On August 5, the day
after Bismarck had returned to Berlin from the war, the
Chancellor invited the South German States to send to
Berlin plenipotentiaries for negotiating a peace. The
Bavarian representatives suggested that the South Gerfnan
States should negotiate jointly with Prussia, but Bismarck
preferred to handle them singly in order to break their
resistance fill the easier. He began negotiating with Wiir-
temberg. When difficulties arose he suggested that Prussia
and Wiirtemberg should guarantee one another's possessions,
and the idea of such a mutual guarantee of territory was
expanded into the proposal of concluding a defensive and
offensive alliance between the two States by the terms of
which the troops of Wiirtemberg should be placed under
the command of the King of Prussia. Wiirtemberg was ter-
rified by the superior strength of Prussia and by threatened

250 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

exactions, and so she signed simultaneously a treaty
of peace and of alliance on August 13. By similar
means Baden was induced to conclude on the identical
basis a treaty of peace and a secret treaty of alliance on
August 17, and Bavaria followed suit on August 22. The
Prusso -Bavarian treaty stated :

Art. I. A defensive and offensive alliance is hereby con-
cluded between his Majesty the King of Prussia and his
Majesty the King of Bavaria.

The High Contracting Parties mutually guarantee to
each other the integrity of the territories of their respective
countries, and bind themselves, in case of war, to put their
whole military force at the disposal of each other for that
purpose.

Art. II. His Majesty the King of Bavaria transfers for
such a case the command-in-chief of his troops to his Majesty
the King of Prussia.

Art. III. The High Contracting Parties bind themselves
to keep this Treaty secret for the present.

On October 21 the kingdom of Saxony concluded peace
with Prussia, joined the North German Federation, agreed
to reorganise her army upon the Prussian model and to
place it under command of a Prussian general.

Six weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, when
Prussia's attitude clearly indicated that she intended to
attack Austria, the far-seeing Thiers told France in a
speech delivered before the Corps Legislatif, which created
an enormous sensation at the time :

Ce qui est certain, c'est que si la guerre, je le repete, lui
est heureuse, elle s'emparera de quelques-uns des Etats alle-
mands du Nord ; et ceux dont elle ne s'emparera pas, elle lea
placera dans une diete qui sera sous son influence.

Elle aura done une partie des Allemauds sous son autoritd
directe, et I'autre, sous son autorite indirecte ; et puis on ad-
mettra I'Autriche, comme protegee, dans ce nouvel ordre de

HOW GEEMANY MAKES PEACE 251

His remarkable prophecy has come true in every
particular.

Germany's present position curiously resembles that
of Prussia in 1866. In 1914, as in 1866, the Hohenzollern
State went to war with a number of States. In going to
war the German monarch and statesmen knew that they
risked the existence of the State and of the dynasty. Still
they were once more ready to risk all for all in view of the
immensity of the advantages which a victory would bring to
them. The victory of 1866 doubled the population under the
sway of William the First and more than doubled Prussia's
armed strength and wealth. It raised Prussia to the rank
of a real Great Power and gave her the predominance in
Europe. The war of 1914, if successful, would far more
than double the population governed from Berlin, and would
give Germany the predominance throughout the world.
These were gigantic stakes. It was worth while risking
once more all for all.

Austria-Hungary has become Germany's vassal, and
Bulgaria and Turkey have become vassals of the Central
Empires. These four States have together a population
of about 150,000,000, and for all practical purposes they
form now a single political unit absolutely controlled from
Berlin. By merely preserving the status quo before the
war, and without allowing for Germany's vastly improved
strategical position by her domination of the point where
three continents meet, that country would have more than
doubled her population and armed strength. It must be
obvious to all that if peace were now concluded re-establish-
ing the status quo ante helium, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Turkey would not be able to recover their independence.
They would remain Germany's vassals politically, militarily,
and economically. It follows that a drawn war would
considerably more than double Germany's strength. If,
on the other hand, the Central Powers should be victorious
and retain their conquests and dictate a peace, Germany

252 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

would no doubt keep the lion's share. She would retain
part of Eastern France and Belgium, with together perhaps
10,000,000 inhabitants, and her annexations in the East
would increase her population still further. If Germany
should take the Baltic Provinces of Eussia and Poland and
attach these to herself, her population would be increased
from 67,000,000 to about 100,000,000. As Belgium and
Poland are the two most important industrial centres out-
side Germany on the Continent of Europe, Germany's
economic power and wealth would be more than doubled.
Poland, Belgium, and Eastern France are exceedingly rich
in coal and iron, which furnish weapons of war and muni-
tions of every kind.

Possibly Germany would, as Herr von Bethmann-HoU-
weg and other German statesmen have repeatedly declared,
re-establish the independence of Belgium and Poland under
vaguely mentioned 'guarantees,' which would safeguard
Germany from another ' aggression ' on the part of her
rapacious neighbours. The nature of these ' guarantees '
has been made known to the world through numerous
indiscretions of leading Germans who have outlined thetn
in detail. The most authorised description of these guaran-
tees is contained in the remarkable disclosures made by Mr.
Gerard, the late American Ambassador in Berlin. He has
stated in his book :

From the time when Chancellor HoUweg first spoke of
peace, I had asked him and others what the peace terms of Ger-
many were. I could never get anyone to state any definite
terms of peace. On several occasions when I asked the Chan-
cellor whether Germany were willing to withdraw from Bel-
gium he always said, ' Yes, but with guarantees.' Finally,
in January 1917, when he was again talking of peace, I said :

' What are these peace terms to which you refer continu-
ally ? Will you allow me to ask a few questions as to specific
terms of peace ? First, are the Germans willing to withdraw
from Belgium ? '

HOW GEEMANY MAKES PEACE 253

The Chancellor answered : ' Yes, but with guarantees.'

I said : ' What are these guarantees ? '

He replied : ' We must possibly have the forts of Liege
and Namur. We must have other forts and garrisons
throughout Belgium. We must have possession of the
railroad lines. We must have possession of the ports and
other means of communication. The Belgians will not be
allowed to maintain an army, but we must be allowed to
retain a large army in Belgium. We must have commercial
control of Belgium.'

I said ; ' I don't see that you have left much for the
Belgians excepting that Kiug Albert will have the right to
reside at Brussels with a guard of honour.'

And the Chancellor answered : ' We cannot allow
Belgium to be an outpost (Vorwerh) of England.'

' I do not suppose the English, on the other hand, wish it
to become an outpost of Germany,' I returned, ' especially
as Tirpitz said the coast of Elanders should be retained in
order to make war on England and America.'

I then asked : ' How about Northern France ? '

' We are wiUing to leave Northern France,' the Chancellor
responded ; ' but there must be a rectification of the frontier.'

' How about the Eastern frontier ? ' I asked him.

* We must have a very substantial rectification of our
frontier.'

' How about Eoumania ? '

' We shall leave Bulgaria to deal with Eoumania."

' How about Serbia ? '

' A very small Serbia might be allowed to exist, but that
question is for Austria. Austria must be left to do what she
wishes to Italy, and we must have indemnities from all the
countries^ and all our ships and colonies back.'

Of course ' rectification of the frontier ' is a polite term
for annexation.

The nature of the * guarantees ' demanded by Gern^any
appears clearly from the Chancellor's own words.

Before the war Germany had 67,000,000 inhabitants,
and the four States of the Central Alliance had together

254 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

about 150,000,000 people. By attaching to Germany
Belgium, Poland, the Baltic Provinces, and certain French
territories Germany's population would be increased to
about 100,000,000. Austria-Hungary, if victorious, would
probably acquire the Ukraine and parts of Eoumania and
of Serbia, which would increase the population of the Dual
Monarchy to about 80,000,000. The population of Turkey
and Bulgaria combined would, by the territories they claim,
be increased to at least 40,000,000. The population of the
four States would then be increased to at least 220,000,000,
and these would be absolutely dominated by Germany.

A greatly aggrandised Germany would not merely con-
trol her three vassal States, but would likewise endeavour
to attach to herself the smaller States aroimd the gigantic
new composite State in accordance with the views and
desires which have been expressed by many of the most
promiuent Germans. Holland, Denmark, and Switzer-
land would be the first to fall under Germany's sway.
A victorious war would therefore not merely double the
population and wealth at the disposal of Berlin, as did the
war of 1866, but would more than treble Germany's sub-
jects and armed strength.

The crude system of increasing the number of one's
subjects by the annexation of independent States is com-
pletely out of date. One can have the identical result by
incorporating States which nominally retain their indepen-
dence. Bismarck's action in 1866 and the German system
of Kartells have furnished valuable precedents. In 1866
the Prussian Government doubled the population under
its sway while preserving the nominal independence of
the minor German States. After a victory in the present
war Germany might respect the nominal independence
of Austria-Hungary, Bulgariai and Turkey, who now stand
in the same relation to Germany in which Bavaria, Wiirtem-
berg, and Baden stand to Prussia; and she might in addition
maintain the nominal independence of Belgium and Poland

HOW GEEMANY MAKES PEACE 255

as well. The latter countries would probably be given
even less real independence than is enjoyed by the ' indepen-
dent' States of Brunswick and Oldenburg. Germany's
present rulers share the view which Bismarck expressed in
his dispatch of July 9, 1866, previously quoted, that the
full control of nominally independent States is as valuable
as their absolute possession.

To all who think clearly it must be obvious that a
peace which would re-establish the ante-bellum frontiers
would firmly establish a greater Germany of more than
150,000,000 people, while a peace concluded on the basis
of a German victory would create a connected State under
Germany's control the population of which would be at
least 220,000,000. Germany would dominate the world.

CHAPTEE IX

HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR IN PEACE — HER POLICY TOWARDS
(THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1888 ^

Germany has consistently followed a twofold policy towards
the United States. Always reckoning with the possibility
of a collision with England, she has endeavoured to be on
good terms with the United States, counting upon their
support in case of a great war. At the same time, German
statesmen have seen in the Great Eepublic an economic
and political danger, and, while ostensibly maintaining ex-
cellent relations with the United States, they have stealthily
endeavoured to weaken them by various ways, and espe-
cially by creatiiig ,enmity between them and England.
In leading German circles it has been an article of faith
that the United States and England are natural enemies ;
that both countries bitterly remember the War of Indepen-
dence and the quarrels which succeeded it. It has been
an article of faith \n Germany that Canada was coveted
by all Americans ; that the existence of that great English
Dominion in North America was an ever-present cause of
friction between the two Anglo-Saxon States ; that the
Americans would take Canada as soon as England was
involved in a really serious war.

The twofold policy pursued by oflBcial Germany towards
the United States may be seen from the pronouncements of
Bismarck, the creator of modern Germany. At every oppor-

1 From the Fortnightly Seview, Januaiy 1916.
256

POLICY TOWARDS UNITED STATES 257

tunity Bismarck showed sympathy to America and flattered
American sentiment. However, although he frequently pub-
licly stated that there was no point of difference between
the German Empire and the United States, he combated
secretly the Americans and their Monroe doctrine. On
March 13, 1884, Bismarck stated in the Reichstag :

Frederick the Great was the first European monarch
who entered upon closer relations with the United States.
Since then good relations between Prussia and America
have become a Prussian heritage which the German Empire
has taken over. Since the time when I began conducting
the foreign affairs of Prussia and of Germany, I have un-
ceasingly endeavoured to cultivate our relations with the
United States. ... I think I may say that since the time
when I entered into the Cabinet up to the present day nothing
has happened which was likely to disturb the cordiality of
German- American relations. Hence, , I think they are at
the present day as friendly and as intimate as they were
at the time when I entered the Government.

On July 8, 1890, that great statesman, addressing a
deputation of New York citizens, said :

As a Minister of Prussia, and later on of Germany, en-
trusted with the conduct of national foreign policy, I have
always endeavoured to maintain those friendly relationB
with the North American Republic of which the great King,
Frederick II, laid the foundation more than a hundred years
ago by being the first ruler who recognised their indepen-
dence. The friendly relations existing between Germany
and the United States are a legacy of Frederick the Great,
which has been highly valued ever since. Germany and the
United States belong to that category of States which happily
have no cause to bear envy to one another.

The views publicly uttered by Bismarck relating to
the United States were most satisfactory to all Americans.
However, the Iron Chancellor secretly endeavoured to
antagonise American policy. In 1913 Herr Hermann

258 THE FOUNDATIONS 0^ GEEMANY

Hofmann, the former editor of the Hamburger Nachrich-
ten, brought out his reminiscences of Prince Bismarck.
They are particularly valuable, because the Prince published,
after his dismissal, his political views in the Hamhurger
Nachrichten in numerous articles, and Herr Hofmann
acted as an intermediary, standing in constant relation
with the aged statesman. Herr Hofmann reprinted in
his Memoirs the articles of which Prince Bismarck was
the author, and these betray unmistakably their origin by
their marked and vigorous style. On February 9, 1896,
the Prince caused the following article on the Monroe
doctrine to be published in the Hamburger Nachrichten :

The Moneoe Dootbinb

Some German newspapers continue discussing the so-
called ' Monroe doctrine,' in consequence of the events
which have taken place in South America. We are of
opinion that that doctrine, and the way in which it is now
advanced by the American Eepublic, is an incredible im-
pertinence (eine unglaubliche Unverschdmtheit) towards the
rest of the world. The Monroe doctrine is merely an act
of violence, based upon great strength, towards all American
States and towards those European States which possess
interests in America. If we desire to state a European'
doctrine similar to that overweening American doctrine,
we must imagine that some European State, let us say
France or Eussia, should claim that it would not allow any
alteration of the frontiers of Europe to take place, except
with its consent, or we must imagine that some preponderant
Asiatic Power, such as Eussia or England, should advance
the pretension that it would not allow a change in Asia's
political relations, except with its permission ! We are under
the impression that the great -^fealth which the American
soil has furnished to its inhabitants has caused part of the
American legislators to over-estimate their own rights and
to under-estimate at the same time the right to indepen-
dence possessed by the other American Powers and by the
European Powers as well.

POLICY TOWARDS UNITED STATES 259

In Bismarck's time and after his dismissal, Germany,
while maintaining ostensibly the most friendly and inti-
mate relations with the United States, has repeatedly
endeavoured to oppose and damage America's interests.
More than once has she been successful, and more than
once has (Jermany's anti- American policy led to dangerous
friction between the two States.

The first quarrel between Germany and the United
States occurred during the time when Bismarck was still
in office. It took place in 1888 in connection with the
Samoa Islands, upon the possession of which the United
States and Germany possessed certain claims. In view
of the great strategical importance of these islands, which
dominate one of the great American trade routes, the United
States had undoubtedly the stronger claim upon their
possession. The friction between Germany and the United
States about Samoa became so acute that both Powers
sent fleets there. At the most critical moment a sudden
storm, destroyed both fleets, and then matters were patched
up by mutual agreement.

Ten years later, in 1898, the Spanish-American War
broke out. The United States discovered that all Conti-
nental Europe sympathised strongly with Spain. The
entire Continental Press, and the entire German Press too,
violently attacked America's policy, and an attempt was
made to create a pan-European combination for restrain-
ing the United States. However, the action of the Conti-
nental Powers was foiled by Great Britain supporting
America's policy. Although Germany had taken a promi-
nent part in the attempt of bringing about European inter-
vention, German diplomacy endeavoured to explain that
England had striven to create a European combination
hostile to the United States, and that Germany's loyalty
to America had prevented its success.

During the Spanish- American War Germany endea-
voured to acquire the Phihppines. While other countries

260 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

had sent only a few ships to the Philippine Islands, Ger-
many had, without any obvious reason, dispatched there her
Pacific Squadron — a force equal to that commanded by
Admiral Dewey. The German Admiral Diedrichs endea-
voured to foil Admiral Dewey's operations, and the relations
between the German and American fleets became so strained
that a battle between the two was avoided only by the
intervention of the English commander, who backed up
his American colleague.

In 1901 Germany induced England and Italy to intervene
jointly in Venezuela. Ostensibly, the purpose of the joint
naval action was to bring pressure to bear upon that country
with a view to obtaining satisfaction regarding certain
economic claims advanced by these three Powers which
the Venezuelans had disregarded. Ostensibly, the purpose
of the joint expedition of these three European Great Powers
on the American continent, which created much excite-
. ment in the United States and in England, was purely
economic. On December 11, 1901, Germany declared
that in her proposed measures against Venezuela she had
' no purpose or intention to make even the smallest acquisi-
tion of territory on the South American continent, or the
islands adjacent.' That statement was by no means an
acknowledgment of the Monroe doctrine. With regard to
it, Mr. Archibald Gary Coolidge, the eminent professor at
Harvard University, wrote in his excellent book, ' The
United States as a World Power ' : ' This statement has
been regarded as an acknowledgment of the principle (the
Monroe doctrine), but it was nothing but a statement of
intentions on a particular occasion, and in no way binding
for the future.' Commenting on Germany's American
policy, Professor Coolidge wrote, not without cause:
' Eightly or wrongly, the Americans were convinced that
Germany was " trying it on " to test the Monroe doctrine,
and for greater security had persuaded the other two Powers
to join her. The loud and almost universal condemnation

POLICY TOWAEDS UNITED STATES 261

by the English people and Press of the action of their
Government prevented resentment against England, and
since Italy scarcely attracted attention, all the vials of
American wrath were poured on Germany. For a while
the situation was somewhat critical.'

At the time when English statesmen were considering
withdrawing from the Venezuela expedition, upon which they
had entered without sufficient consideration, largely owing
to the German Emperor's personal persuasion, I had a long
conversation with a very eminent German diplomat, who
explained to me that England's withdrawal would be a
breach of faith towards Germany. If England and Germany
settled the Venezuela affair without taking overmuch notice
of America's protests, the Monroe doctrine would be dead,
and the United States would observe an attitude of becoming
modesty towards other countries for at least thirty years. —
Germany probably intended to use the Venezuela imbroglio
for creating enmity between the two Anglo-Saxon nations.
She might have suddenly withdrawn from Venezuela after
having deeply committed Great Britain, or might even have
gone a step further by siding at the critical moment with
America against England.

The fact that the best-informed Germans hopefully
reckoned upon setting England against America, or America
against England, is borne out by numerous pronounce-
ments and writings of most eminent Germans, and especially
by those of General von Bernhardi, who, in his writings,
contemplates the twofold possibility of either fighting the
United States with the help of Great Britain, or Great
Britain with the help of the United States.

Germany's diplomatic policy was supported by her
Press policy towards the United States.

The German Government attaches great value to public
opinion. Practically the entire German Press stands under
Government influence, and the entire non-Socialist Press
of Germany may bo said to be edited by the German Govern-

262 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

ment. Germany has for many years endeavoured to secure
some kind of control over public opinion abroad* Even in
the United States, which are supposed to have the freest
Press, the German Government has exerted a consider-
able influence over public opinion in curious ways, with
which most diplomats who have lived in that country are
acquainted.

In 1907, Mr. Emil Witte, a former Press attache at the
German Embassy in Washington, published at Leipzig a
book on his experiences at the Washington Embassy. For
some reason or other, that book, which contains disclosures
most damaging to the Gerjnan Government, has remained
practically unknown. It is so scarce a book that it seems
possible that the German Government bought up and des-
troyed all the copies it could lay hands on.

The following extracts from Mr. Witte's disclosures
throw a powerful light upon Germany's diplomatic methods,
and upon her American policy. Mr. Witte was, in spring
1898, one of the editors of the Deutsche Zeitung of Vienna.
At that time the Spanish- American War broke out, and
practically the whole of the German and Austrian Press
took the part of Spain and violently attacked the United
States in accordance with official directions. Mr. Witte
was apparently the only editor who, in a leadmg article,
advocated the cause of the United States. His article,
which appeared in the Deutsche Zeitung on April 23,
1898, was cabled in full to America, and led to a warmly
worded letter of gratitude by the American representative
in Vienna. As Mr. Witte thought that the German and
Austrian Press adopted so violent an anti- American attitude
because German editors were insufficiently acquainted with
American affairs, he determined to go to America and found
there a Press agency for the information of the German and
Austrian Press. He was prompted by the wish to serve Ger-
man interests, and as an old German- American journalist
he considered himself well qualified for acting in the way

POLICY TOWAEDS UNITED STATES 268

intended. However, the German Government apparently
did not wish the German and Austrian Press to be informed
from an independent quarter. The semi-official Wolff
Agency made use of his idea, and when Mr. Witte arrived
in America he found himself forestalled. Anxious to find
employment, he approached the German Ambassador in
Washington, and, compelled by necessity, became a confi-
dential employee attached to the Embassy. Mr. Witte
described his position as follows :

At that time Busch's Memoirs were published in London.
They were the sensation of the day. Wherever people met
they discussed the revelations of Bismarck's Press man.
I became an attache for Press affairs to the German Embassy
at Washington and received my income from the secret
Government Fund in Berlin in respect of services which did
not very much differ from those which the late Moritz
Busch rendered to the great German Chancellor.

I now give some extracts from Mr Witte's book. It is
entitled 'Experiences at a German Embassy: Ten Years
of German-American Diplomacy, by Emil Witte, late
Councillor of Legation, Leipzig, 1907 ' :

. . . The public learns from these pages for the first
time the truth, and the whole truth, about German- American
relations, the true state of which has been disguised and
misrepresented on both sides of the ocean by a powerful
and corrupt Press. . . .

' These Americans are, after all, incredibly simple. They
swallow any bait greedily as long as it is sufficiently sugared
and placed before them with a friendly smile.' I heard this
phrase frequently from an intimate friend of Herr von Hol-
leben, the German Ambassador at Washington, at the time
when I had the honour to be attached to the German
Embassy at Washington in order to attend to Press matters.
That phrase is characteristic of the view which prevailed
among German diplomats towards the statesmen of the New'
World. These views have led to very gross errors. Aftar

264 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

a number of serious incidents, such as the Dewey-Diedrichs
episode in the Bay of Manila, the unfortunate Samoa affair,
the Coghlan affair, and the Venezuela imbroglio,, the diplo-
mats at Berlin suddenly remembered the old historic friend-
ship which united Prussia and the United States since the
time of Frederick the Great, and they assured the Ameri-
cans that the great Eepublic possessed no more faithful
and sincere friend than the German Emperor. In order
to give a practical demonstration of that historical friend-
ship to the world in general and to the United States
in particular, the American journey of Prince Henry was
announced. . . .

The Prince arrived, and he convinced himself and was
able to report to his Imperial brother that he was in a country
where one-third of the population was of German birth or
of German descent, and was firmly resolved to stand faith-
fully at Germany's side under all circumstances. He con-
vinced himself of the truth of the statement, which Dr. von
HoUeben had made to a journalist at a time when Ger-
man-American relations were in a critical state, that a war
between Germany and the United States would assume the
character of a civil war.

Dr. A. von Mumm admitted to me at Washington that
Germany was responsible for the unhappy Dewey-Diedrichs
incident at Manila.

The anti-German attitude of the American Press which
was noticeable at the time when I entered upon my duties
(January 1899) was not unjustified. I was selected, as
Press attache to the German Embassy in America, to make
up for the sins which the German Press had committed in
its blind desire to please the men at the Wilhelmstrasse.

When I entered upon my duties, I received the general
instruction td do everything in my power to silence the
journals hostile to Germany, and to convert them from
determined enemies of Germany into friends and admirers
of the Emperor, Besides, it was my duty to create the belief
in American pubhc opinion that the true enemy of the
•United States was not Germany, but England. . . . Thus
I began my work. The German Ambassador was particii-

POLICY TOWAEDS UNITED STATES 265

larly annoyed by the personal attacks which he received
nearly every day from three Washington dailies. One of
the first ta^s which I received from his Excellency was to
try my power of persuasion on their editors with a view to
silencing them. I succeeded largely, and I owed my success
in part to the friendly exertions of Count M. G. Seckendorff,
a younger brother of the former Court Marshal of the Em-
press Frederick, who, during many years, was at the head of
the Washington oflBce of the influential New Yorh Tribune.
Owing to his personality, his connections, and his important
position in the American Press, he enjoyed the unlimited
confidence of the American authorities at Washington. He
was a personal friend of Dr. von HoUeben, and had rendered
him many a service in the Press before I entered upon my
duties, and he assisted me in every way, as I acknowledge
with gratitude.

In order to ensure the success of my mission, it was of the
greatest importance that the true character of my relations
with the German Embassy should remain a strict secret.
In consequence of Herr von Sternburg's suggestion, the
Ambassador empowered me to assume the part of a Special
Correspondent of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,
and in that character I had intercourse with the American
journahsts whose acquaintance I sought by the Ambassador's
orders. Count Seckendorff, of the New York Tribune, knew
of the secret, and gave me letters of introduction to the
editors of the Washington Evening Star and the Washing^
ton Post, with whom he was personally acquainted. In
these letters he introduced me as Special Correspondent of
the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and pleaded that I
should be given opportunity to correct in their journals the
frequently erroneous views of the editors regarding Ger-
many's policy. My reception by Mr. Wilkins, the proprietor
of the Washington Post, was not viary encouraging, because of
his experiences in Germany. In Berlin, and in other German
towns, German officers had demonstratively gone away from
his table when they heard that he was an American. I
was more successful with Mr. Noyes, of the Washington
Evening Star.

' 266 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

I had a very friendly reception by Mr. Goldwin West,
the editor of the WashmgUm Times. That journal, which
hitherto had been one of the most determined opponents of
the German Ambassador, published on the morning following
my visit an article in which the necessity of preserving and
cultivating friendly relations between the United States and
Germany was advocated with the greatest zeal. I succeeded
in ^arranging a meeting between Mr. West and Herr von
HoUeben, which was extremely satisfactory to both. Later
on, Mr. West confided to me that since that meeting, Hprr
von Sternburg was a frequent and welcome midnight visitor
in the editorial sanctum of the Washington Times.

As I am speaking of the local Press of Washington, I
might give an amusing anecdote showing how the German
Ambassador was taken advantage of by a smart American.
The facts given in these pages make it clear how great a
weight Herr von HoUeben would attach to obtaining so
great an influence upon a Washington daily that it would
in all circumstances, and for any purpose, be at his absolute
disposal. Therefore, he eagerly grasped the opportunity
when he was approached by a journalist, Mr. W. E. Vaughan,
who came to him with an introduction frOm a Senator from
the West, and who offered to bring out a daily in Washing-
ton in which as many columns as he desired would be at the
Ambassador's disposal. As he did not possess sufficient
capital for starting the enterprise, he confidently hoped
that the Ambassador would assist him. On February 22,
1899, there was really published the first number of Unck
Sam's American Eagle, adorned with Mr. Vaughan's name
as publisher and editor. However, Herr von HoUeben was
bitterly disappointed when he discovered that that journal
was not a daily, as he had been promised, but quite an un-
important weekly, which was filled with cheap, syndicated
articles furnished in stereotype plate. At the same time,
one must confess that Mr. Vaughan took the greatest trouble
to retain the Ambassador's goodwiU by his articles. In
long periods he announced that Uncle Sam's American
Eagle was determinedly opposed to America concluding an
alliance with any foreign Power, the unnamed foreign Power

POLICY TOWAEDS UNITED STATES 267

being, of course, England, and that it wotdd with energy
advocate friendship with Germany. I believe that Herr von
Holleben felt soon the attentions shown to him by Uncle
Sam's American Eagle as a burden, for nearly every week
Mr. Vaughan asked his Excellency's permission to print a
special edition of his paper for the use of the Embassy.
Although Mr. Kinne, the Chancellor of the Embassy, was
lavish in distributing gratis copies of that journal, the remain-
ing stock was so great that it sufiBced to fulfil ^\l the require-
ments of the whole Embassy for paper during many years.

The attacks of the New York Sun were a constant source
of anger for the Ambassador, and one day I received orders
to go to New York and see Mr. Laffan. I told Mr. Laffan :
' In my quality of Special Correspondent of the Norddevtsche
Allgemeine Zeitung, I have repeatedly been able to discuss
the attitude Jof the New York Sun towards Germany with
Herr von Holleben, the German Ambassador. As he is one
of the most sincere admirers of all the great features which are
characteristic of the Sun, he deplores most sincerely that
your paper is an opponent of Germany's policy, and he is
earnestly desirous to convince you of Germany's sincere
friendship for the United States. I do not ask anything
from you except that your paper should adopt an impartial
attitude.' Mr. Laffan listened to me with attention, and
assured me that I had not appealed to him in vain, that the
attacks of the Sun upon the German Ambassador should
cease.

The Ambassador was delighted when I returned to
Washington and told him of the success of my journey.
He told me : ' Now, we must see whether the rascal keeps
his word. Sit down and write an article and send it to the
New York Sun. If it appears, I will believe in the sincerity
of Mr. Laffan's assurances.' I wrote the desired article,
and it appeared the next morning in a prominent position
on the leader page, where it filled a whole column. It was
signed with my initials, and the editor had given it a send-off
with some friendly words. When the Ambassador saw the
New York Sun, he said : ' It seems that we have found the
right man in Mr. Witte, for he has succeeded in doing what

268 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

no one has been able to do before him in converting the
New York Sun.'

Those who wish to understand the real attitude of Ger-
man diplomacy in the United States during the time follow-
ing the Spanish-American War will find the secret key
in Germany's hostility towards and envy of England. On
February 13 I received the following letter from Mr. A.
Kinne, the Chancellor of the Embassy :

' Dear Mr. Witte, I enclose, in accordance with orders
received, an article of the Washington Post of July 3,
1898. Kindly make the best possible use of it. — I am,
yours very truly, A. Kinne.'

The article in question treated ' Germany's Position
during the Spanish- American War,' and was written by Mr.
Fred P. Schrader, a German- American journalist. Its
contents are beyond the capacity of a correspondent of the
Western journals, and every line betrays its inspired origia.
It is too lengthy to be quoted in full, but the following
passages may be of interest : ^ —

' ... All those who are acquainted with the present
position of international affairs are aware that the German
Government observes an attitude of absolute neutrality in
the Spanish-American War, and that its neutrality is miti-
gated by its very friendly feelings towards the United
States. Hencej hitherto no Germian ships have been dis-
covered supplying the Spanish squadron with coal, or
strengthening America's enemies with artillerists. Never-
theless, the truth has been systematically perverted for diplo-
matic reasons, which are fully understood at Washington.

' As Secretary Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne, and other
equally pronainent men have openly admitted, England is
forced to conclude an Alliance with another Power, and she
has made to the German Government surprising offers in
order to conclude toith Germany an alliance directed' against
Bussia. We have been told that among the various pro-
posals made to Germany, there was also one according to
which Germany was to be given a free hand for enlarging her

' The quotation from the Washington Post is retranilated from the
Qaiman, as th« tranilatoi had bo aocess to tho original.-

POLICY TOWAEDS UNITED STATES 269

colonial possessions under the shelter of a British guarantee.
In fact, Germany was offered colonial concessions, the exact
nature of which has hitherto not become known.

' For reasons best known to the German Government,
these offers were declined. Great Britain was left in hei
isolation, while Germany openly strove to bring about more
intimate relations with Eussia and Prance. All the attempts
which were made with the object of bringing about an
estrangement between the United States and the German
Imperial Government date from that period.

' The diplomats at Washington are of opinion that sys-
tematical endeavours were made at that critical period to
make Germany suspected, with the object of bringing about
an intolerable position which would induce one side or the
other to commit some rash act which would bring about a
German- American war. In case of such a war Great Britain
would be able either to offer to the United States an aUiance
against Germany, or to Germany an alliance against the
United States. However, to Great Britain an alliance with
a strong land Power such as Germany, which is Eussia's
neighbour and can immediately attack that country, is
more important than an aUiance with the United States.
In all probabihty, England would therefore address her offer
in the first place to the German Emperor, and England's
enthusiasm for her blood relations would as quickly be
changed in favour of a rapprochement with Germany, as her
attitude, friendly to Spain, was changed in favour of the
United States at the beginning of the Spanish-American
War.

' Neither the British Prime Minister, nor the Queen,
have spoken in favour of the United States. Only Angli-
cised newspaper correspondents abroad, such as Austin
Dobson and Eobert Barr, have advocated the creation of
an Anglo-American brotherhood. Secretary Chamberlain
has said something about the flags of the two countries
supporting one another. However, the matter has not
advanced far enough to bind the British Government to a
certain course of policy. At a critical moment it can quite
decently withdraw and make common cause with the German

270 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Emperor after having brought about a war between Germany
and the United States.'

This article was not written by a simple newspaper corre-
spondent such as Mr. Fred F. Schrader, but by the Chief of
the German Embassy. He is the authority for the state-
ment that at the beginning of the Spanish-American War,
England made to the German Government ' surprising offers
in order to conclude with Germany an alhance directed
against Eussia,' that Great Britain had given Germany a
free hand for enlarging her colonial possessions under the
shelter of a British guarantee, and had in addition offered
further colonial concessions to Germany.

The secret differences between Germany and England
found open expression during the Samoa troubles. [In the
following pages the author describes the intrigues whereby
Germany endeavoured to make mischief between England
and the United States during the Samoa negotiations. These
intrigues are at present perhaps of little interest.]

At the time of my presence in Washington there was the
danger of a Customs war between the United States and
Germany. By his reports to the authorities in Berlin, Herr
von Holleben endeavoured to create the impression that a
German- American Customs war would not last long, and that
Germany would be victorious. He endeavoured to create
the same impression in the United States, and to impress
public opinion in that way with the co-operation of Mr.
James Howard Gore, Professor of the Columbia University
at Washington. This gentleman published in The Forum,
an American monthly, a lengthy article on the commercial
relations between the United States and Germany, and he
endeavoiu:ed to prove in it that the United States had every
reason to avoid a Customs war with Germany. As the
arguments and figures given seemed strangely familiar to
me, I made inquiries, which showed that they were the
identical arguments and figures which were habitually
employed by the German Ambassador and his secretaries.
I also discovered that the Professor had crossed with the
Ambassador on the same steamer to Europe. Of course,
we cannot reproach the editor of The Forum for having pub-

POLICY TOWAEDS UNITED STATES 271

lished Professor Gore's article. He did it undoubtedly in
good faith, and in the hope of doing a service to the United
States. At the same time this incident shows that even the
nominally most independent American monthlies are liable
to be secretly influenced by European Governments, and
that public opinion in the United States, as elsewhere, is
led by the nose.

It is not generally known that Germany owes the posses-
sion of the Caroline Islands chiefly to the exertjons of Baron
Speck von Sternburg, who represented Herr von HoUeben
during his leave of absence. Owing to his influence with his
good friend Eoosevelt, he succeeded in obtaining them for
Germany. Scarcely had he achieved this difficult task when
Herr von HoUeben returned from his holiday, and im-
mediately took credit for the acquisition made in his reports
to the German Foreign Office. . . . Germany would like, of
course, to have acquired the Philippine Islands in addition
to the Caroline Islands. She has officially and semi-offi-
cially again and again denied that the German Govern-
ment had had any intention to acquire Manila and the
Philippines. However, I myself can be a witness to the
fact that a secret connection existed between the Phillip-
pines and the Foreign Office in Berlin. Professor Blumen-
tritt, who lived in the neighbourhood of Prague, and who
advocated the freedom of the revolting natives, formed the
connecting link. Only a few days before German interests
in the Philippine Islands were placed under American pro-
tection, I received an official report, written by Professor
Blumentritt, on the revolting natives, for the use of Prince,
then Count, Biilow, which I was to translate and to utilise
in the United States Press. That report contained the most
secret details as to the resources and reserves of the Philip-
pines, as to their armament and equipment, as to their
store of ammunition and food, as to the character of their
leaders, &c. The report concluded with a prophecy that
the Americans would never succeed in mastering the Philip-
piaoes, who would gladly place themselves under a German
Protectorate. This remark explains in part the attention
which the German Admiral von Diedrichs paid to Admiral

272 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Dewey and the American fleet. When I expressed my
surprise that at a time when Germany asked the "^United
States to protect her interests in the Philippine Islands
an article based on that information should be circulated in
■ the United States, I received the short but significant reply :
' We must not allow the United States to become too strong.'

The German Ambassador played a very delicate and
dangerous part in the German-American movement. Mr.
John J. Lentz, of Columbus, Ohio, a member of Congress,
told me : * Please tell the Ambassador to keep the Germdn-
American movement 'progressing with energy.' The Ambas-
sador repHed, when I gave him the message, that ' it was not
unexpected.' I had met Mr. Lentz previously in the house
of Herr von Sternburg, and I met him frequently at the
Embassy. As he was a member of the Committee for Mili-
tary Affairs, and was therefore acquainted with the most
secret information, his intercourse with us was not approved
of by American people. Mr. Lentz was an orator and a
firebrand, and he became generally known as organiser of
the German-American indignation meetings which took
place in the large towns in the West and East, and at which
American citizens of German birth or German descent were
requested to fight at election time every American adminis-
tration unfriendly to Germany.

Herr von Holleben played a very dangerous game, and
in the end it cost him his position.

Formerly official Germany and its representatives in the
United States never took any notice of the German-Ameri-
cans. With the outbreak of the Spanish-American War,
things suddenly changed. The formerly despised 'rene-
gades ' became the object of innumerable attentions on the
part of the Emperor and his Ambassador. Everywhere m
the United States German Veteran Societies were formed,
which, by close interconnection, became an organisation of
great power.
' The Emperor gave colours to many of these societies,
and these were handed over by the Ambassador in person,
accompanied by the most imposing ceremonies. Numerous
I decorations and distinctions were bestowed upon German-

POLICY TOWAEDS UNITED STATES 273

American citizens who had acquired merit in promoting the
German-American movement. . . .

The surprising change of policy which Berlin adopted
towards the formerly so much despised German- American
can easily be explained. When the anti-German current in
the United States seemed to bring the possibility of war with
Germany in sight, intriguing German-American politicians
and University professors drew Herr von HoUeben's atten-
tion to the fact that he could easiest force President McKinley
and his administration to follow a poUcy friendly to Germany
and hostile to England by making use of the milKons of
German-American voters.

I arrived in Milwaukee, the most strongly German town
in the United States, and met there the editor of the Germania
on the very day when that paper had published a paean of
praise of Herr von Holleben. I told the editor, Herr Bmil
von Schleinitz, the reasons why I could not agree with his
article. The editor admitted the justice of my arguments,
and told me verbally : ' Last year, when I was in Berlin, I
had conversations with the Imperial Chancellor and the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Money and decora-
tions were offered to me, and I was to be received by the
Emperor. However, the audience did not take place, as
the Emperor's plans were changed at the last moment.*
Herr von Schleinitz then asked me to tell him what I knew ,
about Germany's readiness for war in America. I replied :
' Germany is absolutely ready for such an event. That is,
after all, necessary.' Herr von Schleinitz replied : * I know
all this, and I know more. I have spoken with ofi&cers in
high positions in Berlin, and I have heard surprising things.
Germany reckons very strongly upon the support of Germans
living im the Western States.' Herr von Schleinitz and I
looked at one another. We knew !

Professor Schonfield, of the Columbia University at
Washington, was a constant visitor at my house, and never
tired of advocating the foundation of a great monthly review
published in the English language, which was to be the organ
of all friends of Germany in America, and which was at
all times to be a reliable instrument in the hands of the

274 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

German Ambassador for influencing public opinion in the
United States. I had much sympathy for the project, and
at last wrested from Herr von Holleben the promise to re-
commend it in Berlia. ' However,' the Ambassador added,
' the first number of the projected review must be got ready
iu manuscript, so that I can enclose it together with my
report to the Foreign Office. When I was Ambassador in
Japan I acted in the same way, sending the first number
of a new Japanese monthly in manuscript to Berlin, and,
by doing so, obtained a success.'

r Professor Schonfield exclaimed, ' They ought to have
given me the post of Professor Miinsterberg. He receives
i $5000 from Harvard and as much from Berlin. I should
\ not demand any more ! '

On March 15 the New York American published a letter
from Mr. H. A. Buck, an engineer who had formerly lived in
Berlin, and who had heard from officers in an exalted position
moving in the entourage of the Emperor that the Gerrqiaa
Ambassador, Herr von Holleben, and Professor Miinsterberg
had created a widely-spread organisation of espionage in
the United States. Professor Miinsterberg had been sent to
America by direct command of the Emperor, in order to
mislead the public of the United States with regard to
Germany's true poUcy towards America.

At a time when the New Yorker Stoats Zeitung displeased
the German Ambassador, Professor Hugo Miinsterberg, of
Harvard University, dealt with it. In several important
journals statements based upon information derived ' from
the best sources ' appeared, according to which the founda-
tion of a new large daily in New York was projected. That
journal was to appeal to all Germans in New York who had
become dissatisfied with the unending quarrels and intrigues,
and with the political faithlessness of the New Yorker Stmts
Zeitung. Besides, the projected journal would prove intel-
lectually and technically superior to the /Stoats Zeitung.
Money would be no object. The new journal would dispose
of unlimited funds, the Treasury of the German Empire.
Mr. Bemhard Bidder is a German-American self-made
man, who began life as an office-boy and became the editor

POLICY TOWAEDS UNITED STATES 275

and part proprietor of the New Yorker Stoats Zeitung. He
became frightened ! After all, the report might be correct,
and if, as was rumoured, Professor Hugo Munsterberg him-
self should become the editor of the new daily, the Stoats
Zeitung would be ruined. Herr Eidder, therefore, thought
it better to give way. A reconciliation dinner took place,
and the new German daily did not appear.

The vast majority of the German newspapers appearing
in the United States could not conveniently exist if they did
not save the wages of journalists and compositors by relying
upon the factories which produce stereotyped matter. The
producers of the stereotyped matter which is sent out to the
German- American papers can make a living only by copying
matter which has appeared in the German and Austrian
journals and periodicals. They reprint part of their contents,
cast plates, and sell these at a very low price to the German-
American Press. The New Yorker Stoats Zeitung asserts
that it is the only German newspaper in America which pays
its contributors for belletristical contributions, but its pay-
ments are more than modest. The very difficult struggle
for existence forces the German-American newspapers to
play a very humiliating part. At election time they usually
sit on the fence with one leg in the Eepublican and the other
in the Democratic camp, waiting for the development of
things. In America, politics are, after all, a business. The
Anglo-American newspapers may indulge in the luxury of
a political conviction. The German-American newspapers
cannot afford to do likewise. In view of the venality of the
German-American Press, it is only natural that German-
Americans are considered by both parties only as voting
cattle, and that they play no part in political life.

It cannot be denied that the Germans living in America
are pohtically indifferent, and both American parties endea-
vour to make use of that indifference. The ' Furor Teutoni-
cus ' of the German- American is aroused only if anyone dares
to touch his most sacred interest — his beer. Then he
becomes savage, and he brings about at the poll the defeat
of the candidate in whom he sees an enemy of his personal
liberty — of the liberty to drink as much beer as he likes, as

276 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

often and as long as he likes, on all days, Sunday includedi
Interference with the public-houses .led to the rejection of
Mr. Seth Low.

The German churches throughout the United States,
which were well frequented, now stand empty during divine
service, and most preachers are forced to preach in English,
because the younger generation of German-Americans faows
only Enghsh. The only thing which could help Germanism
in America, which would bring new blood to the country;
would be an unfortunate war on Germany's part or a German
revolution.

On the German Day, October 6, 1901, Germanism in the
United States was organised at Philadelphia and Pennsyl-
vania. On that date the ' Deutsch-Amerikanische National-
bund der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika ' was founded.
According to its constitution, it endeavours to awaken
among the American population of German descent a feeling
of unity, to organise it for the purpose of energetically pro-
tecting the common interests of Germanism, &c.

It should be of interest to consider the activity of the
German Bund. It agitated energetically with the object of
inducing the Government of the United States to intervene
in the war between England and the Boers. In support of
this agitation it handed to Congress a petition which weighed
more than four hundred pounds, and which was more than
five miles long.

An organisation, similar in character and scope to that
representing all German-Americans, is the ' Centralverband
Deutscher Veteranen und Kriegerbunde Nord-Amerikas,'
the Central Society of German Veterans and Soldier Societies
of North America. The principles and aims of that society
are similar to that of the parent society. ...

Without doubting for a moment the often-asserted loyalty
to the United States expressed by the members of the German
Soldiers' Societies in the United States, and without dwelling
on the reasons why they have been officially distinguished
by the German Government by sending them flags, decora-
tions, gracious letters, &c., it must be frankly stated that fe
relations between official Germany and the emigrant subjects

POLICY TOWAEDS UNITED STATES 277

of the Emperor, wJiether they have become citizens of the Bepublic
or not, may lead to serious com/plications between Germamy
and the United States, and to unforeseen incidents which at any
moment may involve both Powers in serious difficulty. . . .

In handing over the first colours bestowed on behalf of
the Emperor William II to the Military Society of Chicago,
the German Ambassador, Dr. von HoUeben, said : ' Greetings
from the German Emperor ! That is the cry with which
I come before you. His Majesty, my most gracious master,
has ordered me to hand to you to-day the colour which
has been desired by you so strongly and for so long. The
colour is a token of his Majesty's graciousness and of the
approval with which the German Emperor remembers in
love and friendship those who have served in the German
Army and Navy, and those who have fought and bled
for the Patherknd. This colour is to be the symbol
of German faithfulness, German manliness, and German
mihtary honour. His Majesty asks you to accept the colour
as a token of that unity which should prevail among all
German soldiers,, to act also abroad in accordance with the
sentiments of German loyalty and German sense of duty,
and to take for your maxim the word of that great German,
Bismarck : " We Germans fear God, but nothing else in the
world ! " Now let the colour flutter in the wind. In this
moment of enthusiasm, let us all sound the cry that is now
on the hps of every old German soldier : " His Majesty,
German Emperor, William II. Hurrah ! Hurrah ! Hurrah ! " '

The wooing of the formerly despised German renegades
in the United States by the German Empire and its official
representatives in America, since the Spanish-American
War, must seem all the stranger to the spectators, and
especially to Anglo-Americans, as that policy is directly
opposed to the policy which the German Government pursues
in Germany towards men of non-German language. What
would happen if the King of Denmark or the President of the
French Kepublic should send to the former citizens of
Denmark in Schleswig-Holsteia, and of France in Alsace-
Lorraine, through their official representatives, colours with
inciting inscriptions, or if Danes or Frenchmen dwelling

278 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

ia Germany, and remembering regretfully the old reghm,
should send across the German frontier telegrams assuring
their former rulers of their undying faithfulness and loyalty ?
What would happen if the Poles living in Berlia should
march in procession through the streets carrying national
banners and the portraits of their national heroes, singing
Polish national songs ? In America dwell also Danes, French-
men, and Poles, who are good citizens of the Eepublic, who
thirst for vengeance against the German Empire, and who
do not fail at every opportunity to point out how strangely
Germany's policy in America contrasts with Germany's
policy in Germany.

One cannot be surprised if the Government at Washing-
ton is becoming somewhat nervous and beheves that possibly
there is a German league which, in the event of a war between
Germany and the United States, would aim at creating
an independent federation of the largely German States of
the Middle West of America, involving the United States
in a civil war. Herr von HoUeben has pointed out that
possibility by telling a lady interviewer, Mrs. Grace A.
Downing, laying stress upon his words, that a war between
the United States and Germany would bear the character
of a civil war.

CHAPTEE X

THE INFLUENCE OF MACHIAVBLLI UPON GEBMAN
STATBCEAFT ^

Thinkebs and writers are fond of tracing great events to
their ultimate source. Some have told us that William II
began the present war in the desire to emulate Louis XIV
or Napoleon I, and have drawn laborious parallels be-
tween the character of these French rulers and the German
Emperor. Some have blamed for the war men like Clause-
witz, Nietzsche, Treitschke, Bernhardi, and the German
professors in general, whose aggressive teachings have un-
doubtedly greatly inflamed public opinion. The policy
of nations and of powerful rulers is influenced partly by
precedents, partly by certain doctrines. The precedents
were furnished to the German Government and people not
by the great rulers of Prance, but by the most successful
Prussian sovereigns, by Frederick William, the Great Elector,
and by Frederick the Great. The German philosophers of
war have merely provided a scientific cloak for these men,
and have extolled their ambition, brutality, faithlessness,
and treachery as virtues, and have embodied them in a
system. The German professors and writers have been
commentators, not originators. If we wish to discover
the doctrinal source of German unscrupulousness, ruthless-
ness, and barbarity, we must go back four centuries to the
time of Machiavelli, for the great Florentine is undoubtedly

• From the I'ortnightly Beview, June 1917.
279

280 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEBMANY

the father of Pmsso-German statecraft. Machiavelli's works
have been widely read by German rulers and statesmen,
and by the German people. Tbey have been commented
upon by BoUmann, Buble, Ebeling, EUinger, Pehr, Pester,
Feuerlein, Fichte, Frederick the Great, Gaspary, Gervinus,
Hinrichs, Kemmerich, Knies, Leo, Macun, von Mohl, Mundt,
Plato, Eanke, Eathmann, Eeumont, Treitschke, Thudi-
chum, Twesten, Vorlander, Weizel, Wolff, Zimmermann,
and many others, and most of the authors mentioned have
praised Machiavelli's doctrines. Eanke, and especially
Treitschke, the most influential German historians, were
warm admirers of the author of ' The Prince,' while Frede-
rick the Great proved himself an apt disciple of Machiavelli-
by publishing his celebrated ' Anti-Machiavel ' a few weeks
before attackiag unsuspecting Austria and robbmg her of
Silesia. The activity of Pru^so- Germany's rulers' from the
time of the Great Elector to the present day in internal and
external affairs follows Machiavelli's teachings in every
particular, and the resemblance is too great to be merely
accidental.

To Machiavelli conquest seemed the natural occupa-
tion of the sovereign. He judged rulers by their success
or by their failure. He wrote in the third chapter of
' The Prince ' :

Nothing is so natural or so common as the thirst for
conquest, and when men can satisfy it, they deserve
rather praise than censure. But when they are not equal
to the enterprise they undertake, disgrace is the inevitable
consequence.

In chapter xxiv. of the same book we read :

A prince who performs his duties well need never fear
the want of defenders. His recent elevation, far from
esteeming him in a less degree, will on the contrary double
his glory because of the obstacles which he has had to
conquer and which his merit ^lone enabled him to over-

MACHIAVELLI AND GEKMAN STATECEAFT 281

come. He -vyill acquire the renown not only of having
founded a new principality, but of having established wise
laws, a good army, firm alliances^ and glorious examples ;
whereas he who was bom a prince, and loses his dominion
by imprudent conduct, deserves eternal infamy.

The sentences quoted apply in every word to the Hohen-
zollerns. If we did not know the author, we might attribute
them to Treitschke. The material factor, success, is every-
thing. Morality is nothing.

According to Machiavelli, the principal object of a ruler
consists in acquiring glory, in increasing his territories.' As
failure in achieving this object is infamy, foreign and domes-
tic policy should be subordinated to successful aggression.
A ruler cannot hope to conquer his neighbour States unless
he can make the fullest use of his subjects, unless his subjects
are his tools and obey blindly. They should therefore be
subjected to the ruler's will partly by laws, partly by terror.
In chapter iv., book i., of his ' Discourses on Livy,'
Machiavelli writes : —

I have observed that men never behave well unless
compelled, and that whenever they are free to act as they
please and are under no restraint, everything falls at once
into confusion and disorder.

In chapter xvii. of ' The Prince,' which is superscribed
' Of Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether it is Better to be
Loved or to be Feared,' we read :

It may be truly affirmed of mankind in general that they
are ungrateful, fickle, timid, dissembling, and self-interested.
So long as you can serve them, they are entirely devoted to
you. Their wealth, their blood, their lives, and even their
oSspring are at your disposal when you have no occasion
for them. But in the day of need they turn their back upon
you. ...

Men are generally more inclined to submit to him who
makes himself dreaded than to him who merely strives to

282 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

be loved. The reason is obvious, for friendship, being a
mere moral tie, a kind of duty resulting from a benefit,
cannot endure against the claims of calculating interest.
On the other hand, fear carries with it a dread of punish-
ment which never loses its influence. A prince, however,
ought to make himself feared in such a manner that if he
cannot gain the love he may at least avoid the hatred of his
subjects.

The policy of the HohenzoUerns towards their subjects
has always been one of deliberate terrorism. They wish to
be feared by them without being hated at the same time.

Citizens may be held in bonds of fear not merely by
the threat of barbarously severe punishment, but also by-
religious influences. Machiavelli saw in religion chiefly an
instrument whereby a ruler could hold the ruled in awe, and
strengthen the discipline of his army. In book i., chapters
xi. and xii., of his ' Discourses on Livy ' he wrote :

, It will be plain to anyone who carefully studies Eoman
history, how much religion helped in disciplining the army,
in uniting the people, in keeping good men good, and
putting bad men to shame. . . . Princes and Common-
wealths that would save themselves from growing corrupted
should before all things keep uncorrupted the rites and cere-
monies of religion, and always hold them in reverence;
for we can have no surer sign of the decay of a State than to
see divine worship held in contempt.

Machiavelli considered religion as a tool which might
prove useful for political and military purposes. He saw
in it an instrument of discipline, not an inspiration. He
frankly despised Christianity, believing that it tended to
make men merciful, tender, unwarlike, and effeminate. He
stated in book ii., chapter ii., of the ' Discourses on Livy ' :

The present generation of men is less vigorous and daring
than were the men of ancient times, owing to the difference
of the training of the present day from that of earlier ages.

MAOHIAVELLI AND GEEMAN STATECEAPT 283

This difference arises from the different character of the
religions then and now prevailing. Our religion teaches us
to set little store by worldly glory, whereas non-Christians
greatly esteem glory; consider it the highest good, and
display the greatest fierceness in action. . . . When the
old religions prevailed none could obtain divine honours
except those who had received worldly glory, successful
leaders of armies and rulers of States ; while the Christian
religion glorifies men who are of a humble and contemplative
mind, but who do not lead a vigorous life. While the
highest good of the old religions consisted in magnanimity,
vigour, and all those qualities which make men brave, that
of Christianity exalts humility, lowliness, and contempt for
the thmgs of this world, and if it enjoins us to be brave it
calls rather for courage in suffering rather than for courage
in action. Therefore the Christian idea seems to have en-
feebled the world.

In accordance with Machiavelli's teaching of the useful-
ness of religion and of the weakening influence of Christian
morality, we find that religious ceremonies are strictly
enforced in Germany, that religion has been turned into
a powerful instrument for disciplining the nation, that the
King of Prussia is the summus efiscopus, that the clergy
are obedient State officials. At the same time we find
throughout Germany a truly Machiavellian contempt of
Christianity because of its weakness and sentimentality.
The gentle Christ has become in Germany a fierce god of
war — ' Our German God ' — and the German God is gradu-
ally assuming the bloodthirsty character of Odin and of
Thor. Intellectual Germans speak with contempt of the
Christian idea, and many Germans who consider Christi-
anity played out desire to create a new religion, a German
reUgion in which once more Odin and Thor will rule. Ger-
many actually contains powerful ethical-religious societies
for the cult of the old heathen gods.

Machiavelli recommends that sovereigns should en-
deavour to control the people not only by the fear of

284 THE i^OtJNDATIONS OF GEEMANY ,

punishment and by the influence of religion, but that they
should endeavour at the' same time to gain their affection.
In chapter ix. of ' The Prince ' we read :

The only resource upon which a prince can rely in ad-
versity is the affection of his people. . . . Let no one
quote against me the old proverb, ' He who relies on the
people builds on sand.' It may be true that in the case of a
single citizen who is opposed by powerful enemies or op-
pressed by the magistrates, the people are not to be relied
upon. But a prince who is a man of courage and is able
to command, who knows how to preserve order in his State,
need never regret having founded his security on the
affection of the people; ... A wise prince should at all
times conduct hhnself in such a manner that at all times and
under all circumstances his subjects may feel the want of his
directing hand. Then he may rely on their unshaken fidelity.

In chapter xx. Machiavelli states : ' There is no better
fortress for a prince than the affection of the people.'

The writer of ' The Prince ' considers that a ruler should
be able to gain the affection of the citizens by simulating
all the popular virtues. In chapter xviii. it is stated :

It is not necessary for a prince to possess all the good
qualities which I have enumerated, but it is indispensable
that he should appear to have them. I will even venture
to affirm that it is sometimes dangerous to possess these
virtues. Nevertheless it is always useful to seem to possess
them. A prince should earnestly endeavour to gain the
reputation of kindness, clemency, piety, justice, and fidelity
to his engagements. He ought to possess all these good
qualities, but still retain such control over himself as to
display their opposites whenever it may be expedient. . . .
In a word, it will be useful to him to persevere in the path of
rectitude as long as he feels no inconvenience in domg so,
as long as he knows how to deviate' from the straight path
when circumstances make this necessary. He should make
it a rule never to utter anything which does not breathe
kindness, justice, good faith, and piety ; this last quality it is

MACHUVELLI AND GEEMAN STATECEAFT 285

most important for him to appear to possess, as men in
general judge niore from appearances than from reality.
All men have eyes, but few have the gift of penetration.
Everyone sees your exterior, but few can discern what you
have in your heart ; and those few dare not oppose the
voice of the multitude, who have the majesty of their
prince on their side. Now, in forming a judgment of the
minds of men, and more especially of princes, as we cannot
recur to any tribunal, we must attend only to results. Let it
then be the prince's chief care to maintain his authority ;
the means he employs, be what they may, will, for this pur-
pose, always appear honourable and meet applause ; for
the vulgar are ever caught by appearances, and judge only
by the event. And as the world is chiefly composed of such
as are called the vulgar, the voice of the few is seldom or
never heard or regarded.

In Machiavelli's opinion, rulers ought to make themselves
popular by combining strictness bordering upon cruelty with
equal justice to all. Moreover, the absence of favourites
would strengthen the authority of the prince, who could
treat high and low equally as his subjects, as his slaves.
In the ' History of Florence ' we read :

That State alone can duly claim the reverence and love
of its subjects which equally bestows its favours upon them
all, and not that which smiles only upon some few favourites
and frowns upon all the rest.

Machiavelli shrewdly recognised the necessity of respect-
ing the property of the citizens. He considered the security
of property far more important than security of life. Hence
he wrote in ' The Prince ' :

If a prince finds it absolutely necessary to inflict the
punishment of death, he should avow the reasons for it,
and, above all things, he should abstain from touching the
property of the condemned party. It is certain that men
sooner forget the death of theic relations than the loss of
their property.

286 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Nowhere in the world is the security of property greater
than it is in Germany, and nowhere in the world is discipline
more severe, espionage more widespread, and punishment'
more cruel.

Maehiavelli recommended that rulers should make
themselves popular by distributing all favours in person
and by leaving the inflicting of punishments to paid magis-
trates. In chapter xix. of ' The Prince ' he taught :

Princes should reserve to themselves the distribution of
favours and of employment, and leave to the magistrates
the care of inflicting punishments, and, indeed, the general
disposal of all things which are hkely to arouse discontent.

The foregoing advice k carefully followed in Germany.
The King-Emperor makes all appointments in the Civil Ser-
vice and the Army, bestows honours, &c. For centuries the
principal occupation of the HohenzoUern rulers has consisted
in personally signing the documents by which officers and
officials are appointed or promoted, which, owing to the
signature which they bear, are highly treasured by their
recipients. Many hours are spent by the German Emperor
every day in signing such documents.

Maehiavelli further recommended that rulers should
make themselves popular by patronising the sciences and
arts, commerce and industry. In chapter xxi. of ' The
Prince,' which is entitled ' By what means a Prince may
become Esteemed,' he wrote :

Princes ought to honour talent and protect the arts,
particularly commerce and agriculture. It is peculiarly
important that those who follow such pursuits should be
secure from all dread of being overcharged with taxes and
despoiled of their lands after they have improved them by
careful cultivation. Finally, princes should not neglect
to entertain the people at certain periods of the year with
festivals and shows, and they should honour with their
presence the different trading companies and corporations.

MACHIAVELLI AND GEEMAN STATECEAFT 287

On such occasions they should display the greatest affabihty
and facility of access, but they should always remember that
they must support their station with becoming dignity. That
point must never be lost sight of under any circumstances.

In no country in the world are there to be found more
imposing pubUc spectacles, such as military reviews, cere-
monial processions, &c., than in Germany. In his personal
attempts to make himself popular William II and his
predecessors have followed Machiavelli's advice in every
particular.

In Machiavelli's opinion, the principal object of every
ruler should be to increase his dominions and his wealth
by plundering his neighbours. The domestic policy should
be directed exclusively with that end in view, so that the
sovereign's ambitions should receive the fullest support
from the nation. The great Florentine statesman under-
stood that the first condition for success was that a ruler
desirous of conquests and glory should- be backed by a
terrorised, disciplined, and admiring nation. As the army
is the instrument with which glory can be obtained and
conquests achieved, Machiavelli considered military affairs
of the very highest value, and devoted to them a great deal
of attention, and he had come to the conclusion that
a national army, such as that created by Germany, was
bound to be far superior to the armies of hired mercenaries,
who were largely foreigners, which prevailed in his time.
In chapter xii. of ' The Prince ' he stated :

Princes who wish their power to be durable should estab-
lish it on a solid foundation. Now the principal founda-
tions of all States, both ancient and modern, are good laws
and a proper military force to support them. However,
as good laws can never be effective without good troops, and
as these two factors of political power cannot be separated,
it will be sufi&cient if I confine my view for the present to
one of them.

Troops which serye for the defence of the State are either

288 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

national or foreign or mixed. Those of the second class,
whether they serve as auxiliaries or as mercenaries, are useless
and dangerous, and the prince who relies on such soldiers
will never be secure, because they are always ambitious,
disunited, unreliable, and undisciplined.

In chapter xx. of the same book Machiavelli wrote :
' It has always been a maxim with those who raise them-
selves to power to arm their own subjects.'

Machiavelli recommended the formation of national
armies in numerous passages in all his works, and he held
up as examples the valiant Swiss and the citizens of the
German town democracies. At the same time, he recognised
that the formation of powerful national armies was incon-
venient inasmuch as a ruler might fall under the influence
of the army and become its tool. Still such an eventuality
seemed to him a comparatively minor disadvantage, be-
cause by means of the armed force the ruler and the State
could pursue the principal object, the conquest of neighbour
States. Machiavelli wrote in chapter xix. of ' The Prince ' :

A piince is often compelled to do wrong in order to
maintain his power. When the strongest party in the land
is corrupt, whether it be the people, the nobility, or the
army, he must comply with their dispositionj and "content
them, or it will prove his ruin.

It is an open question whether William II brought
about the present war or whether it was forced upon
him by the army. Possibly the Prussian army was as
much responsible for the war of 1914 as for that of 1806.

Every HohenzoUem prince wears the uniform, enters
the army as a child, and is taught to consider mihtary
matters his principal study and occupation, in accordance
with Machiavelh's, teaching. We read in chapter xiv. of
' The Prince ' :

Princes ought to make the art of war their sole study
and occupation, for this is the peculiar science of those who

MACHIAVELLI AND GEEMAN STATECEAFT 289

govern. War and everything relating to it should be theit
only study, and the only profession they should follow. Wat
should be the object' always in their view. By war princes
can maintain possession of their dominions, and iildividuals
of no position are sometimes raised thereby to supreme
authority. On the other hand, we frequently see princes
shamefully reduced to insignificance by slothful inactivity.
By the neglect of the art of war States are lost, and by its
cultivatioii they are acquired. . . .

A prince who is ignorant of the art of war can never
enjoy repose or safety among his armed subjects. He will
always be to them an object of contempt, whUe they will be
to him a cause of suspicion. Consequently ruler and ruled
cannot act in concert. A prince who does not understand
the art of war can never be esteemed by his troops, nor can he
confide ia th^m. It is necessary therefore that princes
should devote all their attention to the art of war, and to
begin with they should take the utmost care that the troops
are well disciplined and well exercised. . . .

As part of the military science can be learned by attentive
study, a prince ought to read history and to pay particular
attention to the achievements of great generals. He should
investigate the causes of their victories and of their de-
feats. Above all, he should follow the example of great
men. Alexander the Great immortalised himself by follow-
ing the example of Achilles, and Csesar by imitating
Alexander.

Since the earliest times up to the present day the
HohenzoUem rulers have been the Commanders-in-Chief
of their army and have led them in the field, whereas
other sovereigns have as a rule left the supreme command
to their generals. In this, again, the HohenzoUem rulers
have acted in accordance with MachiavelU's recommenda- ,
tions, for he wrote in chapter xxx. of the First Book of
the ' Discourses on Livy ' :

A priace should go himself on bis wars, as the Eoman
Emperors did at first, and as the Turks do now, and as all

290 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

valiant princes have done and do. For when it is the prmce
himself who conquers, the glory and the gain are all his own,
but when he is absent the glory is somebody else's.

Machiavelli, like Bernhardi, considered war as good
in itself, as a national tonic. He wrote in chapter xx.
of ' The Prince ' :

It is advantageous for a prince to have enemies. They
will prevent him from indulging in dangerous repose. Be-
sides, war with them will enable him to win the esteem
and admiration both of his loyal and of his rebellious
subjects.

If we read Frederick the Great's history of his own
time, which was written for the guidance of his successors,
his political testaments and essays, which were penned
with the same purpose in view, and his memoir regard-
ing the education of his nephew and of the Prussian
princes in general, we shall find embodied in them the
identical views regarding the army which were put for-
ward by the Florentine statesman. In many instances
they seem to be almost copied word by word from Machia-
velli's writings.

A military prince at the head of a great national army,
and supported by an implicitly obedient nation, should,
in Machiavelli's opinion, obtain power and glory by abso-
lutely unscrupulous means. Morality and fairness are ideas
which never entered Machiavelli's calculations. He viewed
political matters from a purely non-moral standpoint.
Every mean^ that was effective was good. Every measure
that was ineffective was reprehensible. He created a
strictly non-moral system of statecraft, the very system
of political realism (Becd-'poUtik) which is constantly ex-
alted by the Germans. As to him, advantage was the
sole criterion whether political action was good or bad-
treaties were to Machiavelli mere scraps of paper. In
chapter xviii. of ' The Prince,' which is entitled, ' Whethei;

MACHIAVELLI AND GEEMAN STATECRAFT 291

Princes ought to be faithful to their engagements,' we
read;

It is unquestionably very praiseworthy in princes to
be faithful to their engagements. However, those of the
. present day who have been distinguished for great explor s
have as a rule not been remarkable for the virtue of fidelity
to treaty. They have not hesitated to deceive others who
relied on their good faith.

There are two ways of deciding contests. They may be
decided either by law or by force. Law is used by men,
and force by beasts. Still, when the laws are not sufficiently
strong it is necessary to recur to force. A prince ought,
therefore, to know how to use either of these two
weapons. . . .

A prince may learn dexterity from the fox and the uses
of strength from the lion. Those who entirely rely upon the
lion's strength will not always meet with success. A prudent
prince cannot and ought not to keep his word except when
he can do so without harm to himself or when the circum-
stances under which his engagement was concluded have
remained unaltered.

I should hesitate to put forth this teaching if all men were
good, but as most men are bad and are ready to break their
word, a prince should not be more scrupulous than other
men, especially as he can always easily justify a breach of
faith. I could give numerous proofs of this and show that en-
gagements and treaties have been violated by the treachery
of princes, and that those rulers who played the part of
the fox have always succeeded best. At the same time, it
is necessary to disguise the appearance of craft. Princes
should thoroughly understand the art of feigning and dis-
sembling, for men are as a rule so simple and so weak
that dupes can easily be found by those who wish to
deceive.

The foregoing arguments of Machiavelli seem to have
inspired the reasonings of Frederick the Great, who broke
his treaties whenever he found it convenient, and who

292 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

defended his unscrupulousness aa follows in the preface of
his ' Histoire de Mon Temps ' :

Posterity will perhaps see with surprise in these Memoirs
' accounts of treaties which have been concluded and broken.
Although examples of broken treaties are common, the
author of these Memoirs would require better reasons than
precedent for explaining his conduct in breaking treaties.
•A sovereign must be guided by the interest of the State. . . .
Eulers are slaves of their means. To promote the interest
of their State is a law to them, a law which is inviolable.
If a ruler must be ready to sacrifice his life for the welfare
of his subjects, he must be still more ready to sacrifice, for
the benefit of his subjects, solemn engagements which he has
, undertaken if their observance would be harmful to his
people. Cases of broken treaties may be encountered every-
where. It is not our intention to justify all breaches of
treaty. Nevertheless, I venture to assert that there are
cases when necessity or wisdom, prudence or consideration
of the welfare of the people, oblige sovereigns to transgress,
because the violation of a treaty is often the only means
whereby complete ruin can be avoided.

To me it seems clear and obvious that a private person
must scrupulously observe the given word, even if he should
have bound himself without sufficient thought. If a private
person breaks his contract the damaged person can have
recourse to the protection of the law, and, however the
decision may go, only an individual suffers. But to what
tribunal can a sovereign appeal if another sovereign breaks
his treaty ? The word of a private person involves in mis-
fortime only a single human being, while that of sovereigns
can create calamities for entire nations. The question may
therefore be summed up thus : Is it better that a nation
should perish, or that a sovereign should break his treaty ?
Who can be stupid enough to hesitate in answering this
question ?

In a similar manner Bismarck argued in chapter xxix.
of his posthumous Memoirs that treaties need be observed
only if observation is advantageous.

MACHIAVELLI AND 6EEMAN STATECEAFT 293

In the words of the German- Chaneellor, ' Necessity
knows no law.' Necessity compelled, according to him, the
German armies to violate Belgium's neutrality. Neces-
sity, according to the German historians, forced Frederick,
the Great to invade Silesia and to bring about the parti-
tion of Poland. Necessity forced Germany to attack in
turn Denmark, Austria, France, and the Powers at present
at war with her. The doctrine of the non-moral State,
which can embark upon any crime, however hideous, be-
cause it is advantageous, because it can be explained as
being ' necessary,' was not created by Bismarck and by
Frederick the Great, but by Machiavelli. In book iii.,
chapter xli., of his ' Discourses on Livy, ' he wrote :

When the entire safety of our country is at stake, no
consideration of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel,
praiseworthy or shameful must intervene. On the contrary,
every other consideration must be set aside, and that course
alone must be followed which preserves the existence of the
country and maintains its liberty.

■In book V. of his ' History of Florence, ' we read :

, No reasonable man will ever reproach another with de-
fending his country by any means whatsoever.

German statecraft has learned from MachiavelU the
principle that the end justifies the means, that success
is the only desideratum and the only criterion, that glory
and conquest, however achieved, are desirable and praise-
worthy, that the State is a criminal association.

Conquered territories must be preserved and be embodied
in the victorious State. Germany's principles of treating
conquered territories may be found in MachiavelU's writ-
ings. We read in chapter v. of ' The Prince ' :

States which are newly conquered, and which have been
accustomed to Hve in liberty under their own laws, may be
preserved by three means : by ruining them, by inhabiting

294 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

them; by leaving them in the enjoyment of their laws,
rendering them tributary and establishing there a small
council to form a government. This new government,
being created by the prince, is dependent on his favour and
power, and will therefore endeavour to support him.

Machiavelli favoured particularly the latter way of
incorporating conquered territories. In chapter iii. of
! The Prince ' he stated :

In order to preserve a newly acquired State; particular
attention should be paid to two points. In the first place,
care must be taken to extinguish entirely the family of the
ancient sovereign, and in the second place the laws should
not be altered nor the taxes be increased. If these precau-
tions be observed the new State will become consolidated
with the other dominions of the prince within a short time.

The policy of calculated kindness outlined by Machia-
velli was pursued by Prussia after the conquest of Silesia,
Saxony, Hanover, Hesse, and Frankfurt-on-the-Main, with
the greatest success. The conquered citizens have become
most loyal Prussians in accordance with Machiavelli's
prediction. While Machiavelli recommended leniency and
consideration in the case of conquered territories which
would easily yield themselves, he urged the use of the ut-
most cruelty in the case of territories where the population
possessed strength of character and showed some signs of
independence. In chapters iii. and viii. of ' The Prince '
Machiavelli stated :

"We must never lose sight of the maxim : ' Either make a
man your friend or put it out of his power to be your enemy.'
He may revenge a slight injury, but a great one deprives hmi
of the power to avenge himself. Hence the injury should be
of such magnitude that the prince shall have nothing to
dread from vengeance. ...

I conclude that a usurper of a State should commit at
once all the cruelties which his safety renders necessary.

MACHIAVELLI AND GEEMAN STATECEAPT 295

Then he may never have cause to repeat them. By not
renewing his cruelties he will acquire the loyalty of his new
subjects, and by favours given to them he will win their
attachment. If, from bad counsel or timidity, he takes
another course, he must ever have a dagger in his hand, for
he can never rely on subjects whose confidence he has de-
stroyed by repeated attacks. Matters of severity, therefore;
should be finished at one blow, for when time is allowed for
forgetting resentment the wound is not so deep. Benefits
should then be given with circumspection and moderation;
and not too often. 3!hen they will be most appreciated.

The world has stood amazed at the nameless barbarities
perpetrated by the German troops in all theatres of war,
and their systematic plundering. Again German state-
craft has acted in accordance with Machiavelli's teachings.
In chapters xvi. and xvii. of ' The Prince ' we read :

When a prince is at the head of his army and has under his
command a multitude of soldiers, he should make little
account of being esteemed cruel. Such a character will
be useful to him by keeping his troops in obedience and
preventing every species of trouble. . . .

A prince ought to be very spariog of his own and his
subjects' property. However, he should be equally lavish
of that which he takes from the enemy if he desires to be
popular with his troops, for that will not diminish his reputa-
tion, but rather add to it.

The sum and substance of Machiavelli's foreign policy
will be found in a passage of ' The Prince,' and in another
one of the ' History of Florence.' In the sixth book of
the latter he wrote :

It always has been, and indeed ought to be, the main
end and design of those that wage war to enrich themselves
and impoverish their enemies. Nor is there any other
reasonable motive to contend for victory and conquest but
the aggrandisement of one's own nation and the depression
of the other.

296 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

In chapter iii. of ' The Prince ' Machiavelli briefly
states :

The prince who contributes to the advancement of
another Power ruins his own.

MachiavelK teaches that rulers should not only increase
their own territories by every means in their power, but
should ruin other States wherever possible. Guided by
this maxim, the Hohenzollems have not only endeavoured
to increase their lands, but also to create trouble in all other
States. It is notorious that the present Emperor has not
only pushed Eussia into the war with Japan, and brought
about the South African War, but has endeavoured to
involve France and England in war, and has made mischief
among nations wherever possible.

Machiavelh saw the ideal State in Turkey, which at
his time was at the height of its power. He admired both
the civil organisation and the army of the Turks, and their
cruelty and violence. He wrote in chapter iv. of ' The
Prince ' :

In a country governed by a prince and by the ministers
which he has appointed the sovereign enjoys by far the
greatest authority. . . . The whole Turkish monarchy is
governed by a master to whom all the others are slaves.
He has divided his kingdom into different provinces, and
these are ruled by governors whom he changes and recalls
at pleasure.

Prusso-Germany, with its Ministers who are responsible
only to the Sovereign, its sham parliament, and its mili-
tary organisation; is organised on the model of Turkey,
and the people have been animated with a truly Moham-
medan conqueror's spirit. Allah and the ' German God '
are identical. The difference between ancient Turkey and
modern Germany consists in this, that the absolutism of
the Hohenzollems is carefully disguised by parliamentary
trappings.

MACHIAVELLI AND GEtlMAN STATECEAFT 297

Machiavelli lived at a period of the greatest lawlessness.
In every part of Europe violence was in the ascendant. A
reign of terrorism and treason seemed to have opened.
Crowned criminals of the darkest dye triumphed everywhere.
Thirteen years before MacbiavelU's birth Mohammed II
had conquered Constantinople and destroyed the Byzantine
Empire. Serbia, Greece, Egypt, and Himgary were invaded
by the irresistible Turks. The Turkish rulers acted with
terrible cruelty against aU. Sultan SeUm I, the Ferocious,
who reigned at the time when ' The Prince ' was written, de-
throned and killed his father, Bayezid, and all his brothers.
The atrocities and the successes of the great Turkish rulers,
of Louis XI of France, and of Eichard III of England, were
on all men's lips in Machiavelli's time. Pope Alexander VI
(Borgia) and Pope Julius II, perhaps the greatest criminals
who have ruled at Eome, were Machiavelli's contem-
poraries. Spain was ruled by the terrible King Ferdinand,
during whose government the Inquisition was introduced,
and the Moors and Jews expelled. In Italy the most
notorious figure among princes was Cesare Borgia, the
son of Pope Alexander VI, and the brother of Lucretia
Borgia, the great poisoner. By audacity and treason, by
poison and dagger, he had acquired glory and power. See-
ing everywhere vice triumph over virtue, might over right,
and treason over honesty, the melancholy Florentine believed
in the triumph and in the necessity of wrong. Hence he
held up as ideals for the rulers of States King Ferdinand
of Spain and Cesare Borgia, whose name has become a
byword. He wrote of King Ferdinand in chapter xxi. of
' The Prince ' :

Nothing is more likely to make a prince famed, than great
enterprises and extraordinary actions. Ferdinand, the pre-
sent King of Spain, may be considered as a new prince, for
he has advanced himself from a petty ruler to be the most
renowned monarch in Christendom. . . .

Scarcely was this prince seated on the throne when he

298 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

attacked the kingdom of Grenada. This war laid the
foundation of his greatness. Afterwards, desirous to under-
take enterprises still more brilliant, he assumed the mask of
religion and cruelly drove the Moors out of his dominions.
The means he chose were undoubtedly barbarous. Yet his
exploit was extraordinary and almost unexampled. Under
the same cloak of religion Ferdinand afterwards attacked
Africa, Italy, and France. He had always some great
designs which kept his subjects in continual suspense and
admiration.

Machiavelli knew Cesare Borgia well, for he had been sent
to him on an embassy, and had had numerous opportunities
of studying his actions. He admired greatly that criminal.
One of the longest chapters in ' The Prince,' chapter vii.,
is devoted to a glowing eulogy of that monster who, deter-
mined upon success, readily made use of every crime with-
out hesitation and without regret. Machiavelli wrote :

The Duke Borgia determined neither to depend on for-
tune nor on the arms of another prince. He began by
weakening the party of the Orsini and the Colonna at Eome,
by corrupting all the persons of distinction who adhered to
them, either by bribes, or by appointments, or by commands,
suited to their respective inclinations, so that in a few
months a complete revolution was effected in their attach-
ment, and all came over to the Duke.

Having thus humbled the Coloima, he waited for an
opportunity to destroy the Orsini. The Orsini, fearing that
the Duke would ruin them, called a council of their friends
to concert measures of protection. In consequence of their
deliberations Urbino revolted, and troubles arose in the
Eomagna. Borgia's position being threatened, he resolved
to rely on artifice and dissimulation. ... He reconciled
himself "with the Orsini through the intervention of Signer
Paolo, whom he had gained over by rich presents. Paolo
was deceived by Borgia, and the credulity of the Orsmi was
such that they attended the Duke at an interview at Sini-
gaglia. There he had all of them put to death. Having

MACHIAVELLI AND GEEMAN STATilCEAFT 299

thus exterminated the chiefs and converted their partisans
into friends, Cesare Borgia laid the solid foundations of his
power. . . .

After the Duke had possessed himself of the Eomagna
he appointed Eamiro d'Orco as governor, a cruel but active
man, to whom he gave the greatest latitude of power. The
severities of Eamiro had made the Duke hated. He re-
solved, therefore, to clear himself from all reproach, and to
gain the affection of the people by putting the blame on the
governor whom he had appointed. He caused Eamiro to
be massacred in the market-place and his body to be exposed
upon a gibbet. . . .

Upon a thorough review of Cesare Borgia's conduct and
actions, I cannot reproach him with having omitted any pre-
caution, and I feel that he merits serving as a model to
all who by fortune of foreign arms succeed in acquiring
sovereignty. For as he had a great spirit, and vast designs,
he could not have acted otherwise in his circumstances, and
if he miscarried in them, it was solely owing to the sudden
death of his father and the illness with which he was himself
attacked. Whoever, therefore, would secure himself in a
new principality against the attempts of enemies, and finds it
necessary to gain friends, to surmount obstacles by force or
cunning, to make himself beloved and feared by the people,
respected and obeyed by the soldiery ; to destroy all those
who can or may oppose his designs ; to promulgate new laws
in substitution for old ones ; to be severe, indulgent, magna-
nimous, and liberal ; to disband an army on which he cannot
rely, and raise another in its stead ; to preserve the friend-
ship of kings and princes, so that they may be ever prompt
to oblige or fearful to offend ; such a one, I say, cannot
have a better or more recent model for his imitation than is
afforded by the conduct of Cesare Borgia.

Those who are astonished at the policy pursued by the
HohenzoUerns, and at the barbarity and treason which have
marked Germany's diplomacy and warfare of recent times,
should remember that Machiavelli has been the teacher
of the rulers and statesmen of Prusso- Germany, that the

300 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

learned German advocates of violence and of every form
of treachery, from the notorious von Bielfeld to Treitschke
and Bernhardi, have been MachiaveUi's pupils and admirers.
They should remember that-^ MachiaveUi's doctrines were
inspired by the. actions of the most cruel and most faithless
tyralnts known to history, that the terrible Cesare Borgia
was to him the ideal prince, and that he was held up as
model to ambitious rulers. William II should therefore
not be compared to Louis XIV and to Napoleon I, but to
his true master, Cesare Borgia.

CHAPTER XI

THE INFLUENCE OF LUTHER UPON GERMAN NATIONAL
CHARACTER

The Great War has drawn the attention of the whole
world to two qualities in the German national character —
to the callous brutality of the ruling classes and to the
abject Bubmissiveness and docility of the masses.

It is usually assumed that the absolutism of the rulers
of Germany and the blind obedience of the people are due
to the iron discipline which has been established by the
Hohenzollems, that the German character has been formed
by Frederick William, the Great Elector, King Frederick
William I, the Prussian drill sergeant, King Frederick the
Great, and Prince Bismarck, who have created the Prusso-
German tradition of government. The four creators of
Prusso-Germany have undoubtedly done a great deal in
shaping the national character. However, their action was
so powerfully influenced by the character, the actions, and
the political teachings of Luther that one must consider
the great reformer as one of the principal creators of Prusso-
Germany. Heinrich von Treitschke, in his book ' Politics,'
placed Luther side by side with Frederick the Great and
Bismarck, and very sign^cantly and quite justly he asserted
that Luther and Machiavelh had worked hand in hand
in creating the modem State of the Prusso-German type.
Martin Luther is chiefly known to the English-speaking
peoples as a religious reformer. In the following pages

301

302 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

an attempt will be made to show the influence which he
has had upon German political organisation, upon German
policy, and upon the German national character.

Luther was the son of a poor miner who in course of
time acquired a competence. His ancestors were poor
peasants and working men. He was a son of the people.
Hence he is frequently described as the first German demo-
crat, and the Lutheran revolution has often been called a
revolt of German democracy against the absolutism and
the tyranny of Eome.

In the beginning of his career Luther was indeed the
advocate and the champion of the poor, of the workers, and
especially of the peasants. The German working masses
in the towns, and especially the peasants in the country, had
in the course of time been converted from free men into serfs.
Their oppression and exploitation by the rich and the
powerful became greater from year to year. At the time
of Luther's advent all Germany was not only in a religious
ferment, but in a political and social ferment as well. The
risings of the persecuted and oppressed peasants were becom-
ing more and more frequent, and peasant revolts broke out
in all parts of Germany, particularly in the south and west,
which culminated in the terrible Peasants' War of 1525. At
the beginning of his career Luther was not merely a religious
reformer, but was a revolutionist who, in the interest of
the suffering masses, opposed clerical and secular oppression
with the utmost energy. The tyranny of the princes and
of the nobility over the poor, and their limitless exactions
and cruelties, filled him with rage against Germany's rulers.
In a widely circulated pamphlet, entitled ' On Secular Autho-
rity, and how far it should be obeyed,' which was published
in 1523, Luther treated the German princes with the utmost
contempt. He wrote :

One should know that from the beginning of the world a
clever prince has been a rara avis, and that a pious one has

LUTHER AND THE GEEMAN CHAEACTEE 803

been still rarer. Princes are usually either the greatest fools
or the greatest scoundrels in the world. Hence little good
may be expected of them, particularly in religious matters.
... Name a prince who is clever, pious, and godly, and what
a marvel of God's kindness he appears to the people of the
land ! ... It has come to such a pass that there are few
princes who are not considered fools or knaves. . . . We
may not, we will not, we cannot any longer tolerate their
tyranny and wickedness. ... It is no longer to be borne,
as formerly, when they drove the people about like wild
beasts. Princes ! cease your wickedness ; consider what is
right, and allow God's Word to have its way, for it will have
it despite yourselves.

A prince should not say to himself ' the land and its
people are miae, therefore will I do what I wish with them.'
He should say ' I will do what is right and useful.' When a
prince is a fool or a knave the whole country suffers. ... If
these princes had a city or a castle taken away from them by
the Emperor, how quickly they would rise in revolt ! Yet
they consider it perfectly proper to oppress the poor and to
put down rebelUon, and then they say that it is by the com-
mand of the Emperor. Formerly such men were called
rogues. Now they are called God-fearing princes.

Luther's activity with word and pen was prodigious.
His influence upon the mind of the German masses was most
far-reaching. His teachings influenced them. However, it
would be incorrect to assume that the great peasant revolt
was caused by Luther's incitements. Still, it may be stated
without fear of successful contradiction that by his preach-
ing and teaching Luther excited and inflamed the down-
trodden and ill-used masses and contributed vastly to the
great outbreak which in the main was due to a sense of
unbearable wrong.

When, in 1525, the peasant revolts assumed the char-
acter of a war, the peasants embodied their demands in a
number of articles which became their charter. In connec-
tion with the ' Twelve Articles ' of the revolted peasantry of

304 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Swabia,' Luther published in 1525 a small book entitled
' Admonition to , Peace.' At the opening of his pamphlet
Luther stated, addressing the German princes and lords :

In the' first place, the turmoil and revolt is due to no one
on earth as much as to you princes and lords, and to you
blind bishops and mad clerics and monks. You in your
obduracy do not cease raging and foaming against the holy
gospel, although you know that it is right and that you
cannot contradict it. Besides in your secular government
you do nothing but skin and sweat the people, so that you
may live in luxury and pride, until the poor can bear it no
longer. The sword is at your throats, yet you believe that
you are seated firmly in the saddle, that no one can lift you
out of it. Your conceit and your hard-hearted audacity
will br«ak your necks. That you will see. I have prophesied
this to ,you many times in the past. Beware of the words
in Psahn 104 : ' Effundit contemptum super principes, ' He
pours ;bontempt over the princes.' You carry on and on,
and y6u want to be knocked on the head, and no warnings
and admonitions wiU help you.

Now as you are the cause of the wrath of God, His judg-
ment will fall on you without doubt unless you better your
ways in time. The signs in the sky and the miracles on
earth are meant for you, dear gentlemen. They foretell
evil, and evil wiU happen to you. A great deal of the anger
of the Lord is already visible. The Lord has sent false
prophets among us, so that we may amply deserve hell and
eternal damnation by our errors and our blasphemies. And,
on the other hand, the peasants are gathering in bands arid
are rising, and as God does not prevent it and does not heed
our repentance Germany is being desolated, devastated, and
destroyed by horrible murder and the shedding of blood.

Now, my dear gentlemen, you shall know that God wills it
so. One cannot, one will not, one must not endure any
longer your raging. You must alter and you must yield
before the Word of God. If you do not do it willingly and
cheerfully, force and ruin will compel you to give way.
If the peasants do not succeed in this, other men wUl. And

LUTHEE AND THE GEEMAN CHAEACTEE 305

if you defeat them all they will yet be undefeated, for God
will arouse others in their place, for the Lord means to strike
you down, and will strike you down. Not the peasants have
raised their hands against you, but God Himself is your
enemy, and He punishes you for your fury. . . .

No words could be stronger than those in which Li^ther
held up the princes and the nobility of Germany to public
execration and contempt. He seemed indeed ta be the
champion of the downtrodden masses. His attitude changed
suddenly and completely. After having denoimced the
princes and the nobility for their tyranny, their oppression,
and their extortion for years, he became abruptly the cham-
pion of princely tyr&nny, and urged the rulers of Germany
to persecute and ill-treat in every way their unfortunate
peasants, whose rising he had largely caused, In the same
year, 1525, in which he had pubhshed his ' Admonition to
Peace ' he brought out a small pamphlet, entitled, ' Againsi
the Thieving and Murderous Bands of Peasants,' which
for violence and brutality is unmatched in Luther's writings.
The little patnphlet is so characteristic and so impoHant
that I would render it in full in English. This seems parti-
cularly worth while, because, as far as I know, it has not
previously been translated into English. Luther wrote :

In my previous booklet I could not condemn the peasants
because they desired to instruct themselves. Besides, Christ
Himself has told us in Matthew vii. that one should not judge.
However, before I had time to look around the peasants
continued, put forth their fists, forgot their duties, and
robbed and raged like raving dogs. Now one can see what
they had in their false hearts, that it was nothing but lies
when they talked of their Twelve Articles in the name of
the Gospel. In short, the peasants do nothing but the devil's
work, and the greatest devil of them all is the one (Thomas
Miinzer) who reigns at Miilhausen. He does nothiag but rob,
murder, and spill blood, and Christ has said of him ia St. John,
chapter viii., that he was a murderer from the beginning.

306 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

As the peasants and other wretched people have allowed
themselves to be seduced, and as their actions are different
from their words, I must write in a different tone. I must in
the first instance place their sins before their eyes, as God did
in the case of Isaiah and Ezekiel, so that they may recognise
the truth, and then I must instruct the temporal authorities
how they should act in this matter.

The peasants are guilty of three horrible sins against
God and man, for which they have deserved death of body
and soul many a time. In the first place, they have sworn
to be submissive and obedient to their superiors in accord-
ance with the command of God, who says ' Bender unto
Csesar the things which be Caesar's,' and in Eomans xiii.,
' Let every soul be subject to the higher powers,' &c. Be-
cause they have broken their obedience wilfully and crimi-
nally, and have set themselves against their masters, they
have forfeited both body and soul, as is the case in faithless,
oath-breaking, lying, and disobedient knaves and rascals.
Hence St. Paul pronounced in Eomans xiii. the following
verdict against them : ' Whosoever resisteth the power
resisteth the ordinance of God ; and they that resist
receive to themselves damnation.' That will be the fate of
the peasants. They will receive their punishment soon or
late, for God wiUs that faith and duty should be kept.

As the peasants have revolted, and are criminally robbing
and plundering monasteries and castles which do not belong
to them, and as they act like common highway robbers and
murderers, they deserve for this alone death in body and soul.
Hence those act rightly and properly who, as soon as they
can do it, throttle these men ; for in case of public sedition
everyone becomes at the same time judge and executioner.
Exactly as in case of a fire he acts best who is first in quench-
ing it, so in case of revolt it is not like common murder, but
Uke a large fire which consumes and devastates the whole,
country. Sedition fiUs a country with murder and the
shedding of blood. It makes widows and orphans and
destroys everything like the greatest calamity. Therefore
everyone who can must use weapons, throttle and stab both
stealthily and openly, and must remember that nothing is

LUTHEE AND THE GEEMAN CHAEACTEE S07

more poisonous, more nojuous, and more devilish than a
revolutionary. He must be treated like a mad dog and killed,
for if you do not kill him he will kill you, and with you the
whole country.

Besides, to cover their horrible and gruesome sin against
the gospel these men call themselves Christian brethreij, take
the oath, and force people to support them in their crimes.
They are the greatest of all blasphemers. They disgrace
the holy name, and they honour and serve the devil under
the cloak of the gospel. Hence they have deserved certainly
ten times death both in body and soul. No more horrible
sin has ever been known. I beUeve that the devil feels that
the Judgment Day is approaching, and that therefore he has
said to himself : ' This is the last, and therefore it shall be
the worst. So I will stir up everything from the very
bottom.' Thus one can see that the devil is a powerful
prince who holds the world in his hands and mixes things
up. He can catch, seduce, delude, and cause to rise many
thousands of peasants, and in his rage can do with them
whatever he wishes to do.

It will not help the peasants if they assert that, in accord-
ance with Genesis i. and ii., all things had been created free,
and should be held in common, and that we all are equal
owing to our baptism. In the New Testament Moses is of
no importance, for there stands our Master Jesus Christ, and
He places us with our bodies and our worldly goods under the
Emperor and under the law of the world, for He says :
' Eender unto Caesar the things which be Csesar's.' Simi-
larly St. Paul says in Eomans xii. to all baptised Christians :
' Let every soul be subject to the higher powers,' and St.
Peter says : ' Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man,'
It is our duty to live according to Christ's teachings, for the
Father in Heaven has ordered it so and has said : ' This
is My Beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased ; hear ye Him.'
The gospel does not free body and worldly goods, but frees
the soul. The gospel does not establish the community of
goods except if such a community is established willingly,
as did the Apostles and Disciples ; see Acts iv. These did
not demand the goods of Pilate and Herod, as our mad.

308 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

raging peasants would have it, but gave their own goods
to the community. But our peasants wish that goods
which are not theirs should be held in common, and wish
to keep at the same time their own property. They are nice
Christians. I believe there is no longer a single devil in hell,
for all the devils have entered the bodies of the peasants.
Their raging is exceedingly great and is beyond all measure.

As the peasants have offended both God and man, and as
they have deserved death many times both in body and
soul, as they will neither wait patiently nor act lawfully, but
continue raging, I must instruct the temporal authorities
how they should act in this matter and preserve a clear
conscience. In the first place, I will not condemn the autho-.
rities which, according to right and justice, slay and punish
the peasants, although this is opposed to the gospel. Eight is
on their side, the more so as the peasants fight no longer for
the gospel, but have become faithless, perjured, disobedient,
and seditious murderers, robbers, and blasphemers whom
the authorities can punish with justice. In fact it is their
duty to pimish such rogues. For this object they carry the
sword and are servants of God. See Eomans xiii.

The Christian authorities who are guided by the gospel
should act with the fear of God, In the first place, they
should leave the settlement of this matter to God, and should
acknowledge that we have deserved our troubles, that God
has let loose the devil for the punishment of Germany.
Then they -should humbly pray for help agaiast the devil,
for we fight not only against human blood and flesh, but
against the spiritual enemy in the air, who must be attacked
with prayer. Now when the heart has been so directed to-
wards God that His divine will shall have sway, one should
turn against the mad peasants and offer to act towards them
according to justice and equity, although they do not deserve
it. If that offer should not serve, the sword should be taken
up without delay.

A prince and a lord must remember that he is the Repre-
sentative of God and the servant of God's wrath, and that,
according to Eomans xiii., he should use the sworji against
such rascals. Besides, he who does not punish and he who

LUTHER AND THE GERMAN CHARACTER 809

does not act according to his office sins as much against God
as he who commits murder. He who can punish, but does
not punish, murder and the Shedding of blood is guilty of
all the murders and all the wickedness which such rascals
perpetrate. He wilfully neglects the divine commands and
allows such men to practise their wickedness although he
could prevent it, and although his duty calls him to do so.
Therefore there must be no delay. There must be no
patience and no mercy. This is a time which calls for
wrath and the sword, but not for grace and clemency.

Their authorities must act with courage and must strike
with a good conscience as long as a muscle can be moved.
The advantage is that the peasants have a bad conscience
and are in the wrong, and every peasant who is slain is lost
in body and soul and is given over to the devil for ever.
The authorities, on the other hand, have a good conscience.
They have right on their side, and they can say to God in the
candour of their heart : ' Lord, Thou hast made me a
, prince or a lord. I cannot doubt it. And Thou hast com-
manded me (Romans xiii.) to wield the sword against the
evU doers. This is Thy word. It does not lie. So I must
fulfil my office or lose Thy grace. It is clear that the peas-
ants have deserved death many times for Thee and for the
world. If Thou wilt that I shall be killed by them, and if
Thou wilt take away from me my office and let me perish. Thy
will be done. Thus I shall die according to Thy word and
divine command, and I shall be xjbedient to Thy command
and to the duties of my office. Therefore I will punish and
slay as long as I can move an arm and Thou wilt direct my
actions.'

Thus it will happen that those who are slain on the side
of the authorities will be true martyrs in the eyes of God,
provided their conscience guides them as has been described.
For they act according to divine command. On the other
hand, those who wiU fall on the side of the peasants will
burn in hell for ever, for they wield the sword against God's
word and are actuated by the devil. And if the peasants
should be victorious, which God forbid, for to God all thingb
are possible — perhaps on the Day of Judgment, which may

310 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

not be far off, He wishes to destroy all order and authority
and make a general confusion-^the lords will die in any
case, and they will perish with a good conscience. They will
have fulfilled the office of the sword. They will leave the
world to the devil and will gain in exchange eternal blessed-
ness. In these strange times a prince may as easily go to
heaven by the shedding of blood as by prayer.

There is another point which should move the autho- '
rities. Not satisfied that they have given themselves over
to the devil, the peasants have forced many pious men against
their will to enter their deviUsh league. Thus these men are
forced into wickedness and damnation, for those who have
given way become guilty of all the evil actions in which they
participate. They must act against their will because they
are weak in faith and do not resist. A pious Christian
should rather suffer a hundred deaths than cede to the
peasants by a hairbreadth. Many martyrs might now be
created by the bloodthirsty peasants and prophets of murder.
The authorities should have mercy only upon those prisoners
made among the peasants who have been forced to join
theic bands. If there were no other reason for using the
sword mercilessly upon the peasants and to risk lives and
goods in the fight, the princes and noblemen should use the
sword in order to save the souls of those who have been
forced by the peasants to enter into a league with the devil.
These have sinned horribly, and will find damnation unless
they are saved and helped.

Therefore, dear gentlemen; get ready, save and help.
Take mercy upon the poor people. Stab, smite, throttle
who can. If you are killed you will be blessed. Never
can you find a more blessed death, for you will die obedient
to the divine word and to the commands in Eomans xiii., and
you do a service of love in saving your neighbour from the
bonds of hell and of the devil. I pray that all who can
should shun the peasants as they would shun the devD
himself. I pray that God may enlighten and convert those
who do not shun them. May those who refuse to be en-
hghtened find misfortune and non-success, and let every
pious Christian say ' Amen.' I know that this prayer is

LUTHER AND THE GEEMAN CHAEACTER 811

right and good and that it pleases God. If anybody should
think that I am too bard, let him remember that sedition is
vmbearable.

Many of Luther's supporters who had seen in the great
reformer the champion of the ill-used masses against clerical
and secular absolutism were horrified at his sudden change
of policy towards the people. Some tried to explain and
to justify his action, but the great majority of his sup-
porters began to consider him to be a turncoat who tried
to curry favour with the princes and the powerful nobility.
Even his friends condemned his pamphlet against the
peasants and called him ' adulator frimd'pum.' From
an advocate of the oppressed, Luther had indeed become
an advocate of the oppressors. The common people turned
away from him in disgust. The German princes and noble-
men, on the other hand, greeted Luther's pronouncement
with rapture, and in accordance with his admonition they
raged against the unfortunate peasants with the utmost
cruelty. Without mercy the defeated peasants were slaugh-
tered and tortured by their masters. According to the
best evidence available, more than 120,000 were slain, and
apparently the vast majority of these were executed for
revenge and in order to terrorise the others. In later years,
as may be seen from the fifty-ninth volume of his works,
Erlangen edition, Luther boasted that he had been the
principal executioner of the German peasantry, for he stated:

The preachers are the greatest destroyers of men, for
they admonish the authorities to fill their ofi&ce and to punish
the wicked. I, Martin Luther, have in the peasant revolt
slain all the peasants that were killed, for I have caused them
to be killed. The blood of all the slain peasants is on my
head. But the responsibility for it is with the Lord my
God, who has ordered me to speak as I have done.

Even Luther's admirers, both in Germany and abroad,
have found it difficult to reconcile his sudden change of

312 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

front, his desertion of the poor men for the rich and the
powerful in the hour of need. For instance, Professor
T. M. Lindsay wrote in his excellent book, ' Luther and the
German Eef ormation ' :

When all is said that can reasonably be said in explana-
tion of his action, we cannot help feelijag that the language
of this pamphlet is an ineffaceable stain on Luther, which no
extenuating circumstances can wipe out. ... Up to the
tragical year 1525, the Lutheran movement absorbed all
the various elements of discontent in Germany, and Luther
seemed to have the whole land behind him. This year was
the parting of the ways. ... As for Luther himself, the
Peasants' War imprinted in him a deep distrust of the
' common man,' which prevented him from believing in a
democratic Church, , and led him to bind his reformation in
the fetters of a secular control, to the extent of regarding the
secular government as having a quasi-episcopal function.
He did his best within Germany to prevent attempts to con-
struct anything Uke a democratic Church government. .

Up to the time when Luther admonished the princes
and the nobility to slay mercilessly the peasants in their
thousands, the reformer had been the most popular man in
Germany. Suddenly he became the most unpopular man,
except with the princes and the nobihty, whose absolute
power he strengthened by his writings and preachings. His
desertion of the masses and the cruelty against the defeated
peasants advocated by him were widely condemned in word
and in print. Hence Luther took up his proHfic pen in his
own defence and justification. In a ' Missive regarding the
Hard Booklet against the Peasants,' printed in 1525, he
endeavoured to justify himself at considerable length. In
the course of his pamphlet he stated :

It would be a nice piece of loving-kindness to show mercy
and charity to thieves and murderers and allow them to
murder, outrage, and rob. There is nothing more out*
rageous than the mad mob and the peasants when they are

LUTHEE AND THE GEEMAN CHAEACTEE 313

filled with , meat and drink and have power, . . . There-
fore I repeat, as I stated in my previous book, that no one
should take pity on the obstinate, infatuated peasants.
Everyone who can do so should strike, stab, strangle, and
slay them whenever he can and however he can as if they were
mad dogs. They are shamelessly faithless, disobedient, and
seditious thieves, robbers, murderers, and blasphemers, and
every one of them has deserved death at least tenfold, and
should suffer death without mercy. The lords know now
the character of the mob. Donkeys must be kept in order
with beating, and the mob must be governed with a forceful
hand.

In accordance with his violent, passionate, and obstinate
character, Luther never disavowed or recanted the brutal
views regarding the masses. In a sermon preached in 1528,
which will be found in the twenty-second volume of his
works, Erlangen edition, he stated :

God would prefer to suffer the government to exist, no
matter how evU, rather than allow the rabble to riot, no
matter how justified they are in doing so. . . . When Hen
Omnes seizes the sword under the impression that he is
doing right, then evil begins. A prince should remain a
prince, no matter how tyrannical he may be. He beheads
necessarily only a few, since he must have subjects in order
to be a ruler.

The few extracts given make it obvious that Luther
completely changed bis attitude in 1525, that the champion
of the masses became the champion of the rulers, that the
man who previously had stood for justice stood henceforth
for princely absolutism, however tyrannous and however
vicious. Those who are acquainted with Luther's writings
are aware that the great reformer, who is widely supposed
to be an advocate of democracy because he opposed the
absolutism of the Eoman Church, simply abolished in Ger-
many Eoman Catholic absolutism in order to establish in its
place a far more rigid andfar more vicious secular absolutism.

314 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

His hostility to the masses was by no means solely directed
against the peasants owing to their revolt. His hostility
against the masses became after 1525 a matter of principle
and was general. In the seventh book, fifth chapter, of
Janssen's excellent ' History of the German People at the
Close of the Middle Ages ' we read :

' Scripture, speakmg figuratively,' wrote Luther in the
year 1524, ' calls rulers drovers, task-masters, and scourgers.
Like the drivers of donkeys, who have to belabour their
animals incessantly with rods and whips, or they wiU not
obey, so must the rulers do with the people ' (with ' Herr
Omnes,' as he calls them) ; ' they must drive, beat, throttle,
hang, burn, behead, and torture, so as to make themselves
feared and to keep the people in check. For God is not
satisfied with our merely holding up the law before the people ;
He requires that we should drive them to keep it. For if
we only held it up before them, and did not compel them to
carry it into practice, it would all come to nothing.'

In one of his sermons on the first book of Moses, which
were first published in the year 1527, Luther said ' It was
almost desirable that servants should be subjected to a kind
of slavery, such as had existed among the Jews. Then
Abimelech,' he said, ' took sheep and oxeil, and men-servants
and maid-servants, and gave them to Abraham, and spake
unto Sarah, &c. &c. That was a royal gift. Then he gave
them power over the sheep and oxen and men-servants and
maid-servants, so that they were all personal property, and
the owners might sell them as they hked ; and it would
verily be almost best that this state of things should exist
again, for nobody can control and tame the populace in any
other way. And so you see that Abraham and Abimelech
held by this custom and let their dependents remain in
bondage. Some will say it would have been great kindness
and mercifulness if they had set them free ; how could love
endure that they should be kept as slaves ? Just in the same
way as love endures that people should be hanged on the
gallows or otherwise punished. For there must be firm
control by the secular government, in order to curb and

LUTHEE AND THE GEEMAN CHAEACTEE 815

manage the people. The owners would gladly have set
them free, if they could, hut it would not have answered ;
they would soon have grown too haughty if too many rights
had been granted them.'

The fact that Luther in his advocacy of monarchical
absolutism went so far as to recommend the princes to en-
slave their subjects, to treat them as if they were cattle,
and to ill-treat them deliberately in order to keep them
terrorised, humble, and submissive, is known to all students
of Luther's teachings. It is not denied by the most fer-
vent admirers of Luther, but it is frequently glossed over.
Only Prusso- Germans of the ultra-patriotic type, such as
Treitschke, highly approve of the ruthless absolutism which
Luther recommended to the rulers.

The Eeformation, which in the first instance was a demo-
cratic revolution, changed its character through Luther's
action. While professing to act in the interest of the people
Luther merely transferred absolute authority from the com-
paratively gentle and powerless Church to the princes.
These had in the past shared authority over the people
with the Eoman Catholic Church. The secular and the
spiritual authorities had balanced one another. Hence-
forth all secular and all spiritual authority became united
in a single hand. The Protestant ruler became the summus
episcofus of his country. King and bishop became one.
The King claimed the sanctity of the Pope with regard to
his secular actions, and he assumed the titles and attributes
of the Deity. Thus the German rulers, who in the past had
been elected by the popular vote, became the representa-
tives of God on earth and reigned by divine right. On the
other hand, the bishops, who formerly had been kept in check
by the secular authority, possessed henceforth the entire
power of the State. The judges and the army, the whole
official apparatus of the country, could be utilised for ecclesi-
astical purposes on the part of the clerical prince who wore

816 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

at the same time th6 temporal and the spiritual crown.
Henceforth theology and policy went hand in hand. The
clergy became part of the executive of the bureaucracy, and
princely absolutism was defended and advocated in every
church.

Luther's influence upon the German character was most
far-reaching. He was responsible for the creation of an all-
powerful autocratic government which has found its fullest
expression in Prusso- Germany. He is therefore largely,
and probably chiefly, responsible for the absolutism of the
Prusso-German Government on the one hand and for the
submissiveness of the people on the other hand. Besides,
the great reformer is probably also responsible for the
brutality and ruthlessness which the Germans have dis-
played in their warfare and their treatment of the con-
quered peoples.

The character of nations is largely shaped by tradition.
The character of the citizens is frequently modelled upon
that of their national heroes. It is frequently assumed
that the brutality of the Prussians is due to the example of
Bismarck, Frederick the Great, and especially to that of
King Frederick William I, the Prussian drill-sergeant.
Very likely these men were not so much originators as
imitators. Exactly as the men of modem Germany try
to imitate their great hero, Bismarck, in word, thought, and
action, even so the men of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries probably tried to model themselves upon Luther.
Now Luther was not only wonderfully successful in all
he had undertaken, he was not only a Bismarck on the
religious side, but he was personally almost unbelievably
brutal and coarse. These characteristics of the great
reformer are usually passed over by his biographers, most
of whom were Protestants. They have found adequate
analysis and description in the excellent Ufe of Luther by
Hartmann Grisar, a Eoman Catholic, which was published
in three very large volumes in Freiburg in 1911 and 1912.

LUTHEE AND THE GEEMAN CHAEACTEE 317

Of this book a good English translation has been published
by Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co. Ltd. The sixteenth
century was a time of plain speaking ; however, among his
contemporaries Luther was easily first in his capacity for
coarseness and abuse. He called the Germans, according
to Grisar's fifteenth chapter, swine and senseless beasts.
He wrote, for instance ; ' We Germans are and remain
Germans, which means swine and hogs without reason ;
we Germans are such disgraceful swine that we possess
neither breeding nor sense ; we are a barbarous nation ;
we abuse the gifts of God worse than swine.'

Luther habitually employed against his opponents not
only the coarsest but also the filthiest language, in which
the human excreta and certain intimate parts of the human
anatomy are constantly mentioned. It is practically im-
possible to render Luther's language in English. It amazed
his contemporaries, who certainly were not squeamish.
His attack upon King Henry VIII of England was so
full of coarse and filthy expressions that Thomas More
replied in words which can fitly be given only in Latin :

Nihil habet in ore (Lutherus) praeter latrinas, merdas,
stercora, quibus foedius et spurcius quam uUus unquam
scurra scurratur. ... Si pergat scurrilitate ludere nee aliud
ia ore gestare quam sentinas, cloacas, latrinas, merdas, ster-
cora, faciant quod volent alii, nos ex tempore capiemus
consilium, velimusne sic bacchantem . . . cum suis merdis
et stercoribus cacantem cacatumque relinquere.

German coarseness in sexual matters may also be largely
due to the incredible indelicacy and coarseness with which
Luther habitually treated these subjects. For instance,
in advocating matrimony for the clergy he stated in words
which can be rendered only in Latin :

Major pars puellarum in monasteriis positarum non
potest voluntarie statum suum observare . . . Puella
non potest esse sine viro, sicut non sine esu, potu et somno.

318 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Ideo Deus dedit homini membra, venas, fluxus et omnia;
quae ad generandum inserviunt. Qui his rebus obsistit,
quid aliud facit, quam veils ut ignis non urat ? Ubi castitas
involuntaria est, natura non desistit ab opere suo ; caro
semen concipit sicut creata est a Deo ; venae secundum
genus suum operantur. Tunc incipiunt fluxus et peccata
clandestina, quae S. Paulus mollitiem vocat (1 Cor. vi. 10).
Et, ut crude dicam, propter miseram necessitatem, quod
non fluit in carnem, fluit in vestimenta. Id deinde accusare
et confiteri verentur. . . . Vide, hoc ipsum voluit diabolus,
docens te coercere et doinare naturam quae non vult esse
coacta.

In his table-talk he frequently discussed the most imti-
mate matters of sex in the coarsest manner, and did not even
spare his wife, Catharine, whether she was present or not.
For instance, Cordatus wrote in his diary, mercifully in
Latin, on page 8 :

Eidens sapientiam, qua esse volebat sua Catharina,
Creator formavit masculum lato pectore et non latis femori-
bus, ut capax sedes sapientiae esset in viro ; latrinam vero,
qua stercora eiciuntur, ei parvam fecit. Porro haec in
femina sunt inversa. Ideo multum habent stercorum
mulieres, sapientiae autem parum.

Luther habitually indulged in coarse and especially
obscene language and in ribald jests which came easily to
his tongue. Before men and women he joked without
restraint in words which cannot be rendered in EngUsh,
and the reported coarsenesses and obscenities of Luther are
so numerous that they would fill a volume. Often he re-
gretted the obscenity of his language and tried to repress
it, but his natural habit always reasserted itself.

The facts given in the foregoing show clearly that Luther
was not merely a religious reformer, but that his activity
profoundly and permanently affected the body political
and the character of the German nation. He coarsened
and brutalised the nation by his example, his personal

LUTHEE AND THE GEEMAN CHAEACTEE 319

habits, and his language. Before all he destroyed the
popular liberties, and he firmly established the absolutism of
the German rulers. Largely through his action, the German
people became a people of serfs. It is difficult to read
the heart of man. Possibly he abandoned the cause of
the people and became the strongest advocate of princely
absolutism and tyranny because the outrages committed by
the maddened peasants changed his views. This has been
asserted by many of Luther's admirers and apologists.
Possibly he became the champion of princely power because
he remembered the fate of Huss and other democratic
reformers and feared for his safety. Possibly, guided by
the idea that the end justifies the means, that necessity
knows no law, he was so determined to succeed in his struggle
with Eome that the cause of the people seemed of little
importance to him, that he sacrificed without scruple all
else to success. In view of Luther's passionate and ruthless
character, the last explanation is very likely the correct one.

If we look upon Luther not from the point of view of
the theologian, but from that of the poHtical observer, it is
perfectly clear that Luther was the greatest enemy of the
people and the greatest benefactor of princely absolutism.
He vastly strengthened the power of the German princes
by handing over to them the wealth accumulated by the
Eoman Church and by giving them at the same time absolute
power over the people, who henceforth were doubly enslaved.
The counterpoise of the Eoman Catholic Church was abol-
ished. The Protestant clergy became part of the govern-
ment apparatus directed by an absolute ruler. Luther
delivered to the princes the wealth of the people and the
people themselves and made the princes sacrosanct in the
eyes of the people.

Frederick William, the Great Elector, King Frederick
William I, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck, have created
the governmental tradition of Prusso- Germany, and their
activities have had a profound ijafluence upon the character

820 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

of the German nation. However, the character and the views
of these eminent men were largely formed by Luther and
his pupils. Owing to the activities of the great reformer,
the Protestant Church became a part of the Prusso-German
bureaucracy. If we bear in mind Luther's prestige and
the vast influence of his example arxdi teachings through
centuries and centuries* it becomes clear to us that the abso-
lutism of the HohenzoUems on the one hand and the abject
submissiyeness and docility of the German masses on the
other hand are due to Martin Luther, that the ruthlessness
and brutaUty which Germany has practised during the
present war were largely caused by the man who established
the Eeformation, that much of the coarseness of the German
people is due to Luther's habits of life, of thought, and
of expression. The genesis and character of the Prussian
State Church also explains to us the bloodthirsty and in-
human attitude of the Protestant clergy, which otherwise
would seem inexplicable. The principle, ' L'Etat c'est moi,'
was not established by Louis XIV, under whom the French
people enjoyed a good deal of hberty, but by the Hohen-
zoUems, who based their action upon the teachings of their
politico-religious reformer.

CHAPTBE XII

Prussia's downfall in 1806 — its causes, its conse-
quences, ITS LESSONS ^

The character of nations, as that of individuals, is shaped
by their history and by their experiences. Prusso-Germanyi
has been created by the Hohenzollerns. That"Tamily"Tias '
imprinted its character upon the nation. Men and nations
are made what they are not only by their successes, but
also by their failures. While the character and achievements
of the Great Elector, Frederick William I, Frederick the
Great, and William I are generally known, only a few men;
both in England and in Germany, are acquainted with
the lives and deeds of the two successors of Frederick the
Great. Frederick William II and Frederick William III were
weak and incompetent rulers. The Prussian historians are
somewhat ashamed of them. Hence their lives are little
mentioned and their failings are usually glossed over. How-
ever, the period of their reign, and especially the twenty
years which elapsed between the death of Frederick the Great
and Prussia's downfall at Jena and Auerstadt, has been
of such immense importance for the development of the
national character of Prussia that it seems worth while
considering the lives and achievements of these two men.
Brandenburg-Prussia had been created by the Austrian
Emperors. Almost exactly fivd hundred years ago, on
April 30, 1415, the Emperor Sigismund signed the cele-

* !From the Fortnightly Review, January 1918.

321 T

822 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

brated document whereby Count Friedrich of Nuremburg was
invested with Brandenburg and the Electoral dignity. The
small territory of the HohenzoUerns rapidly grew through
the energy and enterprise of its rulers. Chiefly by conquest
it increased fifteen-fold to its present size, and it grew
particularly at the cost of the Austrian Emperors who had
created it. At an early date the HohenzoUerns became
the opponents and the competitors of the Habsburgs, their
overlords. Austria was the determined champion of Eoman
Catholicism. Not imnaturally, the HohenzoUerns, who
envied them, became equally determined champions of Pro-
testantism. The Reformation and the sanguinary wars
which sprang from it were caused after all quite as much
by political as by reUgious motives. Eeligious differences,
envy, and the desire to become independent of Vienna caused
Prussia to embark upon a deliberately anti- Austrian policy,
and Austria's attempt to restrain the growing power of
Prussia and to keep that country in obedience merely embit-
tered the HohenzoUem rulers. Frederick William I created
a powerful army for use against his Emperor, and his son,
Frederick the Great, attacked Austria soon after his accession
under the flimsiest pretext and invaded Silesia. Frederick
manifested his hostility to Austria not merely by depriv-
ing that country of its fairest provinces, but he prevented
Austria finding compensation for her loss by the acquisition
of Bavaria. With that object in view he entered in 1778,
in his extreme old age, upon the Bavarian War of Succession.
Frederick aimed not merely at enlarging Prussia at Austria's
cost. He desired to lame the power of the Habsburgs by
creating a counterpoise to Austria in the form of a North
German union of States dominated by Prussia. On July 23,
1785, he created a union of Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover,
which was joined later on by Brunswick, Mecklenburg,
Saxe- Weimar, Saxe-Gotha, Zweibrucken, Ansbach, Baden,
Anhalt-Dessau, and Mayence. Thus Frederick the Great
laid the foundation of the North German Confederation and

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806 323

of the German Empire under Prussia's leadership which
relegated the Austrian Empire to a secondary position. In
his Political Testaments of 1752 and of 1776 Frederick the
Great urged his successors to extend Prussia's territories
in Germany, especially by conquest, and he recommended
particularly the acquisition of Saxony, the possession of
which would vastly strengthen Prussia* against Austria.
The anti- Austrian pohcy which Frederick the Great had '
consistently pursued during the forty-six years of his reign,
and which had been bequeathed to him by his ancestors,
was naturally taken up by his successors.

Frederick the Great had no children. Hence the Prussian
crown devolved upon his nephew, Frederick William II,
a dissolute and utterly unworthy man possessed of a huge
body but a weak brain. Frederick had married his nephew
to Princess Ehzabeth of Brunswick, but the marriage proved
an unhappy one. Frederick described the cause of its
dissolution in 1769 as follows in his Memoirs :

L'^poux, jeune et sans mceurs, abandonn6 h, une vie
crapuleuse dont ses parents ne pouvaient le corriger, faisait
journellemeat des infidelites ^ sa femme. La princesse,
qui 6tait dans la fleur de sa beaute, se trouvait outragee
du peu d'egards qu'on avait pour ses charmes ; sa vivacite
et la bonne opinion qu'elle avait d'elle-mSme I'excitkent h
se venger des torts qu'on lui faisait. Bientot elle donna dans
les debordements qui ne le cedaient guere h ceux de son
6poux. Les desordres 6claterent et furent bientdt publics.

Later on he married the daughter of the Landgrave of
Hesse-Darmstadt, but he was faithless also to his second
wife. Apart from innumerable temporary attachments, he
had several permanent ones. He was completely under the
influence of Wilhelmina Enke, the daughter of a musician,
to the end of his days. He married her to his valet Eitz,
and he concluded ' left-handed ' marriages with a Miss von
Voss. who became Countess Ingenheim, and with Countess

324 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Sophie Donhoff. His uncle, Frederick the Great, tried in
,viain to restrain the dissoluteness and the wastefulness of his
successor. The strictness of the old King caused Frederick
William to hate him. On November 12, 1774, Lord Malmes-
bury, the British Ambassador in Berlin, reported to the
Earl of Suffolk :

The precipitancy with which his favourite mistress was
obliged to fly to Hamburgh, although she is now returned ;
the prohibition of masquerades, and the banishment of his
taerry companions, are events which dwell so deeply on his
mind, as to make him wish the demise of his uncle with more
eagerness than ever.

The heir-apparent was, owing to his dissolute life, con-
stantly in need of money, and an intermediary sent by him
demanded a loan from England through the British repre-
sentative in Berlin. In a report dated December 15, 1774,
Lord Malmesbury has given an account of the conversation.
The emissary stated that Frederick William ' n'auroit pas de
quoi payer sa blanchisseuse.' In his most interesting letter,
which throws a great deal of light upon the inner workings of
international politics in the eighteenth century, we read :

As he spoke with a most impetuous vivacity, I have no
doubt he was in earnest in what he said, and as I had no
sort of reason to be discomposed with his disapprobation of
my conduct, I thought it a favourable opportunity of getting
some further l%hts into the Prince of Prussia's real character
and connexions ; I therefore, without affecting to justify
myself, endeavoured to make him speak more freely, by
suggesting different methods of obtaining the succours
required, and hinted that Holland, Vienna, and Petersburg
were certainly at his disposition. His answer was, ' Que
le Prince d' Orange n'avoit pas le sou, que I'Empereur
n'avoit pas la Bourse, que I'lmperatrice Eeine Maria Theresa
ne doimeroit qu'aux Eglises, et que I'lmperatrice de Eussie
le denoncerait tout de suite k son oncle.' I then mentioned
the rich merchants, as well those of his country as strangers.

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806 325

' II les a tous ^pulses, il doit 300,000 ecus (£15,000) ici et
autant dans I'etranger.' I ventured to hint that this sum
appeared to me incredible, considering the very small osten-
sible expense of his Eoyal Highness. ' II a tout mange chez
les Mes, il en a une qui lui coute 30,000 ecus par an, et I'argent
qu'il lui faut pour gagner les espions de son oncle monte en-
core a autant. Vous ne sauriez croire combien de fois j'ai
pris la hberte de lui representer combien peu sa fa^on de
vivre convenoit h un grand Prince, mais son penchant pour
le plaisir est trop decide, il n'en reviendra jamais, cela aug-
mente joumellement, et la maniere dont son oncle le traite
a tant aigri son esprit, que s'il vit encore cinq ans, son
caract&re changera entiferement. . . .'

I have only to add that I have since heard that the Prince
of Prussia has apphed through his Princess to the Grand
Duchess of Eussia, and that he expects to be relieved from
that quarter. This accounts for the change of style in our
second conference.

The British Ambassador, in his report of July 1, 1775,
described Frederick William as follows :

The Prince of Prussia has nothing in his figure which
denotes a person of superior talents or genius ; tall and
robust, without grace, he has more the air of a stout foot-
soldier than that of a great Prince. Constrained and
watched to a degree by his uncle, it is difficult to say whether
silence and reserve are natural or acquired habits in him.
It is certain these strongly characterise him, not only at
Court, and before people of high rank, but even when he
forgets he is a prince, and frequents lower company, which,'
through the pains he takes to be constantly in it, appears
to amuse him ; yet, even there, he never expresses his satis-
faction otherwise than by encouraging his companions to
be as loud and clamorous as possible, and to lay aside every
respect due to him as their future sovereign.

His favourite mistress, formerly a stage dancer, presides
at these revels, and takes the lead in all the scenes of indecent
mirth which pass there. She is large in her person, spirited
in her looks, loose in her attire, and gives a true idea of a

326 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

perfect bacchanalian. He is liberal to her to a degree; and
she alone spends the full income he receives from the King.
She makes, indeed, the best return in her power to such
generosity ; for at the same time she assures him that he
has the sole possession of her affections, she by no means
exacts the same fidelity from him, but endeavours, as far as
lies in her power, to satisfy his desires, whenever from
fickleness or satiety they fix themselves on some new object ;
and in this profession she is so dexterous as never to suffer
him to become acquainted with any woman who is Ukely
to be her rival in the dominion she has over him. Her
choice, and fortunately for her, is generally among those of
the lowest kind.

The pursuit of these pleasures, the only ones for which
he has any turn, employs the greatest part of his leisure ;
the rest of his time is spent either at the parade, in atten-
dance on the King, or in dressing — an article in which,
whenever he can venture to lay aside his uniform, he is
refined and delicate to a degree. He is even at the expense
of keeping a favourite valet de chamhre, by name Espere
en Dieu, constantly between Potsdam and Paris, for no
other purpose than to give him the earliest information of
any alteration in the fashions ; and as Bsp&re en Dieu
collects his intelUgence solely from his brethren (the hair-
dressers), so those who follow his instructions may very
easily be mistaken for one of this class.

Such, my Lord, are the outlines of his amusements, in
which one may perceive more levity than vice, and even
suppose, had he been fairly dealt with, his debauchery,
which is now certainly of the lowest kind, would at least have
taken a better turn, and deserved the name of gallantry.
Distressed as he is for money, persecuted by his uncle,
deprived entirely of the conversation of men of parts and
probity, and surrounded by a set of debauched officers, it is
not astonishing that he should have fallen into such a low
style of libertinism ; it would be much more so if, when he
shall be called to the throne, he ever gets the better of habits
so long contracted, and gives up a way of life from which
he appears to receive so' great satisfaction.

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806 327

In the eighteenth century mysticisna became fashionable.
Its strength may be seen from the prestige enjoyed by men
like Swedenborg, Cagliostro, St. Germain, Mesmer, and
many others. Numerous secret societies and orders were
founded by mystics, and Frederick William fell under the
influence of the Eosicrucians. Two men of that order,
WoUner and Bischoffswerder, became his intimate friends,
and the mystics and the mistresses ruled the Prince between
them. Wollner, a former tutor, who possessed considerable
eloquence, and who dabbled in alchemy and other mystic
arts, became virtually Prime Minister.

Wollner was made not only the principal adviser of the
King in civil affairs, but he managed the Treasury and the
Building Department, while Bischoffswerder controlled
mihtary and foreign affairs as aide-de-camp of the monarch.
The King had given himself entirely into the hands of these
two men, and especially of Wollner, and complaints and warn-
ings addressed to the monarch did not reach him. Frederick
the Great had caused his subjects to address their complaints
to him in person. Frederick William II ordered that they
should be sent to him only in writing and by the post.
Hence Wollner and his friends could prevent petitions and
complaints reaching the King. Wollner had in his house a
little theatre of mysticism where, among others, the shadow
of Cfflsar was made to appear. The part of the spirits
was played by a man Steinert, a friend of Bischoffswerder,
who was a skilled ventriloquist. The King was prevailed
upon to attend the seances and to give Steinert a salary
of 500 thalers a year. By studying the face of the King,
the impression which the spiritualist frauds made upon
him, and by bringing about suitable manifestations of the
spirits, these men caused Frederick WiUiam to fall more
and more under their domination. The King became
entirely absorbed in mysticism. He was known to the
members of the Eosicrucian Order not as the King, but
merely as Brother Ormesus. His small Hbrary in the'marble

328 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

palace of Potsdam consisted nearly exclusively of books
on mysticism, such as Bohme's ' Theosophia Eevelata,'
Jugel's ' Pbysica Mystica,' &c. The prophecies and counsels
of the spirits proved more effective than the advice of
ministers and generals, and those who wished to advance
or to gain influence upon the King were forced to join the
Eosicrucians. Eitz, the King's personal valet and the
nominal husband of his mistress, spied upon the King in
the interest of Wollner and Bischoffswerder, and Eitz's
brother acted as Cabinet Secretary to the monarch, and
shaped the orders emanating from the King in accordance
with the views of his Eosicrucian principals. A bankrupt
Eosicrucian merchant of Dresden named Dubosc was called
by bis friend Bischoffswerder to Berhn and was appointed
head of the Ministry of Trade and Commerce.

Frederick William II was sensuous and dissolute, and
was simultaneously addicted not only to vice and to mysti-
cism, but to religious intolerance and obscurantism. His
religious zeal probably sprang from hatred of Frederick the
Great, who was tolerant and a free-thinker. While Frederick
the Great had been extremely thrifty, almost parsimonious,
his successor wasted the vast funds which had been accumu-
lated. It had been Frederick's principle that the whole
business of State was concentrated in the hands of the King.
None of his Ministers had complete knowledge of the posi-
tion of the national finances, and no proper budget was
drawn up, so that the King could dispose at will of the
enormous surpluses which accumulated, and he could spend
vast sums at his discretion to the best advantage of the
State. Frederick William II employed the right of unlimited
disposal of the State funds for his personal gratification.
Frederick the Great had spent for himself only 492,500
thalers per year. Frederick William II spent in the first
year of his reign more than three times as much, and shortly
afterwards more than four times a^ much on his amusements.
In addition, his mistresses, his Eosicrucian favourites, and

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806 829

their relatives and friends defrauded the State of ccflossal
sums. They induced the King either to present them with
large estates or to sell them estates at absurdly low prices,
and resold them immediately at a huge profit. Count Hoym
received an estate which was supposed to be worth 40,000
thalers, and sold it immediately to his friend Count Lubinski
for 200,000 thalers. Bischoffswerder induced the King to
give him an estate officially valued at 18,000 thalers, which
was in reality worth 191,000 thalers, and which he sold
for 115,000 thalers. Haugwitz made in a similar way a
profit of 65,000 thalers, and received in addition lands worth
200,000 thalers. Numerous similar insjiances occur.

Mirabeau was sent by the French Government to Berlin
on a secret mission at the time when Frederick the Great
was dying. That great Frenchman was a close observer,
and he mingled with the best society of the Prussian capital.
In his dispatches, which were reprinted in his anonymously
published ' Histoire Secrete de la Cour de Berlin,* we get a
wonderful picture of Prussian society and of Frederick
William II. In his reports sent between July 16, 1786,
and January 13, 1787, Mirabeau wrote :

It seems that the successor possesses all the syinptolns
of the most incurable weakness, and that those who surround
him are most corrupt. The latter increase' from day to day
their authority over him. . . .

Frederick William looks sometimes angry and some-
times agitated. He can neither control his features nor his
movements. He is false, and he does not know how to
dissemble. Although he has some sense and talent he has
not an idea of his own. He knows only small means, mean
passions, and low views. Everything is small in the King's
mind, while his body is gigantic. He acts without method.
He has the pride of a parvenu, and the vanity of a man of no
position. He neither can guide others, nor will he allow
others to guide him. What the new King fears most is that
it should be believed that he is guided by others. I think

330 • THE F0UNDAT:I0NS OF GEEMANY

he would willingly leave the Governmeat to other people,
supposing that the world should think that he did every-
thing himself. . . .

It is inapossible to exaggerate the turpitude of the details
of the King's household, of its disorders, and of his waste of
time. The men-servants of the King fear his violence, but
! they are the first to treat his incapacity with derision.
Not a single document is kept in order, not a memorandum
is attended to, not a letter is personally opened. No human
power can induce the King to read forty consecutive lines.
In him are combined the passion of violence and the
torpor of nullity. . . .

What is the King ? It would perhaps be very bold to
judge him so early after his advent.' Still, one would be
tempted to reply that he is nothing. He has no spirit, no
strength, no logic, and no industry. He has the tastes and
inclinations of the pig of Epicurus. The only heroic quality
which he possesses is his pride, or rather his narrow-minded
bourgeois vanity. Those are his characteristics, and in
what circumstance, at what age, and at what a post ! I
must discard my reason if I wish to hope. What is really
to be feared is that the universal contempt which the King
will soon incur will irritate him and rob him even of the little
good-nature which he shows at present. The King possesses
a mad thirst after pleasures, and his taste is not delicate.
He desires to act in secret in a position where nothing can
remain secret. . . ,

If the present regime will, continue for another three
months, the King can no longer lose the respect of the
Prussian people. All the symptoms of putrefaction appear.
Eitz is a. greedy thief. He is the vilest and the most corrupt
of men, though he manages the royal household and distri-
butes a great part of the auhc favours. He is very suscep-
tible to money, and can be bought, but he is expensive, for
he is a greedy spendthrift. He wants to amass a fortune,
and he can succeed if ever the Government of Prance wishes
to direct the Cabinet at Berlin. As long as the King is of
importance Eitz and Prince Frederick of Brunswick are the
two men who should be gained over. . . .

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806 381

The King's character has three features. He is false,
mistaking falseness for cleverness. He possesses a self-love
which turns to fury at the smallest occasion. He loves gold,
not so much from avarice, but from passionate desire to
possess it. The first vice causes him to be suspicious. Men
who systematically deceive others always beheve themselves
to be deceived. The second vice causes him to prefer the
company of men of mediocre or of low position. The last
induces him to lead an obscure and solitary life. He is
violent at home, impenetrable in public, he cares Httle for
glory, and he finds his whole satisfaction in making people
believe that he is not guided by others. He rarely occupies
himself with foreign politics, deals with army matters, not
from interest but from necessity, and leans towards vision-
aries, not from conviction, but because he believes that he
can with their help read the thoughts of men. . . .

Tha discouragement of the ministers at Berlin increases
continually. Since two months the King has not worked
with a single minister. Hence their torpor and pusillanimity
increases. The art of reigning without doing anything has
never been brought to a higher degree of perfection. . . .
I had a thorough conversation with Prince Henry, the
King's uncle. He is completely discouraged and fears for
his country. He has confirmed to me everything that I
have reported to you. There is torpor where there should
be activity. The Com-t is depressed. The ministers are
amazed. Discontent is universal. Little is planned, and
still less executed, and those who complain that nothing is
done are gravely told that the King is in love, and that
the vigour of the Government depends upon the weakness
of Mademoiselle von Voss. The General Directorate, which
should be a Council of State, is only a dispatching ofi&ce for
current affairs. If the ministers make some proposal they
receive no reply from the King, and if they press for a deci-
sion nothing is done, to their disgust. ...

Public contempt is the worthy reward of unworthy deeds,
and it increases from day to day. The stupor which pre-
cedes contempt has disappeared. At first the people were
surprised to see the King devoting his time to attending

332 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

cotaedies and concerts, to waiting faithfully upon his old
mistress and the new one, to spending hours in looking at
engravings and at furniture in shops and playiag the 'cello;
to spending hours over the small talk and the quarrels of
the ladies of the palace, while trying to find miautes for
listeniag to the ministers who devote themselves to affairs
of State. Now people are surprised if no new foUy or vice
fills up his days. To-day the new imiforms which the King
has designed have made their appearance. That childish-
ness confirms the belief that a sovereign who attaches so
much importance to military tailoring has a mind which
sees in the cut of a uniform a matter of significance. . . ,

The King is a man without will-power, and will remain
so to his death. His predecessor was all mind. This one is
all body. The proofs of his incapacity are becoming more
and more serious, and matters are made worse by the fact
that the ministers are plotting against one another. , , .

It may be stated as a fact that with a thousand louis
d'or one can in case of need know all the secrets of the Cabinet
at Berlin. The papers of State, which are always lying in
disorderly masses on tables, can be read and copied out by
two secretaries, four valets, six or eight lacqueys, two pages,
and the female attendants, who have access to the royal
apartments. Hence the Emperor at Vienna received every
day faithful accounts of the deeds and intentions of the
King. . . ,

Never has a kingdom fallen more rapidly into decay.
It is being undermined from all sides. The national in-
come has diminished, and the expenses have increased. The
principles of Government are thrown to the winds, public
opinion is outraged, and the army is weakened. The small
number of people worthy of employment are discouraged;
deserving men are elinunated, and the King surrounds
himself with adventurers in order to make men believe that
he rules alone.

Although Frederick William II was the most incom-
petent, vicious, vain, and idle of monarchs, the courtiers
surrounding him flattered him to the utmost, and had the

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806 888

audacity to compare Mm with Frederick the Great. In 179^,
six years after Frederick the Great's death, Count Hertzberg,
who under Frederick the Great and during the first few years
of the reign of Frederick William II had acted as Minister
of Foreign Affairs, published a collection of the State papers
he had written, and in the introduction to that work he
endeavoured to ingratiate himself with the worthless King
by stating :

Those who study the State papers reprinted in the
present collection, and who carefully and impartially examine
the negotiations and events which have taken place under
the Government of Frederick Wilham II siuce his advent
to the throne in 1786, must be convinced that Prussia's
poKtical activity during his rule consisted in the unswerving
pursuit of the pohcy which the Prussian Cabinet had formed
at the time when the new monarch came to the throne. This
policy consisted in carrying on those aims which Frederick
the Great had pursued during his life. It consisted in making
Prussia the arbiter of the Balance of Power of Europe in the
south, the north, and east of the European Continent.

Every enlightened and impartial observer must recognise
that King Frederick William II had played the part of the
arbiter of the Balance of Power im the south, the north, and the
east on three important occasions, during the Eevolution
in Holland, during the troubles in Poland, and during the
war between the Turks and the Eussians and Austrians. . . .
All enlightened and impartial readers who carefully go
through the volumes of documents will agree that the two
Prussian Kings, Frederick the Great and Frederick William
II, have, since the treaty of Hubertsburg, which concluded
the Seven Years War, played the greatest, the grandest,
and the most glorious part of acting as the facifiers and
arbiters of the Balance of Power in the different parts of
Europe ; that they have stepped iato the breach when the
European equihbrium was threatened ; that they have at
great risk and at an enormous cost, using only their own
strength, saved Bavaria, Holland, Sweden, Poland, and the
Ottoman Empire from impending danger.

334 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Suoh flatteries were unfortunately only too frequent,
and as they emanated from many of the highest dignitaries,
they served to turn the head of the King.

Frederick the Great had concentrated all the power of
the State in his own hands. Lombard, the Secretary of
the Prussian Cabinet, Mirabeau, and others have described
to us the Frederickian organisation. The ministers com-
municated with the King practically only in writing. Very
often they did not see him during many months. Their
reports and inquiries and a vast quantity of miscellaneous
correspondence were sent to the King every day. Frede-
rick's secretaries, his ' scribblers,' as he contemptuously
called them, appended to each document a brief summary of
its contents. These summaries were read to the King, and
the King immediately gave his decision without consulting
anybody. If one of his ministers or one of his, secretaries
should have ventured to utter an opinion on the matter
submitted, the King would have thought him mad. Thus
Frederick dispatched in a morning frequently two hundred
documents. In the afternoon his replies, which had been
elaborated meanwhile by bis secretaries from the brief
decisions given, were put before the King for his signature,
and in order to be sure that he was not deceived by his
secretaries, Frederick read entirely a number of the docu-
ments which were put before him, selecting them at random.
Such being Prussia's organisation, the country could be
governed with good results only by an able monarch. Un-
restricted one-man government required a monarch of the
stamp of Frederick the Great. A vicious decadent sur-
rounded by adventurers and intriguers of the worst kind
was certain to ruin the country.

Soon after Frederick William's accession the French
Revolution broke out. The European monarchs drew to-
gether for mutual defence. The notorious Eosicrucian
Bischoffswerder suggested to the King that Prussia should
abandon the anti-Austrian policy which she had consis-

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806, 335

tently pursued during many decades and conclude an alli-
ance with the House of Habsburg. On July 25, 1791, a pre-
liminary treaty was concluded between the two Powers at
Vienna which stated :

. . . Les deux cours se garantiront reciproquement
leurs 6tats respectifs contre toute agression quelconque ;
la quahtite, la qualite et les termes de secours mutuels, ou
en tout cas leur equivalent en argent, ainsi que I'entretien des
troupes auxiliaires, seront regies dans le traite d'une recip-
rocite parfaite.

Les cours s'entendront et s'employeront pour effeotuei
incessamment le concert auquel S. Maj, I'Empereur vient
d'inviter les principales puissances de I'Europe, sur les
affaires de Fraiice, et elles se porteront de plus h leur requisi-
tion respective, secours et assistance reciproque, au cas que
la tranquillite interne de I'un et de I'autre 6tat fut menacee
de troubles.

On August 27, 1791, the celebrated Declaration of Pilnitz
was signed by the Emperor of Austria and King Frederick
William. It stated :

. . . Pour mettre le Eoi de France en etat d'affermir,
dans la plus parfaite Uberte, les bases d'un gouvemement
monarohique 6galement convenable aux droits des souve-
rains et au bien-etre de la nation fran9oise. . . leurs dites
Majestes I'Empereur et le Eoi de Prusse sont resolus d'agir
promptement, d'lm mutuel accord, avec les forces necessaires
pour obtenir le but propose et commun.

On February 7, 1792, a formal treaty was concluded for
action against France. It was called ' Une Alliance Intime
et Perpetuelle.'

While Frederick William 11, guided by the Eosicrucians,
wished to reverse Prussia's traditional policy of hostility
towards Austria, many influential Prussians opposed that
alliance with all their power. A pamphlet, entitled ' L'in-
teret de la Monarchie Prussieime,' which was sold very

836 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

largely, proclaimed that Austria was Prussia's natural enemy,
that an Austro- Prussian aUiance was an abortion.

At the end of 1792 Prussian and Austrian troops began
the invasion of France. Austrian and Prussian statesmen
had embarked upon the war believing that they would
rapidly defeat the French rabble, that the campaign would
be merely a military promenade. The first encounters
were favourable to the Allies. When, however, all France
sprang to arms and opposed the invaders successfully, and
when the incompetence of Frederick William II and of
his generals had decimated the Prussian troops, the in-
vaders began to withdraw. Prussia, which had concluded
an alliance with Austria in the hope that the war would
result in easily won victories and in great gains of territory,
resolved to abandon her ally, notwithstanding the three
solemn documents from which extracts have been given
and which bound Prussia to Austria. As soon as the war
took an unfavourable turn Prussia began negotiating with
France for a separate peace behind Austria's back, and after
very protracted negotiations Prussia concluded in 1795
at Basle a treaty of peace with France, while Austria was
left fighting. Three reasons had caused Prussia's with-
drawal from the alliance : the unsatisfactory result of the
French expedition; the desire to have her hands free
in order to participate in the partition of Poland ; the
wish to make herself supreme in Germany at Austria's
cost. Albert Sorel wrote in his classical history, ' L'Europe
et la Eevolution Fran§aise ' :

Polish affairs determined Prussia to withdraw from the
Rhine. . . . Hardenberg sought peace with the French
Republic in order to rob Austria of her supremacy in Ger
many and to prepare the renascence of the Empire under
Prussia's leadership. At Basle Hardenberg sought to revive
the Confederation of Princes (created by Frederick the
Great) and to strengthen and to extend it, and thus to
bring about a North German Confederation.

PRUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806 837

By the Peace of Basle of April 7, 1795, Prussia not only
withdrew from the war with France, but it ceded to the
French the Prussian territory on the left side of the Ehine.
That treaty was considered disgraceful at the time, and even
now Prussian historians condemn it. In the popular and
patriotic ' History of Prussia ' by Dr Ludwig Hahn we
read:

The reasons given for Prussia's withdrawal do not suffice
to justify that step. The conclusion of peace was advan-
tageous to the French, who secured further successes, and
when it was too late Prussia recognised that it had acted not
only to the disadvantage of the general interest, but even
to its own disadvantage; for Prussia's action_ strengthened
France against Prussia by weakening Prussia's ally against
France. Before all, Prussia lost by the Peace of Basle its
prestige in Germany.

Frederick William II died for the good of his country
in 1797, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Frederick
William III. During the eleven years of his father's reign
Prussia had sunk very deeply. Incompetence and cor-
ruption had sapped the strength of the army and of the
nation and had impoverished the country. Frederick the
Great had left to his successor a treasure of 50,000,000
thalers in cash, a gigantic sum at the time. During the
government of Frederick William II that vast fund, which
was equal to the total revenue of the country during three
years, had disappeared and had been replaced by a debt of
40,000,000 thalers. Frederick William III was pious,
honest, and well-meaning, but he was as dull as his father,
and was as jealous in defending his absolute authority. In
every attempt of advising him honestly he saw a personal
insult, and he allowed himself to be guided by shallow flat-
terers such as Lombard and the Eosicrucian Haugwitz. He
desired to introduce order into Prussia's finances. He
dismissed Bischoffswerder and Wollner, while his father's

838 ^ THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

mistress, Wilhelmine Enke, was imprisoned and had her
huge fortune confiscated. As Frederiqk William III pos-
sessed to a very pronounced degree the love of authority
which is characteristic of all Hohenzollems, he created only
minor reforms during the first ten years of his long reign.
He did not abolish the system of government which Frede-
rick the Great had introduced, and which could be worked
with success only by a highly gifted monarch. The Prussian
ministers were not allowed to come into frequent personal
contact with the monarch. They sent to the King their re-
ports and proposals, and the dull King formed his decisions,
which he communicated to the ministers through his sec-
retaries. As Frederick the Great had governed Prussia
without advisers, his two incompetent successors thought
they ought to do likewise. Napoleon briefly and correctly
described the character of Frederick William II as follows
to his Irish surgeon O'Meara :

I asked him if the King of Prussia was a man of talent.
' Who ? ' said he ; ' the King of Prussia ? ' He burst into
a fit of laughter. ' He, a man of talent ! The greatest
blockhead on earth. Un ignorantacdo che non da ne
talento, ne informazione. A Don Quixote in appearance. I
know him well. He cannot hold a conversation for five
minutes. . . .

' When,' continued Napoleon, ' I was at Tilsit, with the
Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, I was the most
ignorant of the three m military affairs. These two sove-
reigns, especially the King of Prussia, were completely au
fait as to the number of buttons there ought to be in front
of a jacket, how many behind, and the manner in which
the skirts ought to be cut. Not a tailor in the army knew
better than Kiag Frederick how many measures of cloth it
took to make a jacket. In fact,' continued he, laughing,
' I was nobody in comparison with them. They continually
tormented me with questions about matters belonging to
tailors, of which I was entirely ignorant, although, in order
not to affront them, I answered just as gravely as if the

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806 839

fate of an army depended upon the cut of a jacket. When I
went to see the King of Prussia, instead of a library, I found
he had a large room, hke an arsenal, furnished with shelves
and pegs, in which were placed fifty or sixty jackets of various
modes. Every day he changed his fashion, and put on a
different one. He was a tall, dry-looking fellow, and would
give a good idea of Don Quixote. He attached more im-
portance to the cut of a dragoon or a hussar uniform, than
was necessary for the salvation of a kingdom. At Jena
his army performed the finest and most showy manoeuvres
possible, but I soon put a stop to their coglipnerie, and
taught them that to fight and to execute dazzling man-
oeuvres and wear splendid imiforms were very different
affairs. If,' added he, ' the French army had been com-
manded by a tailor, the King of Prussia would cer-
tainly have gained the day, from his superior knowledge
in that art ; but as victories depend more upon the
skill of the general commanding the troops than upon that
of the tailor who makes their jackets, he consequently
failed.'

The dull and incompetent Frederick William III tried
to govern Prussia autocratically, like another Frederick
the Great, through his personal secretaries, and, like his
father, he fell under the influence of small-minded courtiers
and intriguers. Frederick William III not only preserved
the organisation of the country which Frederick the Great
had created, but endeavoured to continue Frederick the
Great's foreign policy. He desired to humiliate Austria
in order to procure for Prussia the hegemony in Germany.
In his eyes, as in the eyes of most of the leading Prussians,
Austria's downfall was Prussia's opportunity. The French
Bevolutionary armies began to overrun Europe. Napo-
leon won victory after victory. The Austrians were hard
pressed. Both they and the French solicited the aid of
Prussia. However, while Austria was fighting and bleed-
ing, her ally of Eeichenbach, Vieima, Pilnitz, and Berlin
continued the policy of Basle, Prussia remained neutral,

340 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

hoping for great territorial advantages at the cost of either
belligerent. King Frederick WUliam III and his advisers
did not care very much whether Prussia secured . an in-
crease from Austria or from France. Hence, while pursu-
ing ostensibly a policy of neutrality, Prussian statesmen
negotiated continually in Paris and Vienna, trying to
find out where they would be likely to secure the better
bargain.

In 1805 relations between Austria and France became
once more very strained. Another great war between
these two countries was in prospect, and once more both
France and Austria desired to obtain the assistance of the
numerically powerful Prussian army, which still enjoyed
the prestige won m the Seven Years' War. The diplomats
at Berlin negotiated simultaneoiisly an alliance with Napo-
leon which was to secure to Prussia the possession of Han-
over, and an alliance with Eussia and Austria directed
against Napoleon which was to procure Prussia vast terri-
torial advantages in other directions. With cunning
duplicity Prussia had concluded with Eussia an al-
liance which had been called a Declaration, and when
Laforest, the French Ambassador in Berlin, asked Haugwitz
whether Prussia had concluded an alliance with Eussia,
as rumour indicated, that minister replied that that
rumour was untrue, that between the Eussian and Prussian
sovereigns there existed neither a treaty of alliance nor a
convention.

While the French army was advancing towards Austria,
Prussia continued negotiating leisurely with that country,
for she desired to join that side which should be victorious.
The Czar Alexander of Eussia, who had come to Austria's
aid, hoped to act as a mediator between Vienna and Berlin.
As Prussia seemed unable to make up her mind unless
pressure was brought to bear upon her, the Czar hurried
to Berlin in order to secure the aid of Frederick William III.
At that time Prince Metternich was the Austrian Ambas-

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806 341

sador in Berlin. He described the negotiations in Ms
autobiographical memoirs as follows :

This negotiation was conducted on the one hand by the
Emperor Alexander and myself ; on the Prussian side by
Count Haugwitz for the pohtical part, and by the Duke of
Brunswick, to whom the King had given the command
of the army, for the military part. . . . From the first
moment, the Emperor and I were surprised at the ill-will
of the Prussian negotiations. With ill-concealed industry
they resorted to every imaginable pretext to protract the
negotiations, the completion of which grew more and more
urgent in view of the serious aspect of the war on the Danube.
... At last the King made up his mind. A treaty of
alliance between the three Courts was signed at Potsdam
on November 5, and the Emperor Alexander went im-
mediately to the Headquarters of the Emperor Francis (of
Austria).

Metternich's memoirs were written many years after
the event. It is therefore interesting to read the dispatches
which he sent to Vienna from Berlin while the negotiations
for a combined action against France were going on. On
November 4 he reported :

On arriving here I found that the Eussian and Prussian
negotiators had been occupied for several days in completing
a work which was disputed step by step by the latter.
The Emperor began the negotiation by sending through his
ministers a project of assent to the coalition pure and
simple. The King rephed by a counter-project fuU of
words, and showing anything but the active co-operation
of Prussia. . . . Prussia is accustomed to act only when it
is clearly for her own benefit ; that is all she looks to, and
Europe might disappear before her eyes if it depended on
her efforts to save it.

The treaty of alliance was signed at Potsdam on
November 5, 1805. The celebrated battle of Austerlitz, at

342 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

which Austria and Eussia were decisively defeated, took
place on December 2 of that year. A powerful Austro-
Eussian army faced Napoleon. The French troops were
about 82,000 strong, while the Austro-Eussian troops num-
bered 90,000. Napoleon had penetrated deeply into
Austria. The Archduke Ferdinand advanced through
Bohemia, in Napoleon's rear, with 20,000 men. The Arch-
duke Charles was collecting an army of 80,000 men.
Prussia, together with Saxony and Hesse, could have sealed
Napoleon's fate with the 240,000 men at their disposal.
By advancing towards the Danube Valley they could
have cut Napoleon's connection with France. Prussia did
not make use of that opportunity, but allowed Austria
and Eussia to be signally defeated. She looked coolly on,
and Austria revenged herself for Prussia's desertion by
acting merely as a spectator, when, a year later, Prussia
was attacked by Napoleon and defeated at Jena and
Auerstadt.

Prussia's policy of selfishness and intrigue found its
reward. She was punished for deserting Austria in 1795
and 1806 by a defeat which is unique in military his-
tory. On October 12, 1806, Napoleon wrote to the King of
Prussia :

Sire, Votre Majeste sera vaincue ; elle aura compromis
le repos de ses jours, 1' existence de ses sujets, sans I'ombre
d'un pretexte. Elle est aujourd'hui ratacte et pent traitor
avec moi d'une manike conforme k son rang ; elle traitera,
avant un mois, dans une situation differente.

Three days later, on October 15, at three o'clock in
the morning, he wrote to the Empress from Jena :

Mon amie, j'ai fait de belles manoeuvres contre les Prus-
siens. J'ai remporte hier une grande viotoire. lis 6taient
150,000 homihes ; j'ai fait 20,000 prisonniers, pris cent pieces
de canon et des drapeaux. J'etais en presence et pres du
roi de Prusse ; j'ai manque de le prendre ainsi que la

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806 S43

reine. Je bivouaque depuis deux jours. Je me porte ^
merveille.

Adieu, mon amie, porte-toi bien et aime-moi.

Si Hortense est k Mayence, donne-lui un baiser ainsi
qu'^ Napoleon et au petit.

Napoleon.

The twenty-third bulletin, dated Berlin, October 30,
stated : '

Le roi de Prusse a quitte I'Oder et a passe la Vistule ;
il est k Graudenz. Les places de Silesie sont sans garnisons
et sans approvisionnements. II est probable que la place
de Stettin ne tardera pas k tomber en notre pouvoir. Le roi
de Prusse est sans armee, sans artillerie, sans fusils. C'est
beaucoup que d'evaluer k 12 ou 15,000 hommes ce qu'il
aura pu reunir sur la Vistule.

The twenty-fourth bulletin, of October 31 , proclaimed :

Stettin est en notre pouvoir. . . . De toute cette belle
armee de 180,000 hommes, rien n'a passe I'Oder. Tout a
ete pris, tue ou erre encore entre I'Blbe et I'Oder, et sera
pris avant quatre jours. Le nombre des prisormiers mpntera
a pres de 100,000 hommes.

The thirty-first bulletin, of November 12, informed the
public :

Le nombre des prisonniers qui ont ete faits dans la cam-
pagne passe 140,000 ; le nombre des drapeaux pris passe
250 ; le nombre des pieces de campagne prises devant
Tennemi et sur le champ de bataille passe 800 ; celui des
pieces prises a Berlin et dans les places qui se sont rendues
passe 4000.

On November 16 Napoleon wrote to the King of Naples :

J'ai fait dans la campagne 140,000 prisonniers, dont
20,000 de cavallerie. J'ai pris, plus de 800 pieces de canon
et 250 drapeaux et etendards. L'armee et la monarchie
n' existent plus.

B44 THE EOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Warfare by strokes' of lightning-like rapidity was in-
vented not by Moltke, but by Napoleon. The German
campaigns of 1866 and 1870 were based on the campaign
of 1806, Prussia, which had successfully resisted Austria,
France, and Eussia during seven years, was completely
overthrown by Prance alone in a single month.

' Indignant at Prussia's duplicity, Napoleon wished to
make the country harmless. He systematically endeav-
oured to impoverish it. The Prench historian Bignon wrote
that never in the past a State had been so cruelly treated
as Prussia was ill-treated under the Prench occupation.
According to his account the Paymaster-general had only
24,000 francs with him when the Prench army crossed the
Ehine. According to other accounts he took 80,000 francs
with him. During the war Prussia had to feed, lodge,
clothe, and supply with horses, &c., 200,000 Prenchmen
and their allies, and at the end of the first occupation, in
autumn 1808, Prance had a cash surplus of 474,000,000
francs. According to Daru, the Intendant-general, the
cash profilt realised, after deducting the pay of the army,
came on October 15, 1808, to that huge sum. Napoleon
said on March 9, 1809, to Count Eoederer, ' I have drawn out
of Prussia 1,000,000,000 francs.' That was no exaggeration,
but that sum did not comprise the total of Prussia's sacri-
fices. After the evacuation of Prussia in December 1808,
the, country had to pay a heavy monetary contribution,
to maintain Prench garrisons in Kustrin, Stettin, and Glogau.
It lost huge sums through the continental system, which
damaged its trade, and it had to assist Napoleon in 1812
against Eussia and to support the Prench army in its march
through the country. The Prench officers plundered the
land on their own account. The Commander of Berlin, St.
Hilaire, had demanded 800 thalers table money per week,
but increased his demand to a thousand thalers. The
Prussian prisoners were not returned, but were employed
in Prance in constructing canals.

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 180G 345

According to Duncker, Prussia lost through her defeat
the following sums :

Losses during first occupation.

Franca

Goods supplied and services rendered .... 813,527,422'50

Contributions in cash 141,270,222-82

Tases levied by the French 59,064,796-92

Prussian salaries and pensions, not paid by the French 14,321,097-19

Loss through inferior coinage ..... 6,430,870-00

Confiscated timber, minerals, &o., belonging to the State 23,400,083-18

Prussian property confiscated in Warsaw . . . 63,821,088-90

Confiscated trust funds of orphans and minors . . 7,538,636-89

Total 1,129,374,217-50

Losses from November 5, 1808, to March 1813.

VisncB
Maintenance of French garrisons in Stettin, Kustrin, and

Glogau 37,973,951-00

/ Cash contribution? 103,914,318-58

Goods supplied 94,628,674-00

Cost of maintaining French army on the march to and

from Russia 309,430,000-00

Total 545,946,843-58

Grand total 1,675,321,061-08

Daru estimated Prussia's net income at 88,000,000
francs per year, while Napoleon stated it more correctly
at 73,000,000 francs. Even that figure exceeded Prussia's
real income by about 7,000,000 francs. It follows that
Napoleon drew out of Prussia in money, goods, and services
a sum equivalent to the gross income of about twenty
years.

The downfall of 1806 caused Prussia to change her
policy in two directions. Her rulers found it necessary
to alter completely the national organisation and form of
government and to adopt a new policy towards Austria.
The vicious Cabinet government through an incompetent
King assisted by irresponsible secretaries was abolished.
The King and his ministers henceforth worked hand in
hand. As the tyrannical institutions of Frederickian

346 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

times had estranged the people, a moreliberal form of govern-
ment was introduced, the serfs were converted into land-
owning peasants, and the army was converted from a pro-
fessional into a national force. Every citizen was made
liable to military service. Having lost the bulk of her
territories, Prussia found it necessary to rely upon Austria
for support, and with Austria's help Prussia recovered her
independence in the wars of 1813-14. However, as soon
as the Prussian soil had been liberated the Prussian govern-
ment resumed its traditional policy of hostility to Austria.
Priedrich von Gentz, the secretary of the Vienna Congress,
described Prussia's attitude and policy during the Congress
as follows in his memoir of February 12, 1815, which will
be found in Metternich's papers :

Prussia only brought to the Congress an immoderate
desire for extending her possessions at the expense of all
other States, and without regard to any principle of justice
or even of decency. This passion for conquest had its origin
neither in the character of the King nor of his Prime Miaister,
for the King, although below mediocrity in intellect and judg-
ment, is yet at bottom a good sort of man, and Chancellor
Hardenberg is one of the best that ever existed. But the
policy of the Prussian Court does not depend after all either
on the King or upon Hardenberg. Its policy, founded and
pursued diiring the last century, has found fresh support in
the general enthusiasm of the nation, in the energy of the
army, and in the irresistible power which a certain number
of distinguished military men exercise at present on the
Cabinet.

Since the moment of Prussia's resurrection, the principal
object of this party has been the total acquisition of Saxony.
Being neither able nor willing to antagonise Eussia, they
have transferred all their designs to Germany. However,
the acquisition of Saxony, notwithstanding its vastness,
would for them be but the beginning of a grand series of
political operations, by which they hope sooner or later to
unite to Prussia the largest part of the north of Germany,

PEUSSIA'S DOWNI'ALL IN 1806 847

to efface the influence of Austria, and to put themselves at
the head of the whole German Confederation.

The forecast of the far-seeing Gentz has come true. The
war of 1866 with Austria, and of 1870 with Prance, are mile-
stones on the road on which Prussia endeavoured to advance
towards the complete domination of all Germany, includ-
ing Austria ; and the war of 1914 was to bring about the
consummation of that policy which the HohenzoUerns
have steadfastly pursued for centuries. The present war
was likely to result in Austria falling completely under
Germany's domination whether Germany was victorious or
whether she was beaten.

Men and nations rise to greatness by their struggles
and by their sufferings. Adversity is a most excellent
teacher. The Prussian national character has been im-
mensely strengthened by the terrible sufferings endured
between 1806 and 1813. .Iron is tried by fire, and nations
by their sufferings. The experiences of that period have
not only created the determination and the will to victory
of Prusso-Germany, but they have aroused that undying
hatred of France which was manifested both in 1870 and in
the present war. That savage hatred was caused probably
not so much by defeat, national humiliation, and loss of
territory, which, after all, signify but little to the individual,
but by the tyranny with which the French armies ruled
Prussia during seven years, and by the enormous and ex-
haustive extortions which they practised. Germany has,
with incredible short-sightedness, applied the regime under
which she suffered from 1806 to 1813 not merely to Belgium
and France, but to all the countries with which she is at
war, and as far as possible to neutral nations as well. She
has thereby steeled the character and determination of
her enemies and has sown the seed of hatred which will
last for many decades, and perhaps for centuries.

Prussia owed her humiliation and sufferings in Napoleon's

348 THE FOUNDATIONS 05^ GEEMANY

time to the incompetence of the two kings who succeeded
Frederick the Great, and who vainly strove to act in the
manner of that great man. Great men are frequently
fatal to nations, not only because they ijicur great risks,
but also because their example invites their incompetent
successors to embark upon a policy of adventure. It is
dangerous for small men to step into the shoes of a great
genius. The war of 1806 was caused by Prussia's duplicity
and faithlessness, and its direct cause was a Prussian chal-
lenge addressed to Napoleon. Frederick William the Third
sent to the French Emperor an unacceptable and offensively
worded, ultimatum because he, and many of his supporters,
believed that Prussia was still as irresistible as she had been
under the great Frederick. Queen Louise, the Prussian
King's consort, sadly said to Napoleon : ' La memoire du
grand Frederic nous a fait egarer. Nous nous crumes
pareUs a lui, et nous no le sommes pas.'

One-man government established Prussia's greatness,
and one-man government brought about her downfall.
Frederick William the Third, unlike his father, was only
dull, weak, and vain, but not vicious. The people remained
loyal to him and deplored his misfortunes. They considered
that Napoleon, not he, was responsible for the war. Had
Frederick William the Third possessed the character of his
father, or had the war with France been caused by criminal
recklessness on his part, they might have risen against
him and have driven him out of the country. Prussia of
1806 easily forgave Frederick William the Third for the
national disaster which was caused only by weakness and
lack of judgment on the part of the King. Will the Germans
and the Prussians as easily forgive William the Second if
the war should end in Germany's downfall and if the people
should find out that it was brought about by the Emperor's
recklessness ? Prussia's outworn institutions were modern-
ised in consequence of Jena and Auerstadt. Defeat led
to the liberalising of the Prussian government and of the

PEUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806 349

national institutions. A defeat in the present war should
have similar consequences. It should democratise Germany
and might make it a republic.

Prusso- Germany has waxed great at Austria's expense.
For centuries she has persistently pursued a policy hostile
to Austria. The present war may result in Austria's dis-
appearance as an independent State. The Dual Monarchy
may becojne a German vassal, unless, indeed, the Habsburgs
should make a separate peace with the Allies stipulating
that for the Slavonic, Italian, and Eoumanian territories
which they are bound to lose in accordance with the Allies'
declaration of policy made to President Wilson, they should
be given Silesia and the South German States as compen-
sation. Silesia was Austrian until 1740, and the South
German States followed Austria's lead until 1862. If the
war should bring about such a rearrangement Austria might
once more become the predominant power in Germany,
and the war would have destroyed what Prussia has won
during centuries. The Emperor Carl of Austria may re-
venge himself upon Fredeirick William I and Frederick the
Great. The far-seeing Mirabeau wrote in his book,' Dela
Monarchie Prussienne,' which was published in 1788 :

Si jamais un prince peu sense monte sur ce tr6ne, on
verra crouler soudainement, sans cause apparente, ce geant
formidable ; et I'Europe etonnee n'apercevra plus h sa place
qu'un pygmee debile.

His prophecy came true in 1806, and it may be con&med
by the result of the present war.

CHAPTER XIII

DBMOOEATIC GERMANY —A GLANCE INTO THE PAST AND
INTO THE FUTUEB ^

While the other heads of State at war with Germany
accepted the challenge of that Power without drawing a
distinction between the German Government and the
German people, President Wilson in his address of April 2
discriminated sharply and most emphatically between the
German nation and its rulers. He, significantly declared
that the German Government, not the German people,
was at wat with the Government and people of the United
States, that the Americans had not quarrelled with the
German people, that they had no hostile feelings towards
them, that they fought for the liberation of all peoples,
the German peoples included, that they were sincere friends
of the German people. The passages in which these dis-
criminations occur are so interesting, so important, and so
full of meaning that it seems worth while to give them in
full. The President stated :

With a profound sense of the solemn; even the tragical
character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibi-
lities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what
I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that Congress de-
clare the recent course of the Imferial German Government
to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government
and people of the United States ; that it formally accept the
' From the Nineteenth Century :and After, May 1917i
350

DEMOCEATIC GEEMANY, PAST AND FUTUEE 351

status of a belligerent which is thus thrast upon it ; and
that it take immediate steps, not only to put the country
in a more thorough state of defence, but also to exert all
its power and to employ its resources to bring the Government
of the German Empire to terms, and end the war. . . .

We have not quarrelled mth the German feofle. We have
no feeling towards them hut one of sympathy and friendship.
It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted
in entering this war. It was not with their previous know-
ledge or approval. It was a war determined upon, as wars
used to be determined upon in the old unhappy days, when
people were nowhere consulted by their rulers, and wars
were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or little
groups of ambitious men, who were accustomed to use their
fellow-men as pawns and tools. . . .

One of the things that has served to convince us that
Prussian autocracy was not, and could never be, our friend, is
that from the very outset of the present war it filled our
unsuspecting communities, and even our ofi&ces of Govern-
ment, with spies, and set criminal intrigues everywhere
afoot against our national unity of council and our peace
within and without, our industries and our commerce. . . .

Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate
them we have sought to put the most generous interpreta-
tion possible upon them, because we know that their source
lay not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people
towards us — ^who were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as
ourselves — but only in the selfish designs of a Government
that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. . . .

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because
we know that in such a government, follouiing such methods,
we can never have a friend, and that in the presence of its
organised power, always lying in wait to accomplish we
know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for
the democratic Governments of the world.

We are now about to accept the gage of battle with this
natural foe to liberty, and shall, if necessary, spend the whole
force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and
its power. We are glad, now that we see facts with no veil

352 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate
feace of the world, for the liberation of its feofles — the German
peoples included — the rights of nations great and small,
and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of
life and obedience. The world must be safe for democracy.
Its peace must be planted upon trusted foundations of
political liberty. . . .

We are, let me say again, sincere friends of the German
people and shall desire nothing so much as an early re-
establishment of intimate relations to our mutual advantage.
However hard it may be for them for the time being to
believe this, it is spoken from our hearts. We have borne
with thek present Government through all these bitter
months because of that friendship, exercising patience and
forbearance which otherwise would have been impossible.

President Wilson's proclamation is addressed not merely
to the United States, but to the whole world, and perhaps
particularly to the German nation itself. It is a terrible
indictment of the German Emperor and the Prusso-German
Government. It practically absolves the German people
of all guilt in the outbreak of the present war and the
ca,lculated atrocity with which it has been conducted.
Special conditions prevail in the United States. According
to many German writers more than twelve million Americans
are German-Americans. In reality only 2,501,181 people
born in Germany were domiciled in the United States when
the census of 1910 was taken. Still, the number of Germans
in the United States is large, and in certain portions of the
country it is very large. However, it would be a mistake
to believe that President WUson distinguished between
the German Government and the German people and put
all the guilt on the former merely in order to conciliate and
to carry with him the German- Americans. Although the
desire not to wound their feelings may have influenced his
action to some extent, I believe that President Wilson
acted rather as a statesman than as a politician in making

DEMOCEATIC GEEMANY, PAST AND PUTUEB 358

this discrimination. He considered the Gei'man nation
the tool of the Emperor and the governing class, and he
desired to encourage the former to rise against the latter
and to convert Germany into a democracy by a revolution.
That this was President Wilson's aim is shown by many
weighty sentences contained in his proclamation.

It has been asked whether the German people are fit for
democratic rule, whether they are likely to rebel against
the men who have misguided them and who are responsible
for the present war. Many have answered this question
in the negative. They have declared that the Germans*
are a servile race which has never revolted during the whole I
course of its history, and that they are therefore not fit for ■
self-government. This argument seems based upon an
insufficient knowledge of German history and of the German
national character.

By nature; history, and tradition the Germans are demo-
crats. The character of most nations has remained curiously
stable through centuries and centuries. Although alien
races may have swept over the land or have settled in it,
the character of its inhabitants has in many cases remained
so strangely similar that one would almost believe that
it was formed by permanent local influences, by the pre-
vailing climatic, geographical, and geological factors. For
instance, the modern French, as Alfred Fouillee and other
psychologists have pointed out, bear the same character
that the ancient Gauls had two thousand years ago. Caesar
described them as changeable in council, fond of revolutions,
easily carried away by false rumours, rash in action, liable
to act on the spur of the moment, easily elated and easily
depressed, ready to go to war for an idea, fond of adventm-e,
generous, hospitable, frank, kindly, light-hearted, unstable,
vain, attracted by glamour, possessing great acuteness of
mind, being fond of jokes, attracted by novelty, full of
curiosity, cultivating eloquence and possessing an astonish-
ing facility for talking and for being carried away by words.

2a

354 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

CsBsar particularly described the 6lan of the French soldiers.
Strabo described the Gauls as nervous, fond of fighting,
simple-hearted. He also mentions that they are easily
elated when victorious and as easily depressed when defeated.
As they act spontaneously, without logic, they often fail
in their enterprises. Flavius Vopiscus described the Gauls
as the most turbulent nation in the world, ever ready to
change their rulers and government, ever in search of
perilous adventures.

If we wish to understand the character of the Germans
we should not merely study the Germans of to-day and of
yesterday, but should study the evolution of the German
character since the earliest times. Such study will show
that the Germans were originally a democratic nation, and
that only in recent times their character was affected and
falsified, but was scarcely permanently altered, by the rulers
of the House of HohenzoUern. The earliest and the best
description of the Germans, a description which is generally
considered to be reliable, is furnished by Tacitus in his
celebrated book on the Germans. He writes :

In the election of kings they have regard to descent ;
in that of generals to valour. Their kings have not an
absolute or unlimited power ; and their generals command
less through the force of authority, than of example. If
they are daring, adventurous, and conspicuous in action,
they procure obedience from the admiration they inspire.
None, however, but the priests are permitted to judge
offenders, to inflict bonds or stripes ; so that chastise-
ment appears not as an act of military discipline, but as
punishment by the god whom they suppose present with
warriors. . . .

On affairs of smaller moment, the chiefs consult ; on
those of greater importance, the whole community ; yet
with this circumstance, that ■v^'hat is referred to the decision
of, the people is first maturely discussed by the chiefs. . . .

An inconvenience produced by their liberty is that they
do not all assemble at a stated time, as if it were in obedience

DEMOCEATIC GEEMANY, PAST AND FUTUEE 355

to a command, but two or three days are lost in the delays
of convening. When they all think fit, they sit down armed.
Silence is proclaimed by the priests, who have on this occa-
sion a coercive power. Then the king, or chief, and such
others as are conspicuous for age, birth, military renown, or
eloquence, are heard ; and gain attention rather from their
ability to persuade, than their authority to command. . . .

The chiefs fight for victory ; the companions for their
chief. . . .

They proceed to convivial parties, in which it is no
disgrace to pass days and nights, without intermission, in
drinking. The frequent quarrels which arise amongst
them, when intoxicated, sometimes terminate in abusive
language, but more frequently in blood. In their feasts
they generally deliberate on the reconcilement of enemies,
on family alliances, on the appointment of chiefs, and finally
on peace and war ; conceiving that at no time the soul is
more opened to sincerity or warmed to heroism. . . .

Their drink is a liquor prepared from barley or wheat,
brought by fermentation to a certain resemblance to wine.

German conviviality is exactly now as it was two
thousand years ago, but Germany's political organisation
no longer resembles that which prevailed in Tacitus 's time.
Then the Germans possessed free democracies presided over
by elected kings. Commenting on the passage, ' On affairs
of smaller moment the chiefs consult ; on those of greater
importance the whole community,' the celebrated Montes-
quieu wrote, in the chapter on the English Constitution
in his ' Esprit des Lois,' that the British Constitution had
obviously been evolved in the forests of Germany :

Si Ton veut lire I'admirable ouvrage de Tacite sur les
mceurs des Germains, on verra que c'est d'eux que les Anglais
ont tire I'idee de leur gouvemement politique. Ce beau
syst§me a ete trouve dans les bois.

The early German tribes continued to be ruled by elected
kings. The tribe of the Franks became supreme among the

856 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

German tribes under the guidance of some extremely able
rulers, and the greatest of these, Charlemagne, established
by conquest a vast Central-European Empire, became the
protector of the Pope, and was crowned Eoman Emperor
in Eome in the year 800. Thus ' the Holy Eoman Empire
of German nationality ' was established. It was considered
to be the direct successor of the ancient Eoman Empire.
The conception arose and the conviction became &mly
settled in men's minds that the peace and happiness of the
world required one faith and one government, a universal
Church and a universal monarchy. The German Emperor,
when crowned at Eome, significantly received ia double
crown urUs et orbis. Until 1806 the official title of the
German Emperor was Bomanorum Imperator semper
Auguslus, Charlerhagne was considered the direct successor
of the Eoman Caesars, of which he was currently described
to be the sixty-eighth. Exactly as the Pope claimed to be
the overlord of all the bishops, so the German- Eoman
Emperor claimed to be the king of kings, the overlord of
all kings throughout the world. The old Eoman Empire
had scarcely known the right of succession by descent. If
we study Eoman history we find that only three of the
Caesars were followed by their sons. Hence it was only
natural that the great spiritual and temporal monarchies
which succeeded the Eoman Empire became also elective.
Exactly as the Pope at Eome was elected by the represent-
atives of the Church, so the King-Emperor of the Eoman-
German universal monarchy was elected by the represent-
atives of the nation. The old system of choosing rulers
by universal election, by acclamation, had to be simplified
to avoid delay and quarrels. Owing to the strength of
tribal feeling monarchy was not considered to be the right
of any one of the German tribes. All laid claim to it. In
course of time the idea arose that the four largest tribes,
the Franks, the Swabians, the Saxons, and the Bavarians,
were particularly entitled to elect the German king through

DEMOCEATIC GEEMANY, PAST AND FUTUEE 357

their representatives. These four leading tribes furnished
the four great officers of the imperial household, and in
course of time the German Constitution became settled
in this way, that the four most powerful and most represent-
ative individuals of Germany were given the right of election.
They formed the majority of the seven electors of the Holy
Eoman Empire. The remaining three were the leading
princes of the Church in Germany, the bishops of Mayence,
Treves, and Cologne.

In course of time the fiefs which had been granted for
life for great services rendered became hereditary. A
powerful landed nobility arose which strove to increase
its power at the cost of the Emperor, their overlord. Hence
it became the settled policy of the electors to choose for
Emperor not a powerful prince, but a weak one, for a strong
monarch would endanger their privileges and their inde-
pendence. Lord Bryce correctly stated in his excellent
book, ' The Holy Eoman Empire ' :

The chief object of the magnates was to keep the monarch
in his present state of helplessness. . . . Eudolf (of Habs-
burg) was chosen because his private resources were too
slender to make him an object of disquiet. Till the expense
which the crown entailed had began to prove ruinous to its
wearer, the electors preferred to confer it on some petty
prince, such as were Eudolf and Adolf of Nassau and Giinther
of Schwartzburg, seeking when they could to keep it from
settling in one family. They boimd the newly elected mon-
arch to respect all their present immunities, including those
which they had just extorted as the price of their votes ;
they checked all his attempts to recover lost lands or rights,
they ventured at last (in 1399) to depose their anointed head,
Wenzel, King of Bohemia, whose dissipated life and neglect
of his duties certainly justified their displeasure.

The German Emperors, being weak and finding them^
selves opposed and hampered by their nominal vassals,
endeavoured to find a counterpoise in the wealthy and

858 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

flourishing German towns which suffered from the exac-
tions of the landed nobility. The so-called ' free towns '
were the strongholds of German wealth, intelligence, and
democracy. The democratic character of their government
may be seen from numerous contemporary documents,
particularly from the most trustworthy reports of the
Venetian Ambassadors, who at the time were the ablest
diplomats in the world. The Venetian Ambassador Quirini
reported on hig return from the Court of Maximilian in
1507 as follows :

There are in Germany about a hundred free towns, of
which twenty-eight belong to the Swabian League, sixty-
two to the great league of Danzig and Liibeck [the Hanseatic
League], whUe the rest lie in the region of the Ehine. . . .

As for the government of the free towns, each one rules
itself by its council, to which are admitted citizens, traders
who are no citizens, and artisans ; yet not all the members
of these classes are included in the council, for the number
varies with the size of the place, and changes from time to
time. These councils appoint the magistrates, who ad-
minister justice for the time being, and, moreover, regulate
the revenues and public affairs of the town precisely as if it
was a free and independent State.

Some of the towns owe their freedom to privileges granted
by the Emperor for deeds of valour in the struggle of the
Empire against the infidels,' who were earlier very trouble-
some. Others gained their freedom by giving a sum of
money to the temporal lord or bishop who held them, and
who consented accordingly to cede to the town the territory
belonging to it. So many towns have gained their freedom
in these two ways during the period that the Germans have
enjoyed control of the Empire, that they now number nearly
a hundred. In order to maintain their freedom they are
accustomed to unite themselves together in leagues for
mutual protection and to oppose those princes who would
subjugate them. They receive into their leagues those
princes of the Empire who wish to join them, whether

DEMOCEATIC GEEMANY, PAST AND EUTUEE 359

ecclesiastical or secular. The leagues are temporary, and
are continued or changed from time to time as suits their
members.

The great Machiavelli, who, about the same time,
travelled in Germany as the representative of the power-
ful republic of Florence, gave a similar description of the
wealth and power of the self-governing German towns
and of their proud and independent citizens.

The aboriginal democratic spirit of the Germans which
Tacitus had described strongly asserted itself during the
development of feudalism. The absolute power which
princes and barons exercised in the rural parts was counter-
balanced by a democratically chosen Emperor on the one
hand and by democratically governed towns on the other.
Each town was fortified and was defended by its armed
citizens. Most were strong enough to resist single-handed
the absolute lords in the neighbourhood, and their combined
strength was so great that they could deal successfully not
only with the leagues of robber barons and small princes,
but even with powerful kings. At first leagues of free towns
were formed for securing the highways of Germany. Later
on the Hanseatic League was created for defending the
rights of the democratically governed towns on the sea as
well. The united merchants of Danzig, Liibeck, Hamburg,
Nuremberg, Augsburg, Strasburg, &o., created by voluntary
contributions fleets which dominated for some considerable
time the Baltic and the North Sea, and which defeated the
Dorthern kings. The record of the Hanseatic League shows
that the Germans were able to practise self-government
successfully at a very early period.

If democracy means wUIing co-operation for general
purposes, if it means government by men of equal authority
through their elected representatives, Germany was demo-
cratic at the top and at the bottom, in respect of the King-
Emperor and of the towns. However, absolutism existed

S60 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

simultaneously with democracy and with self-government.
It was exercised by the powerful feudal lords in the country
and by the almost equally powerful and equally absolute
representatives of the Church. Bishops and other ecclesias-
tical potentates ruled in their districts often as tyrannously
as the temporal lords around them, and oppressed and
plundered the poor and helpless . The German Eef ormation,
which began about 1520, was not only a spiritual revolt, but
a revolt against temporal tyranny as well. Lord Bryce
rightly says in his ' Holy Eoman Empire ' that it was ' a
revolt against the principle of authority in all its forms,
erecting a standard of civU as well as of religious liberty.'
Princely misgovernment had become as intolerable in Ger-
many as clerical abuse. Martin Luther wrote in 1623 :

Since the beginning of the world a wise prince has been
a very rare bird, and a pious prince has been still rarer.
Princes are, as a rule, the greatest fools and the worst rascals
on earth. Therefore one should alwayg expect the worst
from them and look forward to little good. They are God's
executioners and torturers. They understand nothing except
how to flay the poor and to make a game of God's word.
Such men were formerly called rascals. Now they wish
to be called pious Christian princes. God has struck them
with bliadness, and He wUl make an end of them as He will
with the spiritual junkers. For the common people, are
learning to reason, and the plague of princes is becoming
hateful to the common people. I fear they cannot be paci-
fied unless the princes behave in a princely manner and
commence to govern with good sense and justice. One will
not, one cannot, one must not tolerate their tyrannies and
their wilfulness any longer. God will not suffer it. The
world is no longer a place in which the people can be driven
and chased about like cattle.

Two years later, in 1525, the Great Peasant War broke
out. The ill-treated German serfs in the South of Germany
wished to be free men as were their neighbours in Switzerland

DEMOCEATIC GEEMANY, PAST AND PUTUEE 361

■who had freed themselves from Habsburg rule by a successful
revolt. At first the peasant armies were successful. They
destroyed more than a thousand castles and religious houses.
In many cases the townsfolk assisted them against their
oppressors. Their grievances were not only economic but
political as well. Among the demands made in their procla-
mations, the demand for justice and freedom was always
prominent. For instance, the peasants of south-west Ger-
many claimed : ' None shall any longer be in a state of serf-
dom ; none shall obey any longer any prince or laws but such
as pleaseth him, and that shall be the Emperor; justice
and right shall be as of old time ; should there be one having
authority who displeaseth us, we would have the power to
set up in his place another who pleaseth us.' Mr. Bax
stated correctly in his ' History of the Peasants' War in
Germany ' : ' In the uprising known as the Peasants' War
there is more than one strain to be observed, though all turns
on the central ideas of equality, economic reform, and poli-
tical reorganisation.' The Peasants' War and the Eeform-
ation occurred simultaneously because the democratic Ger-
man nation revolted at the same time against the oppression
of the aristocracy and of the Church. Unfortunately the
revoltiug peasants were badly led. Owing to their ignorance
and dissensions they were defeated by the united feudal
lords. The vastness of the peasant revolt inay be seen by
the fact that, according to the Berner Chronik, more than
130,000 peasants died either in fighting or at the hands
of the 'executioners, for the victorious lords took terrible
vengeance on the vanquished.

The Thirty Years' War, which lasted from 1618 to 1648,
which devastated all Germany and converted the most
flourishing part of the country into a desert, dealt a f earfiil
blow to German self-government and democracy. During
that gigantic struggle, in the course of which Germany's
population was reduced to one-half, if not one-third, the
wealth and power of the commercial and industrial towns

362 THE FOUNDATIONS OF OEEMANY

was completely destroyed. They could no longer defend
their rights and their independence with their armed citizens,
especially as the war had led to the rise of powerful profes-
sional standing armies, with the assistance of which the
princes could easily overcome the opposition of the armed
burghers.

The peace of Miinster and Osnabriick of 1648 reduced
the rights of the Emperor to the utmost. The individual
princes, who had been the Emperor's subordinates, were
given complete independence, and the result was that they
strove to make themselves supreme in the Empire by sub-
jecting its territories to themselves. Among the ablest
rulers of the time was Frederick William, the Great Elector
of Brandenburg, who ruled from 1640 to 1688. Eecognising
the importance of a powerful army for making Brandenburg
Prussia an important State, he resolved to create a large
standing military force. Democratic self-government
prevailed in his dominions. As the self-governing towns
and the estates endeavoured to defend their privileges and
rights, as they refused to be arbitrarily taxed for the creation
of a huge army, a conflict arose between the Elector and the
citizens. Frederick William ruthlessly destroyed local self-
government, and did not shrink from breaking the legitimate
opposition of the burghers by employing his army against
them and by delivering protesting burgomasters to the exe-
cutioner. During his long rule the local Diets were destroyed.
The nation became a nation of serfs, and his grandson. King
Frederick William the First, the father of Frederick the
Great, abolished between 1713 and 1740 the few remaining
rights and privileges of the towns and the nobility. Under
his rule self-government of the towns, even with regard to
trivial local affairs, was abolished. Permission for building
operations costing more than six thalers had to be given
by the King in person.

The Hohenzollern rulers from the Great Elector onward
destroyed the ancient democratic institutions of their country

DEMOCEATIC GEEMANY, PAST AND PUTUEE 363

with the utmost ruthlessness and brutality. Brandenburg-
Prussia became the most autocratic State in the world. The
great material success of the Prussian State caused many
German sovereigns to imitate the Hohenzollern poHcy of
absolutism. But as they acted with greater respect for
old-established rights the old democratic spirit of Germany
remained active in the non-Prussian States, in South Ger-
many, in Austria, and in the Ehenish province, which
became Prussian only in 1815. Herein lies the reason that
the south and the west of Germany are far more democratic
and far more tolerant than the old-Prussian north.

Euthless oppression by sovereigns disposing of irresistible
power had weakened, but had by no means killed, the ancient
democratic spirit of the German people. The Prussians,
though proud of Frederick the Great's achievements, sighed
under their yoke. They wished for less glory and more liberty,
and rejoiced at his death. In the middle of the eighteenth
century the spirit of liberty, which had been suppressed
by rulers such as the Great Elector, Louis the Fourteenth,
and Peter the Great and their successors, was revived, espe-
cially in France. Intellectual Germany thoroughly approved
of the ideals of the French philosophers and viewed with
cordial sympathy the attempts of the French people to
break their shackles. The French Eevolution of 1789 was
greeted with delight by the leading Germans, among them
Goethe and Schiller. They had suffered so much under
dynastic tyranny that love of hberty had become stronger
within them than love of country. They had become ad-
mirers of a liberal cosmopolitanism. When the armies of
revolutionary France crossed the Ehine into Germany
bringing with them the promise of liberty, fraternity, and
equality and the maxim ' war to the castle and peace to the
cottage,' they were received by the Germans with joy as
friends and brothers, as heroes and as deUverers from an
intolerable yoke.

Prussia, which had become a nation of obedient, soulless

364 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

serfs, was easily defeated by Napoleon in 1806, and the
people had so much become accustomed to passive obedi-
ence, they had so largely lost the natural instincts of the
citizen, that t]aey looked upon the defeat of the Prussian army
with comparative indifference. No one had been ordered
to oppose the in.vader, so nobody stirred. The Prussian
people became hostile to Erance only when they began to
suffer from the exactions of the French armies. Stein and
other Prussian patriots recognised that Prussia could be
rejuvenated only by democratising its institutions, by attach-
ing the people to the State by bonds of affection and of in-
terest. The serfs were converted into landowning peasants,
the professions, commerce, and industries were freed from
their mediaeval testrictions, and the necessary enthusiasm
for, fighting Napoleon in 1813 was created by the formal
promise made to the people that it would receive after the
war the representative and democratic institutions for which
it had clamoured for a long time. That promise, which was
solemnly made by King Frederick William the Third before
the war and on September 1, 1816, and which was embodied
in Article XIII of the German Federal Act of June 8, 1815, at
the Vienna Congress, was not fulfilled. After the overthrow
of Napoleon a period of rieaction began throughout Germany,
but although Germany was exhausted by the Napoleonic
War the people refused to abandon their claim for constitu-
tional goyernment. The democratic spirit of the people
^ found eloquent advocates in Germany's leading men, who
demanded the introduction of democratic, constitutional
rule. The reactionary Government tried to stifle the de-
mand for self-government by brutal persecution. Among
the men who were disgraced, imprisoned, hounded out of the
country or driven into exile or rebellion were the founders
of modern Prussia, men such as Stein, Gneisenau, Arndt,
Jahn, W. von Humboldt, Beyme, Boyen ; the most eminent
scientists such as the brothers Grimm, Dahlmann, Gervinus,
Ewald, Mommsen, Eotteck, Welcker, Virchow, poets and

DEMOCEATIO GERMANY, PAST AND FUTUEE 365

musicians such as PreUigrath, Heine, Wagner, Kinkel, Her-
wegh, Laube, Hoffman von Pallersleben, Borne, Dingel-
stedt, Geibel, Fritz Reuter, and many others.

The protracted wars of the Napoleonic period were as
unfavourable to the development of democracy in Germany
as the Thirty Years' War had been. Dissatisfaction with
governmental absolutism led at last in 1848 to a revolution
which broke out simultaneously in Berlin, Vienna, Dresden,
Prague, and elsewhere, and it is highly significant and worth
noting, that the Germans did not take the initiative in revolt-
ing against their leaders, but that they merely followed the
example of the French. The Paris Revolution of 1848 was
the signal to the democrats in Germany. It showed them
the way. History may repeat itself.

The Revolution of 1848 was comparatively a mild one
in Germany. The grievances of the people were not very
great. Peace and quiet were restored by certain concessions
to the popular demands, which, however, were gradually
whittled away. The great successes achieved under Prince
Bismarck's guidance re-established the prestige of absolute
government in Germany, weakened the democratic party,
and to some extent discredited it. In Austria, on the other
hand, where the people had suffered far more seriously from
governmental oppression, where the sense of injustice and
of bitterness was far greater, the Revolution of 1848 assumed
far larger proportions, and it was overcome only with diffi-
culty and at vast cost in human lives.

The details given in these pages show that the often-
heard assertion that the Germans are an undemocratic and
servile race, which has never revolted during the whole
course of its history, which is unfit for self-government, is
untrue. History teaches us that the German race is as
democratic as is the British race. The history of the German
towns, as that of Germanic Switzerland and Holland, shows
the prevalence of a democratic spirit which could temporarily
be suppressed but never be destroyed. The German model

366 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

towns, Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck, are still self-govern-
ing republics. It is also wrong to assert that the Germans
have never revolted. Luther's Eeformation was a political,
social, and a religious revolt which in magnitude, success,
and world-historical importance stands probably above the
English Eevolution against Charles the First and the French
Eevolution of 1789. The Germans did not revolt success-
fully in modern times, but then they had comparatively
little cause to revolt.

If we study the causes of successful revolutions we find
that they are two : political dissatisfaction and economic
distress. They were found combined in the English Ee-
volution, the French Eevolution, the Eevolutions of 1830
and 1848, and the recent Eussian Eevolution. People will
stand oppression patiently and they will stand hunger,
but they will not easily stand both combined. If the
Germans should in due course suffer simultaneously from
hunger and defeat, they may well turn against their rulers
and call them to account.

It may be argued that although the Germans possessed
a highly developed form of self-government in the past,
that although self-government was far more advanced in
Germany in the sixteenth century than it was in other
countries, the German character has changed in the course
of the last few centuries, that the Germans, and especially
the North Germans, are so well drilled and disciplined that
they have become unfit for denaocratic rule. In the past,
however, the North Germans were the most democratic
among the German people. That may be seen from the
history of the Hanseatic League. And as to the present,
if democratic government means willing co-operation for
general purposes, if it means government by men of equal
authority through their elected representatives, then the
men of modern Germany have shown that they are emi-
nently fit for democracy, for in no pountry in the world is
co-operation more highly developed than it is in Germany.

DEMOCEATIC GEEMANY, PAST AND PUTUEE 367

The German co-operative societies, which had 5,555,803
members in 1912, the German trade unions, which had
4,052,867 members in the same year, the German associa-
tions of salary -earners with 623,840 members, the Social
Democratic Party, which in 1912 polled 4,250,329 votes,
and the gigantic professional associations of agriculturists,
peasants, industrialists, &c., are great and significant monu-
ments of German self-discipline and of an ability to co-
operate willingly for a general aim without directions from
the authorities. The fact that these gigantic, well-organ-
ised, highly disciplined, and most efficient associations
are particularly strongly represented in North Germany
and Prussia shows that the North Germans are at least
as fit for democratic rule as are the more easy-going
South Germans.

Having made a special study of German affairs and of
Anglo- German relations, I had foreseen ever since 1900 that
the Emperor's policy was likely to involve Germany in a
world-war. Hence I warned this country against a war
with Germany for many years in this Eeview and elsewhere.
Moreover, in considering the internal position in Germany
and the consequences of Germany's provocative policy, I
had come to the conclusion that a war which had been
brought about by the Emperor's ambition might lead to a
revolution in Germany. I wrote, for instance, in August
1911, at the time of the Agadir crisis, in an article entitled
' German Designs in Africa,' which had the honour of
receiving the first place in this Eeview :

War has been brought within the limits of vision. It is
to be hoped that Germany will turn away from the very
dangerous course upon which she has embarked, a course
which in a very short time will bring her into a collision not
only with Prance, but with several Great Powers ; and as
the Triple Alliance is believed to be a purely defensive
alliance relating only to Europe, Germany may find her-
self deserted by her Allies in the hour of trouble. . . ,

368 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Persistence on the dangerous and unprecedented course which
Germany is steering at the present moment may imperil
Germany's future, and may cost the Emperor his throne.
The German nation is intensely loyal and patriotic, but it
would never forgive a monarch who had driven the nation
into a disastrous war without adequate reason.

Immediately on the outbreak of the present war I wrote
an article entitled ' The Ultimate Euin of Germany,' which
appeared in September 1914 in this Eeview, in which I
once more foretold that Germany's defeat might lead to a
revolution. I stated :

The question now arises whether the docile Germans
will bear their misfortunes patiently, or whether they will
rehel against the crowned crimiiial who has brought about
their misery. A revolt is possible, and it may take a two-
fold shape. Conceivably, the Southern States will, after
a serious defeat of the German Army, detach themselves
from Prussia, refusing to fight any longer for the German
Emperor, The Empire may be dissolved. ... On the
other hand, it is possible that there will be a general rising
of the people against their rulers. The great majority of
Germans are dissatisfied with their form of government.
A well-educated people does not like to be governed like
children. An absolutism thinly disguised by parliamentary
forms is tolerable only so long as it is successful and as the
people are prosperous. . . , Failure of the Government in
the present war will make absolute government impossible
in Germany, If Germany should experience a serious defeat,
she may either become a strictly limited monarchy on the
English model or a republic. However, as both the Em-
peror and the Crown Prince are equally responsible for the
crime of the present war, it may well happen that the
German people will refuse to be ruled any longer by the
HohenzoUerns. The rise of a German repubhc is certainly
within the limit of possibility. In a fatal hour the German
Emperor has apparently destroyed not only the entire life-
work of Bismarck and Moltke, but part of the work of

DEMOCBATIC GEEMANY, PAST AND PUTUEB 369

Erederick the Great, who acquired Silesia and Poland ;
and possibly he has destroyed his own dynasty as well. . . .

Many who consider the possibility of a revolution in
Germany imagine that it will be brought about by the huge
Social Democratic Party. They are wrong. In Germany,
where Parliament is powerless, a revolution cannot be made
by a single party, however strong. It can be brought about
only if the bulk of the nation, regardless of party, is deter-
mined to change the existing form of government and if
the army is with it. A serious German defeat would give
a fatal blow to the privileges of the ruling aristocracy and
of the military caste and to the prosperity of the great
industrial and commercial middle-class. Therefore it seems
likely that in case of defeat the aristocracy, the army,
and the liberal middle-class may turn against the Emperor.
Moreover, whereas the masses of the people would prob-
ably reproach the Emperor for his rashness in involving
the nation in the present war, the aristocracy and the
army might reproach him for his lack of energy and
resolution. They have frequently complained that the
German Emperor has, owing to lack of resolution, failed
to make Germany supreme in Europe and the world.
They have asserted that Germany should have attacked
France in 1905, at the time of the first Morocco crisis,
when the Eussian army had been defeated by Japan,
when France was totally unprepared for war and was still
divided by the Dreyfus scandal, and when France, and
England were still somewhat estranged owing to the
Fashoda affair. Moreover, they have reproached the
^ Emperor and the Chancellor for losing at the beginning of
the present war several precious days in negotiations
which enabled Belgium to provide for the defence of Li6ge,
and thus prevented Germany from administering a knock-
out blow to France by rushing through Belgium and
seizing Paris.

2b

370 THE FOUNDATIONS' OP GEEMANY

President Wilson has sharply discriminated between
the responsibilities of the German Government and of the
people. He has placed all the guilt upon the Emperor and
his Government, and has absolved the nation of practically
all complicity. Whether such discrimination should be
made or not is, after all, not so much a question of abstract
justice as one of practical utility. If no useful purpose
is served, such discrimination is worthless. If it should
shorten the war it is extremely valuable.

President WUson is a student of history and of states-
manship, on which he has written some valuable works.
Probably he discriminated between the German Government
and the German people, and placed all the responsibility
for the outbreak of the war and its atrocious conduct upon
the former, remembering the policy which was followed by
the Allies in the war against Napoleon a century ago. Napo-
leon had been the idol of the French people, but in course
of time the nation had become tired of the never-ending
war and had come to doubt him. All longed for peace.
Prince Metternich made skilful use of this situation. He
issued in the name of the Allied sovereigns a proclamation
that Europe had no quarrel with France, but only with
Napoleon, that they were friends of the French people, and
thab they came to free the land from the incubus. Thousands
of copies of this proclamatibn were distributed in France.
Hence the French saw in the invading armies not enemies
but their deUverers. Important towns readily surrendered,
and the victorious sovereigns were loudly cheered when they
entered Paris. By sharply discriminating between the
Emperor Napoleon and the French people, and by placing
the whole responsibility for the war on the former, the Allies
had cut the ground from under Napoleon's feet, as the Em-
peror himself admitted in his captivity. The nation and
many officers and soldiers became hostile to the man in
whom they had been taught to see the sole cause of the war.
Eecruits refused to join the army. Officers disobeyed the

DEMOCRATIC GERMANY, PAST AND FUTURE 871

orders given. The necessary taxes could not be collected.
Napoleon found himself in a hostile country, the head of an
army but no longer the head of a nation. Every French
defeat was greeted with joy by the people, and every French
victory as a calamity. The public funds on the Paris
Stock Exchange fell whenever a success of the French arms
was announced and rose rapidly upon the news of a defeat.
Perhaps the Germans will before long adopt a similar atti-
tude towards the Emperor and his supporters.

The German people have no doubt begun to recognise
the folly and wickedness of the present war. They must
see that defeat is inevitable, and that it will bring about
not only the weakening of the State, but that it will leave
the nation impoverished and disgraced throughout the
world. They must recognise that, owing to the criminal
conduct of the war, not merely the German State but the
German race has become an outlaw throughout the world,
that the German people can rehabilitate themselves in the
eyes of the world only by repudiating the Emperor and
their Government and by punishing the guilty.

In forecasting the weather and political developments
BO many incalculable factors influence events that one can
speak only of probabilities. A revolution in Germany
consequent upon defeat is not absolutely certain, but is
highly probable in view of the historic character of the
German nation. The German race is naturally democratic,
and the events of the war have undoubtedly strengthened
the democratic spirit to a very great extent. That may
be seen by the concessions whereby the German Government
tries vainly now to appease the people. What the German
people require is not the reform of the Prussian franchise,
but the direction of the policy of the State by their elected
representatives. I think the German nation is too wise
to allow again a single man, who may be a degenerate, a
madman, a criminal, or merely a fool, to send millions of
Germans to their death. Mr. Lloyd George said in his great

372 >■ THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

speech of April 12 with delightful brevity and irony:
' Prussia is no democracy. The Kaiser promises that she
will be a democracy — after the war. I think he is right.'
He and President Wilson have probably correctly forecast
the future of Germany.

CHAPTEE XIV

EXPOSfi DU GOUVBBNBMBNT PEUSSIBN DBS PBINCIPES SUE
LESQVBLS IL BOULB, AVBO QUELQUBB BBFLBXIONS
POLITIQUBS ^

PouB Be f aire une idee g^nerale de ce gouvemement il
faut exanuner en detail toutes les branches du gouveme-
ment, et puis les combiner ensemble.

Je commence par les finances, qui sont comme les nerfs
dans le corps humain, qui font mouvoir tous les membres.

Depuis la guerre, les revenus de I'Etat ont ete pro-
digieusement augmentes, savoir: d'un million deux cent
uuDe ^cus par I'acquisition de la Pom^rellie, un million
de tabac, cent mille de la banque, cinquante mille du bois,
quatre cent mille des accises et peages, cent trente miUe du
sel de Schonebeck, cinquante-six mille du loto, au del4 de
deux cent mille ecus par les nouveaux taux des bailliages,
cent miUe ecus des bois ; de sorte qu'a present le total
des revenus monte k vingt et un millions sept cent miUe
ecus, dont, outre toutes les autres depenses de I'Stat ac-
quittees, cent quatre- vingt-sept mille soldats sont entretenus.
Les depenses decomptees, il reste tous les ans cinq millions
sept cent mille ecus, dont jusqu'ici deux millions ont ete
annuellement deposes dans le tresor, et trois millions sept
cent mille ecus ont ete employes, soit aux fortifications, soit
aux ameliorations du pays, soit pour reparer des malheurs,
ainsi qu'en subsides pour les Busses et en batiments. Mais

t tbia is the famous political testament of 1776.
373

374 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

la destination de ces cinq millions sept cent mille, en temps
de guerre, est pour payer les extraordinaires des campagnes,
qui montent chaque annee h onze millions, de Borte que,
cinq millions sept cent mille decomptes, reste h ajouter
annuellement la somme de cinq millions trois cent mille
ecus. Cette somme doit etre prise du tresor, qui est foumi
de dix-neuf millions trois cent mille ecus, outre quatre
millions trois cent mille ecus, ce qu'on appelle le petit
tresor destine k rendre I'armee mobile. Nous avons encore,
d'ailleurs, quatre millions deux cent mille a Breslau, tout
prSts pour acheter et ammasser les fourrages pour une
armee de soixante mille hommes, et neuf cent mille dans
la banque pour acheter du fourrage pour six semaines h
Magdebourg ; en outre, la caisse de guerre doit avoir onze
millions pour pouvoir payer en temps de guerre les regiments
d'avance ; quatre millions s'y trouvent deji, les autres
y seront dans trois ans. Mais il faut remarquer que si
I'on veut puiser tous les extraordinaires de guerre du tresor,
on ne pourra durer que quatre campagnes, ce qui fait que
de necessite il faut s'emparer de la Saxe, menager le plus
que Ton pent le tresor, qui ne doit servir proprement qa'kt
remplir le vide de quelques provinces envahies par I'ennemi.
Voila le fond des choses, qui demontre qu'il faut user de
la plus grande economie pour avoir le dernier 6cu en poche
lorsqn'on negocie la paix. Get argent, ces deux millions
qui sortent tous les ans de la circulation en entrant dans
le tresor, paraitront une somme tres-considerable ; mais
ce qui justifie cette operation, c'est que la balance de com-
merce est en favour de I'Etat de quatre millions quatre
cent mille ecus, de sorte que la circulation dea especes
augmente encore dans le public annuellement de deux
millions quatre cent mille ecus. Cette balance etait centre
la Frusse h, la mort du feu roi, ou la monarchie perdait
annuellement cinq cent mille ecus par les importations.
J'ai trouve moyen, en etablissant - beaucoup de manu-
factures, et surtout k I'aide de la Sil^sie, de la mettre sur

EXPOSE DBS PEINCIPES 376

I'etat que je viens d'annoncer. C'est pourquoi il ne faut
pas perdre les manufactures de vue; par leur moyen,
cette balance pent encore s'augmenter dans nos possessions
aotuelles de quelques cent mille ecus. Mais ce qui importe
Burtout, c'est de conserver le bon ordre 6tabli maintenant
pour la regie dee deniers publics et la surveillance sur
toutes les caisses; sans quoi le peuple paye beaucoup
et le souverain est vole.

Des Magasins

n y a ici un magasin de trente six mille winspels, dont
on pent nourrir un an ime armee de soixante mille hommes ;
il y a un magasin pareil en Silesie pour le meme nombre
de troupes, et d'ailleurs un fonds de deux millions pour
acheter des grains de la Pologne ; ce qui pourra foumir
cent vingt mille .winspels, par le moyen desquels le pays
sera & I'abri de toute famine, et, en cas de guerre, avec le
ble qu'il y a dej^, on aura de quoi faire trois campagnee.

De Wartenberg

Wartenberg a tons les ans quatre cent quarante mille
ecus d'epargne, qui sont employes en partie pour les
armes, pour augmenter son dep6t, en partie pour I'artillerie,
dont on a construit les canons pour la nouvelle forteresse
de Silesie, et une reserve, k laquelle on travaille encore
h present, de quatre cents canons de reserve pour la
campagne.

De l' Armee

La situation de cet Etat nous oblige d'entretenir beau-
coup de troupes, car nos voisins sont rAutriche, la Eussie,
la France et la Su§de. Le pied de guerre est de deux cent
vingt mille hommes, y compris les bataiUons francs et
I'augmentation dans la cavalerie. De ce nombre on pourra

376 THE FOUNDATIONS OE GEEMANY

mettre en campagne cent . quatre-vingt mille hommes ;
mais dfes qu'il faut former trois armees, il saute aux yeux
que nous n'en avons pas trop en comparaison de nos voisins.
Je crois que la discipline doit rester sur le pied ou elle se
trouve, ainsi que les evolutions introduites, k moins que
la guerre ne change, car alors il n'y a de parti qu'a se plier
aux circonstances et a changer avec elles ; , mais pour egaler
les enemies ou les surpasser il faut que ce soit par I'ordre et
par la discipline, encourager les officiers et les distinguer,
pour qu'iine noble emulation les porte a surpasser leurs
adversaires qu'il ont k combattre. Si le souverain ne
se mele pas lui-m§me du militaire, et s'il n'en donne pas
I'exemple, tout est fini. Si I'on prefere les faineants de
cour au militaire, on verra que tout le monde preferera
cette faineantise au laborieux metier des armes, et alors, au
lieu que nos officiers sont nobles, il faudra avoir recours
aux roturiers, ce qui serait le premier pas vers la decad-
ence et la chute de I'armee. Nous n'avons k present que
soixante-dix citoyens par compagnie ; il ne faut point
s'ecarter de ce principe, pour menager le pays, qui, par
I'augmentation de la population, pourra foumir des res-
sources ou reerues, si la guerre le rend necessaire. Les
forteresses sont en bon etat, k I'exception de Stettia, dont
le plan est tout fait. II faudrait miner toute I'enceinte de
Magdebourg. La partie dans laquelle nous sommes le
plus faibles est ceUe du genie. II nous faudrait encore trente
bons officiers ingenieurs ; mais la difficulte est de les trouver.
Les mineurs sont bons. II faudrait egalement augmenter
le nombre des quartiers-maitres, parce que, suppose trois
armees, leur service demande plus d'habiles gens que nous
n'en avons. Notre population est de cinq millions deux
cent mille dmes, dont quatre-vingt-dix mille k peu pres
sont soldats. Cette proportion pent aller ; mais il ne faut
pas que Ton prenne des cantons plus de huit cent quarante
par regiment d'infanterie et quatre cents par regiment
de cavalerie.

EXPOSE DES PEINCIPE8 377

Db la Politique

Un des premiers principes de la politique est de tacher
de s'allier a celui de ses voisins qui peut porter ^ I'Etat
les coups les plus dangereux. C'est par cette raison que
nous sommes en alliance avec la Eussie, parce qu'elle
nous rend le dos Hbre de c6te de la Prusse, et que, tant
que cette liaison dure, nous n'avons pas a craindre que
la Su6de ose nous attaquer en Pomeranie. Les temps
peuvent changer, et la bizarrerie des conjonctures peut
obliger k prendre d'autres engagements ; mais jamais on
ne trouvera avec les autres puissances I'equivalent des
avantages que Ton trouve avec la Eussie. Les troupes
frangaises ne valent rien, et les Frangais sont accoutumes
a ne secourir que faiblement leurs allies ; et lea Anglais,
faits pour payer des subsides, sacrifient leurs allies, a la paix,
pour favoriser leurs propres interets. Je ne parle point
de la maison d'Autriche, avec laquelle 11 parait presque
impossible que des liens solides se forment. S'il s'agit
des vues politiques d'acquisition qui conviennent k cette
monarchie, les Etats de la Saxe sont sans contredit
ceux qui lui conviendraient le mieux, en I'arrondissant et
lui formant une barriere par les montagnes qui separent la
Saxe de la Boheme, et qu'il faudrait fortifier. II est difficile
de prevoir comment cette acquisition pourrait se faire.
La maniere la plus sure serait de conquerir la Boheme
et la Moravie, et de les troquer avec la Saxe ; soit enfin
que cela put s'operer par d'autres trocs ou des possessions
du Ehin, en y ajoutant Juliers ou Berg, ou de quelque
fagon que cela se fasse. Cette acquisition est d'une necessite
indispensable pour donner a cet Etat la consistance dont
il manque. Car, des qu'on est en guerre, I'ennemi peut
avancer de plain pied jusqu'a Berlin sans trouver la moindre
opposition dans son chemin. Je ne parle pas, d'ailleurs,
de nos droits de succession au pays d'Ansbach, Juliers et
Berg, et le Mecklenbourg, parce que ce sont des pretentions

378 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

coimuee, et dont il faut attejidre I'^vSnement. Comme
I'Etat n'est pas rifche, il faut se garder sur toute chose de
se m^ler dans des guerres ou il n'y a rien a gagner, parce
qu'on s'epuise k pure parte, et qu'une bonne occasion
arrivant ensuite, on n'en saurait pas profiter. Toutes les
acquisitions eloignees sont a charge a un Etat. Uh village
sur la frontiSre vaut mieux qu'une principaut^ a soixante
lieues. C'est une attention necessaire de cacher autant
qu'il est possible ses desseins d'ambition, et, si Ton peut,
de reveiller I'envie de I'Burope contre d'autres puissances,
k la favour de quoi Ton frappe son coup. Cela peut arriver,
et la maiaon d'Autriche, dont I'ambition va le visage
demasque, s'attirera de reste I'envie et la jalousie des
grandes puissances. Le secret est une vertu essentielle pour
la politique ausei bien que pour I'art de la guerre.

De la Justice

Les lois sont assez sagement faites dans ce pays. Je
ne crois pas qu'on ait besoin d'y retoucher ; mais il faut que
tons les trois ans il se fasse une visite des tribunaux des
provinces, pour qu'il y ait des surveillants qui s'informent
de la conduite des juges et des avocats, que Ton punit
quand on les trouve en defaut. Mais comme les parties et
les avoc&ts tachent d'eluder les meilleuies lois, il est neceseaire
que tous les vingt ans on examine par quel rafSnement ils
allongent les proces, et qu'on leur mette des barrilres, comme
on a fait k present, pour ne pas prolonger les proces, ce
qui ruine les parties.

Combination du Total du Gouveenbmbnt

Comme le pays est pauvre, et qu'il n'a gu§re de res-
sources, c'est une chose necessaire que le Souveraia ait
toujours un tresor bien muni, pour soutenir au moina
quelques campagnes. Les seules ressources qu'il peut

EXPOSE DES PEINCIPES 379

trouver dans le besoin conaiatent dans un emprunt de cinq
millions de la Landachaft, et a peu pr^a quatre millions
qu'il pourra tirer du credit de la banque ; mais voil^ tout.
II a a la verite en temps de paix cinq millions sept cent
mille dont il pent disposer; mais la plupart de ceti argent
doit, on entrer dans le tresor, ou Stre employe k des usages
publics, comme forteresses, ameliorations, manufactures,
canaux, defrichements, forteressea, bdtiases de villes dont on
faitenpierreles maisons qui sont en bois,letout pour rendre
la constitution de I'Etat plus solide. Ces raisons que je viens
d'alleguer exigent que le souverain de ce pays soit 6conome
et homme qui tienne le plus grand ordre dans ses affaires.
Une raison aussi valable que la premiere s'y joint encore ;
c'eat que s'il donne I'exemple de la profusion, ses sujets,
qui sont pauvres, veulent I'lmiter et se ruinent. II faut
Burtout, pourlesoutien dea moeurs, queles diatinctiona aoient
uniquement pour le merite et non pas pour les richesses ;
ce principe mal observe en France a perdu les moeurs de
la nation, qui autrefois ne connaiasait que le chemin de
I'honneur pour parvenir k la gloire, et qui croit k present
qu'il suffit d'etre riche pour etre honore. Comme les
guerrea sont un gouffre ou les hommes s'abiment, il faut
avoir I'ceil k ce que le pays se peuple autant que possible,
d'ou il resulte encore un autre bien, c'est que les campagnes
en sont mieux cultivees et les posaesseurs mieux a leur
aise. Je ne crois point que dans ce pays on doive jamais
se laisaer persuader de former une marine militaire. En
voici les raisons. II y a en Europe de grandea marines,
savoir : celle d'Angleterre, celle de France, d'Espagne,
de Danemark et de la Eussie. Jamais nous ne pourrons
lea egaler ; ainai, avec quelques vaisaeaux, demeurant
toujours inferieurs a d'autres nations, la depenae aerait
inutile. Ajoutez que, pour tenir une flotte, I'argent qu'elle
cofiterait noua obligerait de reformer des troupes de terre ;
que le pays n'est pas assez peuple pour founiir des recrues
a I'armee et des matelots pour les vaisaeaux, et enfin que

380 ^HE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

les batailles de mer sont rarement decisives ; d'oii je conclua
qu'il vaut mieux avoir la premiire annee de I'Europe que
la plus mauvaise flotte d^ puissances niaritimes.

La politique doit porter ses vues aussi loin qu'elle peut
dans I'avenir, et juger des conjonctures de TEurope, soit
pour former des alliances, soit pour contrecarrer les projets
de ses ennemis. H ne faut pas croire qu'elle peut amener
les evfenements ; mais quand ils se presentent, elle doit les
saisir pour en profiter. Voil& pourquoi les finances doivent
Stre en ordre. C'est par cette raison que de I'argent doit
etre en reserve pour que le gouvemement soit pr§t d'agir
sit6t que les raisons politiques lui en indiquent le moment.
I/a guerre meme doit ^tre conduite sur les principes de
la politique, pour porter les coups les plus sanglants ^
ses ennemis. C'6tait sur ces principes qu'agissait le prince
Eugene qui a rendu son nom immortel par la marche et
la bataille de Turin, par celles de Hochstadt et de Belgrad.
Les grands projects de campagne ne reussissent pas tous ;
mais ijuand ils sont vastes, il en resulte toujours plus
d'avantages que par ces petits projets ou Ton se borne a
la prise d'une bicoque sur les frontieres. Voila comme
le comte de Saxe ne donna la bataiUe de Bocoux que pour
pouvoir executer I'hiver d'apres son dessein sur Bruxelles,
qui lui reussit.

II est evident, par tout ce que je viens de dire, que la
politique, le miUtaire et les finances sont des branches si
etroitement Uees ensemble, qu'elles ne sauraient etre separees.
II faut les mener de front, et de leur combinaison, assujettie
aux regies de la bonne politique, resultent les plus grand
avantagea pour les Etats. En France, il y a un roi qui
dirige chaque branche k part. C'est le ministre qui preside,
soit aux finances, soit h, la guerre, soit aux affaires etrangeres.
Mais le point de ralliement manque et ces branches, n'etant
pas reunies, divergent, et les ministres ne sont chacun
occupes que des details de leur departement, sans que
personne reunisse a un but fixe I'objet de leurs travaux.

EXPOSE PES PEINCIPES 381

Si pareiUe chose arrivait dans cet Etat, il serrait perdu,
parce que les grandes monarchies vont malgr^ les abus,
et se soutiennent par leur poids et leur force intrinsSque,
et que les petits Etats sont vite 6crases, si tout en eux
a'est force, nerf et vigueur,

Voila quelques reflexions et mes idees sur le gouveme-
ment de ce pays, qui, tant qu'il n'aura pas pris une plus
grande consistance et de meilleurea fronti^res, doit §tre
gouyeme par des princes qui soient toujoura en vedette,
les oreilles dressees, pour veiller sur leurs voisins, et pr^ts
k se defendre d'un jour k I'autre centre lea projets pemicieux
de leura ennemis.

(aign6) Fain^RiQ,

CHAPTEE XV

HISTOIBB DE MON TBMP9
AVANT-PBOPOS. 1775

La plupart des histoires que nous avona sont des com-
pilatioQS de mensonges mSles de quelques Veritas. De
ce nombre prodigieux de faits qui noua ont ete transmis,
on ne peut compter pour averes que ceux qui ont fait
6p.oqile soit de I'elevation ou de la chute des empires. II
parait indubitable que la bataille de Salamine s'est donn^e
et que les Perses ont ^te vaincus par les Grecs. II n'y a
aucun doute qu'Alexandre le Grand n'ait subjugue I'empire
de Darius, que les Eomains n'aient vaincu les Carthaginoia,
Antiochus et Persee ; cela est d'autant plus evident qu'ils
ont poBSede tons ces Ctats. L'histoire aequiert plus de
foi dans ce qu'elle rapporte des guerres civiles de Marius
et de Sylla, de Pompee et de Cesar, d' Augusta et d'Antoine,
par I'authenticit^ des auteurs contemporains qui nous
ont decrit ces ev^nements. On n'a point de doute sur
le bouleversement de I'empire d'Occident et sur celui
d'Orient, car on voit naitre et se former des royaumes du
demembrement de I'empire romain ; mais lorsque la
curiosite nous invite i descendre dans le detail des faits
de ces temps recules, nous nous precipitous dans un laby-
rinthe pleili d'obscurit^s et de contradictions, et nous n'avons
point de fil pour en trouver Tissue. L'amour du merveilleux,
le prejuge des historiens, le zele malentendu pour leur patrie,

382

HISTOIEE DE MON TEMPS 383

leur haine pour les nations qui leur 6taient opposees, toutea
ces differentes passions qui ont guide leur plume et les
temps de beaucoup poat^rieura aux ev6nements ou ils
ont ecrits, ont si fort altere lea faits en les deguisant, qu'aveo
des yeux de lynx m§me on ne parviendrait k les d^voiler
k present.

Dependant, dans la foule d'auteurs de I'antiquit^ Ton
distingue avec aatiafaction la description que Xenophon
fait de la retraite dea dix mille qu'il avait commandos et
ramenee lui-meme en Grece. Thucydide jouit k peu prea
de mSmes avantages. Nous sommea charmes des trouver
dana les fragments qui nous reatent de Polybe, I'ami et le
eompagnon de Scipion I'Africain, les faita qu'il noua raconte,
dent lui-meme a 6te le temoin. Les lettrea de Ciceron
h son ami Atticua portent le m§me caract&re ; c'est un dea
acteura de cea grandes sc&nea qui parle. Je n'oublierai
point lea Commentaires de Cesar, Merita avec la noble aim-
plicite d'un grand homme ; et, quoi qu'en ait dit Hirtius,
les relations des autrea historiens sont en tout conformes
aux evehementa decrits dans ces Commentaires ; maia
depuia Ceaar I'histoire ne contient que dea panegyriques ou
des aatirea. La barbarie des temps suivants a fait im chaos
de I'histoire du Bas-Empire, et Ton ne trouve d'intereaaant
que les Memoires ecrita par la fille de I'empereur Alexiua
Comn&ne, parce que cette princesse rapporte ce qu'elle a vu.
Depuis, lea moinea, qui seuls avaient quelque connaiaaance,
ont laiaa^ dea annales trouvees dana leurs couvents, qui
ont servi h I'histoire d'Allemagne ; mais quels materiaux
pour I'histoire !

Lea Pran5ai3 ont eu un eveque de Tours, un Joinville et le
Journal de I'Etoile, faibles ouvrages de compilateurs qui
ecrivaient ce qu'ils apprenaient auh asard, maia qui difficile-
ment pouvaient §tre bien instruits. Depuia la renaissance
des lettres, la passion d'ecrire s'est changee en fureur. Noua
n'avons que trop de memoires, d'anecdotes et de relations,
parmi lesquelles il faut s'en tenir au petit nombre d'auteura

384 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

qui ont eu des charges, qui ont ete eux-m§mes aoteurs, qui ont
et6 attaches k la cour ou qui ont eu la permission des souve-
rains de fouiller dans les archives, tels que le sage president
de Thou, Philhppe de Cbmines, Vargas, fiscal de concile
de Trente, mademoiselle d'Orleans, le Cardinal du Eetz,
etc. Ajoutons-y les Lettres de M. d'Estrades, les Memoires de
M. de Torcy, monuments curieux, surtout ce dernier, qui
nous developpe la v6rite de ce testament de Charles II,
roi d'Espagne, sur lequel les sentiments ont ete si partages.

Ces reflexions sur I'incertitude de I'histoire, dont je me
suis souvent occupe, m'ont fait naitre I'idee de transmettre
h la post^rite les faits principaux auxquels j'ai eu part ou
dont j'ai 6te temoin, afin que ceux qui k I'avenir gouveme-
ront cat Etat puissent connaitre la vraie situation des choses
lorsque je parvins h la regence, les causes qui m'ont fait agir,
mes moyens, les trames de nos ennemis, les negociations, les
guerres, et surtout les belles actions de nos officiers, par
lesquelles ils se sont acquis I'immortalite ^ juste titre.

Depuis les revolutions qui bouleversferent premiSre-
ment I'empire d'Occident, ensuite celiii d'Orient ; depuis
les succfes immenses de Charlemagne ; depuis Tepoque
briUiante du regne de Charles-Quint ; apres les troubles
que la r6forme causa en Allemagne et qui durerent trente
annees ; enfin aprls la guerre qui s'alluma h cause de la
succession d'Espagne, il n'est aucun evenement plus remarqu-
able et plus interessant que celui que produisit la mort de
I'empereur Charles VI, dernier m§,le de la maison de
Habsbourg.

La cour de Vienne se vit attaqu6e par un prince auquel
elle ne pouvait supposer assez de force pour tenter une
entreprise aussi difficile. Bientdt il se forma une con-
juration de rois et de souverains, tons resolus k partager
cette immense succession. La couronne imperiale passa
dans la maison de Baviere, et lorsqu'il semblait que les
ev6nements concouraient k la ruine de la jeune reine de
Hongrie, cette prmcesse, par sa fermete et par son habilete,

HISTOIEE DE MON TEMPS 385

se tira d'un pas aussi dangereux, et soutint sa monarchie
en sacrifiant la Silesie et une petite partie du Milanais ;
o'etait tout ce qu'on pouvait attendre d'lme jeune princesse
qui, k peine parvenue au trdne, saisit I'esprit du gouveme-
ment et devint Tame de son conseil.

Get ouyrage-ci etant destine pour la post6rit6 me d61ivre
de la gSne de respecter les Tivants et d'observer de certains
managements incompatibles avec la franchise de la verity :
il me sera permis de dire sans retenue et tout haut ce que
Ton pense tout bas. Je peindrai les princes tels qu'ils sont,
sans prevention pour ceux qui ont ete mes allies et sans
haine pour ceux qui ont ete mes ennemis; je ne parlerai
de moi-mSme que lorsque la necessite m'y obligera, et Ton
me permettra, k I'exemple de Cesar, de faire mention de
ce qui me regarde en personne tierce, pour eviter I'odieux
de r^goisme. C'est k la posterity h nous juger ; mais si
nous sommes sages, nous devons la pr^venir en nous jugeant
rigoureusement nous-mSmes. Le vrai merite d'un bon
prince est d'avoir un attachement sincere au bien public,
d'aimer sa patrie et la gloire ; je dis la gloire, car I'heureux
instinct qui anime les hommes du desir d'une bonne reputa-
tion est le vrai principe des actions h^roi'ques ; c'est le
nerf de I'ame qui la reveille de sa 16thargie pour la porter
aux entreprises utiles, necessaire et louables.

Tout ce qu'on avance dans ces memoires, soit k I'egard des
n^gooiations, des lettres de souverains ou de traites sign6s,
a ses preuves conservees. dans les archives. On pen r6-
pondre des faits militaires comme tfemoin oculaire ; telle
relation de bataille a ete differee de deux ou trois jours
pour la rendre plus exacte et plus veridique.

La posterite verra peut-etre avec surprise dans ces
memoires les recits de traites faits et rompus. Quoique
ces exemples soient communs, cela ne justifierait point
I'auteur de cet ouvrage, s'il n'avait d'autres raisons meilleures
pour excuser sa conduite.

L'int6r6t de I'Etat doit servir de regie aux souverains.

2

386 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

Les cas de rompre les alliances sont ceux : (1) ot I'alliS
manque k remplir ses engagements ; (2) ou Tallin medite
de vous tromper et ou il ne vous reste de ressource que de
le prevenir ; (3) une force majeure qui vous opprime et
vous force k rompre vos traites ; (4) enfin I'insuf&sance des
moyens pour continuer la guerre.

Far je ne sais quelle fatalite, ces malheureuses richesses
influent sur tout. Les princes sont les eselaves de leurs
moyens ; I'interet de I'Etat leur sert de loi, et cette loi
est inviolable. Si le prince est dans I'obligation de sacrifier
sa personne mSme au salut de ses sujets, k plus forte raison
doit-il leur saorifier des liaisons dont la contiauation leur
deviendrait prejudiciable. Les exemples de pareils traites
rompus se recontrent communement. Notre intention
n'est pas de les justifier tous. J'ose pourtant avancer qu'il
en est de tels, que la necessite ou la sagesse, la prudence
ou le bien des peuples obligeaient de transgressor, ne restant
aux souverains que ce moyen-la d'eviter leur ruine.

Si Pran§ois I avait accompli le traite de Madrid, il
aurait, en perdant la Bourgogne, etabli un ennemi dans
le coeur de ses Etats. C'6tait reduire la France dans I'etat
malheureux o^ elle etait du temps de Louis XI et de Louis
XII. Si, apres la bataille de Mublberg, gagnee par Charles
Quint, la liguQ protestante d'Allemagne ne s'etait pas
fortifiSe de I'appui de la France, elle n'aurait pu eviter de
porter les chaines que I'Empereur lui pr^parait de longue
main. Si les Anglais n'avaient pas rompu Talliance, si
contraire k leurs interSts, par laquelle Charles II s'etait
uni avee Louis XIV, leur puissance courait risque d'etre
diminu6e, d'autant plus que, dans la balance politique de
I'Europe, la France I'aurait emport6 de beaucoup sur
I'Angleterre.

Les sages, qui prevoient les effets dans les causes, doivent
k temps s'opposer k ces causes si diam^tralement opposSea
k leurs int^rSts. Qu'on me permistte de m'expliquer
exactement sur cette matiere delicate, que Ton n'a gu6re

HISTOIEE DE MON TEMPS 387

trait^e dogmatiquetaent. II me parait clair et Evident
qu'mi particulier doit etre attacb^ scrupuleusemeut ^ sa
parole, I'eut-il mSme donne iiiconsider6ment. Si on lui
manque, il peut recourir h la protection des lois, et quoi
qu'il en arrive, ce n'est qu'un individu qui souffre ; mais
h quels tribunaux un souverain prendra-t-il recours, si un
autre prince viole envers lui sea engagements ? La parole
d'un particulier n'entralne que le malheur d'un seul homme,
celle des souverains des calamites generales pour des nations
entierea. Ceci se r6duit h cette question,: vaut-il mieux
que le peuple perisae ou que le prince rompe aon traits ?
Quel serait I'imb^cile qui balancerait pour decider cette
question ?

Vous voyez par les cas que nous venons d'exposer
qu'avant de porter un jugement decisif sur les actions d'un
prince, il faut commencer par examiner murement les
circonstances ou il s'est trouve, la conduite de ses allies,
les ressourcea qu'il pouvait avoir ou qui lui manquaient
pour remplir ses engagements. Car, comme nous I'avons
dej^ dit, le bon ou le mauvais etat des finances sont comme
le- pouls des Etats, qui influent plus qu'on ne le croit ni
qu'on ne le sait dans les operations politiques et miUtaires;
Le public, qui ignore ces details, ne juge que sur les appar-
ences, et se trompe par consequent dans ses decisions ;
la prudence empSche qu'on ne le disabuse, parce que ce
serait le comble de la demence d'ebruiter soi-meme par
vaine gloire la partie faible de I'Etat : les ennemis, charm^s
d'une pareille decouverte, ne manqueraient pas d'en profiter.
La aagesse exige done qu'on abandonne au public la liberie
de ses jugements temeraires, et que ne pouvant se justifier
pendant sa vie, sans compromettre I'interet de I'Etat,
Ton se contente de se legitimer aux yeux d6sint6resses de
la posterite.

Peut-@tre ne sera-t-on pas fdche que J'ajoute quelques
reflexions generales h ce que je viens de dire sur les 6vene-
ments qui sont arrives de mon temps, J'ai vu que les

388 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

petits Etats peuvent se soutenir contre les plus grandes
monarchies lorsque ces Etats out de rindustrie et beaucoup
d'ordre dans leurs affaires. Je trouve que les grands
empires ne vont que par des abus, qu'ils sont remplis de
confusion, et qu'ils ne se soutiennent que par leurs vastea
ressources et par la force intrins^que de leur masse. Les
intrigues qui se font dans ces cours perdraJent des princes
moins puissants : elles nuisent toujours, oiais elles n'empechent
pas que de nombreuses ,armees ne eonservent leur poids.

J'observe que toutes les guerres portees loin des frontieres
de ceux qui les entreprennent n'out pas les memes succes
que celles qui se font k portee de la patrie. Ne serait-ce
pas par un sentiment naturel dans rhomme qui sent qu'il
est plus juste de se defendre que de depouiller son voisin ?
Mais peut-§tre la raison physique I'emporte-t-elle sur la
morale par la difficulte de pourvoir aux vivres dans un
trop grand eloignement de la frontiere, k foumir k temps
les recrues, les remontes, les habillements, les munitions
de guerre, etc. A,joutons encore que, plus les troupes
sont aventurees dans des pays lointains, plus elles craignent
qu'on ne leur coupe la retraite ou qu'on ne la rende difficile.
Je m'aper9ois de la superiorite marquee de la flotte anglaise
sur celle des Pran^ais et des Espagnols reunie, et je m'etonne
comment la marine de Philippe II, ayant eu autrefois
cet ascendant sur celle des Anglais et des Hollandais,
n'a pas conserve d'ausai grands avantages.

Je remarque encore avec surprise que tons ces armements
de mer sont plus pour I'ostentation que pour I'effet, et
qu'au lieu de proteger le commerce, ils ne I'empechent pas
de se detruire. D'un c6te se presente le roi d'Espagne,
Bouverain du Potose, ob§re en Europe, creancier k Madrid
de ses officiers et de ses domestiques ; de I'autre, le roi
d'Angleterre, qui r6pand k pleines mains ses guin^es, que
trente ans d'industrie avaient accumul6es dans la Grande^
Bretagne, pour soutenir la reine de Hongrie et la Pragmatique
Sanction, ind6pendamment de quoi cette reine de Hongrie

HISTOIEE DE MON TEMPS 389

est obligee de sacrifier quelqaes provinces poor sauver le
reste.

La capitale du monde Chretien s'ouvre au premier
venu, et le pape; u'osant paa accabler d'anath^mes ceux
qui le font contribuer, est oblige de les benir. L'ltalie est
inondee d'^trangera qui Be battent pour la subjuguer.
L'exemple des Anglais entraine comme un torrent les
HoUandais dans oette guerre qui lenr est etrangere, et ces
republicains qui du temps que des heros, les Eugene, les
Marlborough, commandaient leurs armees, y envoyaient
des deputes pour r^gler les operations militaires, n'en
envoient point lorsqu'un due de Cumberland se trouve a
la t§te de leurs troupes. Le Nord s'embrase et produit
une guerre funeste a la Su&de. Le Danemarck s'anime,
s'agite et se calme. La Saxe change deux fois de
parti ; elle ne gagne rien ni avec les uns ni avec les
autres, sinon qu'elle attire les Prussiens dans ses Etats et
qu'elle se ruine. Un conflit d'evenements change les
causes de la guerre : cependant les effets continuent, quoique
le motif ait cesse. La fortune passe rapidement d'un parti
dans I'autre ; mais I'ambition et le d^sir de la vengeance
nourissent et entretiennent le feu de la guerre. II semble
voir nne partie de joaeurs qui veulent avoir leur revanche
et ne quittent le jeu qu'apres s'etre entierement ruines.

Si Ton demandait h un ministre anglais : Quelle rage
vous oblige a prolonger la guerre? C'est que la France
ne pourra plus foumir aux frais de la campagne prochaine,
repondrait-il. Si Ton faisait la m§me question k un ministre
franjais, la r^ponse serait a peu pria semblable. Ce qu'il
y a de deplorable dans cette politique, c'est qu'elle se joue
de la vie des hommes, et que le sang humain, repandu avec
profusion. Test inutilement. Encore si, par la guerre, on
pouvait parvenir & fixer sohdement les frontieres et h
maintenir cette balance des pouvoirs si riecessaire entre les
souverains de I'Europe, on pourrait regarder ceux qui
ont peri comme des victimes sacrifices k la tranquillite

390 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GERMANY

et h la sfirete publique. Mais qu'on s'envie des provinces
en Amerique, ne voil^-t-il pas toute I'Europe entrain6e dans
des partis differents poTxr se battre sur mer et sur terre.

Les ambitieux devraient considerer surtout que les
armes et la discipline militaire etant k peu pres les memes
en Europe, et les alliances inettant pour I'ordinaire I'egalite
des forces entre les parties bellig6rantes, tout ce que les
princes peuvent attendre de leurs plus grands avantages
dans les temps ou nous vivons, c'est d'aequerir par des
succfes accumules ou quelque petite ville sur les frontieres,
ou une banlieue qui ne rapporte pas les int^rSts des depenses
de la guerre, et dont la population n'approche pas de nombre
des citoyens peris dans les campagnes.

Quiconque a des entrailles et envisage ces objets de
sangfroid doit 6tre emu des maux que les hommes d'Etat
causent aux peuples, faute d'y reflechir ou bien entraines
par leur passions. L^ raison nous prescrit une regie sur
ee sujet, dont, ce me semble, aucun homme d'Etat ne doit
s'ecarter; c'est de saisir I'ocoasion et d'entreprendre
lorsqu'elle est favourable ; mais de ne point la forcer en
abandonnant tout au hasard. H y a des moments qui de-
mandent qu'on mette toute son activite en jeu pour en
profiter, mais il y en a d'autres oil la prudence veut qu'on
reste dans I'inaotion. Cette matiere exige la plus profonde
reflexion, parce que non-seulement il faut bien examiner
I'^tat des choses, mais qu'il faut encore prevoir toutes lea
suites d'une entreprise, et peeer les moyens que Ton a avec
ceux de ses ennemis pour juger lesquels I'emportent dans
la balance. Si la raison n'y decide pas seule, et que la
passion s'en mele, il est impossible que d'heureux succ^s
suivent une pareille entreprise- La politique demande
de la patience, et le chef-d'oeuvre d'un homme habile
est' de faire chaque chose en son temps et h propos.

L'histoire ne nous foumit que trop d'exemples de
guerres l^gerement enterprises ; il n'y qu'^ se rappeler la vie
de Francois I et lire ce que Brant6me dit etre le sujet de

HISTOIEB DE MON TEMPS 391

sa malheureuse expedition du Milanais, ou ce roi fut fait
prisonnier k Pavie ; il n'y a qu'4 voir combien peu Charles-
Quint profita de Toccasion qui se presentait k lui, aprfes
la bataiUe de Muhlberg, pour subjuguer I'Allemagne ; il
n'y a qu'^ voir I'histoire de Frederic V, electeur palatin,
pour se convaincre de la precipitation avec laquelle il
s'engagea dans une entreprise bien au-dessus de ses forces.
Et dans nos demiers temps, qu'on se rappelle la conduite
de Maximilien de Bavi§re, qui dans la guerre de Succession,
lorsque son pays etait, pour ainsi dire, bloque par les allies,
se rangea du parti des Frangais, pour se voir depomller
de ses Etats. Et plus recemment Charles XII, roi de
Suede, nous foumit un exemple plus frappant encore des
suites funestes que I'entetement et la fausse conduite des
souverains attire sur les sujects.

L'histoire est I'ecole des princes ; e'est k eux de s'in-
struire des fautes des si^cles passes, pour les eviter, et
pour apprendre qu'il faut se former un syst§me et le suivre
pied a pied, et que celui qui a le mieux calcule sa conduite
est le seul que puisse I'emporter sur ceux qui agissent moins
consequemment que lui.

OHAPTEB XVI

ESSAI SUE LES FORMES DE GOUVEENEMBNT ET SUB LBS
DEVOIRS DES BOUVBRAINS (1777)

Nous trouvons, en remontant a I'antiquite la plus reeulee,
que las peuples dont la connaissance nous est parvenue
menaient une vie pastorale, et ne formaient point de corps
de soei^te : ce que la Gen§se rapporte de I'histoire des
patriarches en est un t§moignage suffisant. Avant le
petit peuple juif, les Egyptiens devaient etre de meme
eparpilles par families dans ces contrees que le Nil ne sub-
mergeait pas ; et sans doute il s'est ecoule bien des siecles
avaht que ce fleuve, dompte, permit aux regnicoles de se
rassembler par bourgades. Nous apprenons par I'histoire
grecque le nom des fondatenrs des villes et celui des le^s-
lateurs qui les premiers les rassamblerent en corps ; cette
nation fut longtemps sauvage, comme le furent tous les
habitants de notre globe. Si les annales des Etrusques,
des Sanmites, des Sabins, &c., nous etaient parvenues,
nous apprendrions assur^ment que ces peuples vivaient
isoles par families avant de s'Stre rassembl^s et reunis. Les
Gaulois formaient dej^ des associations du temps que Jules
Cesar les dompta. Mais il parait que la Grande-Bretagne
n'etait pas perfectionnee k ce point lorsque ce conquerant
y passa pour la premiere fois avec les troupes romaines.
Du temps de ce grand homme, les Germains ne pouvaient
se comparer qu'aux Iroquois, aux Algonquins et pareilles
nations sauvages ; ils ne vivaient que de la chasse, de la

392

LE8 DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS 393

pSche, et du lait de leurs troupeaux. Un Germain croyait
s'avilir en cultivant la terre ; il employait a ces travaux
les esclaves qu'il avait faits ^ la guerre ; aussi la forSt
d'Hercynie couvrait-eUe presque entierement cette vaste
etendue de pays qui compose maintenant I'Allemagne.
La nation ne pouvait pas Stre nombreuse, faute de nour-
riture suffisante ; et c'est 1^ sans doute la veritable cause
de ces emigrations prodigieuses des peuples du Septentrion,
qui se precipitaient vers le Midi pour chercher des terres
toutes defricbees et un climat moins rigoureux.

On est etonne quand on se represente le genre humain
vivant si longtemps dans un etat d'abrutissement et sans
former de sooiete, et Ton recherche avidement quelle raison
a pu le porter a se reunir en corps de peuple. Sans doute
que les violences et les pillages d'autres hordes voisines ont
fait naitre h ces peuplades isolees I'idee de se joindre a
d'autres families pour assurer leurs possessions par leur
mutuelle defense. De la sont nees les lois qui enseignent
aux societes & pref &er I'interSt general au bien particuUer.
Bes lors personne, sans craindre de chatiment, n'osa
s'emparer du bien d'autrui, persoime n'osa attenter sur
la vie de son voisin, il fallut respecter sa femme et ses
biens comme des objeta sacres, et si la Boci6te entiSre se
trouvait attaquee, chacun devait accourir pour la sauver.
Cette grande verite, qu'il faut agir envers les autres comme
nous voudrions qu'ils se comportassent envers nous, devient
le principe des lois et du pacte social ; de la nait I'amour
de la patrie, envisagee comme I'asile de notre bonheur.
Mais comme ces lois ne pouvaient ni se maintenir ni
s'executer sans un surveillant qui s'en occupat sans cesse,
ce fut I'origine des magistrats, que le peuple elut et auxquels
il se soumit. Qu'on s'imprime bien que la conservation
des lois fut I'lmique raison qui engagea les hommes §b se
donner des superieurs, puisque c'est la vraie origine de
la souverainete. Ce magistrat etait le premier serviteur
de I'Etat. Quand ces societes naissantes avaient k craindre

394 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEKMANY

de leurs voisins, le magistrat armait le peuple et volait h
la defense des citoyens.

Get instinct general des hommes qui les anime k se
procurer le plus grand bonheur possible donna lieu h, la
formation des differents genres de gouvemement. Les
uns crurent qu'en s'abandonnant k la conduite de quelques
sages ils trouveraient ce bonheur ; de 1^ le gouvemement
aristocratique. D'autres pr^fererent I'oligarchie. Athenes
et la plupart des republiques grecques choisirent la demo-
cratie. La Perse et I'Orient ployaient sons le despotisme.
Les Bomains eurent quelque temps des rois ; mais lasses
des violences des Tarquins, il toumferent la forme de
leur gouvemement en aristocratie. Bient6t, fatigue de la
durete des patriciens, qui I'opprimaient par des usures, le
peuple s'en separa, et ne retouma k Eome qu'apres que
le senat eut autorise les tribuns que ce peuple avait elns
pour le soutenir contre le violence des grands ; depuis,
il devint presque le depositaire de I'autorite supreme.
On appelait tyrans ceux qui s'emparaient avec violence
du gouvemement, et qui, ne suivant que leurs passions
et leurs caprices pour guides, renversaient les lois et les
principes fondamentaux que la societe avait etablis pour
sa conservation.

Mais quelque sages que fussent les legislateurs et les
premiers qui rassemblferent le peuple en corps, quelque
bonnes que fussent leurs institutions, il ne s'est trouve
aucun de ces gouvemements qui se soit soutenu dans toute
son integrite. Pourquoi? Parce que les hommes sont
imparfaits, et que leurs ouvrages le sont par consequent ;
parce que les citoyens, poussfe par des passions, se laissent
aveugler par I'interSt particulier, qui toujours bouleverse
rint6r§t general ; enfin parce que rien n'est stable dana
ce monde. Dans les aristocraties, I'abus que les premiers
membres de I'Etat font de leur autoritS est, pour I'ordinaire,
cause des revolutions qui s'ensuivent. La democratie des
Bomains fut bouleversee par le peuple meme; la masse

LES DEVOmS DES SOUVEEAINS 395

aveuglee de ces plebeiens se laissa corrompre par des citoyens
ambitieux qui.ensuite les asservirent et les priverent de
leur liberty. C'est le sort auquel FAngleterre doit s'attendre,
si la chambre basse ne prefere pas les veritables interets
de la nation a cette corruption iafame qui I'avilit. Quant
au gouvemement monarchique, on en a vu bien des esplces
differentes. L'ancien gouvemement feodal, qui etait presque
general en Europe il y a quelques siecles, s'etait etabli
par les conquetes des barbares. Le general qui menait
une horde se rendait Souverain du pays conquis, et il par-
tageait les provinces entre ses principaux officiers ; ceux-la
k la verity etaient soumis au suzerain, et lui foumissaient
. des troupes, s'il les demandait ; mais comme quelques-uns
de ces vassaux devinrent aussi pnissants que leur chef,
cela formait des Etats dans I'Etat. C'etait une pepini&re
de guerres civiles dont resultait le malheur de la societe
generale. En Allemague ces vassaux sont devenus inde-
pendants ; ils ont ete opprimes en Prance, en Angletei;re
et en Espagne. Le seul modele qid nous reste de cet abomin-
able gouvemement subsiste encore dans la r6publique
de Pologne. En Turquie, le souverain est despotique,
il peut commettre impuneriient les cruaut^s les plus re-
voltantes ; mais aussi lui arrive-t-il souvent, par une vicissi-
tude commune chez les nations barbares, ou par une juste
retribution, qu'il est etrangle a son tour. Pour le gouveme-
ment vraiment monarchique, il est le pire ou le meiUeur
de tous, selon qu'il est administre.

Nous avons remarqu^ que les citoyens n'ont accord^
la preeminence a un de leurs semblables gu'en faveur des
services qu'ils attendaient de lui ; ces services consistent
k maintenir les lois, a faire exactement observer la justice,
a s'opposer de toutes ses forces k la corruption des moeurs,
a dpf endre I'Etat centre ses ennemis. Le magistrat doit avoir
I'oeil sur la culture des terres ; il doit procurer I'abondance
des vivres k la societe, encourager I'industrie et le commerce ;
il est comme une sentinelle permanente qui doit veiller

396 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

sur les voisins et sur la conduite des egonemis de I'Etat. On
demande que sa prevoyance et sa prudence forment a
temps lea liaisons, et choississent les allies les plus con^
venables aux interSts de son association. On voit par
ce court expose quel detail de connaissances chacun de ces
articles exige en particuMer. II faut joindre k cela une
etude approfondie du local du pays que le magistrat doit
gouverner, et bien connaitre le genie de la nation, parce
qu'en pechant par ignorance, le souverain se rend aussi
coupable que pai? les peches qu'il aurait commis par malice :
les uns sont des defauts de paresse, les autres des vices
du coeur ; mais le mal qui en resulte est le m§me pour la
Bociete.

Les princes, leg souverains, les rois ne sont done pas
revStus de I'autorite supreme pour se plonger impunement
dans la debauche et dans le luxe ; ils ne sont pas eleves
sur leurs concitoyens pour leur orgueil, se pavanant dans
la representation, insulte aveo m^pris a la simplicite deS
moeurs, a la pauvrete, k la misere ; ils ne sont point h la tete
de I'Etat pour entretenir aupres de leurs personnes un tas de
faineants dont I'oisivete et I'inutilit^ engendrent tons les vices.
La mauvaise administration du gouvemement monarchique
provient de bien des causes differentes, qui ont leur source
dans le caract§re du souverain. Ainsi un prince adonne
aux femmes se laissera gouverner par ses maitresses et
par ses favoris; ceux-I^, abusant du pouvoir qu'ils ont
sur I'esprit du prince, se serviront de cet ascendant pour
commettre des injustices, proteger des gens perdus de
moeurs, vendre des charges, et autres infamies pareilles.
Si le prince, par faineantise, abandonne le gouvernail de
I'Etat en des mains mercenaires, je veux dire k ses ministres,
alors I'un tire k droite, I'autre h gauche, personne ne travaille
sur un plan g&eral, chaque ministre renverse ce qu'il
a trouve etabli, quelque bonne que soit la chose, pour
devenir createur de nouveaut^s et pour realiser ses f antaisies,
souvent au detriment du bien public ; d'autres ministres

LES DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS 397

qui remplacent ceux-1^ se hatent de bouleverser k leur
tour ces arrangements avec aussi peu de solidite que leurs
predecesseurs, satisfaits de passer pour inventeurs. Ainsi
cette suite de changements et de variations ne donne paa
k ces projets le temps de pousser racine. De 1^ naissent
la confusion, le d6sordre et tons les vices d'une mauvaise
administration. Les prevaricateurs ont une excuse toute
prete : ils couvrent leur turpitude de ces changements
perpetuels ; et comme ces sortes de ministres se contentent
de ce que personne ne recherche leur conduite, ils se gardent
bien d'en donner I'exemple en sevissant contre leur sub-
altemes. Les hommes s'attachent ^ ce qui leur appartient ;
rEtat n'appartient pas k ces ministres ; ils n'ont done pas
son bien veritablement k coeur, tout s'execute avec non-
chalance et avec une espece d'indifference stoique, d'oii
resulte le deperissement de la justice, des finances et du
militaire. De monarohique qu'il etait ce gouvemement
d^genere en ime veritable aristocratie ou les ministres et
les generaux dirigent les affaires selon leur fantasie ; alors
on ne connait plus de systeme general, chacun suit ses
id6es particulieres, et le point central, le point d'unit6, est
perdu. Comme tous les ressorts d'une montre conspirent
au meme but, qui est celui de mesurer le temps, les ressorts
du gouvemement devraient §tre months de meme pour
que toutes les differentes parties de I'administration con-
courussent ^galement au plus grand bien de I'Etat, objet
important qu'on ne doit jamais perdre de vue. D'ailleurs,
I'interSt personnel des ministres et des generaux fait pour
I'ordinaire qu'ils se contrecarrent en tout et que quelquefois
ils empSchent I'execution des meilleures choses, parce que
ce ne sont pas eux qui les ont proposees. Mais le mal arrive
k son comble, si des ames perverses parviennent k persuader
au souverain que ses interets sont differents de ceux de ses
sujets ; alors le souverain devient I'ennemi de ses peuples
sans savoir pourquoi ; il devient dur, severe, iuhumain
par mesentendu; car le principe dont il part etant faux,

398 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

les consequences le doivent Stre necessairement. . Le souve-
rain est attache par des liens indissolubles au corps de
rfitat ; par consequent il ressent par repercussion tous
les maux qui afiSigent ses sujets, et la soci^te souffre egale-
ment des malheurs qui touchent son souverain. II n'y a
qu'un bien, qui est celui de I'Etat en general. Si le prince
perd des provinces, il n'est plus en etat con^me par le passe
d'assister ses sujets ; si le malheur I'a force de contracter
des dettes, c'est aux pauvres citoyens h les acquitter ; en
revanche, si le peuple est peu nombreux, s'il oroupit dans la
misSre, le souverain est prive de toute ressource. Ce sont
des verites si incontestables, qu'il n'est pas besoin d'appuyer
davantage 1^-dessus,

Je le repete done, le souverain represente I'Etat ; lui
et ses peuples ne forment qu'un corps, qui ne pent Stre
heureux qu'autant que la coneorde les unit. Le prince
est k la societe qu'il gouveme ce que la tete est au corps ;
il doit voir, penser et agir pour toute la communaut^, afin
de lui procurer tous les avantages dont elle est susceptible.
Si Ton veut que le gouvernement monarchique I'emporte
sur le republicain, I'arret du souverain est prononc^ : il
doit §tre actif et int§gre, et rassembler toutes ses forces
pour rempUr la carriere qui lui est prescrite. Voici I'idee
que je me fais de ses devoirs.

II doit se procurer una connaissance exacte et detaillee
de la force et de la faiblesse de son pays, tant pour les
ressources pecuniaires que pour la population, les finances,
le commerce, les lois et le genie de la nation qu'il doit
gouverner. Les lois, si elles sont bonnes, doivent etre
exprim^es clairement, afin que la chicane ne puisse pas
les toumer a son gr4 pour en eluder I'esprit et decider de
la fortune des particuHers arbitrairement et sans regie;
la procedure doit §tre aussi courte qu'il est possible, afin
d'emp^cher la mine des plaideurs, qui consumeraient en
faux frais ce qui leur est dii de justice et de bon droit. Cette
partie du gouvernement ne saurait Stre assez surveillee.

LES DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS 399

pour mettre toutes les barrieres possibles & I'avidit^ des
juges et k I'interSt d^mesur^ des avocats. On retient tout
le monde dans son devoir par des visitations qui se font
de temps k autre dans les provinces, oil quioonque se croit
lese ose porter ses plaintes a la commission, et les prevari-
cateurs doivent etre sev&rement punis. II est peut-Stre
Buperflu d'ajouter que les peines ne doivent jamais passer
le delit, que la violence ne doit jamais etre employee au
lieu des lois, et qu'il vaut mieux qu'un souverain soit trop
indulgent que trop severe. Comme tout particuHer qui
n'agit pas par principes a une conduite inconsequente,
d'autant plus importe-t-il qu'un magistrat qui veille au
bien des peuples agisse d'apr§s un systeme arrete de politique,
de guerre, de finance, de commerce et de lois. Par exemple,
un peuple doux ne doit point avoir des lois severes, mais
des lois adaptees a son caract^re. La base de ces systemes
doit toujours Stre relative au plus grand bien de la societe ;
les principes doivent etre adaptes a la situation du pays,
a ses anciens usages, s'ils sont bons, au genie de la nation.
Par exemple, en politique c'est un fait connu que les
allies les plus naturels et par consequent les meilleurs
sont ceux dont les interSts, concourent avee les ndtres,
et qui ne sont pas si proches voisins, qu'on soit engage
en quelque discussion d'interet avec eux. Quelquefois
des evenements bizarres donnent lieu k des combinaisons
extraordiaaires. Nous avons vu, de nos jours, des
nations de tout temps rivales et meme ennemies marcher
sous les memes bannieres ; mais ce sont des cas qui
arrivent rarement, et qui ne serviront jamais d'exemples.
Ces sortes de liaisons ne peuvent Stre que momentanees,
au lieu que le genre des autres, contraotees par im interet
commun, pent seul etre durable. Dans la situation ou
I'Europe est de nos jours, oii tons les princes sont armes,
parmi lesquels il s'elSve des puissances pr^ponderantes
capables d'ecraser les faibles, la prudence exige qu'on
s'allie avec d'autres puissances, soit pour s'assurer des

400 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

secours en cas d'attaque, soit pour reprimer les projets
' dangereux de ses ennemis, soit pour soutenir, k I'aide de
ces allies, de justes pretentions centre ceux qui voudraient
s'y opposer. Mais ceci ne suffit pas; il faut avoir chez
ses voisins, surtout chez ses ennemis, des yeux et des oreilles
ouverts, qui rapportent fidelenaent ce qu'ils ont vu et
entendu. Les hommes sont mechants ; il faut se garder
surtout d'etre surpris, pares que tout ce qui surprend efEraye
et decontenance, ce qui n'arrive jamais quand on est
prepare, quelque facheux que soit I'evenement auquel on
doit s'attendre. La politique europeenne est si fallacieuse,
que le plus avise pent devenir dupe, s'il n'est pas toujours
alerte et sur ses gardes.

Le systeme militaire doit etre ^galement assis sur de
bons principes qui soient surs et reconnus par I'experience.
On doit connaitre le genie de la nation, de quoi elle est
capable, et jusqu'ou Ton ose risquer ses enterprises en la
menant k I'ennemi. Dans nos temps, il nous est interdit
d'employer k la guerre les usages des Grecs et des Eomains.
La decouverte de la poudre k canon a change entilrement
la fa^on de faire la guerre. Maintenant c'est la superiorite
du feu qui decide de la victoire ; les exercices, les reglements
et la tactique ont et§ refondus pour les conformer k cet
usage, et recemment. Tabus 6norme des nombreuses artil-
leries qui appesantissent les armies nous force egalement
d'adopter cette mode, tant pour nous soutenir dans nos
postes que pour attaquer I'ennemi dans ceux qu'il occupe,
au cas que d'importantes raisons I'exigent. Tant de raffine-
ments nouveaux ont done si fort change Tart de la guerre
que ce serait de nos jours une temerite impardonnable k
un general, en imitant les Turenne, les Conde, les Luxem-
bourg, de risquer une bataille en suivant les dispositions
que ces grands generaux ont faites de leur temps. Alors
les victoires se remportaient par la valeur et par la force ;
maintenant I'artillerie decide de tout ; et I'habilete du
general consiste k faire approcher ses troupes de I'ennemi

LES DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS 401

sans qu'elles soient detruites avant de oommencer ^.I'attaquer.
Pour se procurer cet avantage, il faut qu'il fasse taire le
feu de rennemi par la superiorite de celui qu'il lui oppose.
Mais oe qui restera etemellement stable dans I'art militaire,
c'est la castrametrie, ou I'art de tirer le plus grand parti
possible d'un terrain pour son avantage. Si de nouvelles
decouvertes se font encore, ce sera une necessite que les
generaux de ces temps-li se prStent h ces nouveautes, et
changent k notre tactique ce qui exige correction.

H est des Etats qui, par leur local et par leur constitu-
tion, doivent etre des puissances maritimes ; tels sont
I'Angleterre, la Hollande, la Prance, I'Espagne, le Danemark :
ils sont environnes de la mer, et les colonies eIoign«es
qu'ils poss§dent leur prescrivent d'avoir des vaisseaux
pour entretenir la communication et le commerce entre
la m^re patrie et ces membres detaches. II est d'autres
Etats, comme I'Autriche, la Pologne, la Prusse et meme
la Eussie, dont les uns pourraient se passer de marine, et
Ips autres commettraient une faute impardonnable en
politique, s'ils divisaient leurs forces en voulant employer
sur mer des troupes dont ils ont un besoin indispensable
sur terre. Le nombre des troupes qu'un Etat entretient
doit §tre en proportion des troupes qu'ont ses ennemis ;
il faut qu'il se trouve en meme force, ou le plus faible risque
de succomber. On objectera peut-Stre que le prince doit
compter sur les secours de ses allies. Cela serait bon, si
les allies etaient tels qu'ils devaient etre; mais leur zele
n'est que tiedeur, et Ton se trompe k coup sur, si Ton compte
sur d'autres que sur soi-meme. Si la situation des frontieres
est susceptible d'etre defendue par des forteresses, il ne
faut rien negliger pour en construire, et ne rien epargner
pour les perfectionner. La France en a donne I'exemple,
et elle en a senti I'avantage en differentes occasions.

Mais ni la politique ni le militaire ne peuvent prosperer,
si les finances ne sont pas entretenues dans le plus grand
ordre, et si le prince lui-meme n'est econome et prudent.

3d,

402 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

L'argent est comme la baguette des enchanteurs, par le
moyen de laquelle ils operaient des miracles. Les grandes
vues politiques, I'entretien du militaire, les meilleures
intentions pour le Soulagement des peuples, tout cela demeure
engourdi, si l'argent ne le vivifie. L'economie du souveraib
est d'autant plus utile pour le bien public, que s'il ne
se trouve pas avoir des fonds suffisants en reserve soit
pour foumir aux frais de la guerre sans charger ses peuples
d'imp6ts extraordinaires, soit pour secourir les citoyens
dans des calamitea publiques, toutes ces charges tombent
sur les sujets, quise trouvent sans ressource dans des temps
malheureux ou ils ont si grand besoin d'assistance. Aucun
gouVemement ne peut se passer d'impdta ; soit republicain
soit monarchique il en a un egal besoin^ H faut bien que
le magistral charge de toute la besogne publique ait de
quoi vivre que les juges soient pay6s, pour les empecher
de prevariquer, que le soldat soit entretenu, afin qu'il ne
commette point de violences , faute d'avoir de quoi sub-
sister ; il faut de meme que leS personnes preposees au
maniement des finances soient assez bien payees pour que
le besoin ne les oblige pas d'administrer infidelement les
deniers publics. Ces differentes depenses demandent des
sommes considerables ; ajoutez-y encore quelque argent
mis annuellement de c6te pour les cas extraordinaires:
voila cependant ce qui doit §tre necessairement pris sur
le peuple. Le grand art consiste h lever ces fonds sans
fouler les citoyens. Pour que les taxes soient egales et non
arbitraires. Ton fait des cadastres, qui, s*ils sont classifies
avec exactitude, proportionnent les charges selon les moyens
des individus ; cela est si necessaire, qu'une faute im-
pardonnable en finance serait si les impdts, maladroitement
repartis, d^goutaient I'agriculteur de ses travaux ; il
doit, ayant acquifcte ses droits, pouvoir encore vivre avec
une certaine aisance, lui et sa famiUe. Bien loin d'opprimer
les peres nourriciers de I'Etat, il faut les encourager k bien
cultiver leurs terres ; c'est en quoi consiste la veritable

LES DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS 403

richesse du pays. La terre fourr^it les comestibles les plus
necessaires, et ceux qui la travaillent sont, comme nous
I'avons dej&. dit, les vrais p6res nourrioiers de la Societe.

On m'opposera peut-etre que la Hollande subsists
sans que ses champs lui rapportent la centidme partie
de ce qu'elle consume. Je reponds k cette objection que
c'est un petit Etat, chez lequel le commerce supplee k
I'agriculture ; mais plus un gouvemement est vaste, plus
I'economie rurale a besoin d'etre encouragee.

Une autre espdce d'impdts qu'on leve sur les
villes, ce sont les accises. Elles veulent §tre mani^es avec
des mains adroites, pour ne point charger les comesti-
bles les plus necessaires k la yie, comme le pain, la petite
biSre, la viande, &c., ce qui retomberait sur les soldats,
sur les ouvriers et sur les artisans ; d'oii il s'ensuivrait,
pour le malheur du peuple, que la main-d'ceuvre rehausserait
de prix ; par consequent les marchandises deviendraient,
si cheres, qu'on en perdrait le debit etranger. C'est ce
qui arrive maintenant en Hollande et en Angleterre. Ces
deux nations, ayant contracte des dettes immenses dans
les demi^res guerres, ont cree de nouveaux impdts pour
en payer le dividende, mais comme leur maladresse en a
charge la main-d'ceuvre, ils ont presque ecrase leurs manu-
factures. De 1^, la cherts en Hollande 6tant augmentee,
ces repubHcains font fabriquer leurs draps k Verviers et k
Liege, et 1' Angleterre a perdu un d^bit considerable de ces
laiaes en Allemagne. Pour obvier k ces abus, le souverain
doit souvent se souvenir de I'etat du pauvre peuple, se
mettre a la place d'un paysan et d'un manufacturier, et
se dire alors : Si j'^tais n6 dans la classe de ces citoyens
dont les bras sont le capital, que desirerais-je du souverain ?
Ce que le bon sens alors lui indiquera, son devoir est de
le mettre en pratique. II se trouve des provinces, dans
la plupart des Etats de I'Europe, ou les paysans, attaches
i la glebe, sont serfs de leurs gentilshommes ; c'est de
toutes les conditions la plus malheureuse et celle qui revolte

404 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

le plus rhumauit^. AsaUr^ment aucun homme u'est n6
pour etre I'esclave de son semblable ; on deteste avec raison
, un pareil abus, et Ton croit qu'il ne faudrait que vouloii:
pour abolir cette coutume barbare ; mais il n'en est pas
ainsi, elle tient k d'anciens contrats faits entre les possesseurs
des terres et les colons. L'agriculture est arrangee en conse-
quence des services des paysahs ; en voulant abolir tout d'un
coup cette abominable gestion, on bouleverserait entiere-
ment I'economie des terres, et il faudrait en partie indemniser
la noblesse des pertes qu'elle souffrirait en ses revenus.

Ensnite s'ofee I'article des manufactures et du commerce,
non moins important. Pour qu'un pays se conserve dans
une situation florissante, il est de toute u^cessite que la
balance du commerce lui soit avantageuse ; s'U paye plus
pour les importations qu'il ne gagne par les exportation^,
il faut n^cessairement qu'il s'appauvrisse d'annee en annee.
Qu'on se figure un bourse ou il y a cent ducats : tirez-en
joumellement un, et n'y remettez rien, vous conviendrez
qu'au bout de cent jours la bourse sera vide. Voici lea
moyens d'obvier k cette perte : faire manufacturer toutes
les premieres matidres qu'on poss^de, faire travailler les
mati^res 6trang§res pour y gagaer la main-d'oeuvre et tra-
vailler h bon marche pour se procurer de debit etranger.
Quant au commerce, il roule sur trois points : sur le superflu
de vos denrees, que vous exportez ; sur celles de vos voisins,
qui vous enrichissent en les vendant ; et sur les marchan-
dises etrangferes que vos besoins exigent et que vous im-
portez. C'est sur ces productions que nous venons.
d'indiquer que doit se regler le commerce d'un Etat ; voila de
quoi il est susceptible par la nature des choses. L'Angleterre,
la HoUande, la Prance, I'Espagne, le Portugal, ont des
possessions aux deux Indes et des ressources plus ^tendues
pour leur marine marchande que les autres royaumes ;
profiter des avantages qu'on a, et ne rien entrepreudre
au deM de ses forces, c'est le conseil de la sagesse.

II nous reste k parler des moyens les plus propres pou

LES DEVOIES DES SOUVEEAINS 405

maintenir invariablement rabondance des vivres, dont la
societe a un besoin indispensable pour demeurer florissante.
La premiere chose est d'avoir soin de la bonne culture des
terres, de defricher tous les terrains qui sont capablea de
rapport, d'augmenter les troupeaux pour gagner d'autant
plus de lait, de beurre, de fromage et d'engfais ; d'avoir
ensuite un releve exact de la quantite de boisseaux des
differentes especes de grains gagnes dans de bonnes, dans
de mediocres et dans de mauvaises annees ; d'en decompter
la consommation, et, par ce resultat, de s'instruire de ce
qu'il y a de superflu, dont I'exportation doit etre permise,
ou de ce qui manque k la' consommation, et que le besoin
demande qu'on se procure. Tout souverain attache au
bien public est oblige de se pourvoir de magasins abondam-
ment fournis, pour suppleer k la mauvaise r6eolte et pour
prevenir la famine. Nous avons vu en Allemagne dans les
mauvaises annees de 1771 et de 1772, les malheurs que
la Saxe et les provinces de I'Empire ont soufferts, parce
que cette precaution si utile avait ete negligee. Le peuple
broyait I'ecorce des chines, qui lui servait d'aliment- Cette
miserable nourriture aecelera sa mort ; nombre de families
ont peri sans secours ; c'etait une desolation universelle.
D'autres, p^iles, blames et dechames, se sont expatries pour
chercher des secours ailleurs ; leur vue excitait la compassion,
un coeur d'airain y aurait 6te sensible. Quel reproches
leurs magistrats ne devaient-ils pas se faire d'etre les specta-
teurs de ces calamites sans y pouvoir porter de remede !

Nous passons maintenant 4 un autre article, aussi
interessant peut-etre. II est peu de pays ou les citoyens
aient des opinions pareilles sur la rehgion ; elles different
souvent entierement ; il en est d'autres qu'on appelle des
sectes. La question s'eleve alors : Paut-il que tous les
citdyens pensent de mSme, ou peut-on permettre a chacun
de penser k sa guise ? Voilii d'abord de sombres pplitiques
qui vous disent : Tout le monde doit etre de la m§me opinion,
pour que rien ne divise les citoyens. Le theologien y

406 THE FOUiIdATIONS OP GEEMANY

ajoute : Quiconque ne pense pas comme moi est damne,
et il ne convient pas que mon souverain soit roi des damnes ;
il faut done les r6tir dans ce monde, pour qu'ils prosperent
d'autant mieux dans I'autre. On repond a c61a que jamais
une societe ne penaera de meme ; que chez les nations
chr^tiennes la plupart sont anthropomorphites ; que chez
les catholiques le grand nombre est idolatre, parce qu'on
ne me persuadera jamais qu'un manant sache distinguer
le culte de latrie et d'hyperdulie ; il adore de borme foi
I'image qu'il ihvoque. Voil^ done nombre d'herfetiques
dans toutes les sectes chrfetiennes ; de plus, chacun croit
ce qui lui parait vraisemblable. On pen contraindre par
violence un pauvre miserable k prononcer un certain formu-
laire, auquel il denie son consentement iuterieur ; ainsi le
persfecuteur n'a rien gagne. Mais si Ton remonte k I'origine
de la societe, il est de toute evidence que le souverain n'a
aucun droit sur la fa9on de penser des citoyens. Ne faudrait-
il pas etre en demence pour se figurer que des hommes ont
dit k un homme leur semblable : Nous vous elevons au-dessus
de nous, parce que nous aimons k etre esclaves, et nous vous
donnons la puissance de dinger nos pens^es a votre volonte ?
Us ont dit au contraire : Nous avons besoin de vous pour
maintenir les lois auxquelles nous voulons obeir, pour nous
gouverner sagement, poUr nous defendre ; du reste, nous
exigeons de vous que vous respectiez notre liberte. Voila
la sentence prononcee, elle est sans appel, et mSme cette
tolerance est si avantageuse aux sooi6tes ou elle est etablie
qu'elle fajt le bonheur de I'Etat. Des que tout culte est
libre, tout le monde est tranquille ; au lieu que la persecution
a donne lieu aux guerres civiles les plus sanglantes, les
plus longues et les plus destructives. Le moiadre mal
qu'attire la persecution est de faire 6nadgrer les persecutes ;
la Prance a eu des provinces dont la population a souifert,
et qui se ressentent encore de la revocation de I'edit de
Nantes.

Ce sont 1^, en general, les devoirs qu'un prince doit

LES DEVOIRS DES SOUVERAINS 407

remplir. Afin qu'il ne s'en ecaxte jamais, il doit se rappeler
souvent qu'il est homme comme le moindre de ses sujets ;
s'il est le premier juge, le premier general, le premier financier,
le premier ministre de la sooi^te, ce n'est pas pour qu'il
repr^sente, mais afin qu'il en rempUsse les devoirs. D n'est
que le premier serviteur de I'Etat, oblige d'agir avec probite,
avec sagesse et avec un entier desinteressement, comme
si k chaque moment il devait rei^dre compte de son ad-
ministration h ses citoyens. Ainsi il est coupable s'il
prodigue I'argent du peuple, le produit des imp6ts, en
luxe, en faste, en debauches, lui qui doit veiller aux bonnes
mceurs qui sont les gardiennes des lois, qui doit perfectionner
I'education nationale, et non la pervertir par de mauvais
exemples. C'est un objet des plus importants que la
conservation des bonnes mceurs dans leur integrite ; le
souverain pent y contribuer beaucoup en distinguant
et recompensant les citoyens qui ont fait des actions ver-
tueuses, en temoignant du mepris pour ceux dont, la de-
pravation ne rbugit plus de ses dereglements. Le prince
doit desapprouver hautement toute action deshonnSte,
et refuser des distinctions h ceux qui sont incorrigibles.
II est encore un objet interessant qu'il ne faut pas perdre
de vue et qui, s'il etait neglige, porterait un prejudice
irreparable aux bonnes mceurs ; c'est quand le prince
distingue trop des personnes qui, sans merite, possedent
de grandes richesses. Ces honneurs prodigues mal a propos
confirment le public dans le pr^juge vulgaire qu'il suffit
d'avoir du bien pour etre considere. Des lors I'interet et
la cupidite secouent le frein qui les retenait ; cHacun veut
accumuler des richesses ; on emploie les voies les plus
iniques pour les acquerir ; la corruption gagne, elle s'enracine,
elle devient generale ; les hommes ^ talents, les hommes
vertueux sont meprises, et le public n'honore que ces batards
de Midas dont la grande depense et le faste I'^blouisaent.
Pour empecher que les mceurs nationales ne se pervertissent
jusqu'a cet horrible excSs, le prince doit etre sans cesse

408 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

attentif k ne distinguer que le merite personnel et a ne
temoigner que du tnepris pour I'opulence sans moeurs et
sans vertus. Au reste, comme le souverain est proprement
le chef d'une famille de citoyens, le p§re de ses peuples,
dans toutes les occasions il doit servir de dernier refuge
aux malheureux, tenir lieu de pere aux orphelins, secourir
les veuves, avoir des entrailles pour le dernier miserable
comme pour le premier courtisan, et repandre des liberalites
sur ceux qui, priv6s de tout secours, ne peuvent trouver
d'assistance que par ses bienfaits.

Voil^, selon les principes que nous avons etablis au
commencement de cet essai, I'idee exaete qu'on doit se '
former des devoirs d'un souverain et de la seule maniere /
qui pent rendre bon et avantageux le gouvemement monar-
chique. Si bien des princes ont uiie conduite differente, il
faut Fattribuer au peu de reflexion qu'ils ont fait sur leur
institution et sur les devoirs qui en derivent. lis ont porte
une charge dont ils ont meconnu le poids et i'importance,
ils se sont fourvoy§s faiite de cotmaissances, car dans nos
temps I'ignorance fait commettre plus de fautes que la
mechancete. Cette esquisse de souverain paraltra peat-
Mre aux censeurs I'archetype des stoiciens, I'idee de sage
qu'ils avaient imagine, qui n'exista jamais, et dont le seul
Marc-AurSle apprOcha le plus prSs. Nous souhaitons
que ce faible essai soit capable de former des Marc-AurSles ;
ce serait la plus belle recompense a laquelle nous puissions
nous attendre, et qui ferait en meme temps le bien de
I'humanite. Nous devons cependant ajouter k ceci qu'un
prince qui foumirait la carriere laborieuse que nous avons
tracee ne parviendrait paa k ime perfection entiere, parce
qu'avec toute la bonne volonte possible, il pourrait se
tromper dans le choix de ceux qu'il emploierait k I'adminis-
tration des affaires ; parce qu'on pourrait lui representor
les choses sous un faux jour ; que ses ordres ne seraient
pas executes ponctuellement ; qu'on voilerait des iaiquites
de f agon qu'elles ne parviendraitot pas k sa connaissance ;

LE8 DEVOIRS DES SOUVERAINS 409

que des employes dura et entiers mettraient trop de rigueur
et de hauteur dans leur gestion ; enfin, parce que, dans un
pays etendui le prince ne saurait etre partout. Tel est
done et sera le destin des choses d'ici-bas, que jamais
on n'atteindra au degre de perfection qu'exige le bonheur
des peuples, et qu'en fait de gouvemement, comme pour
toute autre chose, il faudra se contenter de ce qui est le
moins defectueux.

CHAPTEE XVII

INSTRUCTION AU MAJOE BOEOKE (1751)

Jb vous confie I'education de mon neveu, I'heritier pre-
Bomptif de la couronne ; et comme il est tres-different de
bien elever un particulier, ou celui qui est destine k gouverner
des Etats, je vous donne ici una iastruction sur toutea
les chosea que vous devez observer.

1°. Touchant les maitrea :

n faut que mon neveu parcoure Fhistoire ancienne,
qu'il Sache les differentes monarchies qui se sont succede,
de I'histoire grecque surtout ce qui se passa dans la guerre
d'Artaxeroe, de Philippe et d'AIexandre, dans I'histoire
romaiue, le temps des guerres puniques et de Cesar. II
ne faut point lui fatiguer la memoire par les noma des
princes qui se sont succede, poorvu qu'il sache ceux des
hommes illustres qui ont joue un grand r61e dana leur
patrie.

II ne sufi&t pas de lui apprendre I'histoire comme h
un perroquet ; le grand usage dee faita anciena eat de lea
comparer aux modernea, de developper lea causea qui ont
produit des revolutions, de montrer comme pour I'ordinaire
le vice est puni et la vertu recompensee. II faut, de plus,
lui faire remarquer que les historiens anciens ne sont pas
toujours v^ridiques, et qu'il faut examiner et juger avant
de croire. La partie de I'hiatoire la plus essentielle et
la plus indispenaable, c'est celle qui prend a Charlemagne
et qui finit k nos jours ; j'entends par histoire celle de

410

INSTEUCTION AU MAJOE BOECKE Hi

I'Europe. II la lui faut faire ^tudier avec soin, ne s'a;ttacher
qu'aux faits principaux, et n'entrer dans un plus grand
detail qu'^ la guerre de trente ans. Qu'il apptenne
I'histoire de sa maison, cela va sans dire.

En apprenant la geographie, il est necessaire de lui
donner una id^e des etats et de leur gouvemement ; et
comme cette etude va tres bien avec celle de I'histoire,
on peut, en lui enseignant I'une, lui apprendre I'autre en
m6me temps.

Dans quelque temps on pourra lui faire un petit cours
de logique depouille de toute pedanterie, et autant qu'il
en faut pour qu'il disceme de lui-m§me le point faux
d'un raisoimement et en quoi une proposition n'est pas
juste. Ensuite on pourra lui faire lire les orateurs, Ciceron,
Demosthene,, quelques tragedies de Eacine, &c.

Quand il aura quelques annees de plus, on pourra lui
donner un abrege des opinions des philosophes et des
differentes religions, sans lui inspirer de haine pour aucune,
en Ini faisant voir qu'elles adorent toutes Dieu, mais par
des moyens differents. II ne faut pas qu'il ait trop de
consideration pour le prStre qui I'instruit, et il faut qu'il
ne croie les choses qu'aprls les avoir examinees.

J'en reviens k la religion catholique. EUe est assez
etendue en Silesie, dans les duches de Cleves et ailleurs.
Si cet enfant devenait calviniste fanatique, tout serait
perdu. II est tres-necessaire d'empecher mpme le prStre
de dire devotement des injures aux papistes ; tnais le
gouverneur doit adroitement faire sentir a son eleve que
rien n'est plus dangereux que lorsque les catholiques ont
le dessus dans un pays, par rapport aux persecutions, a
I'ambition des papes, et qu'un prince protestant est bien
plus le maitre chez lui qu'un prince catholique.

II s'entend de soi-m§me que mon neveu apprenne k
Ure, k ecrire, k compter ; ainsi je passe ces articles sous
silence. II est trop jeune pour apprendre les fortifications,
11 en sera temps quand il aura dix ou onze ans.

412 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Les exercices comme danser, faire les armes et monter
a cheval peuveat s'apprendre I'apres-midi, dans le temps
de la digestion. Si I'enfant avait envie d'apprendre le
latin, le polonais ou I'italien, il ne d^pendra que de lui ;
mais s'il n'y naarqne pas d'inclination, il ue faut pas le
presser la-dessus, de meme que la musique.

Voici pour ses etudes et ses exercices. Votre grand art
sera de lui faire le tout avec plaisir, de bannir la pedanterie
de ces etudes et de lui en faire venir le gout ; c'est pourquoi,
au commencement surtout, il ne faut pas charger la dose.

Nous en venons h present ^ la plus grande et essentielle
partie de I'education, qui est celle des mceurs. Ni voua
ni toutes les puissances de I'univers ne sauraient changer
le caractere d'un enfant ; tout ce que peut I'education,
c'est de moderer la violence des passions. Traitez mon
neveu comme un particulier qui doit faire sa fortune ;
dites-Iui que s'il a des defauts, ou s'il n'apprend rien, il
sera meprise de tout le monde. Citez lui I'exemple du
M. de Schwedt et de Henri. II ne faut point lui mettre
du vent en tete, et I'elever tout simplement. Qu'il soit
obligeant envers tout le monde, et que s'il fait une grossierete
a quelqu'un, que celui-la la lui rende sur-le-champ. Qu'il
apprenne que tons les hommes sont egaux, et que la naissance
n'est qu'une chimfere, si elle n'est pas soutenue par le merite.
Laissez-le parler tout seul avec tout le monde, pour qu'il
devienne hardi. Qu'importe qu'il parle de tort et travers ?
On sait que c'est un enfant, et, dans toute son education,
faites, autant qu'il sera en vous, qu'il agisse par lui-mSme,
et qu'il ne s'accoutume point a se laisser mener; que ses
sottises soient a lui, de meme que les bonnes choses qu'il
fera.

II est d'une tres-grande importance de lui inspirer du
gofit pour le militaire ; pour cette raison il faut dans toutes
les occasions lui dire tant vous-meme que de lui faire dire
par d'autres que tout homme de naissance qui n'est pa^
Boldat n'est qu'un miserable. II faut le mener tant qu'il

INSTEUCTION AU MA JOE BOECKE 413

veut voir dea troupes. On peut lui montrer les cadets
et en faire venir avec le temps cinq ou six chez lui faire
I'exercice ; que cela soit un amusement et non pas un
devoir, car le grand art est de lui donner du gofit pour ce
metier, et ce serait tout perdre que de I'ennuyer ou de le
rebuter. Qu'il parle a tout le monde, k un cadet, ^ un
soldat, ^ un bourgeois, a un officier, pour qu'il devienne
hardi.

Qu'on lui inspire surtout de I'attachement pour ce pays,
et que personne ne lui tienne des discours que de bon patriote ;
et sur toute sorte de sujets et de discours on peut y glisser
quelques reflexions de morale, qui tendent a lui prScher
I'humanite, la bonte et les sentiments qu'il convient ^ un
homme d'honneur et surtout k un prince d'avoir.

Je veux que, quand il sera plus ^ge, il commence k
faire ie service de lieutenant, pour qu'il passe tout les
grades ; ainsi il ne faut point lui mettre du vent dans la
tete. Que les officiers qui dinent avec lui I'attaquent et
I'agacent pour le rendre hardi et gai, et qu'il voie le plus
de monde que se pom:ra. Dans ses heures de recreation,
s'il a envie de voir des enfants de son age, cela ne fera pas
de mal ; il est un pen tacitume, et il est tres-necessaire de
I'eveiller ; c'est pourquoi vous vous appliquerez k le rendre
le plus gai que possible. Dans toutes les occasions vous
aurez grande attention k lui inculqUer le respect et I'amour
qu'il doit k son pire, k sa m^re, et la deference envers
ses parents. Quand vous le connaitrez davantage il faudra
voir quelle sera sa passion. Dieu nous garde de la detruire !
mais travaillons k la moderer. Quand il est dans son
particulier, qu'il ne fasse jamais des choses sans en rendre
raison, k moins que ce ne soit dans ses heures de recreation. ,
S'il est souple, soyez doux, s'il est retif, donnez-vous toute
I'autorite qu'il vous convient, punissez-le en lui 6tant
I'epee, en le mettant aux arrets, et, tant qu'il se peut, en
le piquant d'honneur ; jusqu'^ present il parait fort doux,
mais avec I'age il se developpera davantage.

414 THE FOPNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

Vons rendrez toutes lea semaines compte de sa conduite
au pere, et ^ mpi tous les mois. S'il- y a quelqne cas ex-
traordinaire. Tons pourrez toujours recourrir ^ moi. Ne le
rendez pas timide par de trop grands menagements pour
sa sant6, ou par crainte que malheur n'arrive. II faut
avoir un grand soin de lui, mais il ne faut pas qu'il s'en
aper^oive, cela le rendrait douillet, timide et pusillanime.
Mon fr^re ppurra regler ses heures comme il le jugera k
propos, et vous pourrez prendre vos mesures 1^-dessus.

Cette instruction n'est bonne que juaqu'4 I'Sge de dix
^ donze ans, ou il tous en faudra uue autre proportionn^e
aux progr§s de mon neveU) k son ^ge et aux circonstances.

Fait k Potsdam, ce 24 Septembre 1751.

{Sign^ FaiiDfiRic.

CHAPTEE XVIII

AU MINISTBE d'^ITAT, COMTE DE FINCKBNSTEIN, A BERLIN

InSTKUCTION SsCEiiTB POUE LB COMTB DB PiNCK

Beelin, 10 Janvier 1757.

Dans la aituation critique ou se trouvent nos affaires, je
dois vous donner mes ordres, pour que, dans tous les caa
malheureux qui aont dans la poasibilite dea evenements,
voua soyez autoris§ aux partis qu'il faut prendrei

S'il arrivait — de quoi le Ciel preserve ! — qu'une de mes
armeea en Saxe Mt totalement battue, ou bien que lea
Pran5ais chassasaent les Hanoveriena de leur paya et a'y
etablissent et nous inena5assent d'une invasion dans la
Vieille-Marche, ou que les Euases penetrassent par la Nouvell e-
Marche, il faut sauver la fanaille royale, les principaux
dicast&res, lea ministres et le directoire. Si nous aommea
battua en Saxe du c6te de Leipzig, le lieu le plus propre pour
le transport de la famiUe et du treaor eat a Ciiatrin ; il
faut, en ce cas, que la famille royale et toua ci-dessus nommes
aillent, escortefe de toute la garniaon, a Ciistrin. Si les Eusses
entraient par la NouveUe-Marche, ou qu'il nous arrivat
un malheur en Lusace, il faudrait que tout se transport§,t
h Magdebourg. Enfin, le dernier refuge est k Stettin ; maia
il ne faut y aller qu'4 la demiere extremite. La gamison,
la famiUe royale et le tresor sont inseparables et vont
toujours ensemble ; il faut y ajouter les diamants de la
couronne et I'argenterie des granda apartements, qui en

416

416 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

pareil cas, ainsi que la vaisselle d'or, doit etre incontinent
monnayee.

S'il arrivait que je fusse tu6, il faut que les affaires
continuent leur train sans la moindre alteration et sans
qu'on s'apergoive qu'elles sont en d'autres mains ; et en
ce cas il faut hitei serments et hommages, tant ici qu'en
Prusse, et surtout en Silesie.

Si j'avais la fatalite d'etre pris prisonnier par I'ennemi,
je defends qu'on ait le moindre egard pour ma personne,
ni qu'on fasse la moindre reflexion sur ce que je pourrais
ecrire de ma detention. Si pareil malheur m'arrivait, je
veux me sacrifier pour I'Etat, et il faut qu'on obeisse h
mon frere, lequel, ainsi que tons mes ministres et generaux,
me repondront de leur tete qu'on n'offrira ni province ni
ran^on pour moi, et que Ton continuera la guerre, en poussant
ses avantages tout comme si je n'avais jamais existe dans
le monde.

J'espere et je dois croire que vous, comte Finck,, n'aurez
pas besoin de faire usage de cette instruction ; mais, en
cas de malheur, je vous autorise SpTemployer, et, marque que
c'est, apres une mfire et saine deliberation, ma ferme et
constante volonte, je la signe de ma main, et la munis de
mon cachet.

FfiiiDiiBio, B.

CHAPTEE XIX

Th£i WAB aims of the QtlBMAN BUSINESS MSN ^

Petition signed hy the League of Agriculturists, the German
Peasants League, the Wesiphalian Peasants Sodiety,
the Central Association of German Industrialists, the
League of Industrialists, and the German Middle-class
Associatimi.

' Your Excellency, — ^Together with the whole German
people, the German men of business engaged in agriculture,
the manufacturing industries, commerce, and trade, are
firmly determined to persevere in the struggle for life or
death which has been forced upon our country. They will
persevere to the last, and at whatever cost, so that Germany
may issue from the struggle externally stronger, and that
it may possess the guarantee of a lasting peace and the
guarantee of an assured national economic and cultura'
development.

' In view of this aim and the readiness of the whole nation
to make the necessary sacrifices, it is only natural that the
people have been alarmed by rumours regarding peace
negotiations, and particularly regarding the conclusion of a
separate peace with England, which was to be based upon
certain English wishes and demands.

' In these circumstances the declaration of the Nordr
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung that nobody endowed with
common sense could think of giving up the advantages
arising from the favourable military position by a premature
peace with any one of our enemies has been received every-
where with satisfaction.

* Reprinted from Gmmbach, Oermany'a Annexationist Aims (John
Murray, 1917).

■^ 417 2 b

418 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

' That determination should not be affected by a less
favourable or a less secure position of the war. Otherwise,
the external and internal aims which have been indicated
by his Majesty the Emperor would be lost sight of. These
aims can be obtained only by the military enforcement of a
peace which gives us a greater security for our frontiers in
the West and the East, which broadens the basis of Germany's
naval power, and which gives us the possibility of a power-
ful and unhampered development of our economic forces.
Briefly, peace must bring us such an increase of our political,
military, maritime, and economic power that it establishes
our greater strength against the nations without.

' A peace which does not jdeld these results makes in-
evitable the renewal of the struggle at an early date under
materially less favourable conditions for Germany. There-
fore, no premature peace must be concluded. Erom such
a premature peace no adequate fruits of victory can be
derived.

' But there should also be no half-hearted peace, no
peace which, through the defects indicated, does not lead to
the full political exploitation of the final military success
for which we hope !

' It must not be overlooked that the full exploitation of
the favourable military position is necessary not only for
securing Germany's future externally and for safeguarding
its future, but that the full exploitation of victory is equally
necessary during the ensuing years of peace for reasons of
internal policy. Only then the people will wUlingly make
the necessary sacrifices. The German nation does, of course,
not expect the impossible. Notwithstanding its patriotism,
it would consider reasonably the existence of insuperable
military difficulties which would make impossible the con-
clusion of a satisfactory peace. However, the consequences
upon the internal position of Germany would be most disas-
trous if, at the conclusion of peace, Germany should make
concessions which are not made necessary by the military
situation, if the country should prematurely end the struggle.
The result would be that the returning German warriors
would believe that the sole result of "their bravery was an

WAE AIMS PETITION 419

unbearable load of taxation. That would be fatal for our
internal peace. Germany's gains derived from its victories
must correspond to the sanguinary sacrifices made by
hundreds of thousands !

' The detailed demands which must be fulfilled in the
opinion of the signatories, should they be militarily obtain-
iable, and which are necessary to strengthen Germany politi-
cally, militarily, and economically to such a degree that the
country can with confidence look forward into the future,
have been given in the petition adjoined which has been
placed before your Excellency on March 10th of this year
by the League of Agriculturists, by the German Peasant
League, by the Central Association of German Industrialists,
by the League of Industrialists, and by the German Middle-
class Association. Since then the Christian German Peasant
Associations have joined the associations named. The
Petition before mentioned was worded as follows :

' " The undersigned associations have considered the
question how to carry out the demand which has so fre-
quently been made during the last few months, that .the
present war should be followed by an honourable peace, by
a peace which corresponds with the sacrifices made, and
which will be secure and lasting.

' " If we wish to answer this question we must never
forget that our enemies unceasingly proclaim that Germany
must be annihilated and must disappear from among the
Great Powers. As these are their aims, Germany cannot
find security in treaties which would be trodden under-
foot as soon as convenient. On the contrary, we can find
security only by weakening our enemies economically and
militarily to such a degree that peace will remain secure
for an indefinite time.

' " We demand the possession of a Colonial Empire which
corresponds with the many-sided economic interests of
Germany. We demand security for Germany's colonial
policy and for her customs policy in the future. We
demand a sufficient war indemnity in a suitable form.
We believe that our principal aim should be to secure and
improve the European basis of the German Empire, in

420 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEEMANY

view of the war which has been forced upon us. Germany's
position in Europe should be improved as follows :

' " Belgium must be placed under German law in order
to secure Germany's naval, military, and economic power
in the future, especially as towards England. Besides, we
must remember the close connection which exists between
the economically so important Belgian territory and the
principal industrial districts of Germany. For these reasons
Belgium must be placed under the German Empire with
regard to military affairs. Customs matters, the Mint,
Bank, and Postal arrangements. The Belgian railways
and waterways must become part of the German transport
system. In the Government and the administration of
Belgium the Walloon and Flemish districts must be kept
apart. At the same time, the industrial undertakings and
landed properties which are so important for dominating
the country must be transferred from Belgian to German
hands, and arrangements must be made which ensure that
the iijiabitants of the country will obtain no political in-
fluence upon the German Empire.

' " As regards France. For the reasons given above, with
regard to Germany's relations to England, the possession of
the French shore and coast districts up to the Somme must
be considered as a question of life or death for Germany's
future position on the sea, for we must have access to the
Atlantic. The Hinterland, which would have to be ac-
quired at the same time, must secure the fullest economic
and strategical exploitation of the newly acquired Channel
ports. All further acquisitions of French territory must
be exclusively based upon military and strategical considera-
tions. The acquisition of the mining district of Briey will,
however, form an exception to th^ principle indicated.
In view of the experiences of the present war, it may be
considered a matter of course that we can never again expose
our frontiers to hostile invasion. We can therefore, in
particular, not allow our opponents to retain Verdun and
Belfort and the western slopes of the Vosges which lie be-
tween these two points. By acquiring the line of the Meuse
and the French coast of the Channel, Germany would obtain

WAR AIMS PETITION 421

not only the ore deposits of Briey, which have already been
mentioned, but also the coal districts of the Department du
Nord and of the Department Pas-de-Calais.

' " In view of the experiences made in Alsace-Lorraine, it
may be considered a matter of course that the population of
the annexed French territory will not be allowed to obtain
political influence in Germany, and that here also the impor-
tant economic factors, including large and medium-sized pro-
perties, win be placed into German hands, while France should
undertake to receive and to indemnify the original owners.

' " As regards The East. In the first place, we should
be guided by the principle that the vast increase of indus-
trial power which we may expect to receive in the West must
be balanced by equivalent acquisitions of agricultural
territory in the East. The present economic structure of
Germany has proved so fortunate in the course of the war
that the necessity of preserving its happy balance for all
time may be described as indispensable according to the
general conviction of the German people.

' " In view of the necessity of Strengthening not only the
industrial, but also the agricultural basis of Germany, a
comprehensive policy of colonisation with German agricul-
tural colonists is indicated. The German peasants living
abroad, and particularly those domiciled outside Germany,
and especially in Eussia, who have been deprived of their
rights in consequence of the war, must be enabled to
return to Germany. Their return will greatly increase
the population and the military strength of the country.
In view of the requirements mentioned, a considerable
expansion of German territory is needed towards the
Bast. At least part of the Baltic Provinces and of the
territories to the south of them must be aimexed. The
aim to make the eastern frontier of Germany more easily
defendable must constantly be kept in mind.

' " Recreated Eastern Prussia requires more secure
frontiers. The provinces of Western Prussia, Posen, and
Silesia also must no longer be allowed to remain in their
present exposed position. The necessary protection can
best be created by acquiring large territories farther east.

422 THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

' " With regard to the granting of political rights to the
inhabitants of the annexed territories, and with regard to
securing within these new districts Germany's economic
supremacy, the principles laid down with regard to France
should apply. The war indemnity to be demanded from
Russia should largely consist of land.

' " Of course these demands depend on the assump-
tion that military results will enable us to carry them
but. However, in view of the successes obtained so far,
we are full of confidence that our armies and their leaders
wUl obtain a victory which guarantees the fulfilment of
these our wishes. The aims indicated must be striven for,
not from love of conquest, but because a lasting peace can
be secured only by achieving them. In view of the sacrifices
made by them, the German people expect such a peace.
Besides, the voluntary surrender of enemy lands which
have been drenched with so much German blood, and which
contain innumerable graves of the best Germans, would
not correspond with the sentiments of the people, and with
their ideas of what constitutes an honourable peace.

' " Lack of harbours on the Channel would strangle
Germany's oversea development, as it has done in the past.
An independent Belgium would continue to be an Enghsh
Mte de font, a hostile base. It would mean a constant threat
on the part oi our enemies if the natural line of fortresses of
Prance should be allowed to remain in the hands of the
French. Russia, on the other hand, would under-estimate
Germany's strength for action and power should she experi-
ence no loss of territory. Besides, if we should not acquire
agricultural territory on our eastern frontier, we should
diminish the possibility of strengthening Germany's military
power by an adequate increase of the national population in
case of a war with Russia.

' " We have the honour of acquainting your Excellency
with these our views, which are held by vast numbers of
Germans who do not belong to the undersigned Associations,
although there may be differences of opinion with regard
to certain details. At the same time, we would respectfully
point out that we have sent copies of the present document

WAR AIMS PETITION 428

to the Ministries of the individual States of the German
Empire."

' It is necessary to supplement the petition given in the
foregoing. It should expressly be pointed out that the
political, military, and economic aims which the German
nation has in view in order to safeguard its future are closely
interconnected, and cannot be treated separately. In the
first place, it is clear that success in obtaining our great
political aims depends on the efficacy and success of the
German armies. However, the experience of the present
war teaches us that in the last resort Germany's military
successes and the exploitation of our victories to the fullest
extent depend on the economic strength and efficiency of
the German nation. Had Germany's agriculture not been
able to feed the people, despite all the efforts of our enemies
to starve us, had not the German manufacturing industries,
German inventiveness, and German technical skill been
able to maintain our independence from foreign countries,
we should at last be defeated, notwithstanding the glorious
successes of our victorious troops, and possibly we would
by now have been vanquished.

' It follows that our demands which, at first sight, seem
to be dictated by purely economic motives, must be con-
sidered from a larger point of view. They spring from
the necessity of increasing Germany's national and military
power to the utmost. Our demands must therefore be
considered from the military point of view. This is particu-
larly, the case with regard to the acquisition of agricultural
territory upon which stress has been laid in the petition,
and with regard to the seizure of the ore-bearing territories
of the Meurthe and Moselle, and of the French coal districts
of the Departments du Nord and Pas-de-Calais, and the
Belgian coal districts.

' The acquisition of adequate lands suitable for agri'
cultural colonisation is indispensable not only with a view
to broadening the basis of Germany's national economy.
It is necessary not only in order to maintain the happy
balance of Germany's national economy, the importance
of which the present war has plainly disclosed, but also in

424 THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

order to secure the powerful stream of national strength
and of man-power which is provided by a mighty agriculture.
This is particularly necessary if we ' wish to increase the
number of the people and thereby Germany's military
strength.

' Acquisitions in the ore and iron districts mentioned are
required, not only by our economic interests, but also by
military necessity. That will appear clearly from the
following details :

' Since August 1914, Germany's production of raw iron
has increased again to nearly 1,000,000 tons per month, or
has approximately doubled, and Germany's steel production
has increased to more than 1,000,000 tons per month.
Nevertheless, iron and steel are not abundant, but are scarce
in Germany, and are still more scarce in neutral countries.
The German shell works require quantities of iron and steel
which formerly would have been considered incredible. For
cast grey shells alone, which are an inferior substitute for
drawn shells and steel shells, at least 4000 tons of raw iron
have been used every day during the last few months. At
the moment, the exact figures cannot be given. However,
it is certain that the continuation of the war would have
been impossible had the German iron and steel production
not been doubled since August 1914.

' The basis of the German iron and steel production is
minette ore, the preponderant importance of which is con-
stantly increasing. This ore alone can be obtained in rapidly
increasing quantities within Germany's frontiers. The pro-
duction of the other German iron districts is very limited,
and the importation of iron ore from overseas, even from
Sweden, has become so difficult that at many works, even
those outside the Luxemburg-Lorraine district, minette ore
furnishes from 60 to 80 per cent, of the iron and steel
produced. It follows that the war would be as good as lost
should the production of minette ore be interfered with.

' How does the production of minette ore stand in the
present war, and how would it stand in a future war ?

'If the fortress of Longwy and the numerous French
furnaces in the neighbourhood should be given back to the
French, France would be able in a new war to destroy from

WAE AIMS PETITION

425

Longwy thfe following iron works in Germany and Luxem-
burg in a few hours by means of long-distance gun-fire :

Kilometres dis-
tance from Longwy

Eodingen .
Differdingen
Esch ....

. 7

. 10

. 16 to 17

Oettingen .
Eiimelingen
Diidelingen .

, 21
. 21
. 25

Thus, approximately 20 per cent, of the German raw iron
and steel production could be eliminated by France acting
from Longwy.

'A glance at the map shows further that Jarny, the
minette mine of the Phoenix Company, ' is situated at a
distance of from 13 to 15 kilometres from Verdun, and that
the western ore concessions near Landres and Conflans are
no farther than 26 kilometres from Verdun. To-day we
bombard Dunkirk from a distance of 38 kilometres. Can
anyone believe that the French would in the next war
abstain from putting long-distance guns into Longwy and
Verdun, in order not to disturb Germany's ore production
and iron industry ?

'In passing, it should be said that only the vast
production of steel from minette ore enables Germany to
provide agriculture with the necessary phosphoric acid since
the importation of phosphates has come to an end.

' Germany's security in a future war urges us compellingly
to acquii?e the whole of the minette territories, including
the fortresses of Longwy and Verdun, for without their
possession the district described cannot be held.

' The possession of vast supplies of coal, and particularly
of coal rich in bitumen, such as that which is found in
Northern Prance, is at least as decisive for the issue of the
war as is the possession of iron ore. Belgium and Northern
France together produce more than 40,000,000 tons of coal
per annum. Besides, coal is nowadays one of the deter-
mining political factors. That may be seen by the English

426 (THE FOUNDATIONS OP GEEMANY

coal export prohibition of May 15. The industrial neutral
nations must act in accordance with the will of that com-
batant Power which can guarantee to them the necessary-
supply of coal. Germany can at present not provide the
coal required. Hence we are compelled to make use of
Belgium's coal production, for otherwise our neutral neigh-
bours would fall entirely under England's control. It is
very probable that the deliberate expansion of the Belgian
coal production has been of the greatest importance, that
it has induced several of Germany's neighbour States to
maintain their neutrality.

'It is generally known that our most important ex-
plosives are derived from coal, their constituents being
obtained during the coking process, and that coal is
important also for the production of ammonia. Coal can
provide us with benzol, the only product with which we can
replace the benzine which we lack. Lastly, coal furnishes
us with tar, which can be converted into oil fuel, which
is indispensable for naval purposes, and into lubricants.
It should be pointed out that the large expansion of our
torpedo-boat flotilla and of our submarine arm is impossible
unless we have a vast supply of liquid fuel. The course of
the present war has demonstrated the superiority of oil fuel
over coal in the case of torpedo-boats, and its advantages
are so striking that it would be criminal levity to disregard
the lesson in the future. If our enemies secure for them-
selves oil-wells abroad, Germany must take care to obtain
the necessary gas coal at home. In time of peace she must
provide an inexhaustible supply of oil, benzol, toluol,
ammonia, and naphthaline, not only in order to increase
the national prosperity, but also because their possession
is an indispensable part of Germany's war armament.

• In summing up, we would say that the war aims indi-
cated will secure permanently Germany's national economy,
and at the same time guarantee her military strength an4
her political independence and power. In addition, they
will expand Germany's economic opportunities. They will
provide work for the workers, and will therefore be of ad-
vantage to labour as a whole.'

ANALYTICAL INDEX

NoTB. — The letter ' f ' following a page number signifies ' and following
page * ; ' fi ' ■ and following pages.'

PAGE

Absoltttism, Monarchical, condemned by Bismarck . . .119 ff

Agriculture, Promotion of 18, 21, 45 ff, 53

Alexander I and Frederick William III 340 f

Alliance, Trlple-^;8ee Triple Alliance.

Alliances, Frederick the Great's views regarding binding force of

22, 35, 68, 85 ff

Amateurs, -Dan^r of government by 32 ff, 39 ff

Anglophobia in Germany, principally caused by William 11 according

to Bismarck ' 142

Annexations demanded by the six great economic associations in

1915 417 ff

Annexations, Prussian, in 1866, Story of the . . .229 fi

Anti-Maohiavel , . ■ . , » ■ , . . . 65 ff

Aristocracy — See Nobility. •
Army, Danger of management of, by amateurs . . . . 32 fi

„ German, and the General Staff ..... .168 fi

„ German, Discipline of . . . . , . . 33 f

„ Frederick the Great's principles relating to the . . . 31 ff

„ Prussian, Increase of 10 ff, 111

Associations, Annexationist' demands of the six great, in 1915 .417 ff

Auerstadt, Prussia's defeatat - 342 fi

Austerlitz, Battle of 341 f

Austria-Hungary, Bismarck foretells likelihood of Germany getting

entangled in the Balkans through . . . 134
„ „ Bismarck's poUcy towards 112,114, 128 ff, 132 ff, 136 ff

„ „ May regain leading position in Germany . . 349

„ „ Position of, in 1740 72 fi

„ „ Possibility of her attacking Germany outlined by

Bismarck 106 f, 134

War with Prussia in 1866 Ill f

Austro-Prussian War of 1866, Secret story of the , 205 f, 209, 229 ff

BALANOBof Power, European, Frederick the Great's advocacy of . 69 f

Balkan problems, Bismarck's policy towards . 129 fi, 132 fi, 136 fi

Basle, Peace of, in 1795
Beggars and idlers. Treatment of, in Prussia
Benedetti and Bismarck
Bethmann-Hollweg on peace conditions
Bismarck and Benedetti

427

.336f
.164 fi

207, 219 ff, 241 fi
. 252 f

207, 219 ff, 241 ff

428

ANALYTICAL INDEX

tAQE

Bismarck and Napoleon III 204 fE, 233 ff

„ Career and achievements of . . . . . . 109 fE

„ Colonial policy of 139 ff

„ concludes Ke-InBurance Treaty with Russia . . .115

„ concludes Triple Alliance 114

„ condemns ' Machtpolitik ' 124 f

„ condemns monarchical absolutism 119 fE

„ condemns policy of prestige , . . , . . . 145
„ condemns unceasing interference of William 11 . . 123 fE
„ condemns wars of prestige and prevention . . . 126 ff
„ considers conflict with England unthinkable . 141

„ contrasts character of William I with that of William II . 119
describes William II as the principal Anglophobe . . 142
„ desires counterpoise to Emperor in Federal Council . . 124
,f „ ' „ „ ' in free Press and Parlia-

ment . . .121 fi
„ desires Germany to follow a policy of peace and moderation

117 f, 124 a
„ desires good relations with Great Britain . . .139 fE
„ desires responsibility of Ministers in Germany . . 122 f

,, foretells breakdown of Triple Alliance . . 133, 138 f, 142 f
„ foretells Italy's secession from' Triple Alliance 138 f, 142 f, 144 f
„ foretells that Austria may turn against Germany . 106, 134
„ foretells that Germany will get into Austria's leading-
strings ....
„ foretells trouble with fingland ' .
„ foretells trouble with Japan .
„ how he forced war upon Austria in 1866
„ how he forced war upon France in 1870
„ largely increases Prussian Army
„ makes Germany a rich industrial State
„ makes war iipon Austria ' ,
„ makes war upon Denmark . .
„ makes war upon France
„ on German-American relations .
„ on possibility of Austria attacking Germany
„ Policy of . . .

towards Austria . 112, 114, 128 fE, 132 ff, 136 fi
Balkan problems . 129 ff, 132 ff, 136 ff

*■ ■ " .... 115

. 112, 114

. 114, 138 f

. 115

115, 128 ff, 132 ff, 136 ff

. 115

. 110

, ,

. 134

, ,

.145ff

.146 f

.

.133ff

.204 ff

,

. Ill

, ,

. 113

. .

. 112

,

. Ill

. 112

.257 ff

aany .

106 f, 134

, ,

.108ff

Ilnglahd
„ ,, France

„ ■ ;, Italy ,
„ ,, Koumania .

,, ',, Russia

Turkey

prevents William I abdicating

protests against non-renewal of Re-Insurance Treaty

with Russia 130 ff

reveal's existence of Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia . 134 ff
states that Triple Alliance has a purely defensive character,
and does not cover Austrian aggression in Balkan

Peninsula 128 fi, 132 ff, 136 f

tries to make war between France and England . 206 f, 209 f

„ Spain . 209 f, 225 fi

ANALYTICAL INDEX,

429

Bismarck warns Germany not to compete at sea with England
„ warns CSermany not to antagonise Great Britain
„ warns Germany not to antagonise Bussia

Brandenburg-Prussia, anti-Austrian policy of ,

„ earliest history of

Bribery and corruption practised by Frederick the Great

Bureaucracy, German, All-powerfulness of the :

Business men. War aims of the German

FAQB

. 144 f
.139 2
. 143
.322 fE
. 321 i
35, 90 ft
. 178 f
.417ff

Cabinet Government, lYederiok the Great on. , . . . 38 fi
„ • >, The, of Frederick the Great — how organised . 334

„ „ Prussian, Reform of, after 1806 . . . 345

„ . The, under Frederick William I 12 f

Character, German, Foundations of the . . . . .150 ff

„• „ • how degraded by education . . . .174 ft

„. of- Prussian people, how- formed . . . . . 17 fE

Church and school in Germany ... .... 182 f

Churches, German, are part of the bureaucracy . . . .193 3

Citizen, Bights and duties of -the Prussian . . . . . . 162 fE

Civil Service, Prussian, under Frederick William I . . . 12 fE

„ „ . Secret of efficiency of Prussian . . . 43 f, 165

Coalitions, Frederick the Great on weakness of ... . lOl 2

Code, Prussian, Extracts from ....... 44, 161 fi

Colonial policy of Bismarck and of William II ... . 139 fi

Colonising poUoy of Frederick the Great , . . . 46, 50 fi

„ . „ of Frederick William I 'J. , . . .18

Co-operation in Germany ......... 366 f

Coronation, Cost of, under Frederick I and Frederick William I . 9
Corruption and bribery practised by Frederick the Great . 46, 50 fi

Demands of the six great economic associations in 1915 . .417 fi

Democracy, Germany and ....... .350 ff

Democratic and Monarchical Government compared . . . 28 ff
Democratic Government, Frederick the Great on . . . 28 ff 39 ff
Denmark and Prussia ......... m

Diplomacy and history. Study of, peglected in Anglo-Saxon countries

2, 59 ff, 109

Discipline is the principal cause of Germany's strength ... 3

„ Military, how enforced in Prussia . . . , . 33 f

Distinctions and rewards, Frederick the Great on . . , . 42 f

EooNDMlo policy of Prusso-Germany . , 18, 35 ff, 47 ff,

Education, German, and jingoism

„ „ and the German character

„ „ Foundations of . .

„ , of princes, Fiederiok the Great on

„ . Prussian . . . . . 18 f.

Efficiency of .Grerman Civil Service, Secret of
Ems dispatch. Secret story of the

England, Bismarck considers hostility with, imthinkable
„ . Bismarck desires good relations with

113, 152 ff
.175 ff
.174 ff
.150 ff
. 25 ff
55, 150 fi, 155 fi
. 43
.204 fi
. 141
.139 fl

430

ANALYTICAL INDEX

England, Bismarck foietold danger of complication with
„ Bismarck values the friendship of .
„ Bismarck warns against competing with British Navy
„ Bismarck's policy towards

FEHBBELIitN, Battle of . . . .

Finances, national, Frederick the Great on .

Fink von Finkenstein, Frederick the Great's letter to

Fiskalat, The

Food policy of Frederick the Great
Foreign policy, Frederick the Great on .
France, Germany's policy towards

„ Germany's war with,, in 1870-71

„ how forced into war in 1870
Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, and William II

„ „ Murder of ... ,

Frederick I, King of Prussia, Character apd activities of
Frederick the Great, Agricultural policy of .
Anti-Austrian policy of .

asserts that a conspiracy has been formed

against him

Bribery, corruption, and espionage practised

by

Character and activities of

.145 fE
.143 fE
.144f
. 105

7f,

7
. 35 fE
. 24f
. 16 f
37,52
. 37

112, 114
. 112
.201 fE
. 181
. 183

62 f, 161
. 45 fE
322 f

96 f, 100

90 fi
20 fE, 155

claims that the Seven Years' War had been

forced upon him 83 fE

Colonising policy of .... . 46, 50 fE

condemns Machiavelli's teachings . . . 66 fE
condemns wars and praises peace . . 67, 97 fi
created the forerunner of the German Kmpire . 322 f
Fconomic policy of . 18, 35 fi, 47 fi, 113, 153 fi
Educational policy of . . . .65, 166 fi

' Essai ava: les Formes de Gouvernement,' text

of. . . . . . . 392 fi

Food policy of .... 37, 45 fi, 52

' Histoire de mon Temps,' introduction, text

of 382 ff

Industrial policy of 48 f

' Instructions for Major Borcke,' text of . 410 S

Instructions if captured, defeated, or killed in 416 f
■ ... 24 f

. 80 f
22, 35, 68, 85 fi, 292
. 31 fi
. 102
. 38 fi
.101 ff
. 28 ff
. 42f
. 21 ff, 65fi
. 25 ff
. 37
. 167

battle
Matrimonial policy of
on alliances .
on army matters .
on battle of Kunersdorf
on Cabinet Government,
on causes of his victories
on Democratic Government .
on distinctions and rewards for merit
on duties of kings
on education of princes
on foreign policy
on freedom of religion . . .

ANALYTICAL INDEX

481

Frederick the Great, on glory

„ on ' Maohtpolitik '

on military discipline
on national finances and financial policy
on the necessity of unity in Government
on taxation ......

on the management of the nobility .
on the true strength of the State .
on wea^ess of coalitions
' Political Testament 'of
Reclamation of ... .

recommends acquisition of Saxony
SUesian War of ... .

Social policy of . .
' Testament Politique,' text of
tries to corrupt Madame de Pompadour
Unscrupulousness and duplicity of .
Working, methods "of .
Frederick WUliam I, King of Prussia, Character and activities of

8 S, 64, 151 £E

Frederick William 11, Lord Malmesbury on 324 £E

„ „ Mirabeau on .... . .329 5

„ „ Vices and incompetence of . . . .323 fE

Frederick William III, and Alexander I of Bussia .... 340 f

„, „ Napoleon on character of . . . . 338 f

„ „ Weakness and incapacity of . . .337 fi

Frederick William, the Great Elector, Character and activities of 5 S, ISl
French, Historical character of the ...... 363 f

French refugees in Brandenburg-Prussia 6

PAGE

. 71
. 97 ff
. 33 fi
. 35 ff
. 38 fl
. 37
43, 166
. 45
.101 ff
.373 ff
. 50 ff
. 81
. 70 ff
.163 ff
373 ff
92
75 ff, 80 ff
334

Genebal Staff and the German Army 168 ff

Germans, Modem, are fit for self-government .... 365 f

„ Montesquieu -on character of . . . . . . 355

„ Tacitus on character of ■ '. . . . . . 354 f

„ were originally a democratic people . . . .353 ff

Germany, co-operation in . . ' 366 f

„ Lord Bryce on ancient , 357

„ Original democratic character of 353 fi

„ self-government of, Venetian Ambassadors on . . 358 f

Glory, Frederick the Great on ,..,... 71

Government, Monarchical and Democratic compared . 28 ff, 39 fi

Great Britain, Bismarck considers hostilities with, unthinkable . 141

„ „ Bismarck desires good relations with . . . 139 fi

„ „ Bismarck values the friendship of . . . . 143 f

„ „ Bismarck wains against competing with British Navy 144 f

„ „ Bismarck's policy towards ..... 115

Great Elector, Character and activities of 6 ff

Hanseatio League 359

Heligoland 137

History and diplomacy. Study of, neglected in Anglo-Saxon countries

2, 59 ff, 109

482

ANALYTICAL INDEX

HiBtory, Teaching and falsification of, in Germany
Hohenzollern candidature. Secret story of the
Hohenzollerns destroyed German self-government .

178 f, 185 fl
.210 fE
.362 S

iNDtraiBiAi. policy of Bismarck 113

„ „ Frederick the Great . , . . . 48 f

Insurance, National, Foundation of, by Frederick the Great . .163 ff
International law despised in Germany ..... 193

Italy, Bismarck foretold probable secession of, from Triple Alliance

138 f, 142 f, 144
„ . Bismarck's policy towards 144, 138 f

Japan, Bismarck foretold danger of complications with . . . 146 f
Jena and Auerstadt, Prussia's defeat at .... .342 S

Justice, Frederick the Great on . , . . . .55, 159 fE

Krtrp, The, is the first citizen and the first servant of the State

. . 21 fE, 65 f

Kings, Duties of, according to Frederick the Great 21 ff, 65 ff, 162 ff

Krupp 142

Kunerjsdorf,. Battle of 102

Law and justice, Frederick the Great on
Louise, Queen, on Prussia's downfall ,

Ludewig, Professor

Luther, as an advocate of democracy , .
„ as an advocate of princely tyranny ,
„ Influence of, upon the German character
„ ' Personal coarseness of ". . ,

65, 159 ff
. 348
. 95
302 ff, 360
.305 ff
.301 ff
.317f

MACHLiVELLi, Frederick the Great's condemnation of
„ Influence of, on German statecraft .

„ on German self-government .

' MacMpoIitik ' :condemiied by Bismarck

,, condemned by Frederick the Great

Maria Th^eresa and Frederick the Great ,

„ „ Frederick the Great on character of

Matrimonial policy of !^ederick the Great

Menzel, the spy

Metternioh, Prince, on Prussia's duplicity ,
Ministers, Eesponsibility of, urged by Bismarck
Mirabeau on Prussia ......

Moderation, Policy of, recommended by Bismarck . 99,

„ „ „ Frederick the Great

Moltke, Field-Marshal von, and German General Staff .
Monroe Doctrine, Bismarck on .... .

. 56 ff
.279 ff
. 359
. 124 f
. 97 ff
. 70 ff
. 96
. 88 ff
. 93 ff
.340f
. 122 f
329 fi, 349
117 f, 124 ff
. 99
.169 ff
. 257

ANALYTICAL INDEX

433

PIQB

Napoleon I and BrasBia in 1806 . . . . . . .340 fi

„ „ bleeds Prussia white after 1806 . '. . . 344 f

„ Bulletins of, in 1806 342 f

„ „ on character of Frederick William III . . . 388 f

Napoleon HI, how tricked into war in 1870 204 S

„ and Bismarck . . . , . . 204 ff, 233 fE
Navy Bill, German, of 1900 . . . ' . . . r 1*2

Necessity is the highest law 187

Nobility, Frederick the Great on the management of the . 43, 166
North German Federation, how created. 236 fi

OFFOBTUNrriES, Favouiable, shotild be nsed for maUng war / 9S, 98
Organisation, Importance of, ignored by most Englishmen . . 2

Fbaoe and moderatioti. Policy of, leoommended by Bismarck

99, llTf, 124fl
'„ %, recommended by Frederick the Great . 99

Peasants' War, German 302 ff, 360 f

.417 fi
. 335
137, 336
. 163 f
de . 92
45,48
. SOfi
. 49
. 341
124 fi
. 199 f
. 146
95, 98

Petition of the German business men

Pilnitz, Declaration of ...

Poland

Policy, social. Foundations of

Pompadour, Frederick the Great's attempt to corrupt Madame

Popiuation determines strength of the State .

„ Policy of Frederick the Great to increase

„ Prussian, decrease of, during Seven Years' War

Potsdam, Alliance of, in 1805

Precaution, Wars of, condemned by Bismarck 95, 96, 117 f,

Press; German, how controlled by the Government

Prestige, Policy- of, condemned by Bismarck .

„ Wars of, condemned by Frederick the Great

Princes — See Kings

Prussia, Anti-Austrian policy of 322 fi

„ Attitude of, at Vienna Congress 346 f

„ Attitude of, during the French Revolution . . .334 fi
„ Cabinet Government in ...... • 334

„ Cabinet Government, Beformation of ... . 345

„ Decline of, after Frederick the Great . . . .321 fi

„ DownfaU of, in 1806 . . . . . 321 fi, 340 fi

„ Duplicity of, Prince Mettemich on . . . . . 340 f

„ „ „ towards Austria since 1792 . . . .336 fi

„ Effect of defeat in 1806 on character of . . . .345 fi

„ Exploitation of, by Napoleon I 344 f

„ Mirabeau on 329 ff, 349

„ persecuted her patriots after 1816 ..... 364 f

„ Reform of, after 1806 345 f, 364

„ UnscrupvdousnesB of, F. Von Gentz on ... . 316 f

Reaction in Germany after 1816 .
Reclamation policy of Frederick the Great
„ „ of Frederick William I

Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia

.364 fi

. 50 f

18

. 115

2 F

434

ANALYTICAL INDEX

PAGII

Be-insuranoe Treaty with Buseia, Bismarck protests agiunst non-
renewal of . . . 130 S
„ „ „ Existence of, revealed by Bis-

marck . . . .134 £E
n „ „ not renewed by William II . 130

Religion, Freedom of 167

„ Bnbordinated to policy 282 f

Republics — iSfee Democratic Govenunent.

Responsibility of Ministers urged by Bismarck .... 122 f

BcTenue of Brandenburg-Fmssia, ucrease of ... 7, 36, 79

Revolution of 1848 180, 364

„ French, welcomed in Germany 363

„ Germany and 179, 364 S

„ Possibility of, in Germany 367 5

Rewards and distinctions, Frederick the Great on . . . .42
Roman Catholic Church in Germany is controlled by Government .194 £E
Roumania, Bismarck's policy towards ..... 115

Rulers — See Kings.
Russia, Bismarck's policy towards . . 115, 128 fi, 132 fE, 136 fi

Sazont, Acquisition of, recommended by Frederick the Great
„ Invasion of, by Frederick the Great

School and Church in Germany .

Schools,. German, Statistics of . . .
„ Private, in Germany

School teachers, German, are Government officials

Seven Years' War, how begun

„ „ How havoc of, was overcome

„ „ Losses in men caused by

„ „ Terrible efEect of . . ,

„ „ Why Prussia was victorious in

filesian War, Causes and conunencenient of .
ocial policy. Foundations of . . .
Sovereigns — See Kings.
Spanish candidature, Secret story of the
Spying practised by Frederick the Great
StafE, General, and the German Army
State, Conception and powers of, in Prussia .
State Church, German, how organised
Statesmanship ignored at British and American Universities
StofEel, Colonel, on Prussian General Stafi

. 81
. 82 fi
.182f
. 181
.180 fi
180, 183 f
. 82 fi
. SOfi
. 104
. 49 f
.101 fi
. 70 fi
.163 fi

2,

.210 fi
. 90fi
.168 fi
.162 fi
.193 fi
69 fi, 109
.168 fi

Taxation, Frederick the Great on 37

Thirty Years' War, Evil efiect of, in Germany . . . . 361 f
Treaties, Frederick the Great on binding force of . 22, 35, 68, 85, 292

Triple Alliance 114

„ „ Breakdown of, foretold by Bismarck 113, 138 f, 142 f

„ „ Purely defensive character and limited scope of

116, 128 fi, 132 fi, 136 f

Tuijcey, Bismarck's policy towards 116

„ Frederick the Great's policy towards .... 103

ANALYTICAL INDEX 435

FAOB

United States, Ambassador von HoUeben and . . . .265 S
„ Bismaiok on Monroe Doctrine .... 2S8

„ Bismarck on relations with 257

„ General von Bemhardi on .... • 261
„ German confiict with, regarding FhiUippines

259 f, 264, 271
„ „ „ regarding Samoa . . . 269

„ „ „ regarding Venezuela . . 260 f

„ German policy towards the 266 £E

„ Germany was ready to make war on, in 1899 . . 273
„ How German-Americans were organised against .272 fE
„ How German Press in, was influenced by Germany .273 &

„ Number of Germans in 362

„ Press, American, in. How influenced by Germany .262 fi
„ set by Germany against England . . 261, 264, 268 &

„ War manifesto of, in 1917 360 fi

Unity, Frederick the Great on necessity of, in Government . . 38 fE

Universities, Anglo-Saxon, neglect history and statesmanship 69 fi, 109

» German, how controlled by the State . . .184 fi

VlBNiTA Congress, Prussia's attitude at 346 f

I

Wab of 1870, how brought about 204 ff

„ of 1914, how brought about 201 fi

War aims of six great economic associations in 1915 . . .417 fi
Wars of prevention and prestige condenmed by Bismarck

95, 98, 117 f, 124 fi
„ „ „ „ condemned by Frederick the Great

95,98

Weingarten, the spy 93

William I, Abdication of, prevented by Bismarck . . . .110

„ and WiUiam II compared by Bismarck . . . 119

William II and Archduke Francis Fer(£nand . . .181

„ and William I compared by Bismarck .... 119

„ Anti-British policy of 139 fi, 142 fi

„ „ „ condemned by Bismarck . .142 fi

„ Character and policy of . . . . 60 fi, 108 fi

„ Far Eastern policy of, criticised by Bismarck . . 146

„ refused to renew Be-Insurance Treaty with Bussia . 130 fi

„ Unceasing interference of, condemned by Bismarck . 123 S
„ was, according to Bismarck, the principal Anglophobe

in Germany 142

Wilson, President, War manifesto of 350 fi

Zanzibab 137

Printed &]/ Bpottiawooda, BaHantijne <t Co. Ltd., CoUshaler, London and Eton,
Bntliatttl.